X 


LIBRARY 
:RSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
DAVIS 


THE  SECRET  SERVICE 


OF   THE 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE 


OR, 


iht  donfeiieratc  Sruistrs  torn  (gquippeb. 


BY 

JAMES    D.    BULLOCH, 

NAVAL   REPRESENTATIVE   OF   THE   CONFEDERATE   STATES   IN   EUROPE   DURING 
THE   CIVIL   WAR. 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES. 
VOL.  I. 


NEW  YORK : 

P.     PUTNAM'S     SONS, 
27  &  29  WEST  23KD  STREET. 
1884. 


ERRATA. 

VOL.  I. 

Page  14,  line  28,  for  "ten  of  the  Constituent  Republics  "  read 
"  eleven  of  the  Constituent  Republics." 
Page  171,  line  15,  for  "Dr.  Bennett "  read  "  Dr.  Barrett." 
Page  190,  line  19, for  "Danish  Island"  read  "Swedish  Island." 
Page  269,  line  18, for  "food "  read  " fuel" 

VOL.  H. 

Page  224,  line  10,  for  "  Charles  R.  Prioleau,"  read  "  Charles  K. 
Prioleau." 


different  kind.  This  work  Jias  not>  therefore,  oeen 
written  with  the  expectation  of  supplying  a  public 
demand,  but  from  a  sense  of  duty,  and  in  compliance 
with  the  urgent  request  of  many  persons  who  took 
opposite  sides  in  the  Civil  War,  and  who  have  thought 
that  the  future  historian  should  be  furnished  with  the 


PKEFACE, 


THE  American  Civil  War  of  1861-65  will  always  remain 
a  notable  event  in  history  ;  and  its  effects  upon  the 
character  of  the  American  people  and  the  political  in 
stitutions  of  the  country  are  questions  which  have  not 
yet  received  a  final  solution.  Thus  it  is  probable  that 
every  addition  to  the  history  of  that  great  struggle  which 
is  founded  upon  facts  not  hitherto  known,  will  be  received 
with  some  favour  by  those  who  were  actors  in  the  events, 
or  who,  from  their  position  as  statesmen,  are  led  to  ob 
serve  and  to  carefully  note  the  political  disasters  which 
periodically  disturb  contemporary  nations. 

But  it  is,  nevertheless,  manifest  that  the  subject  has 
already  lost  its  interest  with  the  general  public,  who  are 
mostly  absorbed  in  practical  affairs  of  present  impor 
tance,  or  who  seek  amusement  in  literature  of  a  wholly 
different  kind.  This  work  has  not,  therefore,  been 
written  with  the  expectation  of  supplying  a  public 
demand,  but  from  a  sense  of  duty,  and  in  compliance 
with  the  urgent  request  of  many  persons  who  took 
opposite  sides  in  the  Civil  War,  and  who  have  thought 
that  the  future  historian  should  be  furnished  with  the 


iv  PREFACE. 

facts  relating  to  the  foreign-built  navy  of  the  Confederate 
States. 

Many  unavoidable  hindrances  have  prevented  the 
steady,  continuous  completion  of  the  work  ;  and  the 
necessity  of  reading  a  very  large  mass  of  diplomatic  cor 
respondence,  official  reports,  and  legal  proceedings,  not 
always  readily  accessible,  has  added  to  the  difficulty  and 
delay.  The  Introduction  and  Chapter  I.  were  written 
in  the  autumn  of  1881  ;  the  greater  portion  of  the  re 
mainder  was  written  from  April  to  August,  1882  ;  and 
two  chapters  not  until  April-May,  1883.  As  it  has  been 
impossible  to  revise  the  manuscript  critically,  the  fore 
going  explanation  is  necessary  to  account  for  the 
apparent  discrepancy  in  the  illustrations  taken  from 
current  events,  which,  upon  the  supposition  that  the 
whole  work  was  written  at  about  the  date  of  the  opening 
chapter,  would  place  some  of  the  incidents  in  the  anoma 
lous  position  of  being  used  for  demonstration  before  they 
happened.  The  events  thus  used  had  very  lately  or  just 
occurred,  at  the  time  when  the  chapters  in  which  they 
appear  were  in  course  of  composition  ;  and  it  is  hoped 
that  the  context  will  sufficiently  mark  the  time  when 
they  transpired,  even  if  the  date  has  not  been  altered. 

A  thorough  revision  of  the  whole  work  would  have 
made  it  necessary  to  rewrite  a  large  portion  of  several 
chapters  anil  to  abridge  others,  in  order  to  bring  them  all 
into  precise  harmony  in  respect  to  the  dates  of  those 
incidental  and  transitory  occurrences  which  have  been 
chosen  for  illustrations,  and  also  to  avoid  the  appearance 
of  unnecessary  repetition  in  applying  the  principles  of 
law  and  the  actions  of  public  officials  to  the  case  of  each 
separate  ship. 


PREFACE.  v 

But  while  the  want  of  a  careful  revision  has  left  many 
defects  which  mar  the  excellence  of  the  narrative  as  a 
literary  production,  it  does  not  in  any  way  affect  the 
historical  accuracy  of  the  statements,  and  I  have  had  no 
other  purpose  than  to  furnish  a  truthful  record  of  the 
efforts  made  by  the  Confederate  Government  to  organize 
a  naval  force  during  the  Civil  War. 

The  facts  connected  with  the  building  and  equipping 
of  the  ships  are  stated  upon  my  own  knowledge.  Such 
incidents  in  their  cruises  as  involved  questions  of  belli 
gerent  or  neutral  rights  and  duties  are  taken  from  the 
letters  of  their  commanding  officers  to  me  at  the  time  of 
the  occurrences,  or  have  been  epitomized  from  subse 
quent  conversations  with  them.  All  that  has  reference 
to  the  origin,  armament,  and  commissioning  of  the  ships 
has  been  stated  specifically  and  without  reserve. 

Their  adventures  afterwards  have  not  been  told  with 
much  particularity,  because  special  histories  of  their 
cruises  have  already  been  published,  and  because  the 
chief  purpose  of  this  work  is  to  explain  the  naval  policy 
of  the  Confederate  Government,  and  the  controversies 
which  that  policy  provoked  between  the  United  States 
and  some  of  the  neutral  Powers. 

I  would  have  gladly  avoided  any  allusion  to  the  causes 
of  the  war,  and  criticism  of  the  diplomatic  and  other  corre 
spondence  of  United  States  officials  on  the  subject  of  the 
Confederate  cruisers,  but  that  correspondence  was  not 
confined  to  complaints  and  remonstrances  against  the 
alleged  encouragement  and  facilities  granted  to  the  Con 
federate  States  by  the  neutral  Powers.  It  was  made  the 
medium  for  prejudicing  those  Powers  against  the  South 
by  ex  parte  statements  in  reference  to  the  causes  of  the 


vi  PREFACE. 

war,  and  of  disseminating  charges  and  insinuations 
wholly  unsupported  by  evidence,  whose  manifest  pur 
pose  was  not  only  to  discredit  the  policy,  but  the  honour 
of  the  Confederate  Government. 

To  have  pointed  out  the  inaccuracies  of  the  statements 
affecting  the  conduct  of  neutrals,  and  of  those  which 
specifically  referred  to  the  equipment  of  the  ships,  and  to 
have  omitted  all  reference  to  the  political  disquisitions 
and  allegations  contained  in  the  same  despatches,  would 
have  borne  the  appearance  of  tacitly  admitting  their 
truth  and  the  justice  of  their  application. 

I  hope  it  will  be  understood  that  the  names  of  official 
persons  are  mentioned  historically,  and  that  the  criticisms 
are  directed  against  the  contents  of  the  documents  and 
not  against  the  writers. 


LIVERPOOL,  June,  1883. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOL.  I. 


PAGE 

INTRODUCTION   ,  1 


CHAPTER  I. 

Sketch  of  the  anomalous  condition  of  the  whole  country,  North 
and  South,  during  the  period  between  the  election  of  Mr. 
Abraham  Lincoln  as  President  of  the  United  States  and  the 
beginning  of  hostilities,  in  theory  an  undivided  Republic,  in 
fact  two  separate  Governments  :  one  at  Washington,  one  at 
Montgomery. — The  organization  of  the  Confederate  Navy 
Department. — The  poverty  of  the  South  with  respect  to 
naval  resources. — The  naval  policy  of  the  Confederate 
Government. — The  necessity  of  looking  abroad  for  the  means 
to  carry  on  naval  operations. — The  commencement  of  hostili 
ties. — The  Louisiana  'Board  of  War'  and  the  Bienville. — 
Personal  incidents. — Journey  South. — Blocking  the  Missis 
sippi  .......  18-50 

CHAPTER  II. 

Messrs.  Fraser,  Trenholm  and  Co. — The  Confederate  Commis 
sioners. — Major  Huse,  the  Military  Agent. — Early  opera 
tions. — Restrictions  of  the  Proclamations  of  Neutrality. — 
Their  effects  upon  United  States  and  Confederate  Cruisers. 
— The  Oreto  (Florida). — Messrs.  Laird  and  the  Alabama. — 
The  Equipment  of  the  Alabama. — Counsel's  Opinion  on  the 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act. — Despatch  of  the  Bermuda  with 
supplies  for  the  Confederate  Army. — Second  Voyage  and 


viii  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Capture  of  the  Bermuda.— The  Trial  at  Philadelphia. — The 
United  States  and  belligerent  rights.— Decree  of  Court  in 
the  Bermuda  case.— Contrast  between  the  action  of  the 
United  States  as  a  belligerent  and  as  a  neutral  concerning 
belligerent  rights.— The  United  States  and  neutral  vessels 
during  the  Crimean  War. — The  Bahama  Islands  Regula 
tions  '  of  the  British  Government. — Reasons  for  the  seeming 
indifference  of  the  British  Government. — Precedents  estab 
lished  by  the  United  States  favourable  to  Great  Britain. — 
European  Naval  Armaments. — British  Ship-building. — Im 
portance  of  British  Mercantile  Marine. — Weakness  of  the 
United  States  as  a  Naval  Power. — Former  efficiency  of  the 
American  Navy.  —  Seamanship  in  the  Past  and  the 
Present  .  ...  -51-98 


CHAPTER  IIL 

Financial  embarrassments  of  the  Confederate  Agents. — Incom 
plete  organization  of  the  Confederate  Executive  at  this  period. 
— The  financial  arrangements  of  the  Confederate  States  in 
Europe. — Incompleteness  of  the  instructions  of  the  Naval 
Representative,  and  insufficiency  of  the  arrangements  to 
meet  financial  requirements. — Purchase  and  equipment  of  the 
Fingal,  afterwards  the  Atlanta. — Shipment  of  war  material. 
— Mr.  Low,  second  officer  of  the  Fingal. — An  unfortunate 
start. — The  island  of  Terceira. — The  crew  agree  to  run  the 
blockade. — Arrival  in  the  Savannah  river. — The  state  of  the 
Southern  forces.  —  Correspondence  concerning  the  future 
operations  of  the  Fingal. — Enlargement  of  powers  as  Naval 
Representative  in  Europe.— Flag-officer  Josiah  Tattnall  — 
Conversion  of  the  Fingal  into  the  armour-clad  Atlanta. — 
Her  engagement  with  and  capture  by  two  United  States 
4  Monitors.'— Return  to  England  .  .  .  99-151 


CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Florida. — Captain  Duguid. — Correspondence  concerning 
the  Florida. — Her  arrival  at  Nassau.— Commander  Maffitt. — 
The  United  States  blockade  of  the  British  Bahama  Channel. 
— The  equipping  of  the  Florida. — Yellow  fever.  —The  Florida 


CONTENTS.  ix 

PAGE 

runs  the  blockade  at  Mobile. — An  unparalleled  chase. — The 
Florida's  cruise  in  the  West  Indies. — Vessels  captured  by  the 
Florida.  —  Her  stay  at  Brest.— Her  second  cruise.  —  Her 
assassination  by  the  Wachusett. — Justification  of  the  use  of 
the  term  'assassination.'  —  The  Brazilian  Government  and 
the  capture  of  the  Florida.  —  United  States  treatment  of 
prisoners-of-war  .  .i-  •'•*  '.-  -  .>  .  152-224 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  building  of  the  Alabama. — Suspicions  of  the  United  States 
Consul  at  Liverpool. — Captain  Butcher. — The  equipping  of 
the  Alabama. — Quitting  Liverpool. — Bond,  the  Pilot. — Official 
Correspondence. — Captain  Semmes. — The  Alabama  handed 
over  to  his  charge. — Some  matters  connected  with  the  clear 
ance  of  the  Alabama  from  Liverpool. — Mr.  Price  Edwards, 
the  Collector  of  Customs  at  that  Port. — The  Alabama's  first 
engagement. — The  Alabama  a  legitimate  vessel-of-war. — 
Action  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  commissioning 
vessels  at  sea. — Influence  of  the  cruisers  on  the  United 
States  carrying  trade.  —  The  Alabama's  action  with  the 
Kearsarge.—  Mr.  Seward  and  Earl  Eussell  .  .  225-294 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Confederate  cruisers  and  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act. — 
The  protest  of  the  United  States  against  the  '  laxity '  of  the 
British  Government. — The  answer  of  the  British  Govern 
ment. — The  Confederate  States  admitted  to  be  belligerents 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  and  acknow 
ledged  as  such  by  the  European  Powers. — Debate  in  the 
House  of  Commons. — European  recruits  for  the  United  States 
Army  in  England. — Review  of  the  situation  of  the  belligerents 
in  regard  to  neutral  States. — The  American  and  the  English 
Foreign  Enlistment  Acts. — The  Alexandra  Case. — The  Crown 
witnesses. — Conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  this  case. — After- 
history  of  the  Alexandra. — Other  vessels  searched  at  the 
instigation  of  the  United  States  Consul. — United  States  pur 
chases  in  England. — The  Board  of  Trade  Returns. — Messrs. 
Baring  Brothers  and  Co.  and  the  United  States. — Condition 
of  the  Confederates  during  the  War  .  .  .  295-375 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

PAGE 

Review  of  the  Situation  in  November,  1861. — Changed  pur 
poses  of  the  Confederate  Government  in  regard  to  their  naval 
operations. — Armour-clad  vessels  required. — Two  contracted 
for  with  Messrs.  Laird  Brothers. — Correspondence  concerning 
them. — Their  transfer  to  Messrs.  Bravay,  and  their  ultimate 
purchase  by  Government  and  enrolment  in  her  Majesty's  navy 
as  the  Scorpion  and  the  Wivern. — Action  of  her  Majesty's 
Government  and  that  of  the  United  States  in  reference  to 
these  vessels. — Inconsistency  of  the  declarations  and  actions 
of  the  British  Government  .  .  .  .  376-460 


THE  SECEET  SERVICE 


OF  THE 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE. 


INTRODUCTION. 

SINCE  the  end  of  the  great  Civil  War  which  convulsed 
the  States  of  the  American  Union  during  the  years 
1861-5,  many  partial  histories  of  the  causes  which  pro 
duced  the  struggle,  and  the  events  which  marked  its 
progress,  have  been  published. 

Some  of  these  were  written  under  the  influence  of  the 
heat  and  passion  aroused  and  fostered  by  the  magnitude 
and  bitterness  of  the  contest,  and  cannot  therefore  be 
received  with  the  confidence  which  every  narrative  must 
inspire  in  order  to  win  and  to  maintain  that  worthy  and 
lasting  credit  which  distinguishes  history  from  fiction. 

Others  have  been  published  to  defend  the  writers  from 
charges  of  neglect  or  incapacity  in  military  or  civil 
offices,  and  are  too  personal  and  controversial  to  interest 
the  general  reader. 

Lastly,  there  have  been  many  accounts  of  events  both 
in  the  field  and  in  the  Cabinet  which  the  writers  them 
selves  took  part  in,  and  they  have  narrated  the  incidents 

VOL.    I.  1 


2  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

with  the  clearness  and  precision  which  are  always  mani 
fest  in  the  evidence  of  an  eye-witness. 

It  is  now  well  known  that  the  Confederate  Government 
made  great  efforts  to  organize  a  naval  force  abroad  during 
the  Civil  War,  and  that  a  few  armed  cruisers  were  got 
afloat,  which  destroyed  many  American  ships  and  well- 
nigh  drove  the  American  commercial  flag  from  the  high 
seas. 

The  almost  romantic  cruise  of  the  Alabama,  and  the 
account  of  her  tragic  burial  in  the  stormy  Norman  Sea 
off  Cherbourg,  have  been  graphically  narrated  by  the 
late  Admiral  Semmes,  who  commanded  her  during  her 
short  career  ;  and  there  have  been  brief  histories  of  the 
cruises  of  the  Florida,  Shenandoah,  and  other  Confederate 
ships,  so  that  their  performances  afloat  are  familiar  to  all 
who  feel  interested  in  such  adventures. 

No  account,  however,  has  yet  been  published  which 
even  approaches  to  a  correct  statement  of  the  building 
and  equipment  of  those  vessels,  nor  were  the  real  facts 
brought  out  in  the  well-known  suit  of  the  Attorney - 
General  v.  Sillem  and  others  (commonly  called  the 
Alexandra  Case),  tried  before  the  Lord  Chief  Baron  of 
her  Majesty's  Court  of  Exchequer  in  London,  nor  yet  in 
that  of  the  Oreto  (Florida)  in  the  Vice- Admiralty  Court 
of  Nassau. 

When  the  time  comes  for  some  wholly  independent 
and  impartial  historian  to  write  a  full  and  complete 
record  of  the  great  Civil  War,  he  will  perceive  that  the 
naval  operations  of  the  Confederate  States,  which  were 
organized  abroad,  possess  an  importance  and  attraction 
greater  than  their  relative  effect  upon  the  issue  of  the 
struggle,  as  compared  with  the  stupendous  military 
movements  and  the  gigantic  campaigns  which  were 
carried  on  within  the  contending  States. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  3 

He  will  perceive  that  they  gave  rise  to  many  important 
legal  and  diplomatic  questions,  that  they  gave  much 
occupation  to  her  Majesty's  Courts,  and  employment 
to  many  barristers  who  occupied  the  very  highest 
positions  at  the  English  bar,  a  list  of  whose  names 
would  include  two  who  have  since  been  Lord  Chancellors 
of  England,  one  a  Lord  Justice  of  Appeal,  and  one  a 
Vice-Chan cellor.  He  will  learn  that  they  were  the  sub 
ject  of  much  negotiation  and  some  rather  acrimonious 
correspondence  between  her  Majesty's  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  United  States  Minister; 
that  they  created  the  necessity  of  a  special  mission  to 
Washington,  and  the  negotiation  of  a  special  treaty 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  by  which 
a  material  change  was  made  in  the  rules  defining  the 
obligations  of  neutrals;  and  finally,  that  they  were  the 
cause  of  that  great  international  suit  known  as  the 
Geneva  Arbitration,  by  whose  judgment  the  British 
taxpayer  was  unhappily  mulcted  in  damages  to  the 
substantial  amount  of  £3,000,000  sterling. 

When  the  future  historian  contemplates  these  results, 
he  will  naturally  look  for  the  facts  relating  to  them,  and 
he  will  look  in  vain  among  the  records  thus  far  pub 
lished  to  the  world. 

Much  misapprehension  has  heretofore  prevailed  in 
reference  to  the  acts  of  the  Confederate  Government 
in  the  effort  to  organize  a  naval  force  abroad. 

The  allegations  and  affidavits  collected  by  the  Ameri 
can  Consul  at  Liverpool,  upon  which  the  United  States 
Minister  founded  his  complaints,  were  in  almost  every 
particular  either  inaccurate  or  greatly  exaggerated ;  and 
the  '  Case  of  the  United  States  '  presented  to  the  Arbitra 
tors  at  Geneva  was  full  of  errors  and  misstatements,  many 
of  which  could  have  been  disproved  by  very  direct  and 

VOL.  i.*  1—2 


4  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

positive  evidence  if  her  Majesty's  representatives  had 
called  upon  the  parties  concerned  for  the  real  facts. 

It  surely  is  not  to  the  interest  nor  to  the  permanent 
advantage  of  the  people  of  this  or  any  other  country  to 
form  a  conclusion  or  shape  a  policy  upon  a  hasty  con 
sideration  or  misapprehension  of  facts  ;  and  the  time  has 
arrived  when  it  would  seem  to  be  advisable  for  anyone 
who  is  in  possession  of  the  authentic  records  to  make 
them  public,  both  as  an  act  of  justice  to  those  whose 
conduct  has  been  misrepresented,  and  as  a  trustworthy 
historical  record. 

I  was  the  agent  selected  by  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  to  manage  and  direct  the  general  naval  operations 
in  Europe,  and  I  was  the  chief  representative  of  the 
Navy  Department  abroad,  during  the  whole  period  of 
the  war.  All  of  the  ships  that  got  to  sea,  except  the 
Georgia,  were  despatched  and  equipped  under  my  in 
structions  ;  and  all  the  documents  pertaining  to  their 
origin  and  the  means  adopted  to  get  them  to  sea  as 
cruising  ships  are  in  my  possession. 

It  would  be  difficult  for  anyone  not  personally  con 
versant  with  every  incident  to  decipher  and  arrange  the 
documents,  or  to  edit  a  narrative  of  the  transactions, 
which  extended  throughout  a  period  of  four  years,  and 
were  attended  with  many  complications  and  perplexities, 
and  not  a  few  disappointments. 

Often  since  the  end  of  the  war  I  have  been  urged  to 
write  an  account  of  those  interesting  adventures,  but  have 
heretofore  been  unwilling  to  do  so,  for  the  following 
reasons,  among  others  not  necessary  to  mention : 

First,  it  was  necessary  to  have  important  dealings 
with  a  great  many  persons— shipbuilders,  tradesmen, 
and  manufacturers — who  probably  would  not  have  liked 
to  see  their  names  put  in  print  while  the  animosities  and 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  5 

ill-will  aroused  by  the  war  continued.  I  made  it  a  rule 
never  to  deal  with  any  but  people  of  the  highest  character 
and  credit  in  their  respective  branches  of  business.  They 
were  never  asked,  nor  did  they  offer,  to  do  anything 
inconsistent  with  the  strictest  principles  of  commercial 
honour  ;  and  I  have  the  happiness  to  feel  conscious  that 
every  contract  I  made  in  England  was  fulfilled  by  the 
contractor  with  scrupulous  fidelity,  although  it  was  often 
quite  impossible  for  me  to  supervise  the  work  while  in  pro 
gress,  or  even  to  inspect  the  materials  before  shipment. 

In  recurring  now,  after  the  lapse  of  sixteen  years,  to 
those  literally  vast  transactions,  it  is  a  consolatory  and 
satisfactory  conviction  to  feel  that  the  good  under 
standing  between  us  was  never  once  disturbed  by  doubt 
or  suspicion  ;  and  if  any  of  them  happens  to  see  his 
name  mentioned  in  these  pages,  he  will  find  no  record 
of  anything  to  his  discredit,  and  I  pray  him  to  accept 
my  apology  for  naming  him  at  all  without  his  leave, 
which  I  could  not  very  well  get. 

The  second  reason  for  my  reticence  up  to  the  present 
time  arose  from  the  reluctance  most  men  feel  to  write  of 
events  which  must  necessarily  appear  to  be  largely  of 
the  character  of  personal  adventures,  and  therefore  re 
quire  the  frequent  and  embarrassing  use  and  repetition 
of  the  personal  pronoun 

I  have  got  over  this  difficulty  by  reflecting  that  every 
business  or  enterprise  must  have  an  active  agent  to 
manage  and  direct  it ;  and  if  it  is  meet  and  right  to 
publish  a  history  of  these  naval  affairs  at  all,  no  mere 
squeamishness  should  deter  me  from  giving  them  pub 
licity,  and  furnishing  the  future  historian  with  the  facts 
pertaining  to  an  interesting  episode  in  that  great  Civil 
War  which  set  the  Western  World  in  painful  commo 
tion,  and  disturbed  the  repose  of  Europe  as  well. 


6  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

No  one  who  is  attracted  by  the  title,  and  feels  disposed 
to  read  this  book,  need  be  deterred  by  the  fear  of  being 
drawn  into  an  exposition  of  the  causes  of  the  war,  or  the 
right  of  secession ;  nor  will  he  be  asked  to  join  in  a  wail 
over  the  mortification  of  defeat,  or  the  agonies  of  i  Re 
construction.'  Whatever  opinions  may  now  prevail  in 
regard  to  the  constitutional  right  or  expediency  of 
secession,  hostile  and  depreciatory  criticism,  of  the 
Southern  people  has  long  ceased  to  have  any  influence. 

It  is  admitted  that  they  fought  gallantly,  and  exhibited 
admirable  qualities  in  attack  and  defence,  in  victory  and 
defeat.  When  the  last  hope  of  success  was  extinguished ; 
when  the  drain  of  battle  and  the  combined  forces  of  hunger, 

o        / 

toil,  and  exposure  had  consumed  their  energies  and  ex 
hausted  the  power  of  resistance,  the  remnant  laid  down  their 
arms,  and  took  to  the  plough  and  the  pruning-hook  with 
as  little  murmuring  as  any  reasonable  critic  could  expect. 

It  was,  literally,  beginning  a  new  life  from  the  very 
start.  The  whole  land  was  impoverished.  Towns  had 
been  burned  and  fields  devastated.  Throughout  large 
districts  every  corn-mill  and  implement  of  husbandry 
had  been  destroyed.  There  was  scarcely  food  for  the 
people  to  eat,  and  the  only  currency  in  the  country  was 
the  paper  promises  of  the  dead  Confederacy. 

Sixteen  years  have  passed,  and  the  South  is  again  in 
blossom.  Railways  have  been  reconstructed  and  towns 
rebuilt.  Milk  and  honey,  corn  and  wine,  can  be  had  in 
plenteous  profusion,  and  there  is  money  to  buy  them  ; 
and,  lastly,  in  this  year  of  grace  1881,  6,700,000  bales 
of  cotton  have  been  grown  on  Southern  soil,  picked  and 
baled  by  Southern  hands,  and  there  is  cheer}'  music 
among  the  spindles  of  Lancashire,  in  place  of  the  silence 
and  gloom  which  overshadowed  them  while  the  people 
who  grow  the  fleecy  staple  were  fighting  for  their  cotton- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  7 

fields.  Men  who  can  refer  to  such  a  record  in  the 
past,  and  point  to  such  a  position  to-day,  need  make  no 
plaintive  appeals  for  pity.  They  had  much  sympathy 
during  the  struggle,  and  many  kind  things  were  said  of 
them.  These  served  to  cheer  and  inspirit  them  in  the 
day  of  adversity,  and  are  gratefully  remembered  now. 
Those  in  England  and  elsewhere  who  predicted  that  the 
South  would  win,  have  failed  in  their  prophecy,  but 
they  can  at  least  feel  that  their  sympathies  were  given 
to  no  mean  people.  The  South  was  defeated,  and  seces 
sion  from  the  Federal  Union  was  shown  to  be  inad 
missible.  That  is  all  that  has  been  determined  by  the 
appeal  to  arms.  Wars  do  not  define  principles.  They 
neither  analyze  nor  solve  political  problems.  The  sword 
cuts  the  knot,  and  does  not  unravel  it.  No  Southern 
man  can  efface  from  his  mind  the  conviction  that  among 
the  reserved  rights  of  the  States  was  that  of  withdrawing 
from  the  Union,  and  to  deny  that  he  held  that  opinion 
in  the  year  1861,  and  to  shrink  from  confessing  it  to 
have  been  an  article  of  his  political  faith  at  that  time, 
would  prove  that  with  the  loss  of  his  cause  he  had  also 
been  bereft  of  his  honour,  and  he  would  be  without 
excuse  for  the  part  he  took  in  resisting  the  authority  of 
the  United  States  Government  at  the  bidding  of  his  own 
State.  When  the  Southern  leaders  laid  down  their  arms, 
they  admitted  the  supremacy  of  the  Federal  Congress, 
and  surrendered  the  right  of  separate  State  action  ;  but 
they  did  not  renounce  their  belief  that  the  Constitution 
as  it  stood  at,  and  previous  to,  1861,  was  an  agreement 
between  Sovereign  States,"  and  that  each  State  had  the 
first  claim  to  the  allegiance  and  service  of  her  citizens. 
But  the  South  has  '  accepted  the  situation,'  and  as 
a  condition  of  restoration  to  the  political  privileges 
common  to  all  the  States,  she  has  relinquished  her 


8  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  TEE 

own  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  and  has  agreed 
to  accept  that  of  the  majority.  Every  Southerner  is 
bound  by  that  compact,  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  a 
single  sane  or  reasonable  man  wishes  to  break,  to 
evade,  or  to  modify  it.  In  fact,  causes  are  already  at 
work  in  the  Southern  States  which  are  likely  to  effect 
very  important  and  notable  changes  in  the  political 
principles  of  the  people.  The  large  increase  in  the 
number  of  cotton  mills  in  the  South  since  the  war,  and 
the  tendency  to  embark  in  other  mechanical  industries, 
will  probably  ere  long  attach  the  capitalists  of  that 
section  to  the  Union,  and  its  fostering  system  of  pro 
tective  tariffs,  with  the  same  ardour  which  has  in  these 
latter  }^ears  distinguished  the  national  affinities  of  the 
manufacturing  States  of  the  North. 

Secession  was  not  indigenous  to  the  South.  The 
doctrine  was  broached  in  the  early  days  of  the  Republic 
by  Massachusetts  and  other  New  England  States,  and 
was  very  clearly  and  forcibly  enunciated  by  a  Conven 
tion  of  those  States  which  met  at  Hartford  in  1814-15, 
as  the  following  extract  from  the  Journal  of  the  Conven 
tion  will  prove : 

'  That  Acts  of  Congress  in  violation  of  the  Constitu 
tion  are  absolutely  void,  is  an  undeniable  position.  .  .  . 
In  cases  of  deliberate,  dangerous,  and  palpable  infractions 
of  the  Constitution,  affecting  the  sovereignty  of  the  State 
and  liberties  of  the  people,  it  is  not  only  the  right,  but 
the  duty  of  such  State  to  interpose  its  authority  for 
their  protection,  in  the  manner  best  calculated  to  secure 
that  end.  When  emergencies  occur  which  are  either 
beyond  the  reach  of  judicial  tribunals,  or  too  pressing  to 
admit  of  delay  incident  to  their  forms,  States  which  have 
no  common  umpire  must  be  their  own  judges,  and 
execute  their  own  decisions/ 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  9 

Anyone  at  all  familiar  with  the  political  history  of  the 
United  States  from  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  to 
4he  year  1815,  must  admit  that  the  right  of  secession 
was  a  doctrine  which  did  not  originate  at  the  South,  and 
was  not  peculiar  to  Southern  men.  After  the  purchase 
of  Louisiana  in  1803,  the  Legislature  of  Massachusetts 
passed  the  following  resolution  :  '  Resolved,  that  the 
annexation  of  Louisiana  to  the  Union  transcends  the 
Constitutional  power  of  the  United  States.  It  formed 
a  new  Confederacy,  to  which  the  States  united  by  the 
former  compact  are  not  bound  to  adhere.' 

The  speech  of  the  Hon.  Josiah  Quincy,  of  Massa 
chusetts,  delivered  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States, 
January  14,  1811,  in  opposition  to  the  Bill  for  the 
admission  of  Louisiana  into  the  Union  as  a  State,  has 
been  often  quoted.  He  said,  '  If  this  Bill  passes,  it  is 
my  deliberate  opinion  that  it  is  virtually  a  dissolution 
of  the  Union  ;  and  as  it  will  be  the  right  of  all,  so  it  will 
be  the  duty  of  some,  definitely  to  prepare  for  separation — 
amicably  if  they  can,  violently  if  they  must.' 

The  States  which  withdrew  from  the  Union  in  1860-61 
merely  exercised  a  prerogative  which  had  been  previously 
claimed  as  an  inherent  '  State  right '  by  Massachusetts 
and  other  New  England  States,  and  which  had  been 
asserted  and  defended  by  many  prominent  Northern 
men.*  Georgia,  the  Carolinas,  and  A^irginia  made 

*  I  might  fill  pages  with  extracts  from  the  Journal  of  the  Hartford 
Convention,  the  writings  and  speeches  of  eminent  Northern  politicians 
before  the  secession  of  the  Southern  States,  and  leading  articles  from 
Northern  papers  published  at  or  about  the  time  of  the  secession,  in  sup 
port  of  this  statement.  But  I  have  no  wish  to  recriminate,  or  to  even 
approach  controversial  topics,  except  in  so  far  as  may  be  necessary  to 
repudiate  the  crime  of  '  treason  '  which  has  been  so  recklessly  alleged 
against  the  South.  Those  who  wish  to  test  the  accuracy  of  the 
statement  may  refer  to  the  following  American  works  :  '  Is  Davis  a 


10  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

common  cause  with  the  Northern  Provinces,  and  were 
loyal  to  the  Confederation  during  the  trying  times  of  the 

— • 

Traitor  ?'  by  Professor  Bledsoe;  '  The  Kise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate 
Government,'  by  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  ;  and  'Buchanan's  Administra 
tion  /  in  all  of  which  will  be  found  copious  extracts  from  the  speeches 
and  writings  of  Northern  men  who  occupied  high  and  influential 
positions,  with  particular  references  to  the  original  sources  from 
which  the  quotations  are  taken. 

I  mention  the  above  works,  not  with  the  purpose  of  directing 
attention  to  the  arguments  of  the  authors  in  support  of  'State 
rights,'  but  solely  because  they  contain  indisputable  proof  that  the 
assumption  was  not  a  new  doctrine  in  1861,  but  that  it  was  co 
existent  with  the  Union  itself,  and  had  some  of  its  staunchest 
supporters  among  Northern  statesmen  and  expounders  of  Constitu 
tional  law. 

It  is  a  just  subject  for  surprise,  and  is  equally  a  matter  of  regret, 
that  two  such  eminent  men  as  Mr.  John  Lothrop  Motley  and  the 
late  Mr.  Alexander  Everett,  when  writing  and  delivering  public 
addresses  during  the  Civil  War,  with  the  purpose  to  enlighten  public 
opinion  at  home  and  abroad  in  respect  to  the  action  of  the  Southern 
States,  should  have  suppressed,  or  at  least  omitted  to  mention,  those 
facts  which  would  have  tended  to  diminish  the  alleged  criminal 
culpability  of  the  Southern  people,  and  a  knowledge  of  which  was 
absolutely  necessary  to  a  fair,  impartial  judgment.  No  cause  is  ever 
benefited  in  the  long  run  by  an  over-statement  of  its  merits,  or 
by  exaggerated  depreciation  of  the  opposite  side  ;  and  when  public 
opinion  has  been  influenced  by  appeals  founded  upon  insufficient 
evidence,  whether  by  assertion  of  what  is  false,  or  by  the  suppression 
of  essential  facts,  there  is  always  a  reaction  in  the  opposite  direction. 
This  has  been  notably  manifest  in  regard  to  foreign  opinion  in  the 
matter  of  secession.  It  is  now  quite  exceptional  to  meet  a  European 
among  the  reading  class  who  does  not  believe  that  the  Southern  States 
acted  within  their  constitutional  rights. 

For  the  opinion  of  intelligent  foreigners  in  regard  to  the  right  of 
secession,  I  may  refer  to  De  Tocqueville's  '  Democracy  in  America ' 
and  'The  American  Union,'  by  Mr.  James  Spence,  published  by 
Eichard  Bentley,  London,  1861.  The  allusions  in  'Buchanan's 
Administration '  to  the  '  View  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,'  by  William  Eawle  of  Philadelphia,  are  much  to  the  point ; 
and  the  extracts  from  a  correspondence  between  Mr.  John  Quincy 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  11 

Kevolution,  though  they  had  far  less  cause  for  com 
plaint  against  the  mother  country. 

Again,  the  Southern  States  were  loyal  to  the  Union 
in  the  war  of  1812-15,  although  their  special  interests 
had  not  been  hurt  or  interfered  with  by  Great  Britain. 

When  Massachusetts  and  other  Eastern  States,  through 
the  action  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  manifested  their 
purpose  to  dissolve  the  Union,  the  country  was  engaged 
in  a  foreign  war — namely,  in  defence  of  New  England 
commerce,  and  for  the  protection  of  New  England 
seamen. 

The    right    which    Great    Britain    affirmed    to    the 

Adams  and  Mr.  Harrison  Gray  Otis,  both  of  Massachusetts,  are 
worthy  of  especial  notice.  Mr.  Adams  charges  the  Federal  Party  in 
New  England  with  a  deliberate  purpose  to  dissolve  the  Union.  He 
says,  'I  had  no  doubt  in  1808  and  1809,  and  have  no  doubt  at  this 
time  (December  30,  1828),  that  it  is  the  key  of  all  the  great  move 
ments  of  the  Federal  Party  in  New  England  from  that  time  forward 
until  its  final  catastrophe  in  the  Hartford  Convention.'  Mr.  John 
Quincy  Adams's  opinion  in  respect  to  the  right  of  secession  is  very 
clearly  set  out  in  an  address  before  the  New  York  Historical  Society 
in  1839.  A  very  full  quotation  from  that  address  will  be  found  in 
'The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government/  p.  190,  etc.  ; 
and  the  following  extract  from  a  leading  article  in  the  New  York 
Tribune  of  November  9,  1860,  manifests  not  the  isolated  feeling  and 
opinion  of  Mr.  Horace  Greeley,  its  editor  and  proprietor,  but  the 
views  and  sentiments  of  a  large  number  of  Northern  men  at  that 
time : 

*  The  right  to  secede  may  be  a  revolutionary  right,  but  it  exists, 
nevertheless  ;  and  we  do  not  see  how  one  party  can  have  a  right  to 
do  what  another  party  has  a  right  to  prevent.     We  must  ever  resist 
the  asserted  right  of  any  State  to  remain  in  the  Union  and  nullify 
or  resist  the  laws  thereof;  to  withdraw  from  the  Union  is  quite 
another  matter.     And  whenever  a  considerable  section  of  our  Union 
shall  deliberately  resolve  to  go  out,  we  will  resist  all  coercive  measures 
designed  to  keep  her  in. 

*  We  hope  never  to  live  in  a  Republic  whereof  one  section  is  pinned 
to  the  other  by  bayonets.' 


12  TEE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

perpetual  unalienable  allegiance  of  all  natural-born 
subjects,  the  repeated  and  vexatious  vindication  of  that 
right  by  the  stoppage  of  American  ships  on  the  high 
seas,  and  the  violent  removal  of  alleged  British  subjects 
from  them,  were  the  chief  causes  of  that  war.  The 
South  had  neither  ships  nor  seamen,  and  there  was 
nothing  to  arouse  the  interest  of  the  Southern  people,  or 
to  bind  them  to  a  participation  in  the  contest,  but  the 
sense  of  loyal  obligation  to  the  Union. 

When  the  Southern  States  seceded  in  1861,  the 
country  was  vexed  by  no  foreign  complications,  and 
their  action  did  not  add  to  any  existing  troubles.  This 
difference  in  the  conditions  under  which  Massachusetts 
threatened  to  secede  and  the  Southern  States  actually 
did  secede,  should,  in  common  fairness,  be  borne  in  mind 
by  those  who  extol  the  loyalty  of  New  England  and 
have  so  vehemently  denounced  the  Southern  people  as 
traitors  and  rebels. 

But  the  result  of  the  Civil  War  has  been  to  produce  a 
general  disavowal  of  the  principles  so  emphatically  laid 
down  by  the  Hartford  Convention.  The  New  England 
States  helped  with  all  their  energies  to  force  a  contrary 
admission  from  the  South,  and  the  authority  of  the 
Federal  Congress  has  now  been  made  paramount  from 
Maine  to  Texas,  from  New  York  to  California,  by  the 
compulsory,  but  still  by  the  unanimous,  consent  of  the 
people  of  all  the  States. 

The  bitterness  and  the  passionate  heat  of  family 
quarrels  are  proverbial,  and  many  unhappy  incidents  of 
the  war  between  the  States  of  the  American  Union  have 
confirmed  the  experience  upon  which  the  proverb  is 
based.  But  old  associations  and  the  memory  of  past 
troubles,  tribulations,  and  triumphs,  shared  in  common, 
are  drawing  the  people  again  together  ;  and  it  will  be 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  13 

well  for  them  earnestly  to  reflect  upon  the  causes  of  the 
estrangement,  and  to  devise  the  means  of  preventing 
their  repetition,  in  a  spirit  of  fraternal  regard  alike  for 
the  common  welfare  and  the  separate,  if  not  conflicting, 
interests  of  the  various  communities  embraced  in  the 
vast  domain  of  the  Union.  Americans  have  learned 
from  the  sad  experience  of  the  Civil  War  that  Demo 
cratic  institutions  are  not  exempt  from  the  dangers 
which  beset  other  forms  of  government.  History 
furnishes  no  record  of  any  people  who  have  been  fused 
into  one  cohesive  and  durable  nationality  without  much 
internal  commotion  and  many  internecine  struggles. 

It  is  eight  hundred  years  since  the  last  foreign  con 
quest  of  England  ;  but  since  the  battle  of  Hastings  there 
have  been  the  bloody  Wars  of  the  Roses  and  the  fierce 
contest  between  Cavalier  and  Roundhead,  besides 
lesser  revolutions  and  much  border  strife.  Only  within 
the  present  century  have  the  three  kingdoms  been 
brought  into  willing  union,  and  even  now  the  unhappy 
condition  of  Ireland  excites  fears  for  the  peace  and  quiet 
of  the  realm. 

The  United  States  could  not  have  reasonably  hoped 
to  escape  the  political  afflictions  which  other  people  have 
had  to  suffer,  nor  could  they  have  expected  to  grow 
from  their  birth  into  the  family  of  independent  Powers 
to  the  full  maturity  of  national  life  without  passing 
through  some  political  convulsions.  The  territory  is 
vast,  and  even  at  the  present  rate  of  increase  in  population 
it  will  be  many  years  before  the  people  are  brought  into 
as  close  contact  as  in  the  countries  of  Europe. 

Celt  and  Saxon,  Teuton  and  Scandinavian,  are  flowing 
in  a  seemingly  exhaustless  stream  towards  the  great 
prairies  of  the  West,  and  the  problem  of  amalgamating 
those  divers  races  with  the  descendants  of  the  original 


14  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

colonists,  and  fusing  them  into  one  nation,  with  language, 
feeling,  tastes,  and  interests  in  common,  must  be  left  for 
its  solution  to  those  laws  of  nature  or  of  Providence 
which  have  united  equally  variable  materials  to  form 
the  existing  European  types. 

The  theory  that  the  late  Civil  War  was  a  mere  insur 
rectionary  movement  can  deceive  no  one  now.  The 
fact  that  the  secession  of  the  Southern  States  divided 
the  American  Union  into  two  separate  Federal  Republics, 
cannot  be  destroyed  by  the  counter-fact  that  the  Union 
has  been  restored.  The  judgment  of  every  foreign  power 
declared  that  there  was  for  four  years  a  de  facto  Govern 
ment  at  Richmond,  which  was  wholly  independent  of 
the  power  and  control  of  the  Congress  at  Washington, 
and  every  department  of  the  United  States  Government 
confirmed  that  judgment  by  practical  acts  of  recognition. 

The  Union  founded  by  Washington,  Adams,  Jefferson, 
Hamilton,  Madison,  and  the  other  '  Fathers/  was  a 
Federal  Republic,  that  is  to  say,  it  was  a  Government 
constituted  of  several  Constituent  Republics,  which  were 
united  by  an  agreement  or  compact  between  themselves 
as  distinct  and  separate  States.  That  Union  proved  to 
be  inadequate  to  the  exigencies  of  the  conflicting  forces 
to  which  it  was  exposed.  It  resisted  several  severe 
strains,  and  was  maintained  by  one  or  more  compromises, 
which  served  to  demonstrate  its  imperfection  and  its 
inherent  weakness. 

In  1861  the  disintegrating  forces  prevailed,  and  ten  of 
the  Constituent  Republics  withdrew  from  the  Union 
on  the  plea  that  the  original  conditions  of  Union  had 
been  broken  by  the  others,  and  they  formed  a  fresh 
confederation  among  themselves. 

The  remaining  States  or  Republics  resisted  that  act  of 
separation,  and  affirmed  that  the  people  of  the  whole 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  15 

United  States  were,  or  should  be  fused  into,  one  nation, 
and  that  the  division  of  the  Union  into  States  had,  or 
should  hereafter  have,  no  greater  political  significance 
than  the  division  of  the  several  States  into  counties. 

The  States  which  remained  in  the  original  Union,  and 
supported  the  foregoing  dogma,  proved  to  be  stronger 
than  those  which  clung  to  the  opinions  of  the  l  Fathers,' 
and  they  succeeded,  after  a  long  and  bloody  war,  in 
compelling  the  latter  to  admit  that  '  the  people  of  the 
United  States '  meant  the  aggregate  population  of  all  the 
States,  and  that  the  majority,  as  represented  in  the  Con 
gress  at  Washington,  was  the  true  and  only  Sovereign 
of  the  whole  country,  irrespective  of  geographical  State 
lines  or  separate  State  Constitutions.  I  am  broaching 
no  theory,  but  am  simply  stating  facts.  And  they  are 
facts  which  it  behoves  every  American  who  wishes  to 
practise  a  broad  and  comprehensive  patriotism,  and  hopes 
to  maintain  a  hearty  and  brotherly  union  among  the 
reunited  States,  to  admit  and  to  thoughtfully  consider  in 
the  future  arrangement  and  policy  of  political  parties. 
It  is  folly  and  ruin  for  men  in  trade  to  act  without 
reference  to  the  clear  manifestations  of  supply  and 
demand;  it  is  equally  unwise  and  disastrous  for  poli 
ticians  and  statesmen  to  deny  or  to  take  no  account  of 
the  difference  between  theories  for  which  it  has  been 
thought  necessary  to  strive  even  to  the  shedding  of 
blood,  and  principles  which  are  fundamental  and 
unchangeable. 

The  Union  of  1787  was  dissolved  in  18G1  by  the 
action  of  ten  of  the  constituent  republics.  A  new  Union 
was  formed  in  1865  by  the  military  power  of  the 
majority  of  the  States,  compelling  the  minority  to 
accept  their  view  of  the  national  compact.  The  former 
Union  was  a  confederation  of  States,  and  was  of  course 


16  TEE  SECEET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

a  Federal  Republic  ;  the  latter  Union  is  founded  upon  a 
fusion  of  the  people  into  one  nation,  with  a  supreme 
centralized  executive  and  administrative  Government  at 
Washington,  and  can  no  longer  be  called  a  Federal 
Republic  ;  it  has  become  an  Imperial  Republic.  The 
latter  name  gives  some  promise  of  greater  strength  and 
cohesion  than  the  former,  but  the  duration  of  the  re 
stored  Union  will  depend  very  much  upon  whether  the 
people  of  the  whole  country  fully  realize,  and  are  really 
reconciled  to,  the  new  dogma  that  each  State  is  only  an 
aggregate  of  counties,  and  that  its  political  functions 
are  only  to  consist  in  regulating  such  purely  domestic 
concerns  as  the  central  authority  at  Washington  may 
leave  to  its  discretion.  The  principle  upon  which  the 
new  Union  is  founded  may  or  may  not  be  sound  in 
theory,  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  increased 
influence  and  power  granted  to  the  national  executive 
and  legislative  authorities  will  make  it  more  than  ever 
necessary  for  the  educated  classes  in  the  United  States  to 
interest  themselves  in  politics,  and  to  see  that  the  repre 
sentatives  sent  to  Washington  are  not  the  mere  creatures- 
of  the  corrupt  organizations  commonly  known  as  the 
4  Machine.'  If  the  majority  who  have  effected  the  change 
in  the  conditions  of  the  American  Union  are  content  to 
leave  the  management  of  public  affairs  to  the  pro 
fessional  politicians,  the  '  caucuses,'  and  the  i  wire 
pullers,'  they  will  have  fought  iii  vain,  and  will  find  that 
to  secure  the  semblance  of  a  strictly  national  Union 
they  have  sacrificed  the  substance  of  individual  liberty. 

Those  who  are  accustomed  to  closely  scrutinize 
current  political  events,  must  perceive  the  tendency  of 
both  North  and  South  towards  a  re-assertion  of  the 
doctrine  of  State  rights,. and  a  tacit  admission  of  that 
claim  by  the  Federal  Government. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  17 

A  specific  manifestation  of  the  revival  of  the  principle 
may  be  seen  in  the  action  of  California  with  reference 
to  Chinese  immigration,  and  the  cautious  conciliatory 
treatment  of  the  subject  by  Congress  and  the  executive 
authorities  at  Washington.  It  is  hardly  possible  to 
doubt  that  the  pretension  of  each  State  to  regulate 
its  own  affairs  without  the  intervention  of  any  other 
authority  will,  before  many  years,  be  as  rampant 
as  ever,  and  unless  the  statesmen  and  political  leaders 
have  the  wisdom  and  prudence  necessary  to  keep 
national  party  lines  distinct  from  geographical  boun 
daries,  the  danger  of  another  secession  will  be  imminent. 

It  is  earnestly  to  be  hoped  that  the  reunion  of  the 
States  may  be  cemented  and  perpetuated ;  that  bicker 
ings  and  recriminations  may  cease ;  that  nothing  further 
may  be  done  or  spoken  on  either  side  through  strife  or 
vain-glory,  and  that  neither  diversity  of  interests,  dis 
criminating  tariffs,  nor  State  jealousies,  will  again  set 
the  hearts  of  the  people  against  each  other.  But,  what 
ever  may  happen  in  the  distant  and  inscrutable  future, 
it  may  be  safely  predicted,  that  if  there  should  be  a 
second  violent  struggle  for  '  State  rights/  the  issue  will 
be  fought  on  very  different  geographical  lines  from  those 
which  separated  the  contending  parties  in  the  Civil  War 
of  1861. 


VOL.    I. 


18  TEE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 


CHAPTER  I. 

Sketch  of  the  anomalous  condition  of  the  whole  country,  North  and 
South,  during  the  period  between  the  election  of  Mr.  Abraham 
Lincoln  as  President  of  the  United  States  and  the  beginning  of 
hostilities,  in  theory  an  undivided  Eepublic,  in  fact  two  separate 
Governments :  one  at  Washington,  one  at  Montgomery. — The 
organization  of  the  Confederate  Navy  Department. — The  poverty 
of  the  South  with  respect  to  naval  resources. — The  naval  policy 
of  the  Confederate  Government. — The  necessity  of  looking  abroad 
for  the  means  to  carry  on  naval  operations. — The  commencement 
of  hostilities. — The  Louisiana  '  Board  of  War '  and  the  Bienville. — 
Personal  incidents.— Journey  South. — Blocking  the  Mississippi. 

SOUTH  CAROLINA  was  the  first  of  the  Southern  States 
to  secede  from  the  American  Union.  Her  '  Ordinance 
of  Secession'  was  passed  on  the  20th  of  December,  1860, 
about  one  month  after  the  election  of  Mr.  Abraham 
Lincoln  to  the  Presidency  of  the  United  States.  Missis 
sippi,  Florida,  Alabama,  Georgia,  and  Louisiana  soon 
followed.  Delegates  from  those  States  met  at  Mont 
gomery  in  February,  1861,  organized  a  Legislative 
Assembly,  and  formed  a  Provisional  Government,  with 
Mr.  Jefferson  Davis,  of  Mississippi,  as  President. 

Arkansas,  Texas,  and  North  Carolina  followed  at 
short  intervals,  and  were  not  long  in  joining  the  Con 
federacy.  Tennessee,  with  Maryland,  and  the  great 
border  States  of  Missouri,  Kentucky,  and  Virginia,  still 
faltered,  not  from  want  of  sympathy  with  the  movement, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  19 

but  because  they  hoped  to  act  as  a  barrier  between  the 
two  sections,  and  to   secure  a  peaceful  separation  by 
negotiation.      Events   moved  rapidly.      Tennessee  and 
Virginia  withdrew  in  time  to  save  serious  complications; 
but  while  Maryland,  Kentucky,  and  Missouri  hesitated, 
the  '  Union  men  '  within  their  borders,  aided  by  active 
partizans  from  without,  got  partial  control   of  affairs, 
and  the  United  States  authorities  were  able  to   arrest 
the  leading  Secessionists,  to  disperse  the  local  Legis 
latures,    and   to   maintain   possession   of   those    States 
during   the  war.     By  withdrawing   from   the   Federal 
Union  in  this  irregular  way,  the  South  demonstrated 
that  there  was  no  concert  of  action,  and  no  premeditated 
purpose  to   break   up  the  Federal   Government.     The 
political  organization    of  the    seceded  States   remained 
intact,  although   the   Union  between   them   had   been 
dissolved.     Each  preserved  its  complete  autonomy  as  a 
Commonwealth,  with  Executive   Judiciary  and  Legis 
lative  Departments  unbroken,  and  there  was,  therefore, 
no  confusion  and  no  disturbance  of  the  ordinary  routine 
of  civil  government.     The  delegates  at  Montgomery  had 
no  difficulty  in  settling  the  terms  of  a  fresh  compact 
between  the  States  represented  by  them,  and  the  Pro 
visional  Government  was  soon  in  working  order.     The 
chief  and  most  urgent  business  of  the  newly  created 
Executive  was  to  prepare  for  the  great  struggle  which 
was  becoming  more  and  more  imminent  day  by  day. 
The  lack  of  military  resources,  and  the  efforts  which 
were  made  to  organize  an  army,  have  been  described 
by  many  previous  writers,  and  especially  with  much 
minuteness  and  effect  by  ex -President  Jefferson  Davis  in 
his  great  exposition  of  the  '  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Con 
federate  Government/  a  wrork  which  may  be  called  his 
'  Apologia/ 


20  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

My  business  is  with  the  concerns  of  the  Navy  alone. 
When  President  Davis  arranged  his  Cabinet,  the  Navy 
Department  was  assigned  to  the  Hon.  Stephen  R.  Mal- 
lory,  of  Florida.  Mr.  Mallory  had  much  experience  in 
the  management  of  public  business. 

He  had  been  a  Senator  in  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  and  had  served  as  a  Member  of  the  Committee 
on  Naval  Affairs  in  that  branch  of  the  National 
Legislature. 

He  was  well  versed  in  naval  usage  and  naval  law, 
and  had  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  organization, 
equipment,  and  general  disciplinary  rules  of  the  United 
States  Navy.  If  he  had  been  placed  at  the  head  of  that 
service,  he  would  have  been  a  popular  and  efficient 
administrator,  but  at  Montgomery  he  was  like  a  chief 
tain  without  a  clan,  or  an  artizan  without  the  tools  of 
his  art.  It  would  have  been  comparatively  easy  to 
organize  and  administer,  but  the  task  before  him 
was  to  create,  and  the  means  for  constructing  and 
equipping  a  naval  force  for  offensive  warfare,  or  even 
for  a  vigorous  resistance,  were  practically  nil.  The  pine 
belts  of  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas,  the  live  oak  groves 
of  Florida,  and  the  forests  of  other  States,  contained 
inexhaustible  supplies  of  what  are  called  <  naval  stores ' 
and  materials  for  ship-building  of  the  old  wooden  type, 
but  they  were  still  in  the  raw  state.  The  masts  and 
frames  of  navies  were  there,  but  they  were  sprouting 
and  blooming  in  the  green- tree,  and  there  was  great 
lack  of  skilled  workmen  to  fell  and  fashion  them.  Iron,  so 
indispensable  in  the  equipment  of  ships  of  war,  even  at  that 
time,  was  scarce  to  the  degree  of  poverty,  and  before  the 
end  there  was  a  famine.  Between  March,  1861,  and 
January,  1865,  the  price  of  iron  advanced  from  $25  to 
$1,300  per  ton,  and  although  this  extreme  advance  was 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  21 

not  wholly  due  to  the  scarcity  of  the  article,  but  arose 
to  some  extent  from  the  depreciation  of  the  paper  cur 
rency,  yet  it  is  well  known  that  the  home  product  was 
never  equal  to  the  ordinary  wants  of  the  country,  and 
during  the  Civil  War  the  supply  could  only  be  supple 
mented  by  driblets  through  the  blockade. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  there  was  not  a  mill  in 
the  whole  country  which  could  roll  a  2^ -inch  plate,  and 
in  the  entire  Confederacy  there  was  but  one  shop  capable 
of  turning  out  a  first-class  marine  engine.  There  was 
pressing  need  of  everything  required  to  build,  equip,  and 
maintain  a  ship  of  war.  Ordnance  and  ordnance  stores, 
even  medical  supplies,  provisions,  and  clothing,  were 
scarce  from  the  very  outset ;  and  the  Tredegar  Iron 
Works,  at  Richmond,  Virginia,  was  the  only  establish 
ment  south  of  the  Potomac  where  a  gun  of  large  calibre 
could  be  cast  or  wrought ;  and  Virginia,  when  Mr. 
Davis  and  his  Cabinet  began  their  labours,  was  not 
among  the  Confederate  States. 

Norfolk,  in  Virginia,  and  Pensacola,  in  Florida,  con 
tained  the  only  public  dockyards  within  the  limits  of 
the  Confederacy.  The  Navy -yard  at  Norfolk  before  the 
war  was  an  extensive  and  efficient  establishment.  It 
contained  a  dry  dock,  foundry  and  machine  shops,  and 
a  fair  supply  of  materials  had  generally  been  kept  there. 
But  just  at  the  time  when  Virginia  was  in  the  throes 
of  secession,  before  there  was  any  organized  force  at 
Norfolk  capable  of  effective  resistance,  the  United  States 
naval  officers  were  ordered  to  evacuate  the  dockyard, 
which  they  did  hastily,  taking  ship  to  Hampton  Roads, 
after  setting  fire  to  and  scuttling  the  vessels  that  could 
not  be  carried  off,  and  destroying  as  much  of  the 
property  on  shore  as  possible.  (See  Note/p.  49.) 

Pensacola  was  in  an  isolated  position,  and  its  dock- 


22  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

yard  was  not  one  of  construction,  but  only  of  shelter 
and  repair. 

But  even  if  these  two  naval  arsenals  had  been  com 
plete  in  every  particular,  and  there  had  been  no  want  of 
material,  machinery,  and  skilled  workmen,  they  would 
still  have  been  well  nigh  useless  as  places  of  outfit  for 
vessels  suited  to  cruise  at  sea,  because  the  Federal 
Government  held  the  fortifications  at  their  entrances, 
and  there  was  safe  and  ample  anchorage  within  reach 
of  the  guns  on  shore,  so  that  a  thorough  and  efficient 
blockade  could  be,  and  indeed  was,  maintained  at  those 
points  during  the  whole  war,  by  a  powerful  combination 
of  ships  and  land  batteries. 

If  the  Confederate  Government  had  been  able  to  build 
and  equip  cruisers  at  Norfolk,  they  could  not  have  got 
to  sea,  unless  they  had  been  strong  enough  in  number 
and  armament  to  defeat  the  blockading  squadron  in 
Hampton  Roads,  and  had  remained  after  their  victory 
in  condition  to  engage  and  pass  the  forts. 

There  was  equal  deficiency  and  want  in  respect  to 
private  ship-yards.  The  conditions  of  labour,  soil,  and 
climate  which  prevailed  in  the  South  had  made  the 
people  agricultural  and  not  commercial.  They  produced 
valuable  and  bulky  staples,  and  ships  chiefly  from  the 
Northern  States  and  from  England  performed  the 
carrying  trade.  The  merchants  who  lived  and  did 
business  at  the  Southern  ports  owned  few  if  any  ships,  and 
as  there  was  no  home  want  for  large  shipping,  there  had 
been  no  demand  for  architects  to  design  and  build  them. 
It  is  quite  safe  for  me  to  state  that  at  the  beginning 
of  the  year  1861  there  was  not,  within  the  whole  boun 
dary  of  the  Confederacy,  a  single  private  yard  having  the 
plant  necessary  to  build  and  equip  a  cruising  ship  of  the 
most  moderate  offensive  power. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  23 

When  President  Davis  and  his  Cabinet  contemplated 
this  paucity  of  supply  and  poverty  of  home  resources, 
they  did  not  renounce  the  purpose  or  abandon  the  hope 
to  harass  the  enemy's  commerce,  to  interrupt  his  lines  of 
maritime  communication,  and  to  break  through  his 
blockading  fleets,  but  they  perceived  that  an  effective 
effort  to  accomplish  all  or  either  of  those  aims  must  of 
necessity  be  made  abroad;  and  as  early  as  April,  1861, 
it  was  determined  to  send  an  agent  to  England  to  set 
on  foot  and  direct  such  naval  operations  as  it  might  be 
possible  to  organize  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Confederate 
States. 

At  a  very  early  period  of  the  war  it  became  a  matter  of 
common  conjecture  that  ships  were  building  in  England 
for  the  service  of  the  Confederate  States,  and  it  was  not 
many  months  before  the  depredations  of  the  Alabama 
and  Florida  confirmed  those  suspicions.     To  build  or 
even  to  buy  ships  suitable  for  either  attack  or  defence, 
to  get  them  out  of  English  ports,  and  then  to  equip 
and  arm  them,  were  undertakings  requiring  the  utmost 
secrecy  and  reserve,  the  success  of  every  effort  depending 
upon  the  fidelity  and  discretion  of  many   subordinate 
agents,  and  the  precise  correspondence  of  many  com 
plicated  arrangements.     It  was  necessary,  first,  to  build 
or  buy  a  ship,  and  to  disguise  or  omit  the  semblance  of 
equipment  for  purposes  of  war ;  to  obtain  the  guns  from 
one   maker,   and   often  their  carriages  and  gear  from 
another  ;  to  get  the  shot  and  shells  from  a  third,  and 
the  small  arms  and  ammunition  from  at  least  two  other 
parties.     The  large  quantity  of  stores,  clothing,  ham 
mocks,  etc.,  etc.,  required  for  a  cruising- ship  could  not, 
with  prudence,  be  obtained  from  one  dealer,  and  a  tender 
was  needed  to  receive  and  carry  abroad  the  whole  of 
those  essential  effects,  which  it  was  necessary  to  forward 


24  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

to  the  port  of  shipment  with  quick  despatch  and  at  short 
notice. 

When  everything  was  ready,  it  was  no  easy  matter 
to  so  combine  movements  that  ship  and  tender,  sailing 
from  different  ports,  should  meet  at  the  appointed 
rendezvous ;  and  then,  after  the  meeting,  there  was 
always  much  difficulty  and  many  obstacles  to  the  safe 
and  speedy  transfer  of  stores  and  the  completion  of  the 
armament.  The  necessity  for  these  perplexing  and 
intricate  proceedings  arose  not  from  the  fact  that  there 
was  the  slightest  degree  of  moral  criminality  in  their 
performance,  but  because  there  is  in  England,  as  there 
is  in  other  countries,  a  statute  known  as  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act,  or  other  cognate  title,  which  forbids 
either  of  two  belligerents  to  equip,  furnish,  fit  out,  or 
arm  any  vessel  within  the  realm,  for  the  purpose  of 
making  war  upon  the  other.  A  violation  of  that  statute 
involved  the  forfeiture  of  the  whole  of  the  property ; 
and,  as  the  Act  might  also  be  so  interpreted  as  to  bring 
the  parties  concerned  under  its  penal  provisions,  every 
detail  in  the  fitting  of  a  ship,  which  could  by  any  pos 
sible  construction  of  the  law  be  considered  <  equipment,' 
was  of  necessity  dispensed  with. 

During  the  war,  when  the  partizans  of  both  sides 
were  irritated  and  excited,  and  each  spoke  and  wrote 
about  the  other  with  heat  and  passion,  it  was  common 
to  denounce  the  secession  of  the  Southern  States  as  an 
act  of  criminal  rebellion,  and  the  efforts  made  by  their 
agents  to  obtain  abroad  the  supplies  which  the  resources 
of  the  country  at  home  could  not  furnish,  were  con 
demned  in  rather  strong  language. 

That  view  of  the  subject  has  been  almost  universally 
discarded  in  Europe,  and  even  in  the  Northern  States 
there  are  now  but  a  scant  minority,  chiefly  of  the  pro- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  25 

fessional  politician  class,  who  affect  to  regard  the  late 
Civil  War  in  any  other  light  than  that  of  a  revolution 
justified  by  innumerable  precedents  in  history.  If  the 
Confederate  army  had  been  defeated  at  Bull  Run,  and 
General  McDowell,  by  a  rapid  pursuit,  had  captured 
President  Davis,  with  Johnston  and  Beauregard  red- 
handed  from  the  fight,  those  gentlemen  would  probably 
have  been  summarily  tried,  and  possibly  executed,  as 
traitors. 

With  equal  probability  that  would  have  been  the  fate 
of  Washington,  Hancock,  and  Adams  if  General  Gage 
had  been  able  to  disperse  the  '  Continental  forces  '  at 
Cambridge,  Massachusetts,  at  the  beginning  of  the  War 
of  Independence,  and  to  obtain  possession  of  their 
persons.  The  vicissitudes  of  the  late  war  often  gave 
to  the  Confederacy  a  preponderance  of  advantage,  both 
as  regards  success  in  the  field,  and  the  number  of 
prisoners. 

Under  those  conditions  it  was  manifestly  impossible 
to  treat  the  captive  Confederates  as  traitors,  and  since 
the  two  opposing  parties  negotiated  with  each  other  for 
years  upon  equal  terms,  arranged  conditions  of  sur 
render,  and  exchanged  prisoners  in  accordance  with  the 
universally  admitted  rules  of  wrar,  sensible  men  every 
where  have  perceived  the  irrelevancy  of  such  expressions 
as  '  treason '  and  *  traitor.'  They  have  ceased  to  be  used 
in  dignified  and  grave  discussions,  and  will  not  pro 
bably  be  revived  in  any  fair  and  impartial  history  which 
may  be  written  in  the  future. 

It  will  be  my  effort  in  the  following  pages  to 
demonstrate  that  nothing  was  done  by  the  agents  of 
the  Confederate  Government  in  Great  Britain  which 
was  not  justified  by  the  rules  of  fair  and  honourable 
warfare,  nothing  contrary  to  English  law  as  construed 


26  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

by  English  jurists,  and  confirmed  by  the  judgment  of 
English  courts,  and  nothing  in  abuse  of  the  hospitality 
and  refuge  England  has  ever  offered  to  the  exiled  and 
oppressed.  But  it  will  be  necessary,  or  at  least  it 
will  be  convenient  and  proper,  to  give  a  brief  account  of 
the  condition  of  the  country  during  the  period  between 
the  election  of  Mr.  Abraham  Lincoln  to  the  Presidency 
of  the  United  States  and  the  beginning  of  hostilities, 
and  to  describe  the  manner  in  which  the  agent  was 
selected,  and  with  what  instructions  he  was  sent  to 
Europe. 

The  personal  incidents  are  neither  important  nor 
peculiar.  Adventures  similar  in  kind,  and  involving 
greater  personal  risk  to  the  actors,  are  without  doubt 
preserved  in  the  memories  of  many,  but  they  have  not 
been  narrated  in  connection  with  the  general  course  of 
events. 

It  is  my  wish  and  purpose  to  mention  no  circum 
stance  whose  interest  is  of  a  purely  personal  character, 
but  only  such  as  may  help  to  illustrate  the  very  peculiar 
condition  of  affairs  during  those  eventful  months  which 
immediately  preceded  the  great  Civil  War. 

From  the  date  of  the  formation  of  the  Provisional 
Government  at  Montgomery  to  the  beginning  of  hos 
tilities,  the  political  condition  of  the  country  had  been 
anomalous. 

There  were  two  Presidents,  two  Cabinets,  two  Con 
gresses.  The  Government  at  Washington  retained  all 
the  regalia  and  prestige  of  the  supreme  power.  It  con 
trolled  the  army  and  navy,  and  held  the  national 
treasury  and  the  national  domain.  The  foreign  Diplo 
matic  Corps  still  recognised  it  as  the  only  national 
authority,  and  no  foreign  Power  had  yet  questioned 
Mr.  Abraham  Lincoln's  title  to  be  the  President  of  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  27 

whole  Union  in  its  entirety,  both  by  privilege  of  law 
and  by  right  of  possession.  Notwithstanding  all  this, 
there  had  been  for  several  months  a  rival  Executive  and 
a  rival  Congress  at  Montgomery,  to  whom  at  least  six 
States  had  given  their  adherence,  and  within  the  limits 
of  those  States  no  United  States  writ  could  run,  and 
no  United  States  soldier  could  remain. 

The  Government  at  Montgomery  had,  moreover, 
assumed  control  of  the  postal  routes  within  the  seceded 
States,  and  the  Custom  Houses  throughout  their  coasts 
were  administered  under  the  same  authority. 

By  a  law  of  the  United  States,  a  vessel  sailing  from 
one  home  port  to  another  was  required  to  have  a  regular 
Custom  House  clearance,  under  penalty  of  seizure  and 
forfeiture.  The  authorities  at  Washington  did  not,  of 
course,  recognise  those  at  Montgomery,  and  a  certificate 
of  clearance  from  New  Orleans,  verified  by  a  Collector 
of  Customs  appointed  by  the  Confederate  Treasury  De 
partment,  was  not  admissible  at  any  port  in  the  United 
States.  In  spite  of  this  embarrassing  condition  of  affairs, 
the  coasting  trade  and  the  postal  intercourse  between 
the  North  and  South  were  not  for  some  months  inter 
rupted  or  seriously  disarranged.  The  Customs  officers 
at  New  York  and  elsewhere  made  some  seizures  of 
vessels  arriving  with  irregular  Confederate  Custom 
House  clearances,  but  they  were  released  by  orders  from 
Washington.  As  a  test  case,  the  mail- steamship  Bien- 
ville,  under  my  command,  was  seized  at  New  York  in 
March,  1861,  for  alleged  violation  of  the  United  States 
revenue  laws,  and  I  was  requested  to  go  to  Washington, 
where  I  had  an  official  interview  with  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  the  Hon.  Salmon  P.  Chase,  on  the  sub 
ject.  I  pointed  out  that  there  was  no  United  States 
official  of  any  kind  at  New  Orleans,  and  that  I  was 


28  TEE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

compelled  either  to  take  a  clearance  from  the  de  facto 
authority  or  to  remain  at  that  port  indefinitely. 

Mr.  Chase  perceived  the  peculiarities  and  perplexities 
of  the  situation,  and  released  the  ship  from  all  liability, 
but  he  was  manifestly  puzzled,  and  asked  me  if  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  Company  to  send  the  ship  back  to 
New  Orleans.  I  replied  that  it  was. 

He  then  said  that  the  right  of  the  so-called  Con 
federate  Government  to  assume  control  of  the  Custom 
Houses  at  the  Southern  ports  could  not  be  admitted 
even  by  implication  ;  but  still  it  was  obvious  that  for 
the  moment  those  who  had  usurped  the  legitimate  au 
thority  had  the  power  to  enforce  it  against  private 
persons,  and  he  directed  me  on  the  next  occasion  of  ap 
plying  for  a  clearance  to  make  a  formal  notarial  protest 
setting  forth  the  precise  circumstances.  Before  the 
Bienvitte  returned  again  to  New  York,  hostilities  had 
begun,  and  questions  of  civil  jurisdiction  had  been 
silenced  by  the  clamour  of  war.  All  thinking  men  per 
ceived  that  this  dual  authority,  and  this  conflict  of 
prerogative,  could  not  continue  for  an  indefinite  time. 
Virginia  was  still  mediating,  and  a  '  peace  commission ' 
was  sent  from  the  South  to  Washington  to  treat  for  a 
friendly  separation.  But  neither  intercession  nor  nego 
tiation  could  effect  that  purpose.  The  South  wanted 
to  withdraw  from  the  Union,  peaceably,  if  possible. 
The  North  wished  to  preserve  it,  peaceably  if  possible. 
The  South  urged  the  distinct  autonomy  and  the  com 
plete  individual  sovereignty  of  each  State.  The  North 
saw  in  that  doctrine  an  indefinite  extension  of  the 
secession  movement  and  a  final  dissolution  of  the  whole 
Union. 

That  was  the  real  issue.  None  other  could  have 
united  the  Southern  people  or  have  nerved  them  to 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  29 

suffer  as  they  did  ;  none  other  could  have  overcome  the 
repugnance  of  many  in  the  North  to  engage  in  a  war  of 
conquest  against  their  brethren  of  the  South.  The 
charge  often  made,  that  the  North  fought  for  empire  in 
the  sense  of  coveting  more  territory,  appears  to  me  to 
have  been  as  unfounded  as  the  counter-allegation  that 
the  South  took  up  arms  to  extend  the  area  of  slavery,  or 
even  to  preserve  that  institution  in  perpetuity. 

Political  parties  had  ceased  to  be  divided  upon  prin 
ciples  and  interests  common  to  both  sections  of  the 
country,  and  had  come  to  be  separated  by  a  geographical 
line.  Thus  had  arisen  a  condition  which  the  Fathers  of 
the  Republic  foresaw  might  happen,  and  which  they  had 
predicted  would  be  dangerous,  if  not  destructive,  to  the 
Union. 

There  were,  unhappily,  many  men  of  extreme  views 
in  the  dominant  party  at  the  North  who  had  got  control 
of  the  party  machinery.  They  appeared  determined  to 
force  upon  the  country  measures  which  would  have 
placed  the  South  at  the  mercy  of  a  sectional  majority. 
But  I  believe  that  the  great  mass  of  the  people  on  both 
sides  were  very  desirous  to  find  a  peaceful  solution  of 
the  difficulties.  The  principles  at  issue  were,  however, 
too  antagonistic  to  be  reconciled,  and  the  tension  was 
approaching  nearer  day  by  day  to  the  breaking  strain. 
The  fuel  was  laid  in  order,  the  kindling  materials  were 
abundant.  A  spark  might  at  any  moment  light  a  con 
flagration,  and  the  spark  soon  fell.  When  Louisiana 
seceded,  the  Governor  of  that  State,  the  Hon.  Thos.  0. 
Moore,  appointed  a  committee  of  experienced  and  influ 
ential  men  to  advise  and  help  him  to  put  the  State  in  a 
condition  to  meet  any  emergency  that  might  arise. 
Among  the  members  were  General  Braxton  Bragg  and 
Colonel  J.  K.  Duncan,  both  of  whom  were  ex-artillery 


30  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

officers  of  the  United  States  army,  and  the  committee 
was  called  the  '  Board  of  War.'  The  board  had  been 
sitting  for  some  time  at  New  Orleans,  and  State  troops 
had  occupied  the  old  forts,  built  many  years  before  for 
the  protection  of  the  river  approaches,  and  had  put  them 
in  habitable  and  fairly  defensible  condition  against  a 
sudden  attack.  These  circumstances  had  somewhat 
accustomed  the  people  of  New  Orleans  to  the  prospect 
of  a  possible  conflict.  During  the  early  days  of  April, 
1861,  there  was  a  general  feeling  that  affairs  could  not 
be  peaceably  arranged,  and  there  appeared  to  be  a  ner 
vous  solicitude,  and  a  seeming  impatience  of  further 
delay,  together  with  a  suppressed  inclination  to  preci 
pitate  a  direct  and  immediate  issue. 

On  the  13th  day  of  April,  1861, 1  was  in  New  Orleans 
in  command  of  the  United  States  mail  steamer  Bienville. 
The  ship  was  appointed  to  sail  on  the  following  morning, 
and  a  large  number  of  passengers  had  booked  for  the 
voyage,  some  for  their  customary  migration  during  the 
hot  months,  and  some  to  escape  the  danger  and  privations 
of  battle  and  siege,  which  they  already  scented  in 
the  air. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  that  day  there  were  flying 
rumours  that  fighting  had  begun  somewhere,  and 
about  ten  o'clock  it  was  known  with  certainty  that 
Beauregard  had  opened  fire  at  Charleston  upon  Fort 
Sumter. 

The  tidings  soon  spread,  and  the  whole  city  was  alert 
to  learn  the  particulars  and  to  discuss  the  consequences. 
There  was  no  excitement.  Groups  of  men  collected 
about  the  street  corners,  at  the  hotels,  and  other  places 
of  public  resort,  and  talked  earnestly,  but  gravely,  about 
the  possibilities  of  the  future. 

Every  man  who    has   had  to   face  extreme   danger 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  31 

probably  remembers  ever  afterwards  his  feelings  on  the 
first  occasion.  There  was  a  tingling  of  the  flesh,  a 
chilliness  of  the  scalp,  and  a  sensation  as  if  each  hair  was 
slowly  lifting  itself  on  end.  It  was  not  fear,  because 
the  bravest  of  the  brave  are  thus  affected.  It  was  only 
the  keen  consciousness  of  peril. 

It  is  narrated  of  the  great  Henri  Quatre,  that  once, 
at  the  beginning  of  a  battle,  he  felt  this  premonitory 
shiver  creeping  over  him,  and  looking  down  at  his  knees, 
which  appeared  to  be  shaking,  he  addressed  them  thus  : 
*  Ah !  you  tremble.  You  would  tremble  much  more  if 
you  knew  where  I  am  going  to  take  you.7  New  Orleans 
seemed  to  be  in  that  sort  of  tremor. 

There  was  no  appearance  of  bravado,  which  is  never 
the  mark  of  true  self-reliant  courage,  neither  were  there 
any  signs  of  despondency  or  distrust.  There  was  an 
effervescence  among  the  younger  men,  and  a  few  talked 
of  arming  and  marching  to  the  frontier  without  waiting 
for  a  call ;  but  the  majority  of  the  people  spoke  and 
acted  like  men  who  were  conscious  that  a  great  crisis 
had  arisen,  and  they  were  ready  to  meet  it. 

The  Southern  officers  of  the  United  States  army  and 
navy  had,  with  remarkably  few  exceptions,  resigned 
their  commissions  when  their  respective  States  seceded, 
and  the  Confederate  Congress  very  soon  passed  an  Act  to 
incorporate  them  into  the  new  service  with  the  same 
relative  rank  which  they  had  held  in  the  old.  I  was 
one  of  a  small  number  of  lieutenants  in  the  United 
States  navy  who  had  been  detailed  by  the  Government 
to  go  into  the  Mail  Service  some  years  before  the  war, 
with  the  object  to  enlarge  the  school  for  experience  in 
steam.  The  Steam  Packet  and  Mail  Service  increased, 
and  there  was  a  demand  for  commanders.  In  the  navy 
promotion  was  slow,  and  the  certainty  of  remaining  in 


32  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

a  subordinate  position  until  age  had  sapped  the  energies 
and  ambition  had  ceased  to  inspire  was  depressing. 

Private  companies  offered  good  positions  and  satisfac 
tory  emolument,  and  several  lieutenants  resigned  their 
naval  commissions  and  remained  in  the  private  Mail 
Service.  I  was  one  of  those  who  retired,  and  when 
Georgia  seceded  I  was  only  a  private  individual  engaged 
in  the  ordinary  business  of  life.  I  had  become  com-> 
pletely  identified  with  the  shipping  enterprises  of  New 
York.  I  had  no  property  of  any  kind  at  the  South,  nor 
any  pecuniary  interests  whatever  in  that  part  of  the 
country. 

Many  persons  thought  to  the  very  last  that  some 
how  or  other  an  agreement  would  be  come  to,  and  there 
would  be  no  war,  and  I  did  not  feel  that  there  was 
either  a  necessity  or  obligation  requiring  me  to  give  up 
my  occupation  and  business  connections  prematurely. 
All  to  whom  my  opinions  were  of  any  interest  or  import 
ance  knew  what  they  were.  I  had  never  concealed  or 
even  disguised  the  fact  that  in  respect  to  the  issues 
at  stake  my  heart  and  my  head  were  with  the  South. 
My  sympathies  and  convictions  were  both  on  that  side, 
although  my  personal  interests  were  wholly,  and  my 
personal  friendships  were  chiefly,  in  the  North.  What 
ever  had  happened,  neither  friend  nor  foe  could  have 
said  with  truth  that  I  was  not  ready  to  act  in  harmony 
with  my  convictions  at  the  proper  time.  When  Beaure- 
gard  fired  the  first  shot  at  Fort  Sumter  in  the  early 
dawn  of  April  13th,  1861,  he  sounded  a  call  which 
summoned  every  man  to  fall  into  line  on  his  own 
side,  and  there  could  no  longer  be  either  hesitation  or 
delay.  Those  officers  who  had  retired  from  the  United 
States  navy  to  enter  the  Mail  Service,  and  who  still 
remained  in  it,  were  now  drawn  by  a  natural  law  to 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  33 

their  own  side  of  the  dividing  line.  Those  from  the 
Northern  States  thought  it  their  duty  to  offer  their 
services  to  the  Government  at  Washington,  and  were 
restored  to  their  former  positions  in  the  United  States 
Navy.  Those  from  the  Southern  States  were  impelled 
by  corresponding  motives  to  offer  their  services  to  the 
Government  at  Montgomery,  and  were  incorporated  into 
the  Confederate  Navy.  At  10  a.m.  on  the  13th  of 
April,  1861,  all  doubt  in  regard  to  the  condition  of 
affairs  at  Charleston  had  vanished,  and  I  wrote  a  letter 
to  the  Hon.  J.  P.  Benjamin,  who  was  then  the  Attorney- 
General  of  the  Confederate  States,  requesting  him  to 
offer  my  services  to  the  Government. 

Some  members  of  the  Cabinet  knew  of  my  naval 
education  and  employment  in  the  Mail  Service,  and  I 
explained  to  Mr.  Benjamin,  that  being  in  command  of 
the  steamship  Bienville^  it  was  necessary  for  me  to  take 
her  back  to  New  York,  and  return  her  to  those  to  whom 
she  belonged,  but  that  on  arrival  in  New  York  I  would 
be  ready  for  any  service.  After  posting  that  letter  I 
went  on  board  ship,  to  hasten  the  preparations  for  sailing 
on  the  next  morning. 

In  the  course  of  the  afternoon  two  members  of  the 
•*  Board  of  War '  came  to  the  ship  with  the  company's 
agent,  and  informed  me  that  it  had  been  thought  im 
portant  to  secure  the  Bienville  for  the  naval  service  of 
the  Confederate  States,  and  if  I  would  name  a  price,  the 
Governor  would  order  the  amount  to  be  paid. 

I  replied  that  I  had  no  authority  to  sell  the  ship,  and 
therefore  could  not  fix  a  price,  nor  could  I  make  any 
arrangements  for  transferring  her  to  the  Confederate 
States.  We  had  some  further  conversation  on  the  sub 
ject,  the  members  of  the  Board  urging  me  to  accept  the 
Governor's  offer,  and  I  repeating,  in  substance,  what  I 

VOL.  i.  3 


34  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

had  said  at  first.  Finally,  they  told  me  that  if  I  did 
not  accept  the  terms  offered,  it  would  probably  be 
necessary  to  take  the  ship  by  force,  but  they  would 
inform  me  of  the  Governor's  decision  at  a  later 
hour. 

The  Governor  of  the  State  and  the  members  of  the 
Board  of  War  knew  precisely  my  position,  and  the  pro 
posal  for  the  purchase  of  the  ship  was  made  in  a  very 
friendly  way  to  me  personally.  I  felt  assured  that 
nothing  would  be  done  in  a  harsh  or  violent  manner, 
but  still  I  felt  that  I  could  neither  sell  the  ship  nor  give 
her  up  without  resistance,  and  it  was  inexpressibly 
painful  to  contemplate  the  possibility  that  I  might  be 
forced  into  collision  with  the  Government  I  was  willing 
and  had  just  offered  to  serve. 

Late  in  the  afternoon,  one  of  the  gentlemen  who  had 
previously  called  came  again  to  the  ship,  and  told  me 
that  the  Governor  had  decided  to  refer  the  matter  to  the 
authorities  at  Montgomery,  and  he  had  telegraphed  for 
instructions.  The  agent  of  the  Mail  Steamship  Company, 
Mr.  John  Fox,  spent  the  evening  on  board  with  me. 
He  was  a  Southern  man,  and  a  Secessionist,  and,  I 
believe,  in  his  heart  hoped  that  the  ship  would  be  seized ; 
but  he  was  loyal  to  me  and  to -the  New  York  owners, 
and  said  I  was  quite  right  in  refusing  to  give  her  up  on 
any  terms. 

I  told  him  I  could  not,  of  course,  fight,  but  I  could 
run,  and  I  meant  to.  To  that  end  I  had  the  mooring 
lines  shifted,  so  that  they  could  be  slipped  from  on  board, 
and  I  directed  the  engineer  to  get  up  steam.  My  pur 
pose  was  to  swing  off  from  the  pier,  or  c  levee/  at  the 
first  show  of  force,  and  c  skedaddle '  down  the  river. 
There  was  a  good  four  or  five  knot  current,  for  the 
Mississippi  was  in  the  spring  freshets,  and  I  had  no  fear 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  35 

of  being  stopped  by  the  forts  ;  but  I  felt  both  grieved 
and  annoyed  at  the  prospect  of  having  to  run  from  my 
friends,  to  save  the  property  of  those  who  were  con 
structively  my  enemies.* 

Happily,  the  necessity  for  the  race  did  not  arise.  At 
about  10  p.m.  I  had  the  pleasure  to  receive  a  message 
from  the  Governor  to  the  effect  that  the  oifer  for  the 
purchase  of  the  ship  was  still  open,  but  that  nothing 
would  be  done  to  prevent  my  departure  with  her  in 
the  morning.  The  two  gentlemen  who  brought  me 
this  very  agreeable  assurance  were  authorized  by  the 
Governor  to  show  me  the  reply  which  had  been  received 
from  Montgomery  to  his  own  despatch  about  the  pur 
chase  or  seizure  of  the  ship. 

The  reply  was  from  President  Davis.  I  believe  I 
remember  the  very  words.  '  Do  not  detain  the  Bienville ; 
we  do  not  wish  to  interfere  in  any  way  with  private  pro 
perty/  These  personal  incidents  are  of  no  importance 
in  themselves,  but  they  may  be  of  some  interest  as  de 
monstrating  the  comparatively  trivial  circumstances 
which  mark  the  beginning  of  great  events,  and  they 
manifest  the  purpose  of  the  Confederate  authorities  to 
act  with  prudence,  and  without  the  heat  and  passion 
which  commonly  mark  the  conduct  of  men  when  driven 
into  revolutionary  enterprises.  At  8  a.m.,  April  14,  the 

*  The  question  of  the  ability  of  the  forts  to  stop  an  ascending 
fleet  by  their  fire,  independently  of  an  artificial  obstruction  in  the 
river,  had  been  frequently  discussed  in  New  Orleans  after  the 
secession  of  the  State.  On  the  previous  voyage  of  the  Bienville,  I 
had  noted  the  time  required  to  pass  from  a  position  in  which  the 
first  gun  could  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  ship,  until  she  reached  a 
point  at  which  the  curve  of  the  river  interposed  the  protection  of 
the  shore.  I  had  found  it  to  be  fifteen  minutes  when  descending, 
and  twenty-five  minutes  when  ascending,  and  I  had  furnished  the 
Board  of  War  with  a  memorandum  to  that  effect. 

3—2 


36  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Bienville  sailed  from  New  Orleans  for  Havana  en  route 
for  New  York.  As  the  ship  neared  the  forts,  every  one 
on  board  came  on  deck  to  look  at  them.  We  saw  the 
sentinels  standing  at  ease  on  the  parapets.  At  our  peak 
flew  the  United  States  ensign.  The  flag  at  the  staff  on 
Fort  Jackson  bore  the  familiar  red  and  white  stripes, 
with  blue  Union  in  the  corner,  but  the  stars  representing 
the  States  which  still  remained  in  the  Union  had  been 
erased.  The  Confederacy  had  not  yet  adopted  an  en 
tirely  distinctive  flag.  The  Bienville  carried,  I  believe, 
the  first  report  to  Havana  that  hostilities  had  begun, 
and  there  was  much  excitement  there  in  consequence. 
The  United  States  steamer  Corwin  was  in  port,  and  two 
transports  en  route  for  New  York  with  a  dismounted 
regiment  of  United  States  cavalry  on  board.  The  troops 
had  been  serving  on  the  frontier  of  Texas,  and  when  that 
State  seceded,  they  had  been  called  upon  to  surrender 
the  public  property  to  the  State  authorities  and  to 
evacuate  the  State. 

Many  officers  came  on  board  the  Bienville  to  learn  the 
news.  The  officers  of  neither  army  nor  navy  had  been 
fired  with  the  war-fever  at  that  early  date,  and  all  ex 
pressed  regret  at  the  unhappy  turn  of  affairs.  They 
were  nevertheless  Northern  men,  who  meant  to  retain 
their  commissions,  and  fight  it  out  on  that  side,  and  I 
listened  to  their  comments,  but  maintained  a  prudent 
reserve. 

In  due  course  the  Bienville  sailed  for  New  York,  and 
arrived  there  on  the  evening  of  April  22.  Off  the  bar 
we  met  two  outward-bound  steamers,  standing  to  the 
southward.  Both  were  crowded  with  troops.  One  of 
them  hailed  in  passing,  and  reported  that  she  was  bound 
for  Washington. 

It  was  about  9  p.m.  when  the  Bienville  reached  her 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  37 

berth.  Off  the  pierhead  there  was  lying  at  anchor  a 
large  Long  Island  Sound  steamer.  She  loomed  up 
grandly  in  the  thin  mist  that  lay  upon  the  river.  Her 
lofty  tiers  of  saloons  were  brilliantly  lighted,  and  she 
appeared  to  be  swarming  with  passengers. 

As  soon  as  the  Bienville  was  berthed,  one  of  the 
managing  directors  of  the  company  came  on  board. 
The  information  he  had  to  give  was  important.  '  There 
had  been  fears  that  the  Confederates  would  make  a 
sudden  dash  and  seize  Washington,  and  troops  were 
hurrying  forward  for  its  protection.  There  had  been  a 
collision  between  a  regiment  of  United  States  volunteers 
and  a  mob  in  Baltimore,  and  some  lives  had  been  lost. 
The  steamer  off  the  pierhead  was  the  Empire  State,  with 
a  regiment  from  Rhode  Island  on  board. 

'  The  Government  had  chartered  the  Bienville  to  take 
troops  to  Washington,  and  the  Rhode  Island  regiment 
must  embark  as  soon  as  possible.' 

Of  course,  I  could  not  go  on  that  enterprise,  and  I  told 
the  director  so. 

Fortunately  I  was  not  pressed  for  reasons.  The 
directors  of  the  company  were  friendly  to  me,  and 
another  commander  was  appointed  in  such  a  way  that 
no  especial  attention  was  attracted  to  my  retirement. 
Very  shortly  afterwards  the  steamers  belonging  to  the 
company  were  bought  by  the  United  States  Govern 
ment,  and  they  were  soon  armed  and  sent  to  blockade 
the  Southern  ports. 

At  a  later  period  of  the  war  I  recognised  the  Bienville 
off  the  port  of  Savannah,  where  she  formed  a  part  of 
Admiral  Dupont's  fleet. 

It  was  only  nine  days  since  Beauregard's  guns  had 
opened  fire  upon  Fort  Sumter,  but  their  echoes  had 
already  reached  the  farthest  limits  of  the  country.  They 


38  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

had  lighted  a  conflagration  which  spread  with  electric 
speed  and  burned  with  consuming  energy  for  four  years. 

On  the  morning  after  the  arrival  of  the  Bienville  at 
New  York,  I  went  at  an  early  hour  to  the  office  of  the 
Steamship  Company. 

I  was  in  some  doubt  how  to  act,  because  I  had 
received  no  reply  to  the  letter  I  had  written  to  the  Hon. 
J.  P.  Benjamin  from  New  Orleans,  and  it  was  manifest 
that  postal  and  telegraphic  intercourse  between  the  North 
and  South  would  not  be  kept  open,  even  if  it  had  been 
safe  or  prudent  to  communicate  by  those  means.  My 
embarrassment  was  happily  relieved  by  finding  a  letter 
from  Mr.  Benjamin  awaiting  me.  It  must  have  been 
among  the  last  to  come  through  the  regular  United 
States  mail.  The  letter  was  brief,  but  to  the  point. 

'Department  of  Justice,  C.S.A. 

Montgomery,  Alabama. 

1  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  desires  you  to  come  to 
Montgomery  without  delay. 

6  Yours,  etc., 

£  (Signed)  J.  P.  BENJAMIN/ 

The  document  was  too  compromising  to  be  retained 
about  me,  and  I  destroyed  it  at  once.  It  was  necessary 
to  wind  up  my  affairs  with  the  company,  and  to  settle 
other  matters  of  business,  and  safety  required  that  I 
should  act  without  precipitancy.  It  is  probable  that  my 
return  to  New  York  with  the  Bienville  had  removed  any 
suspicion  of  my  '  loyalty '  which  the  public  authorities 
might  have  had,  and  my  friends  either  thought  that  I 
intended  at  least  to  remain  neutral,  or  else  they  were  too 
considerate  to  ask  questions  or  to  suggest  doubts.  I  was 
detained  about  ten  days  in  New  York,  and  the  com- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  39 

pulsory  sojourn  there  at  that  time  was  not  agreeable. 
Subsequent  information  has  assured  me  that  if  I  had 
shown  any  haste  in  my  movements,  I  should  have  been 
arrested.  I  mentioned  to  a  few  personal  friends  that  I 
purposed  going  to  Philadelphia,  and  possibly  to  Cincin 
nati,  and  in  the  early  days  of  May  I  started  southward 
with  light  luggage,  as  if  for  a  short  journey. 

In  the  train  to  Philadelphia  I  met  a  commander  in  the 
United  States  navy,  an  old  shipmate  of  former  days. 
The  war  was  uppermost  in  our  minds,  and  we  could 
talk  of  nothing  else.  My  friend  knew  that  I  was  a 
Southerner,  and  he  had  the  tact  and  prudence  not  to 
ask  any  embarrassing  questions,  but  he  told  me  that  he 
was  going  to  Washington  to  apply  for  a  command 
in  the  East  Indies,  and  said  that  he  wanted  to  get 
on  foreign  service,  where  he  could  not  be  employed 
against  the  South,  and  wished  no  professional  honour  or 
preferment  which  might  be  gained  in  such  a  struggle. 

This  feeling  was  common  to  the  majority  of  the 
regular  officers  of  the  United  States  army  and  navy 
whom  I  met  during  the  memorable  period  between  the 
election  of  Mr.  Abraham  Lincoln  and  the  attack  upon 
Fort  Sumter,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  many  took  up 
arms,  if  not  with  reluctance,  at  least  with  theYeeling  that 
they  were  performing  a  painful  duty. 

I  stopped  one  night  in  Philadelphia.  In  the  public 
squares  and  parks  large  bodies  of  men  were  drilling, 
and  the  streets  were  thronged  with  detachments  of 
troops.  Everywhere  the  din  and  bustle  of  preparation. 
I  hurried  on  via  Pittsburgh  to  Cincinnati,  arriving  at  the 
latter  place  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

Here  it  was  necessary  to  take  steamer  for  Louisville, 
and  the  boat  did  not  start  until  4  p.m.  I  walked  down 
to  the  steamboat  landing  and  looked  across  the  Ohio 


40  THE  SECEET  SERPICE  OF  THE 

river  at  the  Kentucky  hills  beyond.     Kentucky  was  still 
4  in  the  Union/  but  I  knew  that  the  feeling  of  the  people 
was  with  the  South,  and  once  across  the  border  I  should 
be  free  from  the  danger  of  being  asked  at  any  moment  to 
stop  and  give  -an  account  of  myself.     At  the  steamboat 
landing  there  were  a  military  guard,  and  two  civil  officers 
who  examined  the  packages  of  freight,  and  I  learned  that 
passengers  and  their  luggage  would  be  searched.    When 
I  went  to  embark  in  the  afternoon,  the  guards  were 
examining  and  questioning  passengers  at  the  ship's  side? 
but  a  local  gentleman  whom   I   accidentally  met  told 
them  I  was  a  friend  of  his,  who  was  going  to  Louisville 
on  business,  and  I  was  permitted  to  pass  without  ques 
tion  and  without  search.     There  were  a  number  of  Ken 
tucky  people  on  board  the  boat.     The  elder  were  grave 
and  silent,  but  some  of  the  younger  men  were  loud  and 
vehement  in  denouncing  the  examination  of  their  luggage, 
It  was  a  relief  to  me  when  the  lines  were  cast  off  and 
we  moved  swiftly  down  the  river.     I  took  the  first  train 
after  my  arrival  at  Louisville  for  Nashville,  Tennessee, 
and  arrived  there  at  mid-day,  May  5th.     Tennessee  had 
not  yet  seceded,  but  the  Convention  elected  especially  to 
determine  the  important  question  of  secession  was  sitting 
in  the  State  Capitol,  and  the  town  was  full  of  volunteer 
corps  and  people   from  the   country.      There  was    no 
doubt  about  the  feeling  here  ;  it  was  intensely  Southern, 
and  everyone  with  whom  I  spoke,  at  the  hotel  and  else 
where,  expressed  both  the  hope  and  belief  that  the  Con 
vention  would  '  vote  the  State  out  of  the  Union.'     The 
telegraph  was  working  to  Montgomery,  and  as  it  was 
quite  safe  to  communicate,  I  telegraphed  Mr.  Benjamin 
that  I  was   in  Nashville  en  route  for  the  Confederate 
capital. 

While  waiting  for   the  departure  of  a  train  for  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  41 

South,  I  walked  to  the  building  in  which  the  Convention 
was  sitting,  and  saw  there  General  Barrow,  a  prominent 
citizen,  who  had  been  in  the  diplomatic  service  of  the 
United  States.  General  Barrow  was  a  member  of  the 
Convention.  I  mentioned  to  him  that  I  was  on  my 
way  to  Montgomery  to  report  for  duty,  and  he  requested 
me  to  say  to  President  Davis,  confidentially,  that 
although  the  vote  might  not  be  taken  for  several  days, 
he  might  feel  confident  that  Tennessee  would  secede. 

In  due  time  the  train  started,  and  I  got  on  rapidly 
through  Chatanooga,  Atlanta,  etc.,  to  Montgomery.  It 
was  nearly  midnight,  May  7th,  when  I  reached  the  hotel 
at  Montgomery,  but  no  one  seemed  to  think  or  care 
about  sleeping.  Everywhere  on  the  journey  from  New 
York  I  had  heard  but  one  topic  of  conversation,  and 
everywhere  I  beheld  the  same  feverish  excitement,  the 
same  hastening  to  prepare  for  the  now  inevitable  conflict. 

At  an  early  hour  next  morning  I  called  at  Mr.  Ben 
jamin's  office.  He  said  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  had 
been  expecting  me  from  day  to  day,  and  would  be 
desirous  to  see  me  as  soon  as  possible.  He  took  me  at 
once  to  the  Navy  Department,  and  introduced  me  to 
its  chief. 

Mr.  Benjamin  was  a  busy  man  at  that  time,  and  so 
were  all  the  members  of  that  hastily  constructed  Pro 
visional  Government  at  Montgomery.  No  useless  phrases 
were  employed  in  the  presentation. 

'  Mr.  Secretary,  here  is  Captain  Bulloch.' 

( I  am  glad  to  see  you  :  I  want  you  to  go  to  Europe. 
When  can  you  start  ?' 

1 1  have  no  impedimenta,  and  can  start  as  soon  as  you 
explain  what  I  am  to  do/ 

The  announcement  of  this  foreign  mission  took  me 
aback,  to  use  a  nautical  phrase.  I  had  somehow  become 


42  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

possessed  with  the  expectation  that  I  would  be  sent  to 
New  Orleans. 

The  insufficiency  of  the  forts  to  prevent  the  pass 
ing  of  a  hostile  fleet  up  the  Mississippi  had  been  a 
frequent  subject  of  discussion  by  the  '  Board  of  War/ 
and  among  the  leading  citizens  of  New  Orleans  there 
had  been  much  argument  and  many  suggestions  as  to 
the  best  means  of  obstructing  the  channel.  The  diffi 
culties  to  be  met  were  the  depth  and  volume  of  water, 
the  great  strength  of  the  current,  especially  during  the 
spring-freshets,  when  the  Mississippi  flows  to  the  sea 
with  the  velocity  of  a  mill-race,  and  the  quantity  of  drift 
wood  and  timber  which  are  borne  along  by  the  stream. 

The  question  was  thought  to  lie  within  the  scope  of 
nautical  experience,  and  I  had  been  drawn  into  the  dis 
cussion  and  asked  as  a  naval  man  to  give  an  opinion. 
It  was  manifest,  I  thought,  that  no  permanent  immov 
able  obstruction  could  stand  the  strain  of  flood  and 
drift-wood,  and  I  suggested  the  following  plan  : 

6  Float  down  to  the  bight,  between  Forts  Jackson  and 
St.  Philip,  a  large  number  of  logs  from  60  to  100  feet 
long,  some  with  the  stumps  of  the  branches  remaining. 
Bore  large  auger  holes  through  the  butts  of  the  logs,  reeve 
chains  through  the  holes,  and  toggel  or  staple  the  ends. 
Anchor  a  line  of  the  logs  a  short  distance  below  Fort 
Jackson,  say  20  feet  apart,  using  for  this  line  logs  with 
the  stumps  of  their  branches  remaining,  to  form  a  sort  of 
marine  chevaux  de  /rise.  Anchor  a  second  line  a  short 
distance  above  the  first,  with  about  half  of  each  log 
trailing  in  the  space  between  two  logs  of  the  first  line ; 
and  a  third  line  trailing  in  like  manner  between  the 
openings  in  the  second  line,  etc.,  etc.  Multiply  the 
lines  to  any  extent  that  may  be  thought  necessary. 
Anchors  being  scarce,  stones  of  suitable  weight,  which 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  43 

would  soon  sink  in  the  soft  muddy  bottom  and  hold 
well,  can  be  used,  and  timber  being  abundant,  the 
cost  of  such  an  obstruction  will  be  moderate,  and  it  will 
offer  no  impediment  to  the  current,  while  the  drift 
timber  will  cant  and  pass  between  the  logs.  When  the 
attacking  fleet  enters  the  lower  reaches  of  the  river  and 
appears  to  be  preparing  to  force  a  passage,  make  fast  to 
the  ends  of  the  lower  line  of  logs  6  or  8-inch  hawsers, 
so  that  they  will  trail  down  the  river.  Between  the 
forts  the  river  takes  a  great  curve,  and  the  action  of  the 
current  will  keep  the  logs  constantly  sheering  from  star 
board  to  port,  and  they  will  thus  be  so  completely 
interlaced  as  soon  to  bring  up  ships  attempting  to  force 
through  them,  and  the  hawsers  will  foul  the  screws. 
While  the  ships  are  clearing  their  screws,  and  trying  to 
drift  out  of  the  obstructions,  the  fire  of  the  forts  can  be 
directed  upon  them  with  deliberation,  and  therefore  with 
precision/ 

I  proposed  that  field-pieces  or  howitzers,  covered 
by  a  protecting  force,  should  be  masked  on  the  river- 
banks  opposite  the  lower  line  of  logs,  to  prevent  the 
enemy  sending  boats  to  cut  the  hawsers  and  the  log 
chains.  I  am  not  at  all  sure  that  the  foregoing  plan 
was  ever  formally  submitted  to  the  Governor  in  Council 
— indeed,  I  suspect  it  was  not ;  but  it  was  unofficially  dis 
cussed  with  me  by  one  or  two  members  of  the  Board, 
and  when  I  was  in  New  Orleans  with  the  steamship 
Bienville  in  March,  1861,  I  was  asked  to  put  the  sugges 
tion  in  writing,  and  would  have  done  so  on  my  next 
return  in  April,  but  the  suddenness  of  the  crisis  at  that 
time,  the  rapidity  with  which  events  then  moved,  and  my 
necessary  departure  from  New  Orleans,  either  prevented 
my  doing  so,  or  other  pressing  questions  took  precedence- 

The  military  men  on  the  Board  probably  thought  the 


44  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

plan  too  simple;  at  any  rate,  it  was  not  adopted.  When 
Admiral  Farragut  attempted  to  pass  the  forts  on  the 
night  of  April  23-24,  1862,  just  one  year  afterwards,  he 
found  the  passage  obstructed  by  '  a  chain  which  crossed 
the  river,  and  was  supported  by  eight  hulks  strongly 
moored.'* 

Parties  were  sent  in  advance  to  blow  up  the  hulks 
and  break  the  chain.  *  This  duty  was  not  thoroughly 
performed,  in  consequence  of  the  failure  to  ignite  the 
petards  with  the  galvanic  battery,  and  the  great  strength 
of  the  current/  '  The  vessel  boarded  by  Lieutenant- 
Commanding  Caldwell  appears  to  have  had  her  chains 
so  secured  that  they  could  be  cast  loose,  which  was  done 
by  that  officer,  thereby  making  an  opening  sufficiently 
large  for  the  ships  to  pass  through.' 

The  fleet  does  not  appear  to  have  been  delayed  by  the 
obstructions,  for  ^Admiral  Farragut  says,  '  We  soon 
passed  the  barrier  chains/  and  the  forts  could  only 
therefore  get  flying  shots  at  the  ships  as  they  steamed 
up  the  river.  From  Confederate  accounts  it  appears 
that  the  obstruction  was  a  raft,  the  logs  and  hulks  com 
posing  it  being  held  together  by  chains,  and  the  whole 
kept  in  position  by  numerous  anchors. 

This  stationary  and  rigid  structure  could  not  resist 
the  strain  of  flood  and  drift-wood,  and  was  frequently 
broken.  Its  condition  excited  both  interest  and  fears  at 
Richmond.  A  few  days  before  Admiral  Farragut's  attack, 
Mr.  Secretary  Mallory  telegraphed  to  the  officer  com 
manding  the  naval  defences  at  New  Orleans,  '  Is  the 
boom,  or  raft,  below  the  forts  in  order  to  resist  the 
enemy,  or  has  any  part  of  it  given  way  ?  State  con 
dition/  Captain  Whittle  replied  (April  18),  '  I  hear  the 

*  Admiral  Farragut's  report,  dated  May  6,  1862,  in  his  'Life  '  by 
his  son,  p.  243,  etc. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  45 

raft  below  the  forts  is  not  in  best  condition  They  are 
strengthening  it  by  additional  lines.  I  have  furnished 
anchors.'  The  Commanding  General  at  New  Orleans 
had  exclusive  charge  of  the  construction  of  the  raft,  or 
obstruction,  and  the  Naval  Commander  was  simply 
required  to  supply  anchors  and  assistance  when  asked. 

Discussions  in  respect  to  the  best  mode  of  obstructing 
the  river  channel  are  useless  at  this  late  date,  and  con 
jectures  whether  any  other  mode  than  the  one  adopted 
would  have  been  effectual  in  stopping  the  attacking 
fleet,  would  seem  to  imply  some  reproach  upon  the 
defenders,  who  doubtless  did  their  best  with  the 
materials  at  hand. 

Remembering  the  discussions  on  the  subject  at  New 
Orleans,  I  got  the  impression,  when  summoned  to 
Montgomery,  that  I  was  wanted  about  the  Mississippi 
river  defences,  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy's  laconic 
query,  when  could  I  start  for  Europe,  rather  surprised 
me.  There  was,  however,  no  time  for  parley.  The 
Confederate  Government  had  been  scarcely  three  months 
in  existence,  and  yet  it  was  pressed  by  the  requirements 
of  a  great  emergency. 

The  South  was  outnumbered  in  population  at  least 
five  to  one.  In  military  and  naval  resources  the  dis 
proportion  was  many  times  greater.  The  only  hope  of 
success  lay  in  the  prompt  and  energetic  use  of  her  whole 
strength,  and  it  was  the  bounden  duty  of  everyone  to 
accept  the  position  and  employment  allotted  to  him 
without  cavil  or  remonstrance. 

Many  of  the  Southern  officers  were  on  foreign 
stations  when  their  States  seceded.  They  had  not  only 
to  return  to  the  United  States  by  long  routes,  but,  after 
arrival,  they  were  compelled  to  find  their  way  to  the 
South  through  the  Northern  States,  whose  people  were 


46  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

daily  becoming  more  and  more  hostile.  They  had 
often  to  take  circuitous  and  expensive  routes,  and  hence 
most  of  them  reached  their  homes  with  pecuniary 
resources  exhausted,  and  they  had  nothing  to  offer  to 
their  country  '  but  their  patriotism  and  their  swords/ 
Even  their  experience  and  their  technical  knowledge 
were  at  first  of  little  profit,  because  the  Confederacy  had 
no  ships  for  them  to  serve  in,  and  no  seamen  to  be 
organized  and  drilled. 

Mr.  Mallory  briefly  touched  upon  the  condition  of  his 
Department.  Very  few  of  the  naval  officers  who  had 
resigned  from  the  United  States  Service  had  found  their 
way  to  Montgomery,  and  not  many  had  yet  come  into 
direct  communication  with  him.  He  had  been  able  to 
buy  one  small  steamer  at  New  Orleans,  and  Commander 
Semmes  had  been  ordered  to  fit  her  out  for  a  cruise. 

A  committee  of  naval  officers  were  examining  the 
few  vessels  at  the  different  Southern  ports,  but  up  to 
that  date  had  found  only  the  one  Semmes  had  in  hand 
which  could  be  converted  into  a  ship-of-war. 

There  were  no  machine  shops,  nor  yards,  no  ship 
wrights,  and  no  collection  of  material  for  ship-building. 
It  was  thought  to  be  of  prime  importance  to  get  cruisers 
at  sea  as  soon  as  possible,  to  harass  the  enemy's  com 
merce,  and  to  compel  him  to  send  his  own  ships -of- war 
in  pursuit,  which  might  otherwise  be  employed  in 
blockading  the  Southern  ports.  These  were  the  chief 
points  of  Mr.  Mallory's  explanatory  remarks.  He  then 
discussed  the  description  of  vessel  best  suited  to  the 
requirements  of  the  service,  and  the  possibility  of  being 
able  to  buy  or  build  them  in  England,  and  finally  he 
told  me  to  go  to  my  hotel,  turn  the  whole  subject  over 
in  my  mind,  and  make  such  notes  of  the  conversation  as 
might  be  necessary  to  impress  the  substance  on  my 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  47 

memory,  and  to  call  on  him  again  the  next  day.  Even 
at  that  early  date,  the  blockade  of  the  chief  Southern  ports 
had  been  established  more  or  less  rigidly,  and  it  was 
thought  better  that  I  should  find  my  way  into  Canada 
through  the  Western  States,  and  from  thence  to  Europe, 
than  to  attempt  an  exit  from  one  of  the  home  ports  in  a 
sailing  vessel,  the  only  description  of  craft  then  avail 
able  ;  besides  which,  the  route  vid  Canada  promised 
quicker  transit,  and  time  was  of  the  essence  of  the 
enterprise.  This  mode  of  departure  manifestly  pro 
hibited  the  carrying  of  any  documents,  or  even  memo 
randa,  which  could  betray  the  object  of  my  mission  in 
case  of  capture  ;  hence  the  necessity  for  committing  the 
chief  points  of  the  instructions  to  memory. 

In  compliance  with  Mr.  Mallory's  request  I  called  at 
the  Navy  Department  on  the  following  morning,  May  9. 
He  examined  my  notes  of  the  previous  day's  conversa 
tion,  and  enlarged  upon  the  various  subjects.  He  dwelt 
especially  upon  the  probable  course  of  the  European 
Powers,  and  expressed  the  belief  that  they  would 
recognise  the  de  facto  Government  at  Montgomery,  and 
would  grant  to  the  commissioned  cruisers  of  the  Con 
federate  States  the  shelter  and  privileges  conceded  to  all 
belligerents  by  the  comity  of  nations.  He  did  not 
expect  a  formal  recognition  of  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  as  an  independent  Power  until  the  probability  of 
success  had  been  demonstrated  by  some  substantial 
victories  in  the  fi^eld.  He  warned  me  to  be  prudent 
and  heedful,  so  as  not  to  involve  the  diplomatic  agents 
of  the  Confederate  States  in  embarrassing  complaints  for 
alleged  violation  of  neutral  law  0%,  obligation,  and  he 
directed  me  to  acquaint  myself,  as  soon  as  possible  after 
my  arrival  in  England,  with  the  nature  and  scope  of  the 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  and  the  Queen's  Proclamation 


48  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

of  Neutrality,  if  one  should  be  issued.  Keverting  to 
the  special  objects  of  my  mission,  he  impressed  upon 
me  the  wish  of  the  Government  to  get  cruising  ships  of 
suitable  type  afloat  with  the  quickest  possible  despatch, 
and  urged  me  to  buy  and  forward  naval  supplies  of  all 
kinds  without  delay.  He  authorised  me  to  practise  a 
wide  discretionary  power  within  the  limits  of  his  general 
instructions,  and  discussed  at  some  length  the  financial 
question,  and  the  mode  of  placing  funds  in  Europe.  He 
informed  me  that  Messrs.  Fraser,  Trenholm  and  Co.,  of 
Liverpool,  would  be  the  bankers  or  l  depositaries J  of  the 
Confederate  Government,  and  directed  me  to  communi 
cate  with  them,  and  with  the  Hon.  W.  L.  Yancey  and 
the  Hon.  Dudley  Mann,  the  Confederate  Commissioners, 
immediately  upon  my  arrival  in  England.  Finally,  he 
requested  me  to  start  as  soon  as  possible,  and  said  that 
written  instructions,  with  anything  further  he  might 
wish  to  communicate,  would  be  sent  me  by  the  first 
opportunity  through  one  of  the  seaports. 

I  left  Montgomery  by  that  night's  train.  Before 
reaching  the  Kentucky  line  I  destroyed  all  notes  and 
memoranda,  and  from  Louisville  I  proceeded,  without 
let  or  hindrance,  to  Detroit,  Michigan. 

The  whole  North  appeared  to  be  in  military  com 
motion.  Volunteer  corps  in  uniform,  and  large  detach 
ments  of  men  without  uniform,  were  seen  drilling  in 
every  town  through  which  I  passed,  and  t  the  war '  was 
the  one  absorbing  topic  of  conversation  among  the 
passengers  in  the  trains,  and  the  crowds  assembled  at 
the  railway  stations. 

Crossing  from  Detroit  to  the  Canada  side  of  Lake 
Erie,  I  took  the  Grand  Trunk  Kailway  to  Montreal,  and 
the  Allan  Line  steamer  North  American  to  Liverpool, 
arriving  at  that  port  on  the  4th  of  June,  1861. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  49 

NOTE  TO  PAGE  21. 

The  dockyard  at  Norfolk  was  at  that  time  under  the  command 
of  Commodore  C.  S.  McCauley,  U.S.N.  He  had  not  sufficient  force 
on  shore  to  have  held  possession  of  the  dockyard  if  an  attack  had 
been  made  upon  it  from  the  land  side.  But  such  an  attempt  was 
not  contemplated  by  the  local  authorities — indeed,  it  was  not  possible. 
The  Cumberland,  a  powerful  sailing  corvette,  with  a  crew  of  300  men, 
had  lately  arrived  from  sea,  and  was  lying  close  at  hand.  Her 
batteries  commanded  the  neighbouring  town,  and  not  only  afforded 
ample  protection  to  the  dockyard,  but  in  fact  made  Commodore 
McCauley  master  of  the  situation.  Virginia  had  not  yet  seceded, 
but  the  Convention  to  determine  that  important  question  was  in 
session  at  Eichmond,  and  the  signs  pointed  to  the  expectation  that 
she  would  soon  cast  in  her  lot  with  the  States  which  had  already 
withdrawn  from  the  Union.  General  Taliaf erro  had  been  appointed  to 
the  local  military  command  at  Norfolk  on  behalf  of  the  State  of  Virginia, 
but  he  had  no  organized  force  under  his  control.  Confederate  accounts 
state  that  he  had  carried  on  some  negotiations  with  Commodore 
McCauley  in  respect  to  the  dockyard,  and  that  it  had  been  agreed 
that  '  none  of  the  vessels  should  be  removed,  nor  a  shot  fired,  except 
in  self-defence.'  During  the  night  of  April  20th  the  ship-houses  in 
the  yard  were  set  on  fire,  one  of  which  contained  the  frame  of  a  line- 
of-battle  ship.  These,  with  a  long  line  of  store-houses  and  offices 
adjoining  them,  were  soon  enveloped  in  flames,  and  were  burned. 
The  ships  afloat,  including  the  sailing  line-of-battle  ships  Pennsylvania 
and  Delaware,  the  frigates  Raritan  and  Columbus,  and  the  corvettes 
Plymouth  and  Germantoirn,  were  set  on  fire  and  scuttled.  The  above- 
named  vessels  were  completely  destroyed.  The  screw-frigate  Merrimac 
was  burned  nearly  to  the  water's  edge,  but  the  fire  was  extinguished 
after  the  United  States  forces  had  evacuated  the  yard,  and  she 
afterwards  became  famous  as  the  Confederate  ironclad  ram  Virginia. 
While  Commodore  McCauley  was  preparing  for  the  work  of 
destroying  the  dockyard  and  its  contents,  Commodore  Paulding 
arrived  with  the  screw-corvette  Pawnee,  having  a  detachment  of 
troops  on  board,  and  the  further  operations  were  carried  on  under 
his  orders.  The  greater  portion  of  the  guns  in  the  parks  were 
spiked,  the  machinery  in  the  shops  was  broken,  and  an  attempt  was 
made  to  blow  up  the  graving-dock,  but  this  failed.  Finally  Com 
modore  McCauley,  with  the  officers,  embarked ;  and  the  Pau'nee,  with 
the  Cumberland  in  tow,  proceeded  down  the  river.  As  much  of  the 
VOL.  I.  4 


50  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

naval  stores  as  could  be  got  on  board  the  Cumberland  was  carried  off ; 
the  remainder  was  either  destroyed  or  greatly  damaged.  No  effort 
was  made  by  the  Virginia  State  authorities  to  stop  the  ships,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  there  was  no  military  or  naval  force  capable 
of  opposing  them. 

It  will  thus  be  manifest  that  when  Virginia  joined  the  Con 
federacy  she  could  offer  but  a  small  contribution  to  the  naval 
resources  of  her  allies — only  the  wreck  of  her  great  dockyard. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  51 


CHAPTER  II. 

Messrs.  Fraser,  Trenholm  and  Co. — The  Confederate  Commissioners. 
— Major  Huse,  the  Military  Agent. — Early  operations.  —  Restrictions 
of  the  Proclamations  of  Neutrality. — Their  effects  upon  United 
States  and  Confederate  Cruisers. — The  Oreto  (Florida}. — Messrs. 
Laird  and  the  Alabama. — The  Equipment  of  the  Alabama. — 
Counsel's  Opinion  on  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act. — Despatch  of 
the  Bermuda  with  supplies  for  the  Confederate  Army. — Second 
Voyage  and  Capture  of  the  Bermuda. — The  Trial  at  Philadelphia. 
— The  United  States  and  belligerent  rights. — Decree  of  Court  in 
the  Bermuda  case. — Contrast  between  the  action  of  the  United 
States  as  a  belligerent  and  as  a  neutral  concerning  belligerent 
rights. — The  United  States  and  neutral  vessels  during  the  Crimean 
War. — The  Bahama  Islands  '  Regulations '  of  the  British  Govern 
ment. — Reasons  for  the  seeming  indifference  of  the  British  Govern 
ment. — Precedents  established  by  the  United  States  favourable  to 
Great  Britain.  —  European  Naval  Armaments.  —  British  Ship 
building. — Importance  of  British  Mercantile  Marine. — Weakness 
of  the  United  States  as  a  Naval  Power. — Former  efficiency  of  the 
American  Navy. — Seamanship  in  the  Past  and  the  Present 

MY  first  duty  after  arrival  at  Liverpool  was  to  com 
municate  with  the  financial  agents  of  the  Confederate 
Government,  but  it  was  already  late  in  the  day,  and 
places  of  business  were  for  the  most  part  closed.  At  an 
early  hour  on  the  next  morning  I  called  at  the  counting- 
house  of  Messrs.  Fraser,  Trenholm  and  Co.,  and  went  up 
to  London  the  same  afternoon,  to  see  the  Confederate 
Commissioners,  who  at  that  time  were  the  Hon.  William 
L.  Yancey  and  the  Hon.  Dudley  Mann. 

4—2 


52  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

I  had  no  credentials,  and  nothing  to  prove  my  personal 
identity,  or  the  nature  of  my  mission  ;  but  when  men 
are  moved  by  a  common  sympathy,  and  their  minds  are 
earnestly  set  upon  the  same  object,  the  powers  of  dis 
cerning  seem  to  be  quickened,  and  they  recognise  each 
other  by  intuitive  perception.  At  any  rate,  the  Com 
missioners  gave  me  a  cordial  welcome,  and  we  were 
soon  deep  in  Confederate  affairs.  They  explained  the 
diplomatic  situation.  They  had  not  been  officially 
received  by  Her  Majesty's  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  did  not  think  the  Confederate  States  would 
be  recognised  until  they  had  demonstrated  their  ability 
to  win  and  to  maintain  their  independence ;  nevertheless, 
the  chief  European  Powers  had  admitted  that  there  was 
a  de  facto  Government  at  Montgomery,  with  power  to 
raise  armies  and  to  levy  war,  and  they  thought  we  would 
be  permitted  to  obtain  supplies  in  England  upon 
the  same  conditions  as  any  other  belligerent,  and  they 
encouraged  me  to  set  to  work  with  due  precaution,  but 
with  alacrity,  promising  their  hearty  support  whenever 
I  might  need  their  intervention. 

Messrs.  Eraser,  Trenholm  and  Co.  received  me  with 
equal  cordiality  and  equal  trust.  No  funds  had  yet 
reached  them,  and  they  had  no  advice  of  remittances  on 
behalf  of  my  mission  ;  but  Mr.  Charles  K.  Prioleau,  the 
resident  partner,  perceiving  the  necessity  of  prompt 
action,  authorized  me  to  give  out  such  orders  as  were  of 
pressing  importance,  and  to  refer  to  his  firm  for  the 
financial  arrangements.  Captain,  afterwards  Major 
Caleb  Huse,  of  the  Confederate  Army,  had  preceded  me 
to  England,  and  had  already  made  some  large  purchases 
of  arms,  and  still  larger  contracts,  upon  the  credit 
of  Messrs.  Eraser,  Trenholm  and  Co. 

Major  Huse  was  a  graduate  of  the  Military  Academy 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  53 

at  West  Point,  and  after  serving  a  number  of  years  in 
the  United  States  artillery,  had  retired  from  active 
service,  and  when  the  Southern  States  seceded  he  was 
superintendent  of  the  Alabama  State  Military  Academy. 
When  the  Provisional  Government  at  Montgomery  was 
formed.  Major  Huse  was  sent  to  Europe  to  buy 
arms  and  other  ordnance  supplies  for  the  army, 
and  he  represented  the  War  Department,  and  especi 
ally  the  Ordnance  Bureau,  during  the  whole  war. 
This  officer  was  a  man  of  ability,  and  of  unusual  energy, 
but  his  services  were  scarcely  known  beyond  the  office 
of  his  departmental  chief.  I  have  always  felt  that  the 
safety  of  Richmond  at  the  time  of  General  McClellan's 
advance  from  Yorktown  up  the  peninsula,  in  the 
spring  of  1862,  was  largely  due  to  the  efforts  of 
Mr.  Charles  K.  Prioleau  and  Major  Huse,  because  the 
former  furnished  the  credits,  and  the  latter  bought  and 
forwarded  the  rifles  and  field  artillery  without  which 
the  great  battles  of  Seven  Pines  and  the  Chickahominy, 
could  not  have  been  successfully  fought. 

It  is  an  unquestionable  fact  that  the  Confederate 
Government  had  great  financial  difficulties  to  meet,  and 
the  '  depositaries  '  in  England  were  often  under  heavy 
advances  to  the  various  Bureaux  of  the  War  Depart 
ment,  and  on  one  or  two  important  occasions  to  the 
Navy  Department  also.  Major  Huse  showed  both  skill 
and  energy  in  pressing  the  credit  of  the  Government, 
and  he  often  made  large  contracts,  and  even  got  delivery 
of  arms  and  other  ordnance  stores,  when  there  were  no 
public  funds  at  all  in  England. 

My  early  operations  were  greatly  helped  by  the 
generous  confidence  of  Messrs.  Eraser,  Trenholm  and 
Co.  Within  a  month  after  my  arrival,  I  had  not  only 
been  able  to  buy  a  fair  quantity  of  naval  supplies  on 


54  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

their  credit,  but  had  laid  the  keel  of  the  first  foreign  - 
built  Confederate  cruiser,  and  she  was  partly  in  frame 
before  the  Navy  Department  had  found  it  possible 
to  place  any  funds  in  Europe.  The  vessel  thus  early 
begun  (June,  1861),  was  the  Oreto,  afterwards  Florida. 
As  it  is  the  purpose  of  this  narrative  not  only  to 
show  that  a  Confederate  naval  force  was  organized 
abroad  during  the  Civil  War,  but  that  the  operations 
were  carried  on  with  strict  regard  to  local  law,  I  feel 
the  necessity  of  being  somewhat  minute  in  describing 
the  manner  in  which  all  contracts  for  ships  were  made. 

The  great  Maritime  Powers  in  Europe  issued  pro 
clamations  of  neutrality*  at  a  very  early  date  after  the 
beginning  of  hostilities,  and  these  proclamations  were 
supplemented  from  time  to  time  by  Admiralty  orders 
and  regulations  defining  the  conditions  upon  which  the 
ships  of  both  belligerents  would  be  allowed  refuge 
in  the  neutral  ports,  to  make  repairs  and  to  obtain 
supplies.  The  chief  restrictions  specified  in  those 
orders  were,  that  no  ship  should  reinforce  her  crew,  or 
make  greater  alterations  and  repairs  than  were  necessary 
to  ensure  her  safety ;  that  the  armament  should  not  be 
changed  or  increased,  and  that  no  ordnance  or  other  des 
cription  of  stores  classed  as  '  contraband  of  war'  should 
be  taken  on  board ;  that  the  quantity  of  coal  to  be  taken 
should  be  no  more  than  enough  to  carry  her  to  the 
nearest  port  of  her  own  country,  and  after  receiving  that 
quantity  she  should  not  enter  any  harbour  of  the  same 
neutral  power  for  another  supply  until  the  expiration  of 
three  months,  except  by  special  permission. 

The  example  of  England  and  France  was  followed  by 
the   minor   Powers.     Spain  and    Portugal   proclaimed 
their   neutrality,  and  announced  the  conditions  upon 
*  Proclamation  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty  dated  May  13,  1861. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  55 

which  their  ports  might  be  used  by  the  two  belligerents. 
Even  Brazil  and  the  South  American  Republics  soon  fell 
to  defining  their  views,  and  swelled  the  general  chorus  of 
*  impartial  neutrality '  in  the  great  struggle  between  the 
North  and  South  which  the  easterly  trade-winds  wafted 
over  to  them  from  Europe.  If  the  restrictions  thus 
imposed  upon  the  cruisers  of  both  parties  in  the 
Civil  War  were  vexatious  and  inconvenient  to  the 
Federal  Government,  they  were  manifestly  more  burden 
some  and  perplexing  to  that  of  the  Confederacy. 

The  United  States  had  four  ample  and  well-found 
dockyards  on  the  Atlantic  coast  (Portsmouth,  Boston, 
New  York  and  Philadelphia),  at  which  their  ships  could 
be  efficiently  and  completely  equipped.  In  addition  to 
this  advantage,  the  home  ports  were  always  open  to  them 
for  shelter,  repair  and  supply,  and  everywhere  abroad 
there  were  diplomatic  and  consular  agents  to  appeal 
to  for  aid  in  case  of  difficulty  or  undue  exactions  on 
the  part  of  local  authorities.  Besides  this,  the  United 
States  Navy  Department  could  furnish  each  cruising 
ship  with  ample  credits  through  bankers  whose  financial 
position  had  long  been  assured  the  world  over.  A 
Confederate  cruiser,  on  the  contrary,  had  no  home  port 
for  outfit  or  retreat.  She  was  compelled  to  be  as  nearly 
as  possible  self-supporting.  Her  flag  was  tolerated 
only,  not  recognised.  Once  upon  the  seas,  she  could 
never  hope  to  re-supply  the  continual  waste  of  her 
powers  of  offence  or  defence,  and  could  obtain  but 
a  grudging  allowance  of  the  merest  necessaries.  Her 
1  military  chest '  was  the  paymaster's  safe,  and  her 
financial  resources  were  the  moderate  supply  of 
sovereigns  with  which  she  began  her  cruise.  In  case 
of  difficulty,  there  was  no  resident  Minister  to  whom 
the  captain  could  refer  for  counsel  or  support,  110 


56  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

consular   representative  who  could  set   his  case  before 
the  authorities  in  the  neutral  ports. 

In  the  home  ports  of  England  and  France  the  Con 
federate  cruisers  were  fairly  and  courteously  treated — at 
any  rate,  the  treatment  was  uniform  and  consistent — 
but  in  the  distant  colonies,  and  at  the  ports  of  other  less 
powerful  and  independent  countries,  the  manner  in  which 
they  were  received,  and  the  spirit  in  which  the  neutrality 
regulations  were  enforced,  depended  very  much  upon 
the  individual  sympathies  and  opinions  of  the  local 
Governor,  or  the  amount  of  influence  the  resident  United 
States  Consul  could  exert. 

I  believe  this  to  be  a  very  moderate  statement  of  the 
contrast  between  the  conditions  under  which  the  United 
States  and  Confederate  cruisers  were  kept  at  sea  during 
the  war. 

If  it  had  not  been  for  the  limitations  and  restrictions 
of  the  '  Admiralty  orders  '  previously  referred  to,  many 
more  vessels  might  have  been  got  to  sea  under  the 
Confederate  flag  ;  but  it  would  have  been  manifestly 
improvident,  and  a  purposeless  waste  of  the  limited 
resources  of  the  Navy  Department,  to  commission  ships 
for  distant  and  continuous  cruising,  unless  they  could 
carry  ample  supplies  of  all  necessaries,  especially  of 
ordnance  stores,  and  could  sail  as  well  as  steam  at  a 
good  rate  of  speed.  A  vessel  without  good  sailing 
qualities,  and  without  the  arrangement  and  means  for 
lifting  her  screw,  would  have  been  practically  useless  as 
a  Confederate  cruiser.  She  could  only  have  made 
passages  from  one  coaling  station  to  another  ;  and  as 
she  could  only  coal  at  a  port  of  the  same  country  once 
in  three  months,  her  career  would  soon  have  been 
brought  to  an  untimely  and  not  very  creditable  end. 

The  necessities  of  the  case,  then,  dictated  the  type  of 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  57 

the  Confederate  ship,  and  the  Oreto  (Florida)  and.  the 
Alabama  were  especially  designed  to  meet  those  require 
ments.* 

The  Florida  was  a  wooden  vessel.  Messrs.  William. 
C.  Miller  and  Sons  were  the  builders,  and  she  was  built 
at  their  yard  in  Liverpool.  That  firm  was  selected  to 
build  the  hull  of  the  ship,  and  to  supply  the  masts, 
rigging,  boats,  and  general  sea-outfit,  because  the  senior 
of  the  firm  had  been  in  the  Royal  Navy  as  a  shipwright, 
and  had  served  in  her  Majesty's  dockyards  as  a  naval 
constructor.  He  had  therefore  much  experience  in  the 
construction  of  wooden  ships  designed  to  carry  heavy 
weights  on  deck  and  to  berth  large  crews.  Messrs. 
Miller  and  Sons  were  not  engineers,  and,  as  it  was 
advisable,  for  mam-  reasons,  that  ship  and  engines 
should  be  as  near  together  as  possible,  Messrs.  Fawcett, 
Preston  and  Co.,  of  Liverpool,  were  chosen  to  design 
and  build  the  engines.  The  financial  arrangements 
were  made  with  Messrs.  Fawcett,  Preston  and  Co.  ex 
clusively.  They  took  the  whole  contract  for  both  ship 
and  engines,  and  the  preliminary  discussions  were  of  the 
ordinary  business  character. 

Mr.  W.  C.  Miller  had  a  scale  drawing  of  one  of  her 
Majesty's  gunboats,  which  we  adopted  as  a  base  to  start 
from.  She  was  drawn  out  in  the  midship  section,  and 
the  floor  was  flattened  to  get  greater  carrying  capacity. 
The  increased  length  thus  obtained  admitted  of  finer 
entrance  and  clearance  lines,  which  secured  higher  speed. 

*  The  two  vessels  built  at  Liverpool,  and  which  were  afterwards 
commissioned  abroad  as  Confederate  cruisers,  are  generally  mentioned 
in  this  narrative  as  the  Florida  and  Alabama,  to  avoid  frequent  ex 
planation.  It  will,  however,  be  understood  that  they  were  never 
known  by  those  names  in  the  port  of  their  construction,  and  were 
never  alluded  to  in  the  arrangements  with  the  builders,  except  as 
the  Oreto  and  No.  290. 


58  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

The  rigging  scale  was  also  largely  increased,  so  as  to 
get  a  good  spread  of  canvas,  especially  when  close 
hauled,  or  with  the  wind  a-beam.  The  type  and  rig 
of  ship  being  satisfactorily  adjusted,  Messrs.  Fawcett, 
Preston  and  Co.  designed  the  engines,  which  were  care 
fully  discussed.  The  contract  was  made  with  me  as  a 
private  person,  nothing  whatever  being  said  about  the 
ultimate  destination  of  the  ship,  or  the  object  for  which 
she  was  intended.  It  is  not  usual  for  building  firms  to 
ask  questions,  or  to  express  opinions  as  to  the  motives 
or  purposes  of  those  from  whom  they  take  orders. 
Before  the  completion  of  the  ship,  Messrs.  Fawcett, 
Preston  and  Co.  and  the  Messrs.  Miller  may  both  have 
had  a  tolerably  clear  notion  that  she  would  at  some 
future  time,  and  by  some  subsequent  arrangement,  pass 
into  the  possession  of  the  Confederate  Government ;  but 
they  never  mentioned  their  suspicions,  and  they  under 
took  nothing  more  than  to  build  and  deliver  in  Liver 
pool  a  screw- steamer,  according  to  certain  specified 
plans  and  conditions,  fitted  for  sea  in  every  respect,  but 
without  armament  or  equipment  for  fighting  of  any  kind 
whatever.  To  provide  an  answer  in  advance  for  any 
inquisitive  comments  or  surmises,  Oreto  was  chosen  as 
the  dockyard  name  for  the  ship.  It  was  incidentally 
mentioned  among  the  workpeople  that  she  would  pro 
bably  be  sent  to  a  mercantile  firm  doing  business  in 
Palermo,  and  a  local  representative  of  that  firm  under 
took  the  details  of  supervising  and  despatching  her. 

While  the  negotiations  for  the  Oreto  (Florida)  were 
in  progress,  I  went  with  a  friend  to  visit  the  Birkenhead 
Ironworks,  and  was  introduced  to  the  Messrs.  Laird. 
After  an  interesting  examination  of  their  extensive 
establishment,  I  led  the  conversation  to  the  subject  of 
wooden  despatch  vessels,  and  described  with  some 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  59 

minuteness  the  type  which  appeared  most  desirable  in 
my  judgment.  The  subject  was  naturally  of  interest  to 
the  Messrs.  Laird,  and  they  gave  me  their  opinions  and 
the  result  of  their  experience  with  freedom.  A  few 
days  after,  I  called  again,  re -opened  the  conversation 
about  a  screw  despatch  vessel,  discussed  the  matter 
somewhat  more  in  detail,  and  finally  told  them  that  I 
wished  to  build  such  a  ship,  and  asked  if  they  would  be 
willing  to  go  into  the  necessary  calculations,  draw  up 
specifications,  and  make  drawings  and  a  model,  upon  my 
assurance  that  I  meant  business  and  was  ready  to  give 
them  the  necessary  financial  guarantee.  They  were 
satisfied  with  my  proposals,  and  in  a  very  short  time  all 
the  details  of  the  Alabama  were  settled  to  our  common 
satisfaction. 

The  origin  of  the  Alabama,  her  departure  from 
England,  and  her  career  afloat,  have  been  much  dis 
cussed.  Probably  no  single  ship  has  ever  given  occasion 
for  so  much  diplomatic  correspondence,  or  has  furnished 
the  grounds  for  so  many  complaints,  and  the  foundation 
for  so  great  an  alleged  international  grievance.  She  has 
been  called  a  i  British  pirate  ;'  many  persons  believed 
that  she  was  paid  for  by  a  subscription  among  English 
merchants.  The  builders  were  often  accused  of  risking 
the  peace  of  the  realm  by  supplying  a  vessel  of  war  to 
cruise  against  the  commerce  of  the  United  States,  and 
they  have  been  openly  charged  with  committing  a 
flagrant  breach  of  the  Queen's  proclamation  of  neutrality 
for  their  own  selfish  profit — bartering,  as  it  were,  their 
loyalty  as  subjects,  and  their  duty  as  citizens,  for  a 
pecuniary  consideration,  which  it  has  been  erroneously 
alleged  they  received  in  an  extravagant  price  for  the 
ship. 

The  great  Commonwealth  which  forms  one  of  the 


60  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  TEE 

mighty  union  of  States  across  the  Atlantic  is  scarcely 
known  in  Europe  except  as  the  producer  of  some  half- 
million  bales  of  cotton  per  annum  ;  but  her  little  name 
sake  of  a  thousand  tons,  in  a  lifetime  of  barely  two 
years,  has  spread  the  name  to  the  uttermost  parts  of  the 
earth,  and  has  made  it  familiar  to  thousands  who  know 
nothing  of  geographical  State  lines,  and  at  the  mention 
of  it  now  would  probably  think  of  the  'Alabama  Claims/ 
and  not  of  the  '  Alabama  State.' 

This  notoriety  of  the  ship,  and  the  long-current  mis- 
statements  affecting  her  builders  and  all  who  were  in 
any  way  concerned  with  her  origin,  seem  to  impose 
upon  me  the  duty  of  dwelling  upon  the  purely  business 
arrangements  with  the  Messrs.  Laird  more  particularly 
than  would  be  at  all  necessary,  or  even  expedient,  under 
ordinary  circumstances. 

The  contract  for  the  vessel  afterwards  called  the 
Alabama  was  made  in  my  own  name  as  a  private 
individual,  and  the  negotiations  were  carried  on  between 
the  members  of  the  firm  and  myself,  without  the  inter 
vention  of  any  other  parties  whatever.  The  Messrs. 
Laird  very  properly  looked  first  to  the  financial  security. 
I  did  not  leave  them  a  moment  in  doubt  on  that  point, 
and  being  fully  satisfied  that  the  proposed  transaction 
was  in  every  particular  safe  and  regular,  they  took  it  in 
hand  as  a  part  of  their  ordinary  business. 

At  that  time,  wood  had  almost  entirely  gone  out  of 
use  as  a  material  for  ship -building  in  Great  Britain,  and 
it  was  suggested,  and  as  readily  admitted,  that  there 
would  be  some  difficulty  in  getting  suitable  timber  for 
the  heavy  scantling,  such,  to  wit,  as  the  stem,  keelson, 
and  especially  the  sternpost,  -which  would  require  to  be 
bored  to  receive  the  screw  shaft.  These  facts  were 
mentioned  and  discussed  with  reference  to  the  cost 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  61 

and  time  necessary  to  build  the  ship,  and  it  was  perceived 
that  both  would  considerably  exceed  the  estimate  for  an 
iron  vessel. 

The  general  dimensions  and  other  particulars  of  the 
Alabama  were  :  length  220  feet ;  breadth,  32  feet ; 
draft,  with  all  weights  on  board,  15  feet  ;  tonnage,  1040  ; 
engines,  two  horizontal,  of  300  horse-power  nominal,  but 
on  trial  trip  indicated  1,000  horse-power.  She  was 
barque-rigged,  with  very  long  lower  masts,  to  get  large 
fore  and  aft  sails.  Her  sails,  carried  at  will,  were  as 
follows  :  fore,  fore-topmast  staysail  and  jib  ;  two  large 
trysails,  the  usual  square  sails  on  fore  and  main  masts, 
with  the  exception  of  the  main  course,  which  was  set 
flying ;  spanker  and  gaff- topsails  ;  all  standing  rigging 
wire.  She  was  .  admirably  fitted  in  every  respect : 
engines  equal  to  Admiralty  standard  ;  brass  screw, 
Griffith's  pattern,  with  lifting  apparatus,  and  stowage 
in  iron  bunkers  for  350  tons  of  coal.  She  was  provided 
with  a  double  suit  of  sails  and  the  usual  outfit  for 
an  East  India  voyage.  She  had  five  boats,  including 
launch,  cutter  and  whale-boat,  and  ample  ground- 
tackle.  She  was  well  supplied  with  hawsers,  and  had 
spare  blocks,  running  gear,  etc.,  to  meet  all  requirements 
for  at  least  a  year.  The  engineer's  stores  and  spare 
engine-gear  were  on  the  scale  supplied  to  ships  of 
the  Royal  Navy  intended  for  long  and  distant  voyages, 
and  she  was  provided  with  condensing  apparatus  and 
cooling  tank  to  supply  fresh  water.  She  was  built 
of  the  very  best  materials,  copper-fastened  and  coppered, 
and  was  finished  in  every  respect  as  a  first-class  ship. 
I  was  satisfied  in  every  particular  with  the  manner  in 
which  the  builders  fulfilled  their  contract,  and  I  believe 
she  was  as  fine  a  vessel,  and  as  well-found,  as  could 
have  been  turned  out  of  any  dockyard  in  the  kingdom, 


62  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

equal  to  any  of  her  Majesty's  ships  of  corresponding 
class  in  structure  and  finish,  and  superior  to  any  vessel 
of  her  date  in  fitness  for  the  purposes  of  a  sea  rover, 
with  no  home  but  the  sea,  and  no  reliable  source 
of  supply  but  the  prizes  she  might  make. 

The  price  paid  to  the  Messrs.  Laird,  including  the 
outfit,  was  £47,500,  payable  by  the  terms  of  the 
contract  in  five  equal  payments  of  £9,500  each  ;  and 
the  last  instalment  was  made  payable  after  satisfactory 
trial  and  delivery  to  me  on  the  Mersey  in  the  port 
of  Liverpool.  Everyone  who  has  had  experience  in 
the  cost  of  ships  will  admit  that  the  price  named  was 
not  in  the  least  degree  excessive  or  unreasonable.  I 
had  previously  superintended  the  construction  of  vessels 
of  varying  types,  and  I  thought  at  the  time,  and  am  of 
the  opinion  now,  that  the  contract  price  for  the  Alabama 
afforded  only  a  fair  commercial  profit  to  the  builders. 

The  foregoing  statement  will,  I  trust,  be  accepted  as 
a  complete  and  final  refutation  of  the  charge  often  made, 
that  the  Messrs.  Laird  were  paid  a  high  price  for  under 
taking  the  exceptional  risk  of  building  a  vessel  of  war, 
and  delivering  her  to  an  agent  of  the  Confederate 
Government  beyond  British  jurisdiction.  In  point  of 
fact,  they  delivered  to  me  an  unarmed  ship  in  the  port 
of  Liverpool.  As  another  simple  matter  of  fact,  they 
did  not  know  for  what  purpose  the  ship  was  intended 
when  they  agreed  to  build  her.  They  were  not  informed 
of  anything  which  had  reference  to  the  armament,  and 
are  to  this  day  ignorant  of  the  manner  and  place  of 
equipment,  excepting  in  so  far  as  the  movements  and 
performances  of  the  ship,  after  she  passed  out  of  their 
hands,  are  known  to  the  general  public,  (See  p.  96.) 

I  feel  that  I  owe  to  the  memory  of  the  late  Mr.  John 
Laird,  M.P.,  an  explicit  and  unequivocal  denial  of  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  63 

charge  so  often  made  that  he  was  concerned  in  the 
building  and  equipment  of  the  ship  afterwards  called 
the  Alabama,  a  statement  which  many  persons  have 
thought  to  be  confirmed  by  some  inadvertent  expres 
sions  in  Admiral  Semmes'  narrative  of  her  cruise  under 
his  command.  At  the  time  when  I  was  negotiating  for 
the  Alabama,  Mr.  John  Laird  had  retired  from  the  firm 
which  bore  his  name,  and  he  was  shortly  afterwards 
elected  to  serve  in  Parliament  as  the  first  member  for 
Birkenhead.  My  business  arrangements,  and  all  the 
di>cussions  about  the  design  and  cost  of  the  ship,  were 
carried  on  with  Messrs.  William  and  John  Laird,  junr. 
Mr.  John  Laird,  the  subsequent  member  for  Birkenhead, 
had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  transaction,  and  I 
am  quite  sure  that  he  was  never  even  present  at  any  of 
my  interviews  with  the  firm  in  reference  to  that  subject. 

After  Mr.  Laird  took  his  seat  in  Parliament,  I  under 
stood  and  appreciated  his  position,  and  was  rigidly 
reticent  about  Confederate  affairs.  Our  acquaintance 
ripened  into  friendship,  and  I  was  his  debtor  for  many 
acts  of  kindly  social  courtesy,  but  never,  in  the  freedom 
of  friendly  and  familiar  conversation,  was  the  subject 
of  the  Alabama  discussed  or  even  alluded  to  until  she 
was  afloat  as  a  Confederate  cruiser,  and  her  acts  had 
become  matters  of  common  knowledge,  and  topics  of 
general  comment. 

In  May,  1874,  I  had  occasion  to  go  to  the  Brazils  on 
business,  and  I  called  to  bid  Mr.  Laird  good-bye,  and  to 
get  a  number  of  letters  of  introduction  which  he  had 
kindly  obtained  for  me.  We  were  talking  about  the 
Amazon,  and  a  steamship  company  formed  by  the  Baron 
de  Maua  to  navigate  that  mighty  river.  The  conversa 
tion  turned  upon  ships  in  general,  and  the  Alabama  was 
incidentally  mentioned.  I  told  him  how  her  battery 


64  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

and  ordnance  stores  were  shipped  from  London,  and 
gave  him  an  account  of  our  adventures  at  the  island  of 
Terceira,  where  she  was  armed  and  equipped.  He  was 
much  interested,  and  remarked  that  he  had  always 
thought  it  most  fortunate  that  I  had  never  mentioned 
the  circumstances  to  him  during  the  war,  because  his 
ignorance  of  them  enabled  him  to  say,  when  attacked  in 
Parliament,  without  the  least  mental  reservation,  that 
he  was  not  only  free  from  all  complicity  in  the  equip 
ment  of  the  ship,  but  that  he  knew  nothing  about  her, 
except  what  had  been  revealed  to  the  general  public. 

Mr.  Laird's  statements  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  building  or  equipment 
of  the  Alabama  were  frequently  spoken  of  with  distrust 
by  other  members  who  were  ardent  partisans  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  newspapers  which  adopted  and 
defended  the  same  cause  persisted  in  repeating  the 
original  charge,  in  face  of  the  most  distinct  and  un 
equivocal  denials  ;  but  he  had  the  satisfaction  to  know 
that  her  Majesty's  Government  implicitly  believed  his 
disavowal,  and  he  came  to  feel  at  last  that  the  repetition 
of  the  charges  was  merely  intended  for  party  purposes, 
and  hence  he  ceased  to  give  much  heed  to  them. 

At  this  late  date,  when  time  has  softened  the  resentful 
temper  and  the  sharp  antagonism  which  seem  always  to 
warp  the  judgment  and  embitter  criticism  during  periods 
of  great  political  excitement,  I  may  indulge  the  hope  that 
my  testimony  in  regard  to  the  building  and  equipping 
of  Confederate  ships  abroad  will  be  received  without 
distrust.  I  can  conscientiously  say  that  I  have  neither 
the  purpose  nor  the  wish  to  conceal  a  single  fact  ; 
indeed,  my  only  fear  is  that  anxiety  to  tell  the  whole 
truth  may  lead  me  into  the  error  of  too  great  minute 
ness  of  detail,  and  that  I  may  be  seduced  into  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  05 

expectation  that  incidents  and  adventures  which  force  of 
circumstances  strongly  impressed  upon  my  own  mind 
may  be  of  corresponding  interest  to  others. 

The  chief  object  of  this  narrative  is  to  demonstrate,  by 
a  plain  statement  of  facts,  that  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment,  through  their  agents,  did  nothing  more  than  all 
other  belligerents  have  heretofore  done  in  time  of  need — 
namely,  tried  to  obtain  from  every  possible  source  the 
means  necessary  to  carry  on  the  war  in  which  they  were 
engaged,  and  that  in  doing  so  they  took  particular  pains 
to  understand  the  municipal  laws  of  those  countries  in 
which  they  sought  to  supply  their  wants,  and  were 
especially  careful  to  keep  within  the  statutes. 

The  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  and  its  bearing  upon  the 
naval  operations  of  the  Confederate  States  in  England, 
will  be  fully  explained  and  discussed  in  a  subsequent 
chapter ;  but  to  preserve  a  due  and  relevant  connection 
of  subjects,  and  to  keep  the  record  in  appropriate  rela 
tion  to  the  order  of  events,  it  seems  fitting  to  mention 
that  at  a  very  early  day  after  my  arrival  in  England  I 
took  legal  advice. 

The  object  of  the  Confederate  Government  was  not 
merely  to  buy  or  build  a  single  ship,  but  it  was  to  main 
tain  a  permanent  representative  of  the  Navy  Department 
abroad,  and  to  get  ships  and  naval  supplies  without 
hindrance  as  long  as  the  war  lasted.  To  effect  this  pur 
pose  it  was  manifestly  necessary  to  act  with  prudence 
and  caution,  and  to  do  nothing  in  violation  of  the 
municipal  law,  because  a  single  conviction  would  both 
expose  the  object  and  defeat  its  aim.  A  fortunate  cir 
cumstance  led  me  to  consult  the  late  Mr.  F.  S.  Hull,  a 
member  of  a  leading  firm  of  solicitors  in  Liverpool,  and 
he  continued  to  act  as  my  solicitor  during  the  whole 
period  of  the  war.  Mr.  Hull  was  a  prudent,  cautious, 

VOL.  I.  5 


66  THE  SECRET  SEEFICE  OF  THE 

conscientious  adviser,  and  throughout  all  those  troublous 
times  I  found  him  a  watchful  and  safe  mentor.  I  kept 
him  informed  of  all  important  transactions,  and  con 
sulted  him  with  reference  to  all  contracts. 

There  were  many  complications,  and  perplexing  ques 
tions  were  constantly  cropping  up.  These  he  faced  with 
coolness,  judgment,  and  good  temper,  and  never  once 
led  me  astray  or  encouraged  me  to  undertake  the  im 
practicable.  He  piloted  me  safely  through  the  mazes  of 
the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  in  spite  of  the  perplexing 
ambiguity  of  its  7th  Section,  and  the  bewildering  itera 
tions  and  reiterations  of  the  precept  not  to  '  equip, 
furnish,  fit  out,  or  arm '  any  ship  with  intent,  etc.,  etc. 

Generally  Mr.  Hull  felt  and  proved  himself  competent 
to  deal  with  the  legal  questions  as  they  arose,  without 
referring  to  any  other  authority;  but  at  the  time  of 
making  the  contracts  for  the  Alabama  and  Florida,  no 
case  involving  the  forfeiture  of  a  ship  had  ever  been 
brought  to  trial  under  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,* 
and  there  had  therefore  been  no  judicial  decision  as  to 
its  interpretation.  If  the  Act*  prohibited  the  building 
of  a  ship  for  a  belligerent  under  all  circumstances,  and 
imposed  upon  the  builder  the  onus  of  proving  that  there 
was  no  intent  to  arm  her  beyond  British  jurisdiction,  it 
was  important  to  know  it,  because  if  that  was  the  law, 
merely  concealing  the  ultimate  purpose  from  the  builder 
would  not  protect  the  property  from  seizure  and  for 
feiture.  Mr.  Hull  therefore  drew  up  a  case  for  counsel's 
opinion,  and  submitted  it  to  two  eminent  barristers, 
both  of  whom  have  since  filled  the  highest  judicial 
positions.  The  case  submitted  was  a  general  and  not  a 
specific  proposition.  It  was  not  intimated  for  what 

0  'Alexandra  Case,'  speeches  of   the  Attorney-General  and  Sir 
Hugh  Cairns. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  67 

purpose  or  on  whose  behalf  the  opinion  was  asked,  and 
the  reply  was  therefore  wholly  without  bias,  and  em 
braced  a  full  exposition  of  the  Act  in  its  bearing  upon 
the  question  of  building  and  equipping  ships  in  her 
Majesty's  dominions. 

The  inferences  drawn  from  the  investigation  of  the 
Act  by  counsel  were  put  into  the  following  form  by  my 
solicitor  : 

'1.  It  is  no  offence  (under  the  Act)  for  British  sub 
jects  to  equip,  etc.,  a  ship  at  some  country  without  her 
Majesty's  dominions,  though  the  intent  be  to  cruise 
against  a  friendly  State. 

'2.  It  is  no  offence  for  any  person  (subject  or  no 
subject)  to  equip  a  ship  within  her  Majesty's  dominions, 
if  it  be  not  done  with  the  intent  to  cruise  against  a 
friendly  State. 

'  3.  The  mere  building  of  a  ship  within  her  Majesty's 
dominions  by  any  person  (subject  or  no  subject)  is  no 
offence,  whatever  may  be  the  intent  of  the  parties,  because 
the  offence  is  not  the  building  but  the  equipping. 

1  Therefore  any  shipbuilder  may  build  any  ship  in  her 
Majesty's  dominions,  provided  he  does  not  equip  her 
within  her  Majesty's  dominions,  and  he  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the  acts  of  the  purchasers  done  within  her 
Majesty's  dominions  without  his  concurrence,  nor  with 
out  her  Majesty's  dominions  even  with  his  concurrence.' 

The  foregoing  deductions  from  the  terms  of  the  Act 
were  kept  rigidly  in  view  in  all  contracts  for  ships  in 
England,  and  every  possible  precaution  was  practised 
both  for  the  protection  of  the  builders  against  criminal 
prosecutions  under  the  Act,  and  for  that  of  the  ships 
against  forfeiture.  In  no  case  was  any  builder  or  vendor 
informed  what  was  the  purpose  of  the  purchaser.  No 
ship  was  ever  supplied  with  any  portion  of  her  equip- 

5—2 


68  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

ment  within  her  Majesty's  dominions,  nor  was  the 
builder  or  vendor  of  any  ship  employed  to  assist  in  the 
equipment  without  her  Majesty's  dominions. 

On  the  27th  of  July,  1861',  the  first  remittance  on 
account  of  the  Confederate  Navy  Department  reached 
England.  The  Oreto  (Florida)  was  then  partly  in 
frame,  and  the  plans  and  specifications  of  the  ship 
afterwards  called  the  Alabama  being  complete,  the 
contract  with  the  Messrs.  Laird  was  closed  on  the  first 
day  of  August. 

It  is  very  seldom  that  a  particular  name  is  given 
to  a  ship  until  at  or  about  the  time  of  her  launch,  but 
a  dockyard  number  is  assigned  to  her,  for  convenience  of 
reference,  and  for  specification  in  the  accounts  of 
expenditure.  The  number  given  to  the  ship  contracted 
for  with  Messrs.  Laird  was  '  290,'  which,  it  will  be 
perceived,  had  none  of  the  mysterious  signification  so 
often  ascribed  to  it,  but  meant  simply  that  she  was  the 
290th  ship  built  by  them. 

It  was  often  alleged,  after  the  departure  of  the 
Alabama  from  Liverpool,  that  a  peculiar  and  mysterious 
secrecy  was  practised  in  respect  to  her,  and  that  no  one 
was  permitted  to  examine  her,  or  even  to  go  into  Messrs. 
Laird's  yard  while  she  was  building,  without  a  special 
permit.  This  is  quite  a  mistake.  My  intercourse  with 
the  builders  was  only  so  far  secret  that  I  kept  my 
own  counsel,  and  did  not  communicate  to  them  the 
purpose  for  which  the  ship  was  intended.  They, 
on  their  part,  asked  no  questions,  and,  so  far  as  I  know, 
they  adopted  no  special  restrictions  with  regard  to 
visitors  to  the  works  while  she  was  in  their  hands. 
Official  documents,  long  since  published,  have  proved 
beyond  doubt  that  the  officers  of  Her  Majesty's  Customs 
had  free  and  unopposed  access  to  her  at  all  times,  and 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  69 

the  general  public  were  not  excluded  in  a  greater 
degree,  nor  under  more  stringent  conditions  than  are 
commonly  enforced  in  all  well-regulated  manufacturing 
establishments.* 

When  the  United  States  Minister  was  clamouring  at 
the  door  of  the  Foreign  Office,  and  pressing  Her 
Majesty's  Government  to  seize,  or  at  least  to  detain, 
the  Florida  and  Alabama,  the  Consul  at  Liverpool 
supplied  him  with  numerous  '  affidavits  '  of  persons  who 
subscribed  the  usual  form  of  oath  that  they  had  seen  me 
on  board  giving  instructions  and  describing  the  type, 
arrangements,  and  ultimate  destination  of  the  ships. 
Either  those  affidavits  were  '  made  to  order,'  or  else  it 
was  not  difficult  to  get  a  view  of  both  the  ships.  By- 
and-by  it  will  be  shown  that  many  of  the  affidavits 
were  prepared  with  little  regard  to  actual  facts,  and 
that  they  were  generally  made  either  by  hired  '  private 
detectives,'  whose  chief  aim  was  to  earn  their  pay, 
or  at  least  to  give  something  in  return  for  it,  by  self- 
appointed  spies,  who  found  a  ready  market  for  their 
tales,  or  by  that  class  of  persons  who  are  possessed 

*  See  report  of  Mr.  Morgan,  Surveyor  of  Her  Majesty's  Customs, 
Liverpool,  dated  28th  June,  1862  : 

*  The  officers  have  at  all  times  free  access  to  the  building  yards  of 
the  Messrs.  Laird  at  Birkenhead,  where  the  said  vessel  is  now  lying  ; 
and  there  has  been  no  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  builders  to  dis 
guise  what  is  now  apparent  to  all,  that  she  is  intended  for  a  ship-of- 
war.' — '  Alabama  Papers,'  24th  March,  1863. 

That  the  Alabama  subsequently  left  Liverpool  unarmed  is  proved 
by  the  official  report  of  the  Surveyor  of  Customs,  dated  30th  July, 
1862: 

'  I  have  only  to  add  that  your  directions  to  keep  a  strict  watch  on 
the  said  vessel  have  been  carried  out,  and  I  write  in  the  fullest  con 
fidence  that  she  left  this  port  without  any  part  of  her  armament  on 
board.  She  had  not  as  much  as  a  signal-gun  or  musket.' — 'Alabama 
Papers/  24th  March,  1863. 

VOL.   I.* 


70  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

with  a  mania  to  spring  at  a  leap  to  convictions  which 
may  or  may  not  prove  to  be  right  in  the  end,  but 
who,  unwilling  to  await  the  natural  and  regular  fulfil 
ment  of  events,  are  impelled  by  a  restless  impatience 
to  manufacture  the  intermediate  facts  or  to  mould 
and  distort  them  so  as  to  confirm  their  preconceived 
opinions. 

^Fone  but  an  unsophisticated  or  very  impertinent 
person  would  think  of  walking  into  any  business 
premises  and  asking  the  owners  what  they  were  doing, 
and  who  for.  Such  inquirers  get  either  evasive  replies, 
or  rebuffs  more  or  less  courteously  expressed.  It  is 
probable  that  the  Messrs.  Laird  had  frequently  to  meet 
such  contingencies,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  they 
invariably  '  rose  to  the  occasion,'  and  knew  when  to  be 
courteously  equivocal,  and  when  to  maintain  a  frigid 
reserve. 

About  the  month  of  August,  1861,  Messrs.  Eraser, 
Trenholm  and  Co.  determined  to  send  a  steamer  to  one 
of  the  Southern  ports  with  a  cargo,  not  wholly  of  arms, 
but  of  general  supplies  suited  to  the  wants  of  the 
armies  in  the  field,  and  their  Charleston  house,  Messrs. 
John  Eraser  and  Co.,  had  sent  over  an  experienced  coast 
pilot  to  take  her  in.  Mr.  Prioleau  told  me  of  this 
purpose,  and  informed  me  that  while  his  firm  expected 
to  realize  a  fair  commercial  profit  from  the  undertaking, 
their  chief  object  was  to  demonstrate  that  the  blockade 
was  inefficient,  and  thus  they  hoped  to  encourage  others 
to  embark  in  like  enterprises,  by  which  means  the 
pressing  wants  of  the  South  could  be  supplied  with  more 
or  less  certainty. 

It  was  important  to  keep  the  destination  of  the  ship 
secret,  but  Mr.  Prioleau  told  me  of  his  purpose,  as  he 
said,  to  advise  me  about  the  adventure,  and  also  to 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  71 

offer  me  the  opportunity  to  ship  such  arms  and  ordnance 
stores  as  Major  Huse  and  I  might  have  ready  to  forward. 
The  steamer  engaged  for  the  purpose  was  the  Bermuda. 
She  was  fitted  out  and  loaded  at  West  Hartlepool,  and 
I  went  to  that  port  with  Mr.  Prioleau  to  superintend  the 
shipment  of  the  goods  especially  intended  for  the  Con 
federate  War  and  Navy  Departments,  while  Major  Huse 
looked  after  their  despatch  to  the  shipping  port. 

The  Bermuda  was  commanded  by  Captain  Eugene 
Tessier,  who  had  long  been  employed  by  the  firm  in  the 
Charleston  trade ;  and  his  pilot  was  Captain  Peck,  well 
known  on  the  coast  from  Charleston  to  St.  Augustine. 
She  sailed  from  West  Hartlepool  in  August,  1861  ;  got 
safely  into  Savannah,  September  18th  ;  arid  ran  out  again 
with  a  large  cargo  of  cotton,  which  she  brought  to 
Liverpool. 

Mr.  Edwin  Haigh,  of  Liverpool,  the  registered  owner 
of  the  ship,  in  an  affidavit  presented  to  the  United  States 
District  Court  of  Pennsylvania  in  October,  1862,*  said 
as  follows :  '  I  am  informed  and  believe  that  the  said 
steamship  (Bermuda),  in  the  prosecution  of  her  voyage, 
was  not  warned  off  by  any  of  the  blockading  cruisers  ; 
and  that  she  entered  the  port  of  Savannah  without 
meeting  with  any  of  such  cruisers,  or  having  the  oppor 
tunity  of  ascertaining  whether  the  said  blockade  was 
still  in  force,  and  there  discharged  her  cargo.' 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  Messrs.  Eraser,  Trenholm 
and  Co.  accomplished  their  purpose  of  demonstrating 
that  the  blockade  of  the  Southern  coast,  at  the  time  of 
the  Bermudas  voyage  (August  and  September,  1861), 
was  inefficient  ;  and  it  is  probable  that  their  expectation 
of  realizing  a  commercial  profit  by  the  adventure  was 

*  See  'Keport  of  Proceedings  in  Admiralty,  U.S.  v.  SS.  Bermuda 
and  Cargo,  Philadelphia,  August,  1862,'  p.  448. 


72  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

also  fulfilled.  Their  example  undoubtedly  stimulated 
the  trade,  but  the  United  States  soon  strengthened  and 
increased  the  blockading  force,  and  during  the  last  two 
years  of  the  \var  the  difficulty  of  getting  in  and  out  of 
the  Southern  ports  was  made  greater  and  greater,  until 
only  the  swiftest  vessels  stood  any  chance  of  success, 
and  they  only  when  favoured  by  dark  nights  and  suitable 
weather. 

In  February,  1862,  the  Bermuda  was  despatched 
again  from  England,  but  the  greater  efficiency  of  the 
blockade  at  that  time,  together  with  the  fear  that  she 
was  both  too  large  and  too  slow  to  promise  success, 
caused  the  owner  to  abandon  the  purpose  or  attempt  to 
run  her  into  a  Southern  port.  The  cargo,  laden  in 
England,  was  intended  to  be  discharged  at  Bermuda 
or  Nassau,  and  a  return  cargo  for  Liverpool  had  actually 
been  provided  by  her  consignees  at  Nassau. 

This  voyage  of  the  Bermuda  is  interesting  and  im 
portant,  because  it  affords  a  typical  example  of  the 
manner  in  which  the  United  States  dealt  with  neutral 
vessels  captured  for  real  or  alleged  violation  of  the 
blockade,  and  furnishes  also  a  fitting  occasion  for 
some  remarks  upon  the  general  conduct  of  the  United 
States  towards  neutrals  during  the  war,  and  the 
precedents  that  Government  persistently  laboured  to 
establish. 

In  pursuance  of  the  owner's  purpose,  the  Bermuda 
sailed  from  Liverpool,  touched  at  the  island  of  Bermuda, 
and  in  due  course  proceeded  towards  Nassau,  her  final 
port  of  destination.  On  the  morning  of  April  27th, 
1862,  being  off  the  southern  point  of  Great  Abaco 
Island,  the  Hole-in-the-Wall  Light  bearing  south-west, 
distant,  according  to  the  varying  testimony  of  witnesses, 
from  less  than  three  to  over  seven  miles,  the  Bermuda 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  73 

was  stopped  by  a  shot  fired  across  her  bows  from  the 
United  States  steamer  MercecKta,  a  prize  crew  was  put 
on  board,  and  she  was  taken  into  Philadelphia. 

There  was  some  delay  in  bringing  her  case  to  trial  ; 
but  finally  she  was  arraigned  before  Judge  Cadwalader, 
of  the  United  States  District  Court  sitting  in  Admiralty 
at  Philadelphia.  The  proceedings  began  August  12th, 
1862,  and  the  arguments  pro  and  con  were  closed  on  the 
16th  of  the  same  month.  'At  the  conclusion  of  the 
argument,  the  judge  remarked  that  he  would  consider 
the  case  very  carefully,  and  deliver  his  opinion  at  as 
early  a  day  as  practicable.'*  The  outline  of  the  case 
cannot  be  better  stated  than  in  the  words  of  Mr.  George 
M,  Wharton,  counsel  for  the  owners,  or  the  c  claimants/ 
as  they  are  designated  in  the  legal  proceedings.  Mr. 
Wharton  said  :  '  It  is  the  case  of  a  British  vessel,  owned 
by  a  British  subject,  laden  at  Liverpool  by  British 
merchants,  and  bound  for  Bermuda,  a  British  colony. 
After  arriving  at  Bermuda,  the  ship  has  directions  from 
those  who  have  the  right  to  control,  so  far,  her  move 
ments,  to  go  from  Bermuda  to  Nassau,  another  British 
colonial  port  ;  and  while  navigating  in  the  direct  line 
from  Bermuda  to  Nassau,  and  at  the  distance  of  about 
415  miles  from  that  portion  of  the  American  coast  the 
blockade  of  which  she  is  alleged  to  have  violated,  while 
sailing  among  these  British  islands  in  a  direct  line 
toward  her  place  of  destination,  she  is  overhauled  by  a 
cruiser  of  the  United  States  Government,  captured, 
and  brought  here  for  trial  and  consequent  condemna 
tion.' 

The  contention  of  the  United  States  Attorney  was  to 
this  effect.  The  voyage  to  Bermuda  and  Nassau  was 
only  a  colourable  pretext.  The  cargo  was  either 
*  See  '  Report  of  Proceedings,'  p.  397. 


74  THE  SECRET  SER7ICE  OF  THE 

enemy's  property,  or  was  shipped  with  the  intent  to  be 
forwarded  to  an  enemy's  port  through  the  blockade,  and 
that  even  though  the  Bermuda  might  break  bulk  at 
Nassau  and  land  the  whole  of  her  cargo  there,  the 
purpose  was  to  reship  it  for  Charleston,  or  some  other 
blockaded  port.  He  furthermore  urged  the  plea  that  a 
vessel  bound  in  point  of  fact  from  London  to  Charleston, 
could  not  plead  in  defence  an  original  design  to  stop  at 
Nassau  during  the  voyage,  and  that  she  was  sailing  at 
the  moment  of  capture  for  or  in  the  direction  of  the 
intermediate  port.  In  their  arguments  the  counsel  for 
the  United  States  also  contended  that  if  the  original 
intention  was  to  run  the  blockade,  and  merely  to  make 
Nassau  a  place  of  call  for  any  purpose  whatever,  the 
vessel  was  liable  to  capture  the  moment  she  got  beyond 
the  limit  of  British  jurisdiction,  which  they  specified  to 
be  any  distance  beyond  three  miles  outside  of  the  port 
of  Liverpool. 

International  law  is  not  an  exact  science.  The 
highest  authorities  differ  in  the  construction  of  its  rules, 
and  the  most  learned  judges  have  variously  interpreted 
its  provisions.  It  is  a  code  which  has  never  received 
the  willing  or  unanimous  consent  of  all  nations,  but 
bears  upon  its  face  the  impress  of  having  been  forced  by 
the  stronger  upon  the  weaker,  and  history  furnishes 
many  instances  in  which  during  times  of  war  belligerents 
have  set  aside  or  acted  in  defiance  of  its  apparent  and 
commonly  received  conditions,  whenever  their  interests 
required,  and  their  power  was  sufficient  to  enforce 
their  purpose.  Interference  with  trade  between  neutrals 
and  either  of  two  belligerents  has  always  been  considered 
oppressive,  and  in  derogation  of  a  natural  right.  By 
the  declaration  of  Paris  of  1856,  the  principle  that  the 
neutral  flag  covered  the  goods  and  protected  the  ship 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  75 

also  from  search,  when  on  the  high  sea,  was  agreed  to, 
and  the  rules  which  prohibited  a  neutral  from  carrying 
the  goods  of  a  belligerent,  or  compelled  the  neutral 
to  submit  to  '  the  right  of  search/  were  done  away  with, 
as  between  the  Great  Powers  who  were  parties  to  that 
declaration.  This  did  not,  of  course,  abolish  the  right  of 
blockade. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  argue  or  even  to  comment 
upon  the  law  points  involved  in  the  case  of  the 
Bermuda.  The  whole  of  the  proceedings  have  been 
published,  and  have  been  no  doubt  carefully  examined 
by  the  interested  parties.  The  present  object  is  merely 
to  set  out  the  circumstances  of  the  capture,  and  the 
facts  appertaining  to  the  disposal  of  the  ship  and  cargo, 
and  thus  to  demonstrate  the  manner  in  which  the 
United  States  enforced  their  belligerent  rights,  and  the 
broad  scope  they  claimed  and  practised  in  the  exercise  of 
them.  It  is  manifestly  difficult  to  prove  an  intent,  and 
in  the  case  of  the  Bermuda  the  only  evidence  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  was  purely  circumstantial ;  on 
the  other  hand,  a  number  of  persons  in  Liverpool  were  in 
terested  in  the  shipments  by  her,  and  the  particulars  of 
the  voyage  were  known  to  many  persons,  and  were  much 
discussed.  It  was  well  understood  among  the  shippers 
of  goods  that  the  vessel  would  go  only  to  Bermuda  and 
Nassau,  and  among  the  documents  laid  before  the  Prize 
Court,*  there  appears  an  affidavit  by  one  of  the  Liver 
pool  agents  of  the  ship,  in  which  there  is  set  out,  among 
others,  the  following  declaration  :  i  That  the  cargo  laden 
here '  (Liverpool)  '  was  intended  to  be  discharged  at 
Bermuda  or  Nassau,  and  that  a  return  cargo  for  this  port ' 
(Liverpool)  *  had  been  provided  by  her  consignees  at 
Nassau.' 

*  See  *  Report  of  Proceedings,'  p.  424. 


76  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

The  Bermuda  was  no  doubt  tainted  by  the  alleged 
previous  violation  of  the  blockade,  but  it  has  been  shown 
that  she  was  not  warned  off,  nor  did  she  even  see  a 
blockading  vessel  when  she  entered  the  port  of  Savannah 
in  September,  1861,  and  it  is  therefore  questionable 
whether  that  voyage  was  in  reality  a  breach  of  blockade. 
The  captain,  too,  seems  to  have  lost  his  head,  or  to  have 
been  over-confident  in  the  protecting  influence  of  his 
flag  and  register.  He  should  either  have  got  his  ship 
clearly  and  indisputably  within  the  marine  league,  and 
held  on  to  all  of  his  papers,  or  destroyed  every  docu 
ment  except  his  manifest,  letter  of  instruction,  and 
register,  or  he  should  have  beached  the  ship  and  thus 
have  prevented  her  capture.  He  did  neither,  but  stopped 
at  the  first  shot,  and  then  destroyed  only  the  papers  in 
his  personal  charge,  containing  those  which  demonstrated 
that  the  ship  was  to  go  no  further  than  Nassau,  and  left 
on  board  the  private  correspondence,  for  the  nature  of 
which  neither  the  owners  nor  the  agents  were  respon 
sible. 

However,  the  name  and  previous  history  of  the  ship, 
the  nature  of  the  cargo,  and  the  particulars  of  the 
voyage,  could  neither  of  them  have  been  known  without 
forcible  stoppage  and  search,  and  the  fact  remains  that 
the  commander  of  the  Mercedita  enforced  an  extreme 
and  unusual  belligerent  pretension  against  a  neutral 
ship  proceeding  to  a  colonial  port  of  her  own  country, 
when  steering  towards  that  port,  and  on  a  course  away 
from,  and  415  miles  distant  from  the  nearest  part  of  the 
coast  the  blockade  of  which  she  was  alleged  to  have 
violated. 

Although  the  arguments  in  the  Prize  Court  were  con 
cluded  on  the  16th  of  August,  1862,  and  the  judge 
announced  his  purpose  to  render  judgment  c  as  soon  as 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  77 

practicable,'  *  no  decision  was  given  up  to  December  19th, 
1862,  and  the  further  proceedings  in  the  case  may  be 
briefly  stated  as  follows  : 

December  19th,  1862,  the  'Attorney  of  the  United 
States '  petitioned  the  Court  for  an  order  directing  the 
Marshal  to  deliver  to  any  authorized  agent  of  the  Navy 
Department  of  the  United  States  the  said  steamer 
(Bermuda),  on  the  payment  by  the  United  States  into 
the  Registry  of  the  Court  of  the  amount  of  her  appraised 
value,  f  The  petition  showed  that  the  ship  had  been 
appraised  at  the  sum  of  $120,000,  that  the  United 
States  wished  to  employ  her  in  the  naval  service  of  the 
United  States,  and  had  deposited  the  full  amount  of  the 
appraisement  with  the  United  States  Marshal  for  that 
district  (Philadelphia)  ;  that  the  steamer  had  been 
brought  to  the  port  of  Philadelphia,  May  3rd,  1862,  and 
had  remained  there  from  that  time  at  heavy  charges  con 
sequent  upon  her  detention ;  that  besides  the  official 
compensation  allowed  the  Marshal  for  the  custody  of 
said  steamer,  special  expenses  had  been  incurred  in  the 
employment  of  means  necessary  for  the  preservation  of 
the  engines,  boilers,  and  other  parts  of  the  ship,  '  and 
that  the  expenses  incident  to  said  detention  which  have 
accrued,  and  are  continually  accruing,  render  the  said 
steamer  in  a  relative  sense  perishable/  etc. 

On  the  same  date  (December  19th,  1862)  counsel  for 
the  owners  filed  protest  against  the  foregoing  in  due 
form.J  December  23rd  the  Court  ordered  survey  and 
appraisement.  Appraisers  reported,  December  30th  :§ 
4  The  said  steamship  (Bermuda)  has  deteriorated  in 
value  since  the  12th  day  of  September  last  at  the  rate  of 
$800  per  month,  exclusive  of  interest  .  .  .  caused 

*  'Keport  of  Proceedings,'  p.  397.  t  Ibid.  p.  458. 

J  Ibid.  p.  459.  §  Ibid.  p.  461. 


78  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

mainly  by  a  want  of  the  care  and  attention  of  proper 
officers  and  crew  ;'  and  they  fix  the  value  at  $120,000. 
March  5#A,  1863,  the  Court  decreed  as  follows  :*  'It 
appearing  to  the  Court  that  the  said  steamer  was,  at  the 
time  of  capture,  the  property  of  enemies  of  the  United 
States,  or  otherwise  confiscable  as  prize -of- war,  it  is 
ordered,  adjudged  and  decreed  that  the  said  steamer, 
her  tackle,  apparel  and  appurtenances  be,  and  the  same 
are,  condemned  as  good  and  lawful  prize.'  In  a  sort  of 
preamble  to  the  foregoing  decree,  the  judge  stated  that 
he  was  not  prepared  to  give  judgment  in  respect  to  the 
cargo,  and  would  therefore  defer  his  '  reasons  in  detail 
as  to  the  vessel  until  a  decision  as  to  the  cargo/  On 
the  same  day  counsel  for  the  owners  gave  notice  of 
appeal,  and  the  Attorney  for  the  United  States  moved 
for  delivery  of  the  ship  to  the  United  States  ;f  and  it 
was  ordered  4  that,  on  the  deposit  of  the  said  sum  of 
$120,000  in  the  registry  of  the  Court,  the  said  steamer 
be  delivered  to  the  Navy  Department  of  the  United 
States.'  March  6th,  1863,  counsel  for  the  owners 
prayed  an  appeal  in  due  form,  J  which  was  allowed ;  but, 
nevertheless,  the  ship  was  delivered  to  the  United 
States  Navy  Department.  She  was  quickly  armed  and 
equipped  as  a  vessel-of-war,  and  was  cruising  off  the 
Southern  coast  under  the  flag  of  her  captors  before  the 
appeal  was  heard. 

It  can  hardly  be  the  deliberate  purpose  of  any  Govern 
ment  to  exercise  its  belligerent  rights  with  vexatious 
stringency  as  regards  neutrals  ;  and  when  vessels  are 
captured  or  detained  on  suspicion  of  an  intent  to  violate 
a  blockade,  or  of  carrying  enemies'  property,  the  least 
forbearance  that  can  be  claimed  is  that  the  case  should 

*  « Report  of  Proceedings,'  p.  462.  t  Ibid.  p.  463. 

J  Ibid.  p.  463. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  79 

be  promptly  dealt  with,  and  that  the  property  should  be 
carefully  protected  from  injury  pending  the  judicial 
proceedings.  But  a  very  brief  summary  will  demon 
strate  that,  if  the  United  States  were  severe  in  the 
practice  of  their  rights  on  the  high  seas,  they  were  none 
the  less  rigorous  and  unyielding  in  the  treatment  of 
those  whose  commercial  interests  were  involved  in  the 
captures  made  by  their  cruisers.  The  Bermuda  was 
captured  April  27th,  1862,  and  reached  Philadelphia 
May  3rd,  1862,  where  she  was  suffered  to  remain 
until  August  12th,  deteriorating  '  at  the  rate  of  $800 
per  month,  exclusive  of  interest,  for  want  of  care  and 
attention.'  Then,  when  the  hearing  of  the  case  was 
concluded,  no  judgment  was  rendered  for  seven  months, 
the  deterioration  going  on  at,  or  in  excess  of,  the  above 
rate  ;  and  finally  she  was  handed  over  to  her  captors, 
upon  their  application,  in  spite  of  the  owners'  protest, 
and  pending  an  appeal. 

It  will  be  perceived  from  the  statement  of  this  case 
— and  many  others  of  like  particulars  might  be  men 
tioned — that  the  United  States  asserted  and  practised 
the  right  to  stop  any  neutral  vessel  anywhere  exceed 
ing  three  miles  from  her  own  coast,  to  take  her  to 
a  United  States  port,  and  there  to  determine  whether 
there  was  circumstantial  evidence  of  a  purpose  or  intent 
to  proceed  herself,  or  to  re- ship  her  cargo,  to  a  blockaded 
port.  Manifestly  this  pretension  was  a  virtual  denial  of 
the  doctrine  that  'the  flag  covers  the  goods/  a  principle 
for  which  the  United  States  had  contended  previously  to 
the  Civil  War,  although  they  had  not  formally  assented 
to  the  agreement  of  the  Great  Powers  at  Paris.  It  was 
also  an  assertion  of  the  'right  of  search,'  a  doctrine 
which  the  United  States  had  ever  before  resisted  with 
vehement  earnestness,  carrying  the  opposition  so  far,  in 


80  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

1812,  as  to  face  the  cost  and  peril  of  a  war  with  Great 
Britain  rather  than  submit  to  it. 

The  commonly  admitted  principle  that  there  could  be 
no  such  thing  as  contraband  goods  in  a  neutral  vessel 
bound  from  one  neutral  port  to  another  was  wholly 
abolished  by  the  United  States  during  the  Civil  War, 
although  no  country  had  so  strongly  contended  for  its 
maintenance  in  regard  to  its  own  commerce  in  past 
times. 

These  statements  are  not  now  made  as  matters  of  com 
plaint  or  reproach  against  the  United  States,  but  they 
serve  to  confirm  the  truth  of  the  old  and  somewhat 
homely  phrase,  '  circumstances  alter  cases.'  They 
demonstrate  the  fact  that  when  nations  are  at  war 
they  act  upon  the  principle  that  the  end  justifies  the 
means,  and  although  the  laws  of  humanity  in  reference 
to  the  treatment  of  persons  are  not  often  violated  in 
these  latter  days,  yet  the  '  sacred  rights  of  property '  are 
seldom  treated  with  reverence,  and  belligerents  limit 
their  encroachments  upon  the  privileges  of  neutrals,  not 
by  abstract  principles  of  law  and  justice,  by  respect  for 
treaty  stipulations,  or  sentimental  regard  for  inter 
national  comity,  but  by  considerations  of  policy  and 
self-interest.  They  press  their  rights  and  use  their 
privileges  to  the  full  measure  of  forbearance  on  the  part 
of  neutral  states,  or  their  own  power  to  enforce  and 
maintain  them. 

The  bitter  complaints  of  the  United  States  Minister 
against  Her  Majesty's  Government  for  alleged  neglect  in 
permitting  the  Confederate  agents  to  get  a  few  un 
armed  ships  in  England,  the  querulous  despatches  of 
Mr.  Secretary  Seward  on  the  same  subject,  and  the 
harsh  epithets  which  were  freely  showered  upon  the 
persons  concerned  in  those  undertakings,  appear  almost 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  81 

ludicrous  when  the  acts  of  those  agents  are  contrasted 
with  what  was  done  by  the  American  commissioners  to 
France  during  the  War  of  Independence,  the  equipment 
of  Paul  Jones's  ships  within  the  French  dominions,  the 
capture  of  the  Florida  by  the  United  States  ship 
Wachusett  in  the  neutral  port  of  Bahia  ;  the  seizure  and 
search  of  numerous  vessels  sailing  under  neutral  flags, 
and  passing  on  their  course  many  miles  away  from  the 
blockaded  coast  during  the  Civil  War  of  1861-65,  and  the 
enlistment  of  thousands  of  men  in  Europe,  and  their 
shipment  from.  Liverpool  and  elsewhere  for  service 
in  the  United  States  army,  under  the  thin  disguise 
of  labourers  for  American  railways,  or  an  ordinary 
exodus  of  emigrants.  If  there  was  any  blockade -running 
under  the  French  or  Spanish  flags,  the  attempts  were 
too  few  to  attract  public  notice,  and  I  have  no  record  of 
any  official  remonstrances  from  either  Paris  or  Madrid 
against  the  interference  of  the  United  States  with  the 
commerce  of  those  countries. 

It  will  scarcely  be  pretended  that  French  or  Spanish 
subjects  refrained  from  engaging  in  the  prohibited  trade 
with  the  South  because  they  thought  the  traffic  wrong 
in  itself,  or  because  of  any  high  notions  of  duty  or 
favour  to  the  United  States  as  a  friendly  power.  The 
Confederate  Government  confined  their  operations 
chiefly  to  the  better  and  cheaper  markets  in  Great 
Britain,  and  the  purchases  made  in  France  were  for  the 
most  part  sent  first  to  England,  or  to  the  Havana, 
Bermuda  and  Nassau,  from  whence  they  were  transhipped 
to  a  Confederate  port.  Moreover/  maritime  adventure 
of  that  kind  has  always  been  peculiarly  attractive  to  the 
Anglo-Saxon  race,  and  during  the  American  Civil 
War  many  British  subjects  embarked  in  the  contraband 
traffic,  stimulated  alike  by  the  prospect  of  large  profits 

VOL.  i.  6 


82  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

and  the  exhilarating  effects  of  the  risk  and  uncertainty. 
Besides  this,  all  shipments  on  account  of  the  Confederate 
Government  were  made  chiefly  in  English  vessels, 
because  it  was  soon  perceived  that  no  vessel  under 
the  Confederate  flag  could  load  in  a  British  port  and 
hope  to  escape  interference,  detention,  and  perhaps 
seizure,  on  suspicion  that  she  was  intended  for  armament 
as  a  cruiser. 

The  United  States  Government  knew  that  England 
was  the  source  and  fountain  of  supply  for  the  Con 
federate  States,  and  that  English  bottoms  were  the 
means  of  conveyance.  They  looked  with  suspicion 
upon  every  British  ship  which  ventured  to  approach  the 
Western  World.  Their  men-of-war  policed  the  waters 
adjacent  to  Mexico  and  the  Spanish  as  well  as  the 
English  West  Indies,  and  were  not  particular  as  to  the 
course  a  vessel  was  steering,  or  the  port  to  which  she 
was  bound.  A  British  register,  and  a  British  flag, 
were  assumed  to  be  prima  fade  evidence  of  an  '  intent ' 
to  run  the  blockade,  and  many  steamers,  and  even  one 
sailing  vessel,  the  Springbok,  were  captured  when  bound 
from  Europe,  chiefly  from  England,  to  a  British 
Colonial  port,  or  to  Cuban  and  Mexican  ports.  Many  of 
the  vessels  employed  by  the  United  States  in  blockading 
the  Southern  ports  during  the  war  were  captured 
blockade-runners,  and  it  has  always  seemed  strange 
that  no  fast  steamers  were  built  at  the  North  for  that 
special  purpose. 

A  United  States  naval  officer,  who  was  a  long  time  on 
blockade  service,  has  told  me  that  few  of  the  original 
blockaders  could  steam  over  eight  to  nine  knots,  and  it 
is  a  fact  that  very  few  blockade -runners  were  caught  in 
an  open  chase  with  ample  sea-room. 

During   the  Anglo-French   War  with   Russia,  com- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  83 

monly  called   the  Crimean  War,  the  Russian  Govern 
ment  made  a  large  contract  with  Colonel  Samuel  Colt 
for  repeating  arms  of  his  patent.     The  arms  were  chiefly 
manufactured  at  Colonel  Colt's  works,   near  Hartford, 
in  the   State   of  Connecticut,    and   they  were  shipped 
together  with  other  goods,  contraband  of  war,  in  large 
quantities  from  the  United  States  in  American  and  other 
neutral  vessels  to  the  Prussian  port  of  Memel,  on  the 
Baltic,  from  which  they  were  forwarded  to  Russia,  pro 
bably  in  great  part  overland.*     The  British  and  French 
Governments  either  admitted  the  legality  of  this  traffic 
between  neutral  ports  in  articles  contraband  of  war,  and 
manifestly  intended  for  their  enemy,  or  else  they  did  not 
care   to   involve   themselves   in    controversy   with   the 
neutral  Powers  who  were  engaged  in  it. 

In  the  same  way  the  Confederate  agents  and  private 
commercial  parties  also  shipped  goods  of  all  kinds  from 
England  to  English  colonial  ports,  to  Havana  and  to 
Matamoras  during  the  Civil  War.  The  general  purpose 
was  no  doubt  to  use  those  ports  as  entrepots,  and  to 
tranship  the  goods  not  intended  for  bond  fide  delivery 
by  steamers  especially  designed  to  run  the  blockade. 
The  ships  actually  engaged  in  running  the  blockade 
were  liable  to  capture  whenever  they  approached  the 
blockaded  coast  or  were  in  proximity  to  it,  and  were 
legitimate  prize-of-war  when  thus  caught.  But  neutral 
vessels  on  voyages,  say  from  England  to  Nassau,  Havana, 
and  Matamoras,  and  steering  the  direct  course  for  those 
ports,  were  surely  within  their  rights,  and  were  or  should 
have  been  as  free  from  interference  by  either  belligerent 
as  American  ships  trading  to  the  Baltic  at  the  time  of 

*  Besides  the  taking  of  arms  to  Memel  on  behalf  of  Russia,  many 
American  ships  were  chartered  by  the  French  Government,  and  were 
employed  as  transports  during  the  Crimean  War. 

6—2 


84  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

the  Crimean  War  were  exempt  from  interference  by  the 
cruisers  of  France  and  England. 

The  United  States  would  have  complained  most 
bitterly,  and  would  probably  have  done  something  more 
than  remonstrate,  if  those  Powers  had  so  stretched  their 
belligerent  rights  as  to  use  the  Swedish  and  Danish 
bays  along  the  shores  of  the  Cattegat  as  points  of  obser 
vation  from  which  to  watch  and  interrupt  American 
trade  with  the  neutral  ports  in  the  Baltic. 

It  is  on  record,  however,  that  United  States  ships  kept 
lip  a  quasi  blockade  of  Nassau  during  the  years  1861-65, 
and  that  British  vessels  bound  to  that  port  were  chased 
and  captured  within  the  Bahama  Channels.  The  British 
steamer  Margaret  Jessie  *  was  chased  oif  the  island  of 
Eleuthera  by  the  United  States  steamer  Rhode  Island, 
but  escaped,  though  repeatedly  fired  at  with  shot  and 
shell  when  so  close  to  the  shore  that  some  of  the  shell 
fell  upon  the  land,  cut  down  trees,  and  did  other  damage. 
In  fact,  the  United  States  Government  attempted  to 
establish  coal-depots  at  both  Bermuda  and  Nassau,  and 
kept  cruisers  at  or  in  the  near  neighbourhood  of  the 
latter  port,  especially  to  intercept  vessels,  whether  in 
ward  bound  from  Europe  or  outward  bound  in  the 
direction  of  the  southern  coast.f 

To  prevent  this  use  of  the  Bahama  Islands,  and  to 
prevent  also  the  possible  collision  of  United  States  and 
Confederate  ships  within  British  waters,  her  Majesty's 
Government  were  induced  to  issue  '  regulations,'  in 
January,  1862,  forbidding  the  vessels  of  both  belligerents 
alike  to  enter  the  port  of  Nassau  except  by  permission  of 
the  Governor  or  in  stress  of  weather.  The  United 
States  paid  but  little  heed  to  the  spirit  of  those  regula 
tions.  '  There  were  no  less  than  thirty-four  visits  of 
*  *  Margaret  Jessie  Debate.'  t  See  'British  Counter-Case/  pp.  63 — 65. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  85 

United  States  ships -of- war  to  the  Bahama  Islands  during; 
the  time  that  the  regulations  were  in  force.*  On  four 
occasions,  at  least,  vessels  of  the  United  States  exceeded 
the  twenty-four  hours'  limit,  and  took  in  coal  by  per 
mission  ;  one  of  them  also  received  permission  to  repair. 
Several  were  engaged  in  pursuit  of  vessels  suspected  of 
being  blockade-runners,  and  did  not  in  every  instance 
relinquish  the  chase  within  British  limits.  Two  prizes 
appear,  indeed,  to  have  been  captured  by  them,  one 
within  a  mile  of  the  shore,  the  other  almost  in  port/"jr 

'  The  use  made  of  the  waters  of  the  Bahamas  by 
Federal  cruisers,  for  the  purpose  of  watching  and  inter 
cepting  vessels  supposed  to  be  freighted  with  cargoes- 
for  Confederate  ports,  was  so  persistent  as  to  induce  the 
Governor  on  one  occasion,  when  granting  permission  to 
coal  to  the  commander  of  the  Dacotah,  to  accompany  it 
with  the  condition  that  the  vessel  should  not,  within  the 
next  ten  days,  be  cruising  within  five  miles  of  any  of 
the  Bahama  Islands.' 

It  will  be  perceived  that  the  United  States  adopted 
the  most  rigorous  means  to  repress  the  trade  in  neutral 
ships  between  England  and  the  British  and  Spanish 
West  Indian  Islands  ;  and  they  did  finally  almost 
entirely  suppress  it  by  a  strict  and  severe  extension  of 
the  belligerent  rights  of  visit,  search,  and  capture — an 
extension  previously  unknown  to  International  Law. 

Before  the  American  Civil  War,  it  had  been  commonly 
assumed  that  a  neutral  vessel  bound  to  a  neutral  port 
was  free  from  capture,  and  that  a  prize  court  would  not 
inquire  into  the  destination  of  her  cargo.  The  American 
Courts  introduced  the  principle  that  if  sufficient  evi 
dence  could  be  discovered  of  an  intent  to  tranship  the 

*  See  '  British  Counter-Case,'  Geneva  Arbitration,  pp.  109 — 110. 
t  'Appendix  to  British  Case,'  vol.  v.,  p.  224,  for  particulars. 


86  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

cargo  for  delivery  at  a  port  of  the  belligerent,  the  cargo 
itself,  and  in  some  cases  the 'ship  also,  became,  as  Judge 
Cadwalader  expressed  it  in  re  Bermuda,  l  confiscable/ 
The  United  States  Government  acted  upon  the  above 
interpretation  of  international  law.  During  the  Civil 
War  many  neutral  vessels  were  captured  by  their  cruisers 
on  the  high  seas,  when  bound  from  one  neutral  port  to 
another,  and  were  condemned  upon  evidence  of  an 
intended  breach  of  blockade  which  was  often  very  slight, 
and,  from  the  nature  of  the  cases,  purely  inferential. 

The  course  pursued  by  the  United  States  cruisers  among 
the  Bahama  Islands,  to  which  her  Britannic  Majesty's 
Government  opposed  no  effectual  prohibition,  and  the 
decisions  of  the  United  States  Prize  Courts,  to  which 
no  formal  objection  seems  to  have  been  offered,  destroyed 
in  a  great  degree  the  advantage  which  the  proximity  of 
Nassau  to  the  southern  coast  afforded  to  the  Confederate 
Government,  because  the  risk  of  capture  extended  over 
the  whole  voyage  from  England,  and  was  not  limited  to 
the  comparatively  short  run  from  the  Bahama  banks  to 
the  blockaded  ports  ;  and  the  only  benefit  left  was  that 
of  transferring  the  cargoes  to  lighter  and  swifter  vessels 
at  Nassau. 

The  United  States  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seward, 
often  complained  of  and  denounced  the  use  which  the 
Confederates  made  of  Nassau,  and  the  trade  which 
grew  up  at  that  port,  in  language  not  always  suited 
to  the  courtesy  of  diplomatic  correspondence  or  the 
dignity  of  State  Papers,  and  the  United  States  cruisers 
continued  to  chase  and  often  to  capture  the  neutral  ships 
within  the  waters  of  the  Bahamas  and  Spanish  West 
Indies,  or  when  approaching  them  from  Europe. 
England,  the  Power  chiefly  concerned,  submitted,  or  at 
least  made  no  effectual  protest,  and  it  is  both  interesting 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  87 

and  important  to  investigate  the  reasons  for  her  seeming 
indifference. 

No  one  who  remembers  the  promptness  and  spirit 
with  which  Lord  Palmerston's  Government  resented  the 
taking  of  the  Confederate  Commissioners  from  the  Royal 
Mail  steamship  Trent  by  Captain  Wilkes,  and  the 
alacrity  with  which  preparations  were  made  to  forward 
troops  to  Canada,  and  to  prepare  a  fleet  for  offensive 
operations  if  the  said  Commissioners  were  not  given  up, 
can  suppose  that  her  Majesty's  Government  were 
deterred  from  protecting  British  ships  engaged  in  trade 
between  England  and  the  West  Indian  Colonies,  or 
between  the  several  islands  on  that  side  of  the 
Atlantic,  from  lack  of  spirit  to  uphold  the  national 
honour,  or  from  a  conviction  that  the  trade  was  in 
itself  contrary  to  either  Municipal  or  International  Law. 
In  the  '  counter- case  '  presented  on  the  part  of  her 
Britannic  Majesty's  Government  to  the  Tribunal  of 
Arbitration  at  Geneva,  it  is  correctly  stated  that 
Havana  and  Cardenas,  in  the  Spanish  island  of  Cuba, 
were  made  use  of  for  the  same  purpose  as  Nassau,  and 
that  Confederate  agents  were  maintained  at  those  ports, 
and  it  is  then  remarked  (p.  58) : '  In  this  there  was  nothing 
that  the  British  Government  was  bound  or  legally  em 
powered  to  prohibit,  nor  was  any  such  obligation  incum 
bent  on  the  Government  of  Spain.  Persons  trading 
either  with  the  Southern  States  *or  with  those  which 
adhered  to  the  Union  were  free  to  use  Nassau,  as  they 
were  free  to  use  any  other  port  in  the  British  dominions 
convenient  for  their  purpose/  Clearly,  then,  according 
to  the  views  of  her  Majesty's  Government,  the  Con 
federate  transactions  at  Nassau,  so  far  at  least  as 
regarded  its  use  for  the  purpose  of  an  entrepot,  were 
unobjectionable  both  in  equity  and  law. 


88  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

I  would  not  venture  to  say  that  the  British  Ministry 
of  that  day  seriously  discussed  the  conduct  of  the 
United  States  Government  in  Cabinet  Council,  and 
determined  to  submit  to  the  interruption  of  British 
trade,  and  to  the  violation  of  the  British  flag,  with  the 
intent  to  confirm  a  new  interpretation  of  International 
Law  and  to  establish  precedents  against  the  United 
States  ;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  a  broad  con 
struction  of  belligerent  maritime  rights  would  be 
especially  and  peculiarly  favourable  to  Great  Britain 
and  the  other  Great  Maritime  Powers  of  Europe  when 
ever  they  may  be  again  engaged  in  war,  and  the 
course  pursued  by  the  United  States  towards  neutral 
ships  during  the  years  1861-65  and  tacitly  acquiesced  in 
by  the  European  Powers,  will  at  some  future  day 
involve  the  former  Government  in  a  dilemma. 

It  is  manifest  to  those  who  are  acquainted  with  the 
British  steamship  trade  at  this  time,  and  ihe^  class  of 
vessels  engaged  in  it,  that  at  very  short  notice — say  two 
months  after  a  declaration  of  war — England  could  have 
at  sea  not  less  than  one  hundred  steamers  taken  from 
the  merchant  service  capable  of  carrying  heavy  guns, 
ample  supplies  of  stores  and  fuel,  and  with  an  average 
speed  of  thirteen  knots,  a  good  many  with  much 
higher  speed.  So  large  a  marine  police,  in  addition  to 
the  powerful  fleet  of  the  Eoyal  Navy,  would  render  the 
transfer  of  contraband  goods  across  the  seas  impossible, 
and  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that,  if  England  were 
engaged  in  war,  she  would  act  upon  the  example  of  the 
United  States,  and  would  stop  the  conveyance  of  such 
goods  to  ports  adjacent  to  those  of  her  enemy,  even 
though  covered  by  the  American  flag.  What  would  the 
successor  of  Mr.  Secretary  Seward  say  to  that?  He 
could  not  deny  or  explain  away  the  precedents.  Sub- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  89 

mission  to  such  an  interruption  of  their  trade  would  not 
be  long  borne  by  the  people  of  the  United  States.  The 
alternative  would  be  war,  probably  at  a  time  when 
the  country  would  be  unprepared  with  ships  either  for 
active  cruising  or  for  a  vigorous  defence  of  the  coasting 
trade. 

All  the  European  Powers  are  steadily  increasing  their 
naval  forces.  They  are  not  only  building  armour- cased 
ships  and  torpedo  vessels,  but  others  especially  designed 
to  cruise  into  distant  seas.  France,  Germany,  and  even 
Austria  and  Italy,  have  dockyard  accommodation  and 
stores  of  material  which  would  enable  them  to  add 
quickly  to  their  present  force  of  cruising  ships. 
Steamers  taken  from  the  British  or  Continental  merchant 
services  would  be  more  vulnerable  than  vessels  con 
structed  especially  for  war,  but  at  the  beginning  of 
hostilities  they  would  be  greatly  superior  in  speed, 
power,  and  in  number  to  the  opposing  ships  the  United 
States  could  quickly  put  afloat— strikingly  superior 
to  those  commissioned  by  the  United  States  during 
the  Civil  War.  It  is  well  known  that  many  British 
commercial  steamers  built  of  late  years  have  been  con 
structed  with  special  reference  to  future  conversion  into 
cruisers  or  torpedo  vessels,  under  arrangements  with 
the  Admiralty,  and  the  great  building-yards  of  the 
Clyde,  Mersey,  Thames,  Tyne,  etc.,  could  turn  out  any 
description  of  vessels  with  great  rapidity. 

The  aggregate  of  tonnage  built  in  Great  Britain 
during  the  year  1881  was  not  less  than  a  million  tons, 
the  Clyde  alone  having  completed  269  vessels,  represent 
ing  a  tonnage  of  340,823  tons.  There  was  one  firm  on 
the  Tyne — Messrs.  Palmer — who  turned  out  no  less  an 
output  than  50,492  tons  of  iron  shipping  in  that  year. 
In  reference  to  the  advance  which  has  been  made  in 


90  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

speed,  it  is  only  necessary  to  mention  such  ships  as  the 
Britannic,    Germanic,   Servia,    City   of  Rome,  Arizona, 
Alaska,  all  of  which  have  crossed  the  Atlantic  between 
New  York  and  Queenstown  at  a  speed  of  not  less  than 
15   knots  for  every  hour   they  were  at   sea;    and   the 
steamship  Stirling  Castle  has  actually  performed,  at  sea, 
with  a  dead  weight  of  3,000  tons,  18^  knots  in  an  hour. 
There  would  be  no  insurmountable  obstacle  in  convert 
ing  the  majority  of  modern  steam  vessels  of  the  British 
mercantile   marine   to  war   purposes.      The   chief  and 
most  important  alterations  would  be  to  remove  deck 
houses,  increase  pumping  power,  place  additional  water 
tight  compartments,  and  perhaps  protect  exposed  parts 
of  engines.     Such  alterations  as   the  foregoing  would 
enable  most  modern  British  steamers  not  only  to  carry 
batteries    sufficient   to   defend   their  own  cargoes,  but 
would  fit  them  to  cruise  against  commerce  and  to  make 
raids   upon   an   enemy's  coast.     The  Hecla,  a   private 
steamship,  was  bought  by  the  Admiralty  in  1878.     She 
has  been  armed  with  five  64-pounders  and  one  40-pounder 
gun,    and   without    any    structural    strengthening   has 
proved  a  decided  success. 

The  figures  in  respect  to  increase  of  tonnage,  perform 
ance  of  steamship  Stirling  Castle,  and  success  of  Hecla 
are  taken  from  the  address  of  the  President  of  the  '  In 
stitution  of  Naval  Architects,'  and  from  the  paper  read 
by  Mr.  John  Dunn  '  On  Modern  Merchant  Ships,'  at 
the  Session,  March  29th,  1882.  The  logs  of  the  Liver 
pool  and  New  York  packets  have  been  published,  and 
their  performances  are  well  known  to  the  travelling 
public  and  to  all  who  take  an  interest  in  steam  shipping. 
During  the  Crimean  War,  and  on  other  occasions  of 
need,  the  ability  of  the  private  shipbuilders  of  Great 
Britain  to  supplement  the  efforts  of  her  Majesty's  dock- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  91 

yards  has  been  fully  and  satisfactorily  demonstrated, 
and  some  of  the  Continental  Powers  have  in  late  years 
largely  increased  their  building  capacity.  American 
naval  officers,  and  probably  the  executive  naval  autho 
rities  also,  are  conscious  of  the  continuous  increase  of 
maritime  strength  abroad,  and  contemplate  with  painful 
misgivings  the  apathy  that  prevails  at  home.  The 
United  States  do  not  appear  to  have  any  fixed  policy  in 
reference  to  the  national  armaments  or  the  efficiency  of 
the  naval  service.  Congress  doles  out  a  few  millions  of 
dollars  from  year  to  year,  which  barely  suffices  to  keep 
the  public  dockyards  in  repair  and  a  few  ships  of  a  by 
gone  type  at  sea,  and  allows  nothing  for  steady  con 
tinuous  enlargement  of  the  cruising  and  fighting  fleet 
proportionate  to  the  increasing  extent  and  growing 
requirements  of  the  country,  or  the  progress  and  develop 
ment  of  naval  efficiency  abroad. 

There  is  an  admirable  naval  school  at  Annapolis  ;  the 
course  of  study  and  the  scientific  training  of  young 
officers  for  the  United  States  Navy  is  very  thorough, 
and  embraces  a  large  range  of  subjects.  Some  may  and 
do  think  that  both  the  education  and  the  training  are 
too  strictly  theoretical,  and  too  purely  military,  and  that 
too  little  attention  is  now  paid  to  practical  seamanship. 
Some  critics  also  say  that  the  cadet  midshipmen  are 
kept  so  long  and  so  exclusively  employed  at  the  pure 
mathematics,  in  the  study  of  law,  and  at  artillery  and 
infantry  drill,  that  they  are  too  old  when  sent  afloat  for 
regular  cruising  to  acquire  the  constitutional  aptitude 
for  the  sea,  and  the  smart  active  habit  of  handling  ships, 
which  the  officers  bred,  say,  thirty  years  ago  possessed. 

This  impression  is  strengthened  by  the  appearance 
and  manoeuvring  of  the  United  States  ships  I  have  seen 
abroad  since  the  war.  In  the  year  1841-42,  I  was  serving 


92  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

on  board  the  United  States  sailing  sloop-of-war  Decatur, 
on  the  Brazil  Station.  She  was  a  model  inan-of-war. 
Some  of  her  performances  would  almost  seem  incredible 
to  the  officers  brought  up  in  these  days  of  steam.  We 
used  to  furl  sails  from  a  bowline  in  thirty- five  seconds, 
and  shift  courses,  when  at  sea  with  all  sail  set,  in  nine 
minutes  from  the  time  the  first  order  was  given  to  l  up 
courses '  until  the  tacks  were  on  board  again.  Once, 
while  cruising  with  a  squadron  of  five  other  ships,  off 
Cape  Frio  (the  late  Commodore  Charles  Morris  being  in 
command),  the  flagship  made  signal  to  c  shift  main  top 
masts.'  The  squadron,  all  sailing  ships,  was  standing 
by  the  wind  in  two  columns  with  top-gallant  sails  set, 
and  the  spare  main -topmasts  were  lashed  in  cranes  out 
side  and  abreast  of  the  main-chains,  and  in  tidy  ships 
like  the  Decatur  were  covered  with  canvas  laced  tightly 
round  the  spar  and  painted  black.  The  Decatur  had 
her  spare  spar  aloft  and  on  end,  rigging  all  set  up,  and 
the  main  top-gallant  sail  set  again,  in  fifty -two  minutes 
from  the  time  the  signal  was  hauled  down  on  board  the 
flagship.  The  times  of  performing  all  evolutions  were 
entered  in  the  log-books,  and  I  took  notes  of  them  in 
my  journal. 

The  foregoing  may  be  considered  fancy  performances, 
when  everything  was  ready,  or  at  least  in  expectation ; 
but  the  smart,  well-trained  crew  of  the  Decatur  were 
equal  to  any  emergency.  On  one  notable  occasion  the 
ship  was  lying  off  Buenos  Ayres.  She  was  moored  for 
the  winter  gales  with  seventy-five  fathoms  of  chain  on 
the  port  bower,  and  one  hundred  and  five  on  the  star 
board,  the  latter  backed  by  the  stream -anchor.  The  top 
gallant  masts,  top-gallant  and  royal  rigging  were  on 
deck,  the  topmasts  were  housed,  the  topsail-yards  were 
down  from  aloft,  and  the  lower  yards  were  lashed 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  93 

across  the  rails.  While  in  this  condition,  the  captain 
received  orders  very  unexpectedly  to  proceed  without 
delay  to  Montevideo,  and  in  two  hours  and  forty- two 
minutes  the  ship  was  standing  down  the  river  La  Plata, 
under  top-gallant  sails,  jib,  and  spanker,  with  both 
bower-anchors  fished  and  the  stream-anchor  in  the 
fore-hatch.  I  ought  to  mention  that  at  the  time  referred 
to  the  Decatur  was  commanded  by  the  late  Commander 
Henry  W.  Ogden,  and  her  first-lieutenant  was  John  H. 
Marshall,  who  was  unsurpassed  in  his  day  as  an 
executive  officer.  Before  the  end  of  the  cruise,  Com 
mander  Ogden  was  invalided,  and  was  relieved  in 
the  command  by  the  late  Admiral  David  G.  Farragut, 
who  did  not  permit  the  Decatur  to  fall  off  in  smartness ; 
indeed,  while  the  latter  officer  was  in  command,  he 
once,  as  an  experiment,  put  the  ship  through  the 
evolution  of  reefing  topsails  in  stays,  a  manoeuvre 
immortalized  in  nautical  song  and  naval  poetry,  but 
which  I  never  saw  performed  except  on  that  single 
occasion. 

Such  performances  would  not  be  possible  with  the 
heavy  ironclads  of  the  present  day,  and  as  all  men-of- 
war  appear  now  to  enter  and  leave  port  under  steam, 
and  use  canvas  only  with  leading  winds,  or  when 
they  can  make  nearly  the  desired  course,  officers  and 
men  have  but  little  practice  in  manoeuvring  under 
sail,  and  it  is  not  surprising  that  smart  handy  seaman 
ship  should  have  declined  since  the  universal  application 
of  steam-power  to  men-of-war.  This  lack  of  smartness 
is  apparent  in  the  ships  of  all  the  Maritime  Powers.  I 
stood  at  the  George's  Pierhead  in  Liverpool,  and  saw 
her  Majesty's  ship  Defence  man  yards  on  the  occasion  of 
the  visit  of  his  Royal  Highness  the  Prince  of  Wales  to 
open  the  New  North  Docks  in  1881,  and  such  first- 


94  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

lieutenants  as  used  to  handle  the  British  frigates 
and  corvettes  in  olden  times  would  have  nearly  gone  out 
of  their  minds  to  see  the  slow  cautious  way  in  which 
the  men  laid  out  on  the  yards,  and  the  prudent  delibera 
tion  with  which  they  clung  to  the  ratlins  when  laying 
down  from  aloft. 

Officers  of  the  American  navy  are  now  probably,  as 
a  class,  more  carefully  and  thoroughly  educated  than 
those  of  any  other  national  marine,  at  least  in  the 
theory  of  their  profession,  but  there  is  great  scarcity 
of  native  seamen,  and  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that 
there  is  not  now  a  single  ship  on  the  United  States 
Navy  List  which  would  be  classed  at  all  among  the 
effective  naval  forces  of  any  European  Power,  and  the 
United  States  could  not  send  a  squadron  to  sea  upon  a 
sudden  emergency  equal  in  the  character  of  the  ships  to 
the  fleet  which  even  the  little  Republic  of  Chili  had  in 
commission  during  the  late  war  with  Peru. 

In  fact,  the  United  States  appear  to  have  voluntarily 
abandoned  their  claim  to  be  included  among  the  naval, 
or  even  the  maritime,  Powers.  The  military  marine  has 
been  suffered  to  fall  below  that  of  almost  every  other 
country ;  and  such  is  the  lack  of  mercantile  ships,  that 
the  great  staples  produced  in  such  prolific  abundance  in 
the  vast  territory  of  the  Union  would  never  reach  a 
foreign  market  if  dependent  upon  American  vessels 
alone  for  transportation.  England  has,  in  fact,  appro 
priated  almost  the  entire  carrying  trade  of  the  United 
States  ;  and  the  splendid  steamships  which  issue  from 
English  ports,  and  the  wealth  of  British  steamship  com 
panies,  furnish  a  measure  of  Britain's  profit  and  America's 
loss  from  the  apathy  of  the  United  States  Government 
in  respect  to  its  maritime  interests. 

If  this    indifference    to    naval    equality  with    other 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  95 

countries  was  the  result  of  a  well-considered  policy  of 
economy,  or  arose  from  confidence  in  the  ability  to 
make  good  the  deficiency  by  a  great  effort  in  case  of 
need,  it  would  be  intelligible,  although  of  doubtful 
wisdom ;  but  ships  fit  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
modern  warfare  cannot  be  built  hurriedly,  and  hasty 
preparation  always  involves  waste  of  material  and  ex 
travagant  expenditure. 

The  United  States  Government,  through  a  combative 
but  indiscreet  Secretary  of  State,  has  quite  lately  re- 
announced  its  purpose  to  insist  upon  the  application 
of  the  '  Monroe  doctrine/  with  special  reference  to  the 
Panama  Canal  and  the  Chileno- Peruvian  embroglio.  To 
make  remonstrances  effective,  either  at  the  Isthmus  of 
Darien  or  on  the  coast  of  Chili,  would  require  the  pre 
sence  of  a  strong  fleet  of  ships  fully  up  to  the  modern 
type  ;  and  the  United  States  have  none  of  that  kind. 
Governments  who  persistently  keep  their  naval  and 
military  forces  at  a  low  point  of  strength  and  efficiency 
should  also  practise  a  modest  and  inoffensive  diplomacy, 
because  otherwise  their  declarations  will  either  be  treated 
with  indifference,  or  they  are  liable  at  any  time  to 
receive  a  rebuff  which  would  wound  the  national  pride 
and  bring  upon  the  responsible  Ministry  the  indignant 
reproaches  of  the  people. 

The  '  Monroe  doctrine '  as  lately  enunciated  would 
surprise  its  author,  who  probably  never  dreamed  of  so 
broad  an  application  of  its  meaning.  But  if  the  United 
States  seriously  purpose  to  undertake  the  sole  guarantee 
of  the  highway  between  the  two  great  oceans,  and  aspire 
to  be  the  only  arbiters  in  matters  affecting  the  interests 
of  the  numerous  American  States,  it  is  indispensable 
that  they  be  able  to  place  a  powerful  fleet  at  the  required 
spot  and  at  the  critical  moment. 


96  THE  SECEET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

England's  right  of  way  through  the  Suez  Canal 
would  not  be  worth  the  value  of  her  shares  in  the 
capital  stock  of  the  company,  if  it  was  not  thought 
that  she  could  hold  the  two  ends  of  the  canal  against  all 
comers.  A  British  Minister  will  probably  never  issue 
a  circular  manifesto  to  inform  Europe  that  110  one  must 
attempt  to  block  the  way,  but  the  Admiralty  continue  to 
lay  down  and  to  launch  such  vessels  as  the  Northampton, 
Thunderer,  Polyphemus,  Dreadnought,  Edinburgh,  Ajax, 
Colossus,  Majestic,  etc.,  and  everyone  understands  that 
to  interfere  would  involve  the  absolute  consequence  of  a 
hard  struggle,  to  say  the  least. 

In  these  times  of  great  armaments,  nations  who  wish 
to  advance  their  influence,  maintain  their  prestige  or 
even  to  take  part  in  international  discussions  with  the 
expectation  of  being  listened  to  with  respect,  must 
demonstrate  that  they  are  prepared  for  attack  as  well  as 
for  defence,  that  they  can  strike  as  well  as  parry. 
Those  who  are  content  to  make  peaceful  progress  in 
wealth  and  domestic  comfort,  may  possibly  be  left  to 
enjoy  their  freedom  and  their  gains  ;  but  then  they 
must  not  attempt  the  role  of  dictators,  nor  challenge 
attack  by  a  pretence  of  aggressive  strength  which  they 
take  no  pains  to  develop,  and  which  all  the  world  knows 
they  do  not  possess. 

NOTE  TO  PAGE  62. 

After  the  departure  of  the  Alabama  from  Liverpool  and  her 
equipment  as  a  Confederate  vessel-of-war  was  publicly  known,  it 
was  often  stated  that  the  Messrs.  Laird  had  been  guilty  of  a  violation 
of  law  in  building  her.  In  consequence  of  such  reports,  those  gentle 
men  published  a  letter  in  the  Times,  dated  25th  of  May,  1869, 
which  contained  copies  of  the  following  documents  and  opinions  of 
counsel : 

"  I  am  of  opinion  that  Messrs.  Laird  had  a  right  to  build  the  ship 
which  has  since  been  called  the  Alabama  in  the  manner  they  did, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  97 

and  that  they  committed  no  offence  against  either  the  common  law 
or  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  with  reference  to  that  ship.  I  am 
of  opinion  that  the  simple  building  of  a  ship,  even  although  the 
ship  be  of  a  kind  apparently  adapted  for  warlike  purposes,  and 
delivering  such  ship  to  a  purchaser  in  an  English  port,  even  although 
the  purchaser  is  suspected  or  known  to  be  the  agent  of  a  foreign 
belligerent  Power,  does  not  constitute  an  offence  against  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act  (59  Geo.  Ill,  c.  60,  s.  7)  on  the  part  of  the  builder, 
unless  the  builder  makes  himself  a  party  to  the  equipping  of  the 
vessel  for  warlike  purposes.  The  Alabama,  indeed,  appears  to  me  to 
have  been  equipped  at  the  Azores,  and  not  in  England  at  all. 

'GEORGE  HELLISH. 

«3,  Harcourt  Buildings,  6th  February,  1863. 

*  We  entirely  concur  in  the  opinion  given  by  Mr.  Hellish  on  the 
statements  laid  before  him,  and  our  opinion  would  not  be  altered  if 
the  fact  were  that  Messrs.  Laird  Brothers  knew  they  were  building 
the  Alabama  for  an  agent  of  the  Confederate  Government. 

'(Signed)      H.  M.  CAIRNS. 

1  JAMES  KEMPLAY. 

'  17th  April,  1863.' 

Opinion  of  Lord  Chief  Baron  Pollock  on  the  trial  of  the  Alexandra, 
June,  1863  : 

'  Many  allusions  in  the  course  of  this  case  had  been  made  to  the 
Alabama ;  but  he  held  that  as  that  vessel  left  Liverpool  unarmed, 
and  as  a  simple  ship,  she  committed  no  unlawful  act ;  and  we  had 
nothing  to  do  with  the  fact  that  at  a  subsequent  period  she  was 
armed  and  converted  into  a  vessel-of-war  at  Terceira.' 

Letter  from  Lord  Clarendon  to  Mr.  Adams,  2nd  December,  1865, 
quoted  by  Earl  Russell  in  his  speech,  27th  March,  1868 : 

'It  is  nevertheless  my  duty,  in  closing  this  .correspondence,  to  ob 
serve  that  no  armed  vessel  departed  during  the  war  from  a  British 
port  to  cruise  against  the  commerce  of  the  United  States.' 

Sir  Roundel  Palmer,  Solicitor  General,  speech  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  27th  March,  1863  : 

'It  was  not  till  the  Alabama  reached  the  Azores  that  she  received 
her  stores,  her  captain,  or  her  papers,  and  that  she  hoisted  the  Con 
federate  flag.  It  is  not  true  that  she  departed  from  the  shores  of 
this  country  as  a  ship-of-war.' 

VOL.   I.  7 


98  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

It  will  be  perceived  from  the  foregoing  that  Messrs.  Laird  were 
well  supported  in  the  view  that  they  were  acting  in  strict  conformity 
with  law  when  they  built  the  ship  afterwards  called  the  Alabama, 
but  this  whole  subject  is  dealt  with  in  another  chapter. 

Mr.  George  Mellish,  Sir  Hugh  Cairns,  and  Mr.  James  Kemplay, 
are  well  known  to  have  been  leaders  of  great  eminence  at  the  English 
Bar,  and  Sir  Hugh  Cairns  (now  Earl  Cairns)  has  since  been  Lord 
Chancellor  of  England. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUEOPE.  99 


CHAPTER  III. 

Financial  embarrassments  of  the  Confederate  Agents. — Incomplete 
organization  of  the  Confederate  Executive  at  this  period. — The 
financial  arrangements  of  the  Confederate  States  in  Europe. — 
Incompleteness  of  the  instructions  of  the  Naval  Representative, 
and  insufficiency  of  the  arrangements  to  meet  financial  require 
ments. — Purchase  and  equipment  of  the  Fingal,  afterwards  the 
Atlanta. — Shipment  of  war  material. — Mr.  Low,  second  officer  of 
the  Fingal. — An  unfortunate  start. — The  island  of  Terceira. — The 
crew  agree  to  run  the  blockade. — Arrival  in  the  Savannah  river. 
The  state  of  the  Southern  forces. — Correspondence  concerning 
the  future  operations  of  the  Fingal — Enlargement  of  powers  as 
Naval  Representative  in  Europe. — Flag-officer  Josiah  Tattnall. — 
Conversion  of  the  Fingal  into  the  armour-clad  Atlanta. — Her 
engagement  with  and  capture  by  two  United  States  '  Monitors.' — 
Return  to  England. 

THE  narrative  of  the  Bermudas  *  second  voyage,  the 
account  of  her  capture  and  condemnation  by  the  Prize 
Court  at  Philadelphia,  and  the  remarks  upon  the  general 
policy  of  the  United  States  in  the  practice  of  their 
maritime  rights  as  a  belligerent,  which  occupy  much 
of  the  last  chapter,  have  somewhat  anticipated  the 
precise  order  of  events.  But  the  naval  operations  of  the 
Confederate  States  in  Europe  were  full  of  complications, 

*  Captain  Tessier,  who  commanded  the  Bermuda  on  the  occasion 
of  her  successful  voyage  to  Savannah  in  1861,  was  not  in  her  at  the 
time  of  her  capture,  or  the  result  would  probably  have  been  less 
disastrous. 

7—2 


100  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

and  gave  rise  to  many  questions  affecting  international 
duties,  as  well  as  international  comity,  and  it  will  save 
both  time  and  space,  and  will,  I  think,  be  more  impres 
sive,  and  also  more  systematic  and  instructive,  to  treat 
such  questions,  as  a  general  rule,  subjectively,  and  to 
explain  and  discuss  them  when  they  appear  to  have  a 
natural  connection  with  a  special  event  in  the  narrative, 
than  to  postpone  them  for  more  formal  and  exclusive 
treatment  in  separate  chapters. 

The  Bermuda  made  her  first  and  only  voyage  to 
a  Confederate  port  in  August — September,  1861,  and 
she  took  to  Savannah  the  first  shipment  of  war  material 
from  Europe  on  behalf  of  the  Confederate  Government. 
I  reported  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  by  that  vessel 
the  particulars  of  the  Alabama  and  Florida,  advised 
him  of  the  contracts  which  had  been  made  for  general 
naval  supplies,  called  attention  to  the  financial  diffi 
culties,  and  informed  him  that  it  would  probably  be 
necessary  to  buy  a  steamer  and  return  to  the  Confederate 
States  in  her  myself,  with  military  stores,  as  well  as 
for  further  consultation  and  reconsideration  of  my 
instructions.  There  were  at  that  early  date  numerous 
agents  of  the  United  States  in  England,  who  seemed  in 
no  way  desirous  to  conceal  their  operations.  They 
went  about  their  business  with  the  air  of  men  who 
were  sure  of  their  position,  and  who  neither  anticipated 
nor  feared  interference  or  opposition.  They  were  well 
provided  with  money,  or  satisfactory  bank- credits,  and 
they  rapidly  swept  the  gun  market  of  well-nigh  every 
weapon,  whether  good  or  bad.  The  Confederate  agents 
were  forced  from  want  of  means  to  be  content  with 
moderate  purchases ;  but  they  made  large  contracts  for 
forward  delivery,  at  first  on  the  credit  of  Messrs. 
Eraser,  Trenholm  and  Co.,  and  then,  when  remittances 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  101 

began  to  arrive,  upon  the  confidence  they  had  already 
won  by  prompt  payment,  and  the  assurance  they  were 
able  to  give  that  the  Government  had  made  suitable 
arrangements  to  meet  all  liabilities,  and  to  place  their 
bankers  in  funds.  There  was  always,  however,  much 
perplexity  and  embarrassment  from  lack  of  ready  money. 
At  one  time,  in  September,  1863,  I  was  forced  to  report 
to  the  Xavy  Department  that  the  outstanding  contracts 
would  require  £700,000  in  excess  of  the  amount  held 
at  that  date  by  the  financial  agents,  and  the  War 
Department  was  rarely,  if  ever,  able  to  keep  pace 
with  its  requirements.  The  compulsory  sale  of  ships 
that  could  not  be  got  to  sea  because  of  the  prohibition  of 
her  Majesty's  Government  more  than  once  supplied  the 
means  of  continuing  purchases  and  shipments  of  war 
material  which  otherwise  could  not  have  been  bought. 

The  home  authorities  pressed  us  to  hurry  forward 
supplies,  and  I  was  urged  to  place  and  to  keep  cruisers 
at  sea,  but  they  appreciated  the  difficulties,  and  in 
looking  over  the  correspondence  now,  I  can  find  no 
unreasonable  complaints,  and  no  insinuations  even,  that 
more  could  have  been  effected  than  was  being  done. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  first  remittance  from  the 
Navy  Department  was  received  July  27,  1861.  The 
funds  were  forwarded  in  the  form  of  sterling  bills  and 
bank-credits,  but  the  aggregate  amount  was  not  sufficient 
to  cover  the  orders  for  naval  stores  already  placed,  and 
the  price  of  the  two  ships  (Alabama  and  Florida),  and 
no  additional  funds  were  received,  nor  any  advices  on 
the  subject,  until  October,  hence  no  further  contracts 
could  be  made  at  that  time.  Meanwhile  the  work  upon 
the  ships  was  progressing  rapidly.  It  was  estimated 
that  the  Florida  would  be  finished  in  February — March 
and  the  Alabama  in  June,  1862,  and  such  arrangements 


102  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

had  been  made  with  the  builders  that  my  personal  super 
vision  was  not  necessary,  and,  moreover,  frequent  personal 
attendance  at  the  building  yards  was  not  prudent. 

The  Consular  agents  of  the  United  States  had  already 
begun  to  practise  an  inquisitive  system  of  espionage, 
and  it  was  soon  manifest  that  the  movements  of  those 
who  were  supposed  to  be  agents  of  the  Confederate 
Government  were  closely  and  vigilantly  watched.  Men 
known  to  be  private  detectives  in  the  employ  of  the 
United  States  Consul  were  often  seen  prowling  about 
the  dockyards,  and  questioning  the  employes  of  Messrs. 
Laird  and  Miller  in  reference  to  the  two  vessels,  whose 
somewhat  peculiar  type  had  attracted  notice,  and  at  a 
very  early  date  it  became  manifest  that  her  Majesty's 
Government  would  take  a  rigid  view  of  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act,  and  that  there  would  be  very  great 
difficulty  and  expense  in  getting  ships  to  sea  especially 
adapted  in  their  construction  and  general  outfit  for  pur 
poses  of  war.  The  financial  question  was,  however,  the 
greatest  cause  of  perplexity  at  that  time.  The  rapidly 
advancing  rate  of  exchange  clearly  indicated  that  the 
Confederate  Government  would  soon  be  compelled  to 
resort  to  some  other  mode  of  placing  funds  in  Europe 
than  by  sterling  bills.  There  was  also  much  delay  in 
communicating  by  letter,  and  the  danger  of  miscarriage 
or  capture  made  it  hazardous  to  write  fully  and  clearly 
upon  subjects  it  was  vitally  important  to  explain  and 
discuss  without  reserve. 

Very  soon  after  the  beginning  of  hostilities  the  policy 
of  buying  up  the  whole  of  the  cotton  at  the  South,  on 
account  of  the  Government,  and  forwarding  it  as  quickly 
as  possible  to  Europe,  was  suggested  to  the  executive 
authorities,  and  was  no  doubt  earnestly  considered  by 
them.  If  200,000  bales  of  cotton  could  have  been 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  103 

shipped  to  Liverpool  during  the  first  year  of  the  war, 
the  financial  position  of  the  Confederate  States  would 
no  doubt  have  been  infinitely  strengthened,  and  the  first 
levies  might  have  been  put  into  the  field  in  such  a  state 
of  efficiency,  as  regards  clothing  and  equipment,  as  to 
have  greatly  affected  the  results  of  the  struggle.  There 
have  been  many  persons  in  the  South  who  have  severely 
criticized  the  Confederate  Government  for  not  adopting 
the  above  policy  at  the  beginning;  but  those  who  were 
early  employed  in  important  offices  connected  with  the 
supply  of  the  military  and  naval  wants  of  the  country, 
and  whose  faculties  were  keenly  aroused  and  directed  to 
the  consideration  of  the  ways  and  means,  are  conscious 
that  there  were  great,  if  not  insurmountable  obstacles  to 
the  fulfilment  of  that  policy  when  it  was  first  suggested. 
During  the  greater  part  of  the  time  which  intervened 
from  the  secession  of  South  Carolina  to  the  beginning  of 
hostilities,  not  quite  five  months,  there  was  no  general 
Executive  Government  at  all.  The  several  States  with 
drew  from  the  Union  at  different  periods.  Each  in  turn 
was  fully  occupied  with  her  own  internal  affairs,  and 
none  were  at  all  sure  which,  if  any,  of  the  neighbouring 
States  would  secede,  or  whether  after  seceding  they 
would  be  willing  to  unite  in  a  joint  Confederacy  for  a 
common  purpose.  The  Provisional  Government  was 
not  formed  at  Montgomery  until  February,  1861. 

On  the  13th  of  April,  barely  two  months  after,  when 
the  Executive  Departments  were  still  in  the  very  throes 
of  organization,  with  the  whole  machinery  of  Govern 
ment  new  and  untried,  without  a  single  shipyard  or 
military  arsenal  in  working  order,  and  with  no  military 
forces  except  the  State  volunteer  corps,  and  those  not 
yet  regularly  enrolled  into  the  general  service,  hostilities 
were  precipitated  by  the  events  at  Charleston. 


104  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

While  affairs  were  thus  coming  to  a  crisis,  the  ships 
lying  in  the  cotton  ports  took  in  full  cargoes  and  sailed ; 
but  they  were  of  course  loaded  on  private  account,  and 
when  they  left,  few,  if  any,  came  in  their  places.  The 
mercantile  world,  more  astute  than  the  politicians,  fore 
saw  the  coming  storm,  and  did  not  care  to  expose  their 
ships  to  its  fury  ;  hence  the  vessels  that  came  to  Southern 
ports  immediately  before  the  attack  upon  Fort  Sumter 
made  haste  to  load  and  get  away. 

The  authorities  at  Montgomery  did  not  prevent  their 
departure,  and  the  United  States  granted  some  respite 
before  closing  the  ports  by  a  declaration  of  blockade. 
There  were  several  lines  of  steamers  plying  between 
Boston,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  and  Southern  ports, 
both  on  the  Atlantic  coast  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  ;  but 
their  movements  were  so  arranged  that  at  the  critical 
moment  they  were  almost  to  a  ship  either  at  the  Northern 
ports  or  en  route  for  them,  and  at  the  time  when  actual 
hostilities  began,  there  was  scarcely  an  available  ship  of 
any  description  in  Southern  waters.  It  has  already 
been  mentioned  that  the  steamship  Bienville  was  per 
mitted  to  leave  New  Orleans  on  the  day  after  the  attack 
upon  Fort  Sumter,  and  I  know  of  only  three  regular 
sea-going  steamships  which  were  still  at  Southern  ports 
a  month  after  that  event.  One  of  the  number  was 
bought  by  the  Confederate  Government,  and  was  com 
missioned  by  the  late  Admiral  Semmes  as  the  Sumter ;  a 
second,  the  Nashville,  was  also  bought  by  the  Govern 
ment,  and  made  a  short  cruise  to  England  via  Bermuda, 
and  back  to  a  Confederate  port,  under  the  command  of 
Captain  R.  B.  Pegram,  and  the  third  was  bought  by 
Messrs.  John  Fraser  and  Co.,  of  Charleston,  and  sailed 
from  Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  for  Liverpool,  with  a 
cargo  of  cotton,  rosin,  etc.,  on  their  account.  There 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  105 

were  two  or  three  paddle -steamers  at  Richmond,  suited 
to  the  coasting  trade,  but  not  for  foreign  voyages,  and 
they  were  taken  up  by  the  Navy  Department. 

I  do  not  state  positively  that  the  above  were  the  only 
steamers  remaining  in  Southern  ports  at  the  time  men 
tioned,  but  I  think  that  if  there  had  been  any  others 
suitable  for  deep-sea  voyages,  the  fact  would  not  be 
forgotten  by  me  now,  and  I  feel  sure  that  they  would 
have  been  promptly  and  eagerly  appropriated  by  the 
Confederate  Navy  Department.  Whether,  therefore,  the 
Provisional  Government  at  Montgomery  approved  of 
the  proposition  to  buy  and  ship  the  cotton  still  remain 
ing  at  the  plantations  and  other  interior  points  or  not, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  means  for  shipping  it  in 
large  quantities  were  wholly  wanting.  Private  persons 
and  several  mercantile  firms  made  many  ventures  to  the 
Bahamas  and  Havana  during  the  first  six  months  of  the 
war  with  no  better  craft  than  the  ordinary  river  steamer, 
but  undertakings  quite  in  keeping  with  mercantile  usage, 
and  justified  by  the  ordinary  commercial  considerations 
of  profit  and  loss,  are  inadmissible — indeed,  they  are 
impracticable — as  State  enterprises,  for  the  sufficient 
reason  that  the  public  Departments  are  enveloped  in 
legal  as  well  as  traditional  routine.  National  funds  can 
only  be  applied  in  accordance  with  legislative  appropria 
tion,  and  therefore  schemes  which  may  be  put  in  course 
of  effectual  progress  at  the  moment  of  suggestion  by  a 
private  firm  or  corporation,  can  only  be  executed  by  the 
State  after  due  consideration  by  two  or  more  branches 
of  the  Government,  which  necessarily  involves  delay, 
and  often  such  modifications  of  the  original  project  as  to 
lessen  the  chances  of  success,  or  at  least  to  increase  the 
difficulties  to  be  overcome.  Many  persons  will  remem 
ber  how  quickly,  and  on  what  a  stupendous  scale,  the 


106  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Government  at  Washington  hastened  to  prepare  for  the 
invasion  of  the  Confederate  States  when  the  surrender  of 
Fort  Sumter  ended  the  period  of  suspense  and  the  state 
of  war  began. 

The  so-called  Democratic  Party  at  the  North  had 
been  generally  favourable  to  the  Southern  view  of 
6  State  rights/  and  was  strongly  opposed  to  that  party 
which,  by  a  division  among  its  opponents,  had  suc 
ceeded  in  electing  Mr.  Abraham  Lincoln  to  the 
Presidency.  There  had  been  also  a  strong  minority  of 
the  dominant  or  Republican  Party,  who,  while  repro 
bating  the  action  of  the  South,  and  denouncing  the 
principle  of  secession  as  revolutionary  and  unauthorized, 
were  yet  opposed  to  the  exercise  of  any  coercive  measures 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  Union. 

The  Cabinet  at  Washington,  the  party  leaders  and 
the  party  press,  combined  to  arouse  and  direct  public 
sentiment,  and  to  bring  the  people  of  the  North  to  the 
conviction  that  the  right  of  secession,  if  once  admitted, 
would  logically  and  inevitably  tend  to  complete  dis 
solution.  They  addressed  themselves  to  the  fears,  the 
prejudices,  and  the  patriotism  of  the  North,  and  with 
such  success  that,  when  President  Lincoln  issued  his 
proclamation  calling  for  troops  to  i  avenge  the  insult  to 
the  national  flag  at  Charleston/  and  to  'restore  the 
Union  '  (to  use  the  phraseology  of  the  period),  there 
was  a  prompt  and  ample  response.  Party  distinctions 
and  party  principles  ceased  to  restrain  men  from  joining 
together  for  the  common  purpose  of  restoring  and  main 
taining  the  Union,  and  large  masses  of  troops  were  soon 
gathering  around  Washington,  along  the  Potomac  and  the 
northern  frontier  of  Virginia.  To  prepare  for  the  threat 
ened  attack,  and  to  provide  the  means  for  an  adequate 
resistance,  must  have  strained  the  resources  and  taxed 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  107 

the  administrative  faculties  of  the  Provisional  Govern 
ment  of  the  Confederate  States  to  the  fullest  tension. 

Those  who  wish  to  form  just  and  impartial  opinions 
of  public  men,  and  who  aspire  to  write  the  history  of 
great  public  events,  must  first  look  for  the  facts  ;  then 
they  must  give  a  fair,  judicial  consideration  to  all  the 
circumstances.  They  must  be  careful  not  to  infer  that 
a  course  of  action  which  commends  itself  when  viewed 
in  the  light  of  accomplished  events  was  practicable  ;  or, 
if  practicable  when  first  suggested,  whether  something 
else  of  more  pressing  and  essential  importance  did  not 
necessarily  demand  precedence.  The  people  of  the 
South  will  probably  admit  that  it  was  of  more  vital 
consequence  to  keep  the  Federal  armies  out  of  Rich 
mond  in  1861  than  to  effect  even  the  important  purpose 
of  transferring  the  cotton  crop  to  Europe.  An  equitable 
investigation  of  the  facts,  and  due  consideration  of  all 
the  circumstances,  the  insufficient  means  of  transport  by 
land,  and  the  still  greater  lack  of  means  of  transport  by 
sea — will  demonstrate  that  both  enterprises  could  not 
have  been  accomplished  at  the  same  time,  and  the 
project  of  perfecting  the  financial  arrangements  abroad 
was  unavoidably  delayed.  At  a  later  period  of  the  war 
the  Government  made  great  efforts  to  forward  cotton 
and  other  products  of  the  south  to  Europe.  The 
Confederate  Congress  passed  an  Act  authorizing  the 
Treasury  Department  to  buy  and  ship  whatever  staples 
were  readily  convertible  into  money  in  the  European 
markets,  and  agents  were  sent  into  the  interior,  and 
were  stationed  at  the  seaports  to  carry  out  that  purpose. 
A  special  agent  of  the  Treasury  was  sent  to  Europe, 
with  power  to  make  contracts  with  banking  or  com 
mercial  houses  to  supply  the  money  necessary  to  build 
steamers  suitable  for  blockade  running  ;  and  he  brought 


108  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

over  orders  from  the  Xavy  Department  directing  me  to 
look  after  the  designing  and  construction  of  the  ships, 
and  to  see  that  they  were  properly  fitted  for  the  pro 
posed  work.  The  Treasury  agent  was  Mr.  Colin  J. 
McRae,  and  he  made  capital  contracts  with  two  or  more 
firms,  who  agreed  to  advance  the  money  for  a  com 
mission  of  ten  per  cent.,  and  to  be  recouped  from  the 
proceeds  of  the  cotton  or  other  products  brought  out 
by  the  ships  themselves.  The  precise  arrangement  was 
that  the  ships  were  to  be  employed  in  running  the 
blockade,  the  inward  cargoes  to  be  exclusively  on 
Government  account,  and  the  outward  cargoes  half  for 
the  Government,  and  half  to  go  towards  payment  of  the 
ships,  until  the  whole  amount  advanced,  together  with 
the  stipulated  commission,  was  cleared  off.  Until  paid 
for  in  full,  each  steamer  was  to  be  registered  in  the 
name  of  a  nominee  of  the  firm  who  had  advanced  the 
money,  and  then  she  was  to  become  the  property  of  the 
Confederate  Government.  Time  being  of  incalculable 
importance,  four  paddle -steamers,  the  best  that  could  be 
found,  were  bought  to  begin  with  ;  and  ten  were  laid 
down,  carefully  designed  to  get  high  speed  on  a  light 
draft  of  water.  Afterwards  several  larger  and  powerful 
screw- steamers  were  designed,  but  these  latter  were  not 
finished  in  time  to  perform  any  service.  One  of  the 
smaller  class  of  paddle -steamers  brought  out  on  her 
first  voyage  700  bales  of  unpressed  cotton,  on  a  draft  of 
six  feet,  which  was  a  very  satisfactory  performance,  with 
cotton  at  two  shillings  and  sixpence  per  pound. 

Those  who  have  most  sharply  criticized  the  Executive 
Departments  of  the  Confederate  Government,  and  have 
especially  charged  them  with  want  of  foresight  and 
promptness  in  the  management  of  the  finances,  are  chiefly 
Southerners,  who  must  have  been  impelled  by  their 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  109 

impatience  to  expect  striking  results  without  taking- 
due  heed  of  the  pressure  upon  the  several  Departments, 
and  the  extreme  efforts  they  were  so  suddenly  called 
upon  to  make.  Although  the  Confederate  Government 
was  never  recognised  by  any  foreign  Power,  yet  when  the 
Treasury  Department  made  a  bid  in  Europe  for  a  loan 
of  £3,000,000,  five  times  that  amount  was  subscribed. 
There  was  for  a  short  time  what  is  called  a  '  spurt '  in 
Confederate  Bonds,  and  they  actually  rose  to  a  premium 
of  five  per  cent,  upon  the  price  at  which  the  loan 
was  placed,  and  they  stood  for  several  months  at 
a  higher  figure  than  the  bonds  of  the  United  States. 
This  is  an  interesting  fact,  although  it  is  of  no  financial 
importance  now ;  at  any  rate,  it  may  be  fairly  taken  as  an 
offset  to  the  allegations  of  the  grumblers.  Reverting 
now  to  the  actual  state  of  the  finances  at  the  beginning 
of  the  operations  in  Europe,  it  is  proper  to  remark, 
en  passant,  that  before  I  was  sent  from  Montgomery  the 
difficulties  were  foreseen  in  kind,  but  not  in  degree,  and 
it  soon  became  evident  that  the  full  purposes  contem 
plated  in  my  original  instructions  could  not  be 
accomplished  without  a  modification  of  plans  and 
a  well-arranged  system  for  providing  funds  with 
certainty  and  regularity.  After  considering  all  the 
circumstances  as  they  were  at  the  time  when  the  first 
remittance  arrived  (July,  1861),  and^taking  also  into 
account  the  fact  that  personal  supervision  of  the  ships 
under  construction  was  neither  necessary  nor  advisable, 
it  was  thought  that  I  should  communicate  personally 
with  the  Government  at  Richmond,  and  in  September, 
1861,  I  submitted  a  proposal  to  the  officers  representing 
the  War  Office,  that  we  should  contribute  equally  from 
the  funds  of  the  two  Departments,  buy  a  fast  steamer, 
and  that  I  should  go  into  a  Confederate  port  with  her 


110  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

myself,  in  order  to  report  the  precise  condition  of  affairs, 
as  well  as  to  take  in  the  war  supplies  which  were  then 
ready  for  delivery,  and  which  we  knew  were  greatly 
needed.  We  had  a  consultation  with  the  financial 
agents,  and  the  proposal  was  not  only  approved, 
but  I  was  urged  to  carry  it  out  at  once.  Going  upon 
such  an  expedition  was  a  deviation  from  my  instruc 
tions,  and  it  was  also  a  diversion  of  a  considerable  sum 
of  money  from  the  original  purpose  to  which  it  had 
been  appropriated;  but  the  position  of  affairs  was 
critical,  and  I  had  been  authorized  to  exercise  a  wide 
discretion  when  it  appeared  necessary  to  effect  an 
important  purpose.  However,  before  taking  any  decisive 
course,  the  proposition  was  referred  to  the  Commissioners, 
who  expressed  their  full  concurrence,  and  one  of 
them,  the  Hon.  Dudley  Mann,  wrote  me  spontaneously 
an  official  letter,  virtually  offering  to  assume  the 
responsibility,  so  far  as  he  could.  I  immediately  bought 
the  screw-steamship  Fingal,  built  on  the  Clyde  for 
the  Highland  trade.  She  was  a  new  ship,  had  made 
but  one  or  two  trips  to  the  North  of  Scotland,  was 
in  good  order,  well  found,  and  her  log  gave  her  speed 
as  thirteen  knots  in  good  steaming  weather.  I  had 
to  take  her  as  she  stood,  with  all  outfit  on  board,  and 
was  amused  to  find,  in  the  inventory  of  cabin- stores, 
six  dozen  toddy  glasses,  with  ladles  to  match.  Each 
glass  had  the  capacity  of  about  a  half-pint,  and  they 
were  hard  and  thick  and  heavy  enough  to  serve  for 
grape-shot,  in  case  of  need.  The  ship  was  placed  on  a 
loading-berth  at  Greenock,  and  the  goods  were  forwarded 
to  her  as  rapidly  as  possible,  partly  by  rail,  and  partly 
by  a  steamer  from  London.  It  was  necessary  to  act  with 
caution  and  secrecy,  because  the  impression  had  already 
got  abroad  that  the  Confederate  Government  was  trying 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  Ill 

to  fit  out  ships  in  England  to  cruise  against  American 
commerce,  and  during  the  whole  period  of  the  war  all 
vessels  taking  arms  on  board,  or  cases  supposed  to 
contain  arms  or  ammunition,  were  closely  watched  by 
agents  and  spies  of  the  United  States  Consuls,  who  fre 
quently  sent  affidavits  to  the  Customs  authorities,  affirm 
ing  the  belief  that  the  ships  receiving  such  materials 
were  intended  to  be  armed,  and  thus  often  effected  their 
detention,  and  on  several  occasions  their  seizure. 

Colonel  Edward  C.  Anderson,  of  the  Confederate 
army,  had  been  sent  to  England  in  July,  1861,  to  com 
municate  with  Major  Huse,  and  to  look  generally  into 
the  affairs  of  the  War  Department.  Colonel  Anderson 
was  directed  to  remain  in  Europe  if  his  services  seemed 
to  be  necessary ;  but  he  found  that  Major  Huse  had 
everything  in  good  working  train,  and  was  manifestly 
capable  of  conducting  the  operations  alone,  so  he  deter 
mined  to  return  to  the  Confederate  States,  and  the 
Fingal  expedition  afforded  a  favourable  opportunity. 
Two  Charleston  gentlemen  (Messrs.  Charles  Foster  and 
MofFat),  detained  in  Europe  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
and  unable  to  return  through  the  United  States,  had 
consulted  me  about  the  best  means  of  getting  to  their 
homes,  and  I  arranged  to  take  them  in  the  Fingal ;  and 
Dr.  Holland,  a  spirited  Texan,  who  had  served  in  the 
United  States  army  during  the  Mexican  War,  and 
wished  to  go  to  Richmond,  was  notified  to  be  ready  for 
a  move  at  short  notice,  and  was  requested  to  prepare  a 
big  medicine- chest  and  a  case  of  surgical  instruments  to 
take  with  him.  As  the  Fingal  was  the  first  ship  that 
ran  the  blockade  solely  on  Government  account,  and 
her  subsequent  fate  as  the  Confederate  ironclad  Atlanta 
gives  her  some  historical  importance,  the  particulars  of 
her  cargo,  and  the  incidents  of  her  voyage,  will  probably 


112  THE  SEC  BET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

be  of  some  interest.  In  1861  the  English  army  weapon 
was  still  the  muzzle- loading  Enfield  rifle.  Prussia  was 
adopting  the  needle-gun,  and  France  was  preparing  to 
exchange  her  old  arm  for  the  chassepot,  but  no  breeeh- 
loaders  could  be  got  either  in  England  or  on  the  Conti 
nent,  except  as  samples,  and  the  purchases  for  the 
Confederate  States  were  of  the  muzzle-loading  type. 

The  shipment  per  Fingal  was  : 

On  account  of  the  War  Department — 10,000  Enfield 
rifles,  1,000,000  ball  cartridges,  and  2,000,000  percus 
sion  caps  ;  3,000  cavalry  sabres,  with  suitable  accoutre 
ments,  a  large  quantity  of  material  for  clothing,  and  a 
large  supply  of  medical  stores. 

On  account  of  the  Navy  Department — 1,000  short 
rifles,  with  cutlass  bayonets,  and  1,000  rounds  of  ammu 
nition  per  rule  ;  500  revolvers,  with  suitable  ammuni 
tion  ;  two  4^-inch  muzzle-loading  rifled  guns,  with 
traversing  carriages,  all  necessary  gear,  and  200  made- 
up  cartridges,  shot  and  shell,  per  gun  ;  two  breech-load 
ing  2^-inch  steel-rifled  guns  for  boats  or  field  service, 
with  200  rounds  of  ammunition  per  gun ;  400  barrels  of 
coarse  cannon-powder,  and  a  large  quantity  of  made-up 
clothing  for  seamen. 

For  the  State  of  Georgia— 3,000  Enfield  rifles. 

For  the  State  of '  Lousiana — 1,000  Enfield  rifles. 

No  single  ship  ever  took  into  the  Confederacy  a  cargo 
so  entirely  composed  of  military  and  naval  supplies,  and 
the  pressing  need  of  them  made  it  necessary  to  get  the 
Fingal  off  with  quick  despatch,  and  to  use  every  possible 
effort  to  get  her  into  a  port  having  railway  communica 
tion  through  to  Virginia,  because  the  Confederate  army, 
then  covering  Richmond,  was  very  poorly  armed,  and 
was  distressingly  deficient  in  all  field  necessaries. 

Shortly  before  the  Fingal  was  ready  for  sea,  I  was 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  113 

joined  by  Mr.  John  Low,  who  was  a  Liverpool  man  by 
birth,  but  he  had  lived  several  years  in  Savannah,  and 
was  there  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  His  purpose  at 
that  time  was  to  remain  permanently  in  Savannah  ;  he 
was  ardently  attached  to  the  South,  and  at  the  beginning 
of  hostilities  he  went  to  Virginia  in  a  cavalry  corps  from 
Georgia,  but  subsequently  came  over  to  England  to 
join  me  for  special  service.  Mr.  Low  had  been  bred  to 
the  sea  in  the  British  mercantile  marine,  and  as  he 
arrived  at  a  very  opportune  time,  I  sent  him  instanter  to 
Greenock  to  ship  as  second  officer  of  the  Fingal. 

The  Fingal  was  kept  under  the  British  flag  for  ob 
vious  reasons,  and  it  was  therefore  necessary  to  employ 
a  captain  holding  a  Board  of  Trade  certificate  to  clear 
her  outward,  and  to  ship  the  crew  in  accordance  with 
the  Merchant  Shipping  Act.  Some  pains  were  taken 
to  engage  good  engineers  and  a  few  leading  men,  but  no 
hint  was  given  that  the  ship  would  go  further  than 
Bermuda  and  Nassau.  Mr.  Low  proved  to  be  an  able 
seaman,  a  reliable  and  useful  officer  in  every  situation. 
The  character  of  his  services,  and  his  advancement  in 
the  Confederate  navy,  will  often  have  conspicuous  and 
commendatory  mention  in  this  narrative.  The  Fingal 
was  ready  for  sea  about  October  8th.  Messrs.  Foster  and 
Moffat  joined  her  at  Greenock,  and  the  captain  was  ordered 
to  sail  as  soon  as  possible,  and  to  call  off  Holyhead  to 
take  Colonel  Anderson,  Dr.  Holland,  and  myself  on 
board,  it  not  being  thought  prudent  to  show  ourselves  at 
or  about  the  ship  until  she  was  clear  of  the  Custom  House. 

On  the  llth  we  went  to  Holyhead,  and  learned  by 
telegram  that  the  Fingal  was  off  from  Greenock. 

During  the  night  it  came  on  to  blow  a  hard  gale, 
which  continued  for  two  or  three  days,  with  thick 
weather  and  much  rain.  We  could  get  no  tidings  of  the 

VOL.  i.  8 


114  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

ship,  and  although  I  felt  reasonably  satisfied  that  she 
had  put  into  some  harbour  of  shelter,  yet  the  uncertainty 
and  delay  were  perplexing.     During  the  14th  the  gale 
broke.     Towards  evening  the  weather  was  fine,  and  we 
had  hopes  of  seeing  or  hearing  from  the  missing  ship  on 
the  next  day.      At  about  4  a.m.   on  the   15th,  I  was 
aroused  by  a  loud  knock  at  my  bedroom  door,  and  a 
house-porter  came  in  with  a  dark  lantern,  followed  by 
Mr.  Low.     It  had  been  raining,   and   Low  had  on  a 
*  sou- wester/  and  a  long  painted  canvas   coat,   which 
were  dripping  with  wet.     I  was  only  half  awake.     In 
the  dim  light  of  the  lantern  the  figure  before  me  loomed 
up  like  a  huge  octopus,  or  some  other  marine  monster, 
and  I  was  startled  by  a  sepulchral  voice  which  seemed 
to  be  mumbling  under  the  breast  of  the  peajacket  like 
the  last  tremulous  quivering  of  a  thunderclap.     But  my 
ear  caught  the  sound  of  a  few  articulate  words,  among 
which    '  FingalJ    i  brig,'  '  collision,'  *  sunk,'  were  fear 
fully  jumbled  together.      It  is  astounding  with  what 
electric  velocity  the  mind  acts  in  the  few  seconds  of 
awaking   when   one   is    suddenly   aroused   from   sleep. 
Before  I  could  leap  out  of  bed  a  painful  scene  of  wreck 
and  disaster  passed  vividly  through  my  brain,  and  I 
fancied  the  Fingal  at  the  bottom  of  Holyhead  harbour, 
with  the  fishes  swimming  among  the  shattered  Enfields, 
sipping  the  mixture  of  sea-water  and  gunpowder  through 
their  gills,  and  wondering  what  it  all  meant.     Low  was, 
however,  steady,  cool,  and  unimpassioned,  and  put  the 
facts  into  my  mind  without  waste  of  words,  and  they 
may   be   briefly   summarized   thus  :     The   Fingal   was 
creeping   cautiously  round   the   breakwater   when   she 
suddenly  came  upon  a  brig  at  anchor,  with  no  light  up. 
The  steamer  had  barely  steerage  way,  and  the  engines 
were  quickly  reversed,  but  her  sharp  stem  took  the  brig's 
starboard  quarter.     There  was  just  a  slight  sound,  like 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  115 

the  quick  snap  of  a  gun-hammer  upon  the  uncapped 
nipple,  then  a  shout  from  the  deck  of  the  unhappy  craft, 
and  before  a  boat  could  be  lowered  she  went  down  all 
standing.  This  is  what  usually  happens  when  an  iron 
steamer  comes  in  contact  with  a  wooden  ship. 

We  roused  up  Colonel  Anderson  and  Dr.  Holland 
and  got  afloat  as  soon  as  possible. 

Day  was  just  breaking  when  we  got  alongside  of  the 
Fingal,  and  in  the  dim  twilight  we  could  see  the  upper 
spars  of  the  brig  standing  straight  up  out  of  the  water, 
with  the  bunt  of  the  main  top-gallant  sail  just  a- wash. 
The  vessel  proved  to  be  the  Austrian  brig  Siccardi.  She 
was  loaded  with  coal,  which  accounts  for  her  going 
down  so  quickly  and  standing  upright  afterwards. 

It  was  manifestly  out  of  the  question  to  remain  where 
we  were.  Customs  officers  would  soon  be  on  board;  the 
Fingal  would  be  detained  to  settle,  or  give  security  for  a 
satisfactory  settlement,  with  the  consignees  of  the  Siccardi; 
Colonel  Anderson  and  I  could  hardly  hope  to  escape 
notice ;  affidavits  would  be  prepared  by  the  United  States 
Consul  affirming  the  Fingal  to  be  a  suspicious  vessel, 
and  then  there  would  surely  be  inquiry,  further  deten 
tion,  and  perhaps  a  final  break  up  of  the  voyage.  I 
thought  of  the  rifles  and  sabres  in  the  hold,  and  the  ill- 
armed  pickets  on  the  Potomac,  waiting  and  longing  for 
them,  and  told  the  captain  to  weigh  anchor  at  once. 

There  was  no  wish  to  defraud  the  owners  of  the 
Siccardi  of  any  compensation  they  were  entitled  to.  I 
wrote  a  hasty  letter  to  Messrs.  Fraser,  Trenholm  and  Co., 
briefly  reporting  the  circumstances  and  asking  them  to 
find  out  the  consignees  of  the  brig  and  make  the  best 
possible  arrangement  with  them.*  The  letter  was  de- 

*  Messrs.  Fraser,  Trenholm  and  Co.  communicated  with  the  con 
signees  very  promptly.  A  friendly  arbitration  was  agreed  to,  and 

the  affair  was  satisfactorily  settled. 

Q      o 


116  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

spatched  on  shore  by  a  boat  we  had  engaged  to  bring 
our  luggage  off,  and  the  Fingal  was  round  the  point  of 
the  breakwater,  and  steaming  down  Channel,  before  the 
accident  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbour  was  known  to  any 
one  who  would  have  had  authority  to  stop  her. 

For  several  days  after  leaving  Holyhead  we  had  fine 
weather,  and  were  well  satisfied  in  most  respects  with 
the  ship.  She  was  staunch,  comfortable,  and  well -fitted 
in  all  particulars,  but  in  the  anxiety  to  get  as  much  in 
her  as  possible,  she  had  been  'loaded  too  deep,  and  I 
found  that  we  could  not  get  a  higher  speed  than  nine 
knots,  which  was  rather  disappointing,  in  view  of  a 
possible  chase  between  Bermuda  and  the  coast.  About 
the  19th  of  October  we  caught  a  gale  from  the  south 
west  veering  to  north  and  north-east.  The  sea  was  so 
heavy  that  we  were  compelled  to  ease  the  engines,  and 
in  a  measure  lay-to  under  fore  and  aft  sails.  While  the 
gale  was  still  blowing,  the  steward  informed  me  that  the 
fresh  water  seemed  to  be  very  low  in  the  big  iron  tank 
which  held  the  main  supply.  Upon  examination  it  was 
found  that  we  had  only  one  or  at  most  two  days'  supply 
left.  It  seems  that  after  filling  up  the  water-tank  at 
Greenock,  the  ship  continued  to  load  for  some  days,  and 
the  crew,  as  well  as  a  large  number  of  stevedores  em 
ployed  in  stowing  the  cargo,  were  permitted  to  use  and 
to  waste  the  water  at  will.  When  ready  for  sea,  it  did 
not  occur  to  the  captain  to  sound  the  tanks  and  fill  them 
up.  I  do  not  wish  to  injure  the  captain  by  mentioning 
his  name.  He  probably  acted  according  to  his  lights, 
which  were  dull.  He  was  very  inefficient,  and  was  of 
no  use  to  us  except  as  a  medium  of  communication  with 
Customs  and  other  officials.  The  Fingal  had  no  separate 
condensing  apparatus,  but  fortunately  the  gale  was 
moderating,  and  the  wind  was  hauling  to  the  north  and 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  117 

east,  and  so  we  bore  up  for  Praya,  a  bay  and  village  on 
the  north-east  side  of  the  island  of  Terceira,  where  we 
found  good  water,  fruit,  vegetables,  fresh  meat,  etc. 

This  necessary  deviation  from  our  direct  voyage,  and 
the  consequent  delay,  were  not  in  the  end  without  a 
compensating  advantage.  The  bay  afforded  good  an 
chorage,  and  the  whole  neighbourhood  was  so  quiet  and 
retired,  so  isolated  from  Europe,  that  I  could  not  fail  to 
note  its  fitness  for  a  place  of  rendezvous  at  which  to 
collect  our  cruisers  with  their  tenders.  Subsequently 
the  Alabama  was  brought  to  this  very  spot  and  armed 
without  hindrance.  Perhaps  if  it  had  not  been  for  the 
captain's  forgetfulness  in  the  matter  of  the  FingaKs 
water  supply,  we  might  have  gone  to  some  less  favourable 
place  with  the  Alabama  and  failed  in  our  purpose.  The 
efforts  of  life  in  all  undertakings  are  made  up  of  alternate 
failure  and  success,  and  all  that  can  be  hoped  for  is  a 
favourable  balance-sheet  at  the  end. 

The  Fingal  proceeded  on  her  voyage  from  Terceira, 
and  arrived  at  Bermuda  on  the  2nd  of  November.  Here 
we  had  the  pleasure  to  find  the  Confederate  States  ship 
Nashville,  Captain  R.  B.  Pegram,  from  whom  we  learned 
much  about  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  beleaguered  Con 
federacy.  The  Nashville  was  a  paddle-steamer,  built  for 
the  coasting  trade  between  New  York  and  Charleston. 
It  has  been  already  mentioned  that  she  was  bought  by 
the  Navy  Department,  and  her  appearance  abroad  was 
probably  intended  as  a  mere  demonstration  to  prove  the 
inefficiency  of  the  blockade,  and  to  make  an  exhibit  of 
the  Confederate  flag  upon  the  high  seas  and  in  Europe, 
because  she  was  weakly  armed  and  dependent  upon  her 
engines  alone  for  motion.  Nevertheless,  she  captured 
and  burned  the  American  ship  Harvey  Birch  in  the 
English  Channel.  There  had  been  an  original  purpose 


118  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

to  send  the  Confederate  Commissioners,  Messrs.  Mason 
and  Slidell,  to  Europe  in  the  Nashville,  but  this  inten 
tion  was  abandoned,  and  those  gentlemen,  with  their 
suites,  ran  the  blockade  in  a  small  steamer  from  Charles 
ton,    and    proceeded    to    Havana.       Captain     Pegram 
handed  me  a  despatch  from  the  Hon.  S.  R.  Mallory, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  acknowledging  my  reports  sent 
per  steamship  Bermuda  in  August.     He  approved  my 
contracts  for  the  Florida  and  Alabama,  and  for  naval 
ordnance    stores,  and  also  the  proposition  I  had  '  sug 
gested  of  buying  a  steamer  and  returning  in  her  to  the 
Confederate  States  with  supplies  and  for  consultation. 
He  furthermore  informed  me  that  he  had  sent  out  by  the 
Nashville  several  pilots,  and  that  Captain  Pegram  would 
let  me  have  any  one  or  more  of  them  I  might  require. 
Mr.  John  Makin,  a  pilot  for  Savannah  and  the  inlets  to 
the  southward,  was  transferred  to  the  FingaL 

We  were  detained  several  days  at  Bermuda.  The 
United  States  Consul  suspected  the  ultimate  object  of 
the  FingdCs  voyage,  and  he  did  his  best  to  put  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  our  getting  coal  and  other  supplies,  and 
employed  men  to  tamper  with  the  crew  and  alarm  them, 
and  persuade  them  to  leave  the  ship.  However,  the 
local  merchants  and  the  people  generally  were  very 
friendly,  and  we  got  at  last  all  that  was  wanted,  and 
sailed  for  the  coast  on  the  afternoon  of  the  7th  of 
November. 

Up  to  the  time  of  our  departure  from  Bermuda,  not  a 
word  had  been  said  to  a  member  of  the  crew,  nor  even 
to  the  captain,  about  the  purpose  to  run  the  blockade, 
and  the  ship  was  cleared  out  from  St.  George's  for  Nassau. 
We  had,  however,  several  very  active  intelligent  men  for 
ward,  among  them  one  named  Freemantle,  who  followed 
me  back  to  Europe  and  made  the  cruise  in  the  Alabama  as 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  119 

captain's  coxswain.  During  the  passage  from  England 
I  had  kept  an  eye  to  the  men,  and  Low  had  been  much 
with  them  as  an  officer  of  the  ship,  and  we  felt  pretty 
sure  that  '  Jack  '  had  his  suspicions.  That  they  should 
have  resisted  the  persuasions  and  warnings  of  the  United 
States  Consul  at  St.  George's  wras  therefore  a  gratifying 
evidence  of  their  willingness  to  take  part  in  a  little 
exciting  adventure. 

It  was  especially  important  to  know  whether  the 
'  engineer  department '  could  be  relied  upon,  and  I  had 
often  gone  into  the  engine-room  to  have  a  talk  with  the 
chief.  His  name  was  McNair,  a  silent,  steady,  reliable 
Scot,  immovable  and  impassive  as  the  Grampian  Hills 
when  it  was  proper  to  stand  fast,  prompt,  quick,  and 
energetic  when  it  was  necessary  to  act.  He  was  one  of 
that  thoughtful  class  of  men  who  seem  to  be  always 
thinking  that  something  unexpected  may  happen,  and 
to  be  preparing  for  the  difficulty.  From  the  very  first 
I  felt  sure  of  McNair,  and  never  parted  from  him  until 
the  Alabama  was  off  on  her  cruise.  In  fitting  out  that 
ship  he  was  of  great  service,  and  he  had  charge  of  her 
engines  until  she  was  joined  at  Terceira  by  Captain 
Semmes  and  his  regular  staff  of  officers. 

The  day  after  leaving  Bermuda  it  was  necessary  to 
put  the  ship's  head  in  the  direction  of  the  actual  port  of 
destination,  and  of  course  the  men  at  the  wheel,  and  in 
fact  all  on  board,  would  soon  perceive  that  we  were  not 
steering  the  course  for  Nassau.  It  would  not  have  been 
fair  to  conceal  the  object  of  the  voyage  from  the  men 
until  a  critical  moment,  and  it  would  also  have  been 
imprudent  to  go  on  to  the  coast  without  knowing  their 
minds,  because  they  had  not  agreed  to  undertake  any 
such  risk. 

I  determined,  therefore,  to  settle  the  matter  there  and 


120  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

then,  and  sent  for  all  hands  to  come  aft  to  the  bridge. 
I  told  them  very  briefly  'that  they  had  shipped  in  a 
British  port,  to  make  a  voyage  in  a  British  ship  to  one 
or  more  British  islands  and  back  again  to  England ;  that 
I  had  no  right  to  take  them  anywhere  else  without  their 
consent,  and  I  did  not  mean  to  use  either  force  or  undue 
pressure  to  make  them  do  anything  not  set  out  in  the 
shipping  articles,  but  I  thought  they  must  have  sus 
pected  that  there  was  some  other  purpose  in  the  voyage 
than  a  cruise  to  Bermuda  and  the  Bahamas,  and  the 
time  had  arrived  when  it  was  both  safe  and  proper  for 
me  to  tell  them  the  real  port  of  destination,  which  was 
Savannah,  and  of  course  this  meant  a  breach  of  blockade, 
with  the  risk  of  capture  and  some  rough  treatment  as 
prisoners -of- war.7  I  added,  '  If  you  are  not  willing  to 
go  on,  say  so  now,  and  I  will  take  the  ship  to  Nassau 
and  get  other  men  who  will  go ;  but  if  you  are  ready 
and  willing  to  risk  the  venture,  remember  that  it  is  a 
fresh  engagement  and  a  final  one,  from  which  there  must 
be  no  backing  out.' 

I  had  thought  over  what  to  sa}T,  and  was  prepared 
with  a  few  exhilarating  and  persuasive  phrases  ;  but  I 
caught  Freeman  tie's  eye  and  saw  that  several  of  the  men 
were  whispering  together.  It  flashed  across  my  mind 
at  once  that  no  further  talk  was  necessary,  and  I  put  the 
question  plainly,  '  Will  you  go  ?'  to  which  there  was  a 
prompt  and  unanimous  consent.  I  thanked  them,  but 
said  there  was  still  something  to  explain,  which  I  did  to 
the  following  effect : 

4  The  United  States  have  been  compelled  to  buy  up 
steamers  from  the  merchant  service  for  blockaders. 
Many  of  them  are  neither  so  strong  nor  so  efficient  in 
any  way  as  this  ship,  and  they  are  not  heavily  armed. 
If  we  should  fall  in  with  any  blockaders  off  Savannah 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUEOPE.  121 

at  all,  they  are  likely  to  be  of  that  class,  and  Colonel 
Anderson  and  I,  who  represent  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment,  and  the  gentlemen  passengers,  who  are  Southern 
men,  do  not  feel  disposed  to  give  up  this  valuable  and 
important  cargo  to  a  ship  not  strong  enough  to  render 
resistance  useless,  or  to  open  boats  that  may  attempt  to 
board  us.  So  long  as  the  Fingal  is  under  the  British 
flag,  we  have  no  right  to  fire  a  shot,  but  I  have  a  bill  of 
sale  in  my  pocket,  and  can  take  delivery  from  the 
captain  on  behalf  of  the  Confederate  Navy  Department 
at  any  moment.  This  I  propose  to  do,  if  there  should 
appear  to  be  any  likelihood  of  a  collision  with  a  blockader, 
and  I  want  to  know  if  you  are  willing  under  such  cir 
cumstances  to  help  in  defending  the  ship  ?' 

They  answered  '  Yes  '  to  a  man.  These  preliminaries 
being  satisfactorily  settled,  all  hands  were  set  briskly  to 
work  to  arm  the  ship.  We  mounted  the  two  4^-inch 
rifled  guns  in  the  forward  gangway  ports,  and  the  two 
steel  boat-guns  on  the  quarterdeck.  We  got  up  a  suffi 
cient  number  of  rifles  and  revolvers,  with  a  good  supply 
of  ammunition,  and  converted  the  '  ladies'  saloon '  into 
an  armoury,  shell -room,  and  magazine. 

The  cases  containing  the  made-up  cartridges  for  the 
guns  were  stowed  out  of  easy  reach,  so  we  hoisted  out 
of  the  hold  a  few  barrels  of  powder  and  a  bale  of  flannel, 
and  made  ten  or  fifteen  cartridges  for  each  gun.  Colonel 
Anderson  had  passed  a  good  many  years  of  his  early 
life  in  the  United  States  navy,  and  although  he  had 
been  long  out  of  the  service,  his  'right  hand  had  not 
forgot  its  cunning.'  He  and  I  cut  out  the  cylinders, 
the  other  passengers  helped  at  the  sewing,  and  the 
Fingal  was  on  the  next  day  ready  to  beat  off  a  boat 
attack,  or  even  to  exchange  shots  with  an  impromptu 
blockader  on  a  dark  night,  and  thus  perhaps  prevent  her 


122  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

closing.  Freemantle  and  two  or  three  others  of  the 
crew  were  old  naval  men,  and  took  the  leading  positions 
at  the  guns.  We  had  two  or  three  drills,  and  found  that 
we  could  handle  the  '  battery '  satisfactorily. 

I  had  a  talk  with  McNair  after  settling  everything 
with  the  men.  Although  he  did  not  say  so,  I  felt  sure 
from  his  manner  that  he  had  been  expecting  the  in 
formation,  because  he  received  it  quite  as  a  matter  of 
course,  and  told  me  that  he  had  been  putting  aside  a  few 
tons  of  the  nicest  and  cleanest  coal,  and  if  I  could  give 
him  time  just  before  getting  on  the  coast  to  haul  fires 
in  one  boiler  at  a  time,  and  run  the  scrapers  through  the 
flues,  he  thought  he  might  drive  the  ship,  deep  as  she 
was,  at  the  rate  of  eleven  knots  for  a  spurt  of  a  few 
hours.  These  preparations  seemed  to  put  all  hands  in 
good  spirits;  indeed,  the  men  were  quite  jolly  over  the 
prospect. 

On  the  llth  McNair  got  the  chance  to  clean  his  flues. 
It  was  my  purpose  to  make  the  land  at  the  entrance  to 
Warsaw  Sound,  through  which  Makin  said  he  could 

'  O 

take  the  ship  by  inland  creeks  into  the  Savannah  river, 
and  the  course  was  shaped  so  that  at  noon  on  the  llth 
we  should  be  on  the  parallel  of  Warsaw.  From  that 
position  we  steered  in  on  a  due-west  course,  and  timed 
the  speed  to  make  the  land  about  3  a.m.,  or  at  any  rate 
before  daylight. 

The  moon  set  early,  but  the  night  was  clear,  and  there 
was  an  unusually  good  horizon  line.  Several  suitable 
stars  passed  the  meridian  between  dark  and  1  a.m.,  and 
Polaris  was  of  course  available,  so  we  were  able  to  get 
the  latitude  every  half  hour,  and  thus  to  check  the 
course.  At  about  1  a.m.  on  the  12th  we  got  along 
shore  soundings  inside  the  Gulf  Stream.  Up  to  this 
time  it  had  been  uncomfortably  clear,  with  a  light  south- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  123 

east  breeze,  but  it  now  fell  calm,  and  we  could  see  a 
dark  line  to  the  westward.  Makin  said  it  was  the  mist 
over  the  marshes,  and  the  land-breeze  would  soon  bring 
it  off  to  us.  In  half  an  hour  or  so  we  felt  a  cool  damp 
air  in  our  faces,  then  a  few  big  drops  of  moisture,  and 
we  ran  straight  into  as  nice  a  fog  as  any  reasonable 
blockade-runner  could  have  wanted.  There  was  not  a 
light  anywhere  about  the  ship  except  in  the  binnacle, 
and  that  was  carefully  covered,  so  that  the  man  at  the 
wheel  could  barely  look  at  the  compass  with  one  eye, 
and  the  engine-room  hatches  were  well-hooded.  Not  a 
word  was  spoken,  and  there  was  not  a  sound  but  the 
throb  of  the  engines  and  the  slight '  shir-r-r '  made  by  the 
friction  of  the  ship  through  the  water,  and  these  seemed 
muffled  by  the  dank  vaporous  air. 

When  we  got  into  six  fathoms  the  engines  were  eased 
to  dead  slow,  and  we  ran  cautiously  in  by  the  lead, 
straight  for  the  land,  the  object  being  to  get  in- shore  of 
any  blockaders  that  might  be  off  the  inlet.  "We  sup 
posed  the  ship  to  be  drawing  fifteen  or  sixteen  feet,  and 
we  stood  on  into  three  and  a  quarter  fathoms,  when  we 
turned  her  head  off  to  the  light  easterly  swell,  and 
stopped  the  engines.  The  fog  was  as  thick  as,  and 
about  the  colour  of,  mulligatawny  soup,  and  the  water 
alongside  looked  of  a  darkish  brown.  From  the  bridge 
it  was  just  possible  to  make  out  the  men  standing  on 
the  forecastle  and  poop.  We  could  not  have  been  in  a 
better  position  for  a  dash  at  daylight. 

While  we  were  thus  lying-to  and  waiting,  every  faculty 
alert  to  catch  the  slightest  sound,  and  every  eye  search 
ing  the  fog  for  the  first  glimpse  of  land,  or  of  an 
approaching  ship,  there  burst  upon  our  ears  a  shrill 
prolonged  quavering  shriek.  The  suddenness  of  the 
sound,  coming  upon  our  eagerly  expectant  senses,  and 


124  TEE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

probably  much  heightened  in  volume  and  force  by  con 
trast  with  the  stillness,  was  startling.  I  am  afraid  to 
venture  upon  a  superlative,  but  I  may  safely  say  it  was 
unearthly.  None  of  us  could  conceive  what  it  was,  but 
all  thought  that  it  was  as  loud  and  as  piercing  as  a 
steam-whistle,  and  that  it  must  have  been  heard  by  any 
blockader  within  five  miles  of  us.  In  a  moment  the 
sound  was  repeated,  but  we  were  prepared,  and  it  was 
this  time  accompanied  by  a  flapping  and  rustling  noise 
from  a  '  hencoop  '  in  the  gangway.  '  It  is  the  cock  that 
came  on  board  at  Bermuda/  said  some  one.  Several 
men  ran  to  the  spot.  Freemaiitle  thrust  his  arm  into 
the  coop,  drew  out  an  unhappy  fowl,  and  wrung  off  its 
head  with  a  vicious  swing.  But  it  was  the  wrong  one, 
and  chanticleer  crowed  again  defiantly.  '  Try  again/ 
came  up  in  an  audible  whisper  from  under  the 
bridge  ;  but  Freemaiitle' s  second  effort  was  more  dis 
astrous  than  the  first.  He  not  only  failed  to  seize  the 
obnoxious  screamer,  but  he  set  the  whole  hennery  in 
commotion,  and  the  '  Mujan '  cock,  from  a  safe  corner, 
crowed  and  croaked,  and  fairly  chuckled  over  the  fuss 
of  feathers,  the  cackling,  and  the  distracting  strife  he 
had  aroused.  At  last  the  offending  bird  was  caught. 
He  died  game,  and  made  a  fierce  struggle  for  life  ;  but 
Freemaiitle  managed  to  catch  him  with  a  firm  grip  by 
the  neck,  and  fetching  a  full  arm- swing,  as  if  heaving 
a  twelve-pound  lead,  the  body  fell  with  a  heavy  thud 
upon  the  deck,  and  we  were  again  favoured  with  a 
profound  stillness. 

By  this  time  daylight  began  to  break.  Makin  said 
the  fog  would  settle  and  gather  over  the  low  marshes 
towards  sunrise,  and  gradually  roll  off  seaward  before 
the  light  land-wind.  I  went  aloft  to  look  out  for  the 
first  sight  of  the  '  inlet.'  Makin  was  right.  In  less 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  125 

than  half  an  hour  I  could  see  the  bushy  tops  of  the  tall 
pine-trees,  then  their  straight  slender  trunks,  then  the 
brushwood,  and  finally  the  pale  yellow  streak  of  sand 
which  formed  the  foreshore. 

I  reported  this  to  Makin,  who  could  not  see  it  all  from 
the  deck,  and  he  asked  me  to  come  down  and  consult. 
I  assured  him  we  were  right  abreast  of  Warsaw  Inlet, 
and  of  this  he  was  satisfied,  but  he  said  the  buoys  would 
all  be  up,  and  the  low-lying  fog  would  probably  cover 
the  distant  leading  marks,  and  we  might  go  wrong  in 
the  intricate  channels.  He  thought  it  would  be  some 
time  before  the  fog  would  clear  off  to  seaward,  but  as  it 
was  settling  over  the  land  and  we  would  soon  have  a 
tolerably  clear  view  in-shore,  he  proposed  making  a 
dash  for  Savannah,  about  17  miles  to  the  north  and 
east,  where  he  felt  sure  we  could  get  in,  buoys  or  no 
buoys. 

In  a  few  moments  the  engines  were  doing  their  best, 
and  the  ship's  head  was  laid  for  the  outer  bar  of  the 
Savannah  river.  McNair  fulfilled  his  promise,  for  the 
Fingal  was  making  a  good  eleven  knots.  Meanwhile 
the  fog  continued  to  settle  and  roll  off  the  land,  and  the 
low  sandy  beach,  with  the  tall  pines  in  the  background, 
and  a  gentle  surf  just  creaming  its  outer  edge,  was  soon 
in  full  view  from  the  deck.  We  skirted  the  shore  in  the 
least  water  the  ship's  draft  permitted,  and  were  much 
favoured.  The  land  breeze  dropped,  and  about  half  a 
mile  off  shore  the  fog  hung  heavily,  a  great  grey  mass, 
almost  black  at  the  water's  edge.  It  served  as  a  veil 
between  us  and  any  blockaders  that  might  be  enveloped 
in  it. 

We  bowled  along  at  a  steady  pace,  and  before  long 
the  beach  and  the  line  of  pines  trended  abruptly  away  to 
the  westward ;  we  caught  sight  of  the  high  brick  walls 


126  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

of  Fort  Pulaski,  and  were  off  the  estuary  of  the 
Savannah.  In  another  quarter  of  an  hour  Makin  had 
his  marks  on :  '  Starboard/  '  Steady  at  north-west  by 
north/  and  the  Fingal  was  over  the  bar  and  ploughing 
up  channel, '  a  big  bone  in  her  mouth,'  the  favouring  fog 
still  to  the  eastward,  and  the  sheltering  fort  on  the  port 
bow.  Before  getting  in  range  we  fired  a  gun  and 
hoisted  the  Confederate  flag  at  the  fore,  which  was  an 
swered  from  the  fort.  The  parapet  of  the  main  works 
and  the  glacis  of  the  outer  were  lined  with  men,  and  as 
we  drew  near  we  saw  the  caps  waving,  although  we 
could  not  hear  their  cheers. 

The  entrance  to  the  Savannah  river  is  through  a  broad 
estuary,  but  though  the  expanse  of  water  is  wide,  the 
ship  channel  is  narrow  and  comparatively  shoal.  Nearly 
opposite  Fort  Pulaski  two  large  wooden  sailing  ships  had 
been  sunk  right  in  the  fairway;  but  Ma-kin  thought  with 
our  draft  we  could  probably  squeeze  by  on  either  side,  and 
he  ported  the  helm  to  pass  off  shore  of  them,  but  just 
abreast  of  the  outer  ship  we  brought  up  in  an  oyster 
bank. 

The  tide  was  ebb,  but  the  bottom  was  soft  oozy  mud, 
and  as  the  ship  could  take  no  harm,  we  determined 
to  let  her  lie  as  she  was  until  we  could  find  how  it  was 
possible  to  get  round  the  obstructions.  Colonel  Anderson 
was  a  Savannah  man,  and  he  went  on  shore  immedi 
ately  to  learn  the  news  and  to  telegraph  our  arrival  up 
to  town. 

Colonel  Olmstead,  the  commandant  of  the  fort,  sent  a 
boat  off  to  the  ship  as  soon  as  he  perceived  that  we  were 
aground,  to  inform  us  that  a  few  days  previously  a  large 
United  States  fleet,  under  Admiral  Dupont,  had  attacked 
and  driven  the  Confederate  troops  out  of  the  batteries 
protecting  Port  Royal,  and  that  place  had  been  occupied 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  127 

by  a  strong  land  force.  We  were  further  informed  that 
the  Federal  fleet  was  still  at  Port  Royal,  and  that 
as  there  was  interior  water  communication  with  the 
Savannah  river,  the  enemy  might  send  over  small 
vessels  or  boats  to  cut  us  out ;  but  the  boarding  officer 
was  directed  to  say  that  a  good  look-out  would  be  kept 
on  the  ship,  and  a  sufficient  number  of  men  to  defend 
her  would  be  sent  off  if  any  such  attempt  should  be 
made. 

The  distance  from  Port  Royal,  however,  was  much 
too  far  for  us  to  be  seen,  and  no  danger  was  looked  for 
from  that  quarter.  The  blockading  vessels  had  pro 
bably  been  drawn  off  to  assist  in  the  operations  at  Port 
Royal.  At  any  rate,  we  saw  nothing  of  them,  although 
later  in  the  day  several  appeared  off  the  outer  bar.  We 
had  thus  been  able  to  effect  a  '  breach  of  blockade  '  with 
no  graver  incident  than  the  scrimmage  with  the  Ber- 
mudan  cock,  and  the  men  appeared  to  be  a  little  dis 
appointed  at  the  pacific  and  commonplace  termination 
of  the  adventure. 

At  about  1  p.m.  three  river  steamboats,  being  the 
main  portion  of  Flag-officer  TattnalPs  so-called  fleet, 
came  down  to  look  after  us.  Lieutenant- Commanding 
Johnston  sent  us  a  hawser  from  his  ship,  the  Savannah, 
and  dragged  us  out  of  the  mud.  After  some  pulling 
and  hauling  they  got  the  Fingal  above  the  obstructions, 
and  escorted  her  up  to  the  city,  abreast  of  which  we 
anchored  at  about  4  p.m.,  November  12th,  1861.  The 
same  afternoon  I  telegraphed  my  arrival  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  and  next  day  received  orders  by  telegraph 
to  go  on  to  Richmond  as  soon  as  arrangements  for  the 
discharge  of  the  arms,  etc.,  could  be  made.  On  the 
14th  Flag-officer  Tattnall  detailed  an  officer  to  attend  to 
the  business  of  the  ship,  and  I  started  in  company  with 


128  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Colonel  Anderson,  who  was  also  going  to  Richmond  to 
report  to  the  War  Department. 

I  knew  from  statistics  and  from  personal  knowledge 
of  the  country  that  the  South  was  poor  in  military  and 
naval  resources,  and  that  there  had  been  no  preparation 
for  war,  and  no  collection  of  material.  But  figures 
never  carry  to  the  senses  full  and  clear  impressions. 
When  it  is  said  that  the  drought  in  India  has  destroyed 
so  many  million  tons  of  rice,  the  mind  is  at  once  im 
pressed  with  the  conviction  that  there  will  be  a  great 
deficit  of  food  in  Bengal ;  but  it  is  only  those  who  wit 
ness  the  sufferings  of  the  famishing  people  who  fully 
comprehend  the  melancholy  import  of  the  statement. 
On  the  route  to  Richmond  I  had  ample  and  painful 
evidence  of  the  strain  which  the  sudden  outburst  of  war 
had  put  upon  the  South,  and  the  inadequate  means  to 
meet  it. 

The  railways  having  only  one  line  of  metals,  and  the 
rolling  stock  barely  able  to  satisfy  the  ordinary  pas 
senger  and  goods  traffic,  were  already  yielding  to  the 
increased  wear  and  tear,  and  the  heavy  trains,  filled  with 
troops  moving  towards  Virginia,  and  loaded  with  stores 
and  supplies  for  the  army,  were  dragged  slowly  along  by 
the  over- worked  engines.  The  troops  in  the  train  with  me 
were  irregularly  and  indifferently  armed,  and  were  with 
out  uniformity  of  dress  or  equipment  ;  but  they  were 
full  of  spirit,  and  laughed  and  sang  songs  around  the 
impromptu  fires  which  were  quickly  kindled  wherever 
the  train  stopped,  for  we  frequently  waited  for  some 
purpose  or  other  many  miles  from  a  station,  often  in  the 
woods. 

At  a  place  called  G-oldsborough,  in  North  Carolina, 
we  remained  for  an  hour  or  more,  and  while  the  passen 
gers  were  getting  dinner  I  heard  loud  singing  in  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  129 

street,  mingled  with  the  music  of  a  band,  and  going  out 
of  the  hotel  I  saw  a  long  line  of  uncovered  railway 
freight-trucks,  with  rough  cross-benches  uncomfortably 
close  together,  and  each  bench  was  filled  with  men. 
There  was  an  engine  at  the  end  of  the  line,  and  I  learned 
that  the  men  were  a  regiment  of  North  Carolinians  from 
the  Buncombe  district,  on  the  way  to  join  the  forces  at 
Wilmington. 

The  troops  were  remarkably  fine-looking  men,  mostly 
young  and  well-proportioned,  but  they  were  dressed 
in  their  ordinary  clothing,  and  many  had  no  great 
coats,  although  it  was  November,  and  the  air  was 
keen  and  at  night  frosty.  I  walked  along  the  whole 
line  of  trucks  and  spoke  to  some  of  the  men,  and 
asked  about  their  arms.  Some  had  old-fashioned  flint 
lock  muskets,  some  had  only  double-barrel  sporting 
guns,  of  course  without  bayonets,  and  a  few  had  percus 
sion  lock  muskets.  I  believe  twenty  or  thirty  had  the 
old  heavy  small-bore  weapon  called  the  'Mississippi 
rifle/  but  I  did  not  see  a  single  modern  military  rifle  in 
the  whole  battalion.  In  about  half  an  hour  the  train 
moved  on,  the  men  singing  '  Dixie,'  and  the  people  in 
the  street  cheering. 

It  would  hardly  be  possible  to  exaggerate  the  discom 
forts  and  privations  to  which  the  Southern  troops  were 
exposed  during  the  war.  At  first  they  were  wholly 
destitute  of  camp  equipage,  and  were  compelled  to 
bivouac  in  the  open  air  without  tent  shelter  or  even  the 
comfort  of  covered  field  hospitals,  and  these  deficiencies 
were  never  more  than  partially  supplied.  The  best 
manhood  of  the  South,  young  men  of  spirit  and  good 
wiry  constitutions,  flocked  into  the  army,  and  thousands 
were  carried  off  by  diseases  always  more  or  less  preva 
lent  in  camps,  but  whose  virulence  and  fatal  effects  are 

VOL.  i.  9 


130  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

greatly  lessened  by  good  food  and  suitable  protection 
from  wet  and  cold. 

No  one  will  suppose  that  I  depreciate  the  efforts  or 
the  services  of  those  who  held  high  commands,  or  occu 
pied  responsible  positions,  whether  in  the  field  or  in  the 
Cabinet,  but  I  have  always  thought  that  the  true  heroes 
of  the  '  lost  cause  '  were  the  rank  and  file — the  men  who, 
while  in  no.  sense  responsible  for  the  political  events 
which  produced  the  struggle,  and  the  great  majority  of 
whom  had  not  the  least  personal  interest  in  that  domestic 
institution  which  many  assert  to  have  been  the  underlying 
cause  of  the  antagonism  between  the  North  and  South, 
yet  answered  quickly  and  loyally  the  appeal  of  their 
States,  and  formed  that  splendid  infantry  which,  though 
ill-armed  and  equipped,  poorly  clad,  and  often  insuffi 
ciently  fed,  marched  and  countermarched,  toiled  in 
trenches,  and  fought  in  line  of  battle,  with  admirable 
patience  and  courage  for  four  years,  and  who,  in  the 
depressing  retreat  to  Appomatox  Court  House,  when  it 
was  manifest  that  there  was  no  longer  a  hope  of  final 
success,  turned  upon  their  pursuers  with  all  the  elan  of 
Chancellorsville.  No  one  can  have  witnessed  what  those 
men  endured,  or  can  know  what  they  performed,  without 
feeling  impelled  to  speak  a  word  of  admiration  ;  but  the 
subject  is  one  for  the  military  historian  of  the  war,  and 
I  have  no  space  for  more  than  a  passing  tribute. 

After  frequent  delays  en  route,  the  train  reached  Rich 
mond,  and  I  lost  no  time  in  reporting  at  the  Navy 
Department. 

It  would  be  both  uninteresting  and  useless  to  record 
in  detail  the  consultations  with  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy.  I  reported  fully  upon  the  state  of  affairs  abroad, 
and  the  object  of  my  return  to  the  Confederate  States 
was  explained.  The  wants  of  the  Department  and  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  131 

naval  policy  of  the  Government — how  to  supply  the  one 
and  to  carry  out  the  other — were  the  chief  considerations, 
and  they  were  amply  discussed.  Finally  it  was  decided  as 
a  first  step  that  the  Fingal  should  be  filled  up  with  cotton, 
on  account  of  the  Navy  Department,  and  that  I  should 
return  to  Europe  with  her  to  carry  out  the  further  pur 
poses  of  the  Government ;  and  while  the  ship  was 
loading,  my  original  instructions  and  powers  would  be 
revised,  and  the  mode  of  furnishing  funds  would  be 
arranged  with  the  Treasury  Department. 

Messrs.  John  Eraser  and  Co.,  of  Charleston,  were 
instructed  to  buy  in  the  interior  and  forward  to  Savan 
nah  the  quantity  of  cotton  necessary  to  fill  up  the  Fingal, 
and  the  naval  paymaster  at  that  station  was  ordered  to 
supply  the  coals  required  for  the  outward  voyage.  I  got 
back  to  Savannah  about  November  23rd.  The  situation 
of  affairs  was  interesting,  and  I  think  it  will  afford  a 
better  picture  of  passing  events  if  I  give  the  official  cor 
respondence  which  was  carried  on  from  that  place,  than 
if  I  continue  the  account  in  the  narrative  style. 

'  Savannah,  November  25,  1861. 
'  SIR — 

c  I  have  the  honour  to  report  that  the  steamship 
Fingal  has  been  discharged,  and  now  lies  in  the  Savan 
nah  river  ready  to  receive  freight.  Paymaster  Kelly  has 
written  to  Columbus  to  have  the  necessary  quantity  of 
coal  sent  down  at  once,  and  expects  it  to  be  here  to 
morrow  or  next  day.  I  cannot  refrain  from  urging  the 
necessity  of  getting  the  ship  off  without  delay.  Yester 
day  five  of  the  enemy's  gunboats  stood  cautiously  in, 
and  after  throwing  a  number  of  shell  upon  and  over 
Tybee  Island,  a  force  was  landed  without  opposition. 
'  This  morning  the  Federal  flag  is  flying  from  the 

9—2 


132  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

lighthouse,  and  they  will  doubtless  soon  have  a  battery 
upon  the  point  of  the  island.  The  only  egress  left  for 
the  Fingal  is  through  Warsaw  Inlet,  and  it  can  scarcely 
be  supposed  that  the  enemy  will  permit  it  to  remain 
open  many  days.  .  .  .  The  small  quantity  of  naval 
stores  and  cotton  required  for  the  Fingal  could  be  got 
on  board  in  a  couple  of  days  if  they  were  brought  here 
on  the  spot. 

'  I  am,  etc., 
4  (Signed)         JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 

« Hon.  S.  R  Mallory, 

f  Secretary  of  the  Navy/ 


The  railways  were  so  fully  occupied  with  the  trans 
port  of  troops  and  material  of  war  for  Virginia,  and 
other  frontier  points,  that  the  local  traffic  was  almost 
wholly  stopped,  and  the  cotton  and  coals  for  the  Fingal 
were  brought  forward  in  the  merest  driblets.  On  the 
4th  of  December  I  received  the  following  letter  of 
instructions  : — 


*  Confederate  States  of  America,  Navy  Department, 

*  Richmond,  Virginia,  November  30,  1861. 

'  SIB — 

4  You  will  take  command  of  the  Pinged,  receive 
on  board  so  much  cotton  and  rosin,  to  be  delivered  to 
you  under  the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  as 
your  judgment  may  approve,  together  with  your  coal, 
and  proceed  to  such  port  in  Great  Britain  as  you  may 
deem  expedient,  delivering  your  cargo  as  you  may  be  re 
quested  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  You  will 
select  two  coast  pilots  to  aid  in  bringing  the  Fingal 
safely  back.  On  your  arrival  in  Great  Britain  you  will 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  133 

transfer  the  command  of  the  Fingal  to  Lieutenant  G.  T. 
Sinclair,  whom  you  will  receive  on  board  at  Savannah.7 

Then  follows  information  in  regard  to  funds,  and 
instructions  as  to  the  articles  most  needed,  which  I  was 
to  buy,  if  not  already  included  in  the  outstanding  con 
tracts,  and  ship  back  to  a  Confederate  port  in  the  Fingal. 

'  So  soon  as  either  of  the  vessels  under  contract  in 
England  shall  be   completed   and    delivered,  you  will 
adopt  such  measures  as  you  may  deem  best  to  arm  and 
equip  her  as  a  vessel  of  war,  without  infringing  the  laws 
of  Great  Britain,  or  giving  to  that  Government  just 
cause  of  offence  ;  and  having  obtained  a  crew  and  all 
things  necessary  for  an  extended  cruise,  you  will  leave 
England  in  command,  and  proceed  against  the  enemy  in 
whatever  quarter  of  the  ocean  circumstances  may  then 
indicate  as  affording  the  best  chances  of  success.     Lieu 
tenant-Commanding  Pegram  (of  the  Nashville)  is   in 
structed  to  detail  such  officers  from  his  vessel  as  you  may 
require,  and  you  are  authorized  to  confer  acting  appoint 
ments  upon  such  others  as  you  may  deem  necessary. 
The  Department,  the  speed  and  qualities  of  your  vessel 
being   unknown,  is  unwilling,   so   far   in   advance,    to 
assign  any  particular  locality  for  your  operations,  but 
desires  to  impress  upon  you  the  importance  of  rendering 
your  vessel  as  formidable,  and  your  cruise  as  destructive, 
as  practicable,  leaving  to  you  entire  freedom  of  action. 
Should  your  judgment  at  any  time  hesitate  in  seeking 
the  solution  of  any  doubt  on  this  point,  it  may  be  aided 
by  the  reflection  that  you  are  to  do  the  enemy's  com 
merce  the  greatest  injury  in  the  shortest  time.  A  speedy 
recognition  of  our  Government  by  the  Great  European 
Powers  is  anticipated,  and  I  have  no  reason  to  doubt 
that  if  you  shall  seek  their  ports,  you  will  receive  the 


134  THE  SECEET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

consideration  and  treatment  due  from  neutrals  to  an 
officer  of  a  belligerent  Power  with  which  they  desire  to 
establish  close  commercial  relations.  The  strictest  re 
gard  for  the  rights  of  neutrals  cannot  be  too  sedulously 
observed  ;  nor  should  an  opportunity  be  lost  of  culti 
vating  friendly  relations  with  their  naval  and  merchant 
services,  and  of  placing  the  true  character  of  the  contest 
in  which  we  are  engaged  in  its  proper  light.  You  will 
avail  yourself  of  every  opportunity  of  communicating 
with  your  Government,  using,  when  you  may  deem  it 
expedient,  a  cipher  for  this  purpose.  The  Department 
relies  with  confidence  upon  the  patriotism,  ability,  and 
conduct  of  yourself,  officers,  and  men,  and  with  my 
earnest  wishes  for  the  prosperity  of  your  cruise,  and 
your  triumphant  return  to  your  country, 

4  1  am,  etc., 
'  (Signed)         S.  R.  MALLORY, 

'  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
*  Captain  James  D.  Bulloch, 
*  Savannah,  Georgia.' 

In  a  subsequent  letter  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
directed  me  to  arm  the  Fingal  for  the  outward  voyage, 
and  I  replied  to  the  main  points  as  follows  : 


5,  1861. 
<  SIR  — 

'  I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge,  etc  ..... 
The  greatest  obstacle  will  be  met  at  the  very  outset  in 
the  difficulty  of  arming  and  equipping  a  cruiser  in  a 
neutral  port  ;  for  even  if  Great  Britain  should  have 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  the  Confederate 
States,  unless  she  has  become  a  party  to  the  war,  her 
obligations  under  the  International  Code  would  force 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  135 

her  to  prohibit  the  equipment  of  an  armed  ship  under  a 
belligerent  flag  in  her  ports.  You  are  better  informed 
as  to  such  contingencies  than  I  can  be,  and  I  only 
allude  to  the  subject  to  show  that  I  am  fully  prepared 
to  submit  to  the  disappointment  of  not  at  once  getting 
upon  that  element  which  is  free  to  any  flag  when 
properly  defended. 

'  Such  portions  of  your  instructions  as  are  specific 
shall  be  carried  out  as  strictly  to  the  letter  as  possible, 
and  in  the  exercise  of  the  large  discretion  granted  me, 
I  will  endeavour  to  act  with  as  much  caution  and 
prudence  as  will  be  consistent  with  promptness  and 
vigour.  I  particularly  note  your  remarks  in  reference 
to  neutrals,  and  will  bear  constantly  in  mind  your 
suggestions  upon  this  and  other  points.  There  has 
been  much  delay  in  getting  the  cotton  forward,  but  I 
think  the  Fingal  will  be  ready  for  sea  on  Saturday 
night.  ...  I  have  not  deemed  it  necessary  to  arm  the 
Fingal  for  the  return  voyage,  as  it  is  important  to 
preserve  her  original  character  as  an  English  ship. 
This  course  will  ensure  her  less  trouble  and  annoyance 
in  getting  another  cargo  on  board.  If,  on  our  arrival 
in  England,  the  Confederate  Government  has  been 
acknowledged,  the  flag  can  be  changed.  .  .  . 

4 1  am,  etc., 

'JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 

'  Hon.  S.  R.  Mallory, 

1  Secretary  of  the  Navy.' 


Owing  to  the  continued  difliculty  of  inland  transpor 
tation  and  the  delay  in  getting  the  cotton  for  the  Fingal 
to  the  shipping  port,  she  was  not  loaded  until  December 
20th,  and  the  following  copies  of  the  correspondence 


136  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

will  best  explain  the  attempts  to  get  her  to  sea,  as  well 
as  the  condition  of  affairs  at  Savannah  : 

*  Steamship  Fingal,  off  Thunderbolt  Battery, 

'Near  Savannah,  December  24,  1861. 

4  SIR — 

4  On  Saturday  morning  the  barometer  and  the 
general  appearance  of  the  sky  indicating  a  favourable 
state  of  weather,  I  made  preparations  for  sea,  and  on 
Sunday  morning  early  dropped  the  ship  down  to  a 
bight  in  Wilmington  Island,  where  she  can  lie  concealed 
from  the  enemy's  ships  at  Warsaw  as  well  as  at  Tybee. 
This  bight  is  about  one  mile  above  a  seven-gun  battery 
on  Skidaway  Island,  from  which  point  there  is  a  clear 
view  of  the  opening  to  Warsaw  Sound.  Immediately 
after  anchoring,  the  captain  of  this  battery  informed  me 
that  three  blockading  vessels  were  off  the  bar,  and  that 
one  of  them  had  chased  his  boat  in  on  the  afternoon 
before.  Still,  as  all  appearances  indicated  a  dark  and 
squally  night,  it  was  determined  to  get  under  weigh  on 
the  first  quarter  of  the  flood,  so  as  to  get  down  to  the 
bar  before  the  moon  rose.  At  early  dark  a  fog  set  in 
over  the  marshes,  concealing  the  leading  marks,  and  the 
pilots  were  unwilling  to  move  the  ship.  This  circum 
stance,  sufficiently  annoying  at  first,  probably  saved  us 
from  capture,  as  it  appears  that  the  enemy  were  keeping 
an  especial  look-out  that  night. 

'  No  vessel  could  have  seen  to  cross  the  bar  before 
half-past  seven  o'clock,  yet  at  8  a.m.  one  of  their  small 
vessels  appeared  in  full  sight  of  the  battery  below  us, 
and  actually  steamed  up  to  within  half  a  mile  of  its  guns, 
turned,  and  steamed  down  channel  again  without  receiv 
ing  a  shot.  I  am  informed  that  the  approach  of  this 
vessel  was  not  reported  to  the  commander  of  the  battery 
until  she  was  in  the  act  of  turning. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  137 

'  Ignorant  of  the  incident  above  mentioned,  I  sent  an 
experienced  pilot  in  an  eight-oared  boat  with  good  sails, 
kindly  furnished  by  Lieutenant -Commanding  Kennard, 
of  the  Confederate  States  steamer  Samson,  to  examine  the 
bar  and  the  coast  north  and  south  of  the  point  of  Warsaw 
Island,  and  to  report  as  quickly  as  possible,  so  that  if 
all  was  clear  we  might  go  to  sea  on  the  afternoon  tide. 
In  the  meantime  two  additional  gun- vessels  had  joined 
the  first,  and  the  three  coming  rapidly  up  channel  with 
the  young  flood,  cut  off  our  boat,  compelling  her,  as  it 
is  now  thought,  to  go  into  one  of  the  creeks  running 
through  the  Romerly  Marsh,  from  which  I  trust  she  has 
been  able  by  this  time  to  reach  Green  Island.  The 
enemy's  three  vessels  took  up  an  anchorage  just  opposite 
the  main  passage  through  Romerly  Marsh,  thus  effec 
tually  closing  all  communication  with  Savannah  from 
the  sea,  through  any  inlet.  As  the  enemy  could  easily 
have  discovered  the  position  of  this  ship  by  landing 
upon  Wilmington  Island,  and  could  have  cut  her  out 
with  boats  at  night,  I  took  advantage  of  last  night's 
flood  to  bring  her  up  to  this  place,  where  there  is  another 
battery.  For  some  time  before  last  Saturday  the  enemy 
had  not  entered  Warsaw  Sound,  their  vessels  simply 
cruising  up  and  down  the  coast  in  very  regular  order. 
This  movement,  therefore,  would  seem  especially  intended 
to  prevent  the  escape  of  this  ship,  and  would  indicate 
treachery  somewhere.  It  may,  however,  only  be  the 
development  of  a  general  plan  of  attack  upon  Savannah, 
which  place  I  consider  far  from  being  safe.  The  batteries 
are  weak  in  guns  and  gunners,  and  whatever  the 
gallantry  of  the  men  may  be,  which  is  undoubted,  they 
could  not  withstand  a  vigorous  attack  from  the  ships 
which  could  be  brought  over  Warsaw  bar. 

'  I  will  remain  in  a  position  to  take  advantage  of  any 


138  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

change  in  the  enemy's  plans,  and  will  lose  no  oppor 
tunity  of  getting  to  sea. 

4 1  am,  etc., 
1  (Signed)         JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 

'  Hon.  S.  R  Mallory, 

'  Secretary  of  the  Navy.' 

'Savannah,  December  26,  1861. 

6  SIR,— 

'  On  the  24th  inst.  I  addressed  you  from  the 
anchorage  at  Thunderbolt,  reporting  my  failure  to  get 
the  Fingal  to  sea,  and  informing  you  that  the  enemy 
had  effectually  sealed  up  all  the  approaches  to  Savannah 
from  Warsaw  Inlet  and  the  other  channels  leading  from 
the  southward.  The  position  of  the  Fingal  below  the 
battery  at  Thunderbolt  was  not  safe,  as  the  enemy  might 
at  any  time  cut  her  out  with  boats.  I  therefore,  by  the 
advice  of  Flag-officer  Tattnall  sent  her  back  to  the  city 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  24th,  and  went  down  to  Warsaw 
Island  myself  in  search  of  the  boat  I  informed  you  had 
been  cut  off  by  the  sudden  approach  of  the  enemy's  gun 
boats  on  the  day  before.  I  returned  to  Savannah  last 
night,  and  have  the  satisfaction  to  report  that  the  men 
(with  Mr.  Low  and  two  midshipmen  who  were  of  the 
party)  were  found  and  brought  safely  to  Skidaway,  and 
are  now  here,  with  the  exception  of  two  of  the  crew  of 
the  Samson,  who  I  regret  to  say  deserted,  and  it  is 
feared  got  on  board  the  blockading  vessels.  Yesterday 
morning,  while  I  was  on  Warsaw  Island,  a  large  paddle- 
wheel  steamer  joined  the  three  vessels  already  anchored 
below  Skidaway,  and  late  in  the  afternoon  a  screw- 
steamer,  barque  rigged  and  pierced  for  eight  guns,  came 
in.  There  are  thus  five  ships-of-war  at  the  entrance  to 
the  Eomerly  Marsh,  a  force  too  powerful  for  the  simple 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  139 

blockade  of  the  Fingal,  and  this  assembling  of  the  enemy's 
fleet  can  only  be  regarded  as  preliminary  to  an  attack  in 
force  upon  the  city.  It  is  impossible  to  conjecture  what 
chance  may  occur  to  open  a  passage  for  the  Fingal.  .  .  . 
If  the  Fingal  is  irretrievably  locked  up  for  the  war,  I 
presume  you  would  desire  me  to  get  to  England  by  some 
other  means,  etc. 

i  I  am,  etc. , 
'  (Signed)         JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 

'  Hon.  S.  R  Mallory.' 

From  the  date  of  the  foregoing  letter  I  continued  to 
report  the  condition  of  affairs  at  Savannah,  and  the 
position  of  the  enemy's  ships  at  the  main  entrance  to 
the  river,  as  well  as  in  Warsaw  Sound,  and  received 
various  letters  from  the  Department,  increasing  the 
orders  for  purchase  of  supplies  in  England,  and  en 
larging  the  general  scope  of  my  duties  there,  and  espe 
cially  instructing  me  to  '  examine  into  the  subject  of 
constructing  iron  and  steel  clad  vessels  in  England  and 
France.' 

On  the  3rd  of  January,  1862, 1  reported  as  follows  : — 

'  Since  my  last  letter  there  has  been  no  change  in  the 
position  of  the  blockading  vessels  off  Tybee,  but  the 
enemy  seems  to  have  changed  the  design  indicated  by 
the  first  appearance  of  his  squadron  near  Skidaway 
battery.  On  the  30th  ultimo,  three  old  sailing  ships, 
probably  part  of  the  much-talked-of  "  Stone  Fleet,"  were 
brought  in  and  anchored  at  the  entrance  to  the  Romerly 
Marsh,  and  have  since  been  stripped  to  their  lower 
masts.  If  these  vessels  are  sunk  in  their  present  posi 
tion,  the  inland  communication  would  of  course  be 
closed  between  Savannah  and  the  more  southern  ports 


140  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

of  Georgia  ;  but  should  the  enemy,  content  with  this 
interruption  of  local  trade,  remove  the  men-of-war  for 
other  operations,  or  for  outside  cruising,  the  Fingal 
might  yet  be  got  to  sea  through  the  regular  ship  channel 
leading  between  Warsaw  Island  and  little  Tybee.  Up 
to  the  present  moment  no  opportunity  has  oifered  to 
pass  the  blockading  ships.  By  way  of  Warsaw  they 
occupy  the  entire  channel  with  five  ships,  sometimes 
seven  ;  and  at  the  anchorage  near  Tybee  there  have 
never  been  less  than  four  ships,  frequently  as  many  as 
eleven.' 


January  13th  I  again  reported  :— 

1 1  regret  to  say  that  this  letter  must  be  of  the  same 
tenor  as  the  last.  The  enemy  are  fully  informed  of  the 
FingaTs  position  and  the  intention  to  get  her  out  if 
possible,'  etc.  '  Unless  there  be  some  changes  in  the 
political  relations  of  the  United  States  with  the  courts 
of  Europe,  I  consider  the  port  of  Savannah  as  com 
pletely  closed  to  commerce  for  an  indefinite  time ;  con 
sequently  my  detention  here  with  any  hope  of  getting 
the  Fingal  to  sea  is  not  only  unnecessary,  but  will 
occasion  much  delay  and  confusion  in  the  settlement  of 
the  business  for  which  I  was  originally  sent  to  Europe. 
I  therefore  respectfully  suggest  that  you  order  me  to 
proceed  at  once  to  England  for  the  purpose  of  com 
pleting  that  business,  and  of  still  further  carrying  out 
your  instructions  of  November  30,  1861.' 

In  continuation  I  pointed  out  the  effect  of  the  delay, 
and  the  probable  impossibility  of  completing  or  even 
fairly  setting  on  foot  the  various  duties  with  which  I 
was  charged,  in  time  to  go  to  sea  in  the  first  ship, 
which  would  probably  be  ready  by  the  date  of  my 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  141 

arrival  in  England,  and  suggested  that  I  should  be 
transferred  to  the  second  ship,  which  would  be  finished 
three  to  four  months  later.  In  reply,  my  orders  were 
modified  in  the  above  particular,  and  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  directed  me  to  turn  over  the  Fingal  to 
Lieutenant  Gr.  T.  Sinclair,  and  to  proceed  to  England  by 
any  feasible  route. 

Mr.  John  Low,  upon  my  recommendation,  was  ap 
pointed  a  master  in  the  Confederate  Navy,  and  was 
ordered  to  accompany  me  to  Europe.  Two  midshipmen, 
E.  C.  Anderson,  junior,  and  Eugene  Maffitt,  were  ordered 
to  join  me,  and  also  Mr.  Clarence  R.  Yonge,  an  assistant 
in  the  paymaster's  office  at  Savannah,  the  last  named  to 
act  as  clerk,  and  then  to  be  appointed  acting  paymaster 
in  one  of  the  cruising  ships. 

Mr.  Yonge  afterwards  left  the  Alabama  when  at 
Jamaica,  somewhat  unexpectedly,  and  as  he  took 
service  on  his  return  to  England  under  the  United 
States  Consul  at  Liverpool,  and  afterwards  took  the 
prominent  part  of  chief  witness  in  the  4 Alexandra  Case' 
(which  will  be  dwelt  upon  in  a  subsequent  chapter), 
his  conduct  was  much  criticised  at  the  time. 

The  official  correspondence  quoted  above  has  not  been 
included  in  the  body  of  this  narrative  merely  to  illus 
trate  the  movements  of  the  Fingal,  but  chiefly  to  de 
monstrate  the  views  of  the  Government  in  respect  to  the 
proposed  naval  operations  abroad,  and  to  make  a  fair 
representation  of  the  enemy's  operations  and  the  condi 
tion  of  affairs  at  Savannah  in  December — January, 
1861-62.  My  duties  at  that  time  compelled  me  to  be 
much  and  often  at  both  entrances  to  the  Savannah 
river,  and  to  examine  carefully  and  critically  the  move 
ments  and  force  of  the  blockading  fleet,  and  the  strength 
and  number  of  the  Confederate  defensive  works. 


142  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

The  main  approach  to  Savannah,  via  Tybee,  was 
defended  by  two  old  brick  forts,  very  inefficiently 
armed,  chiefly  with  smooth-bore  32 -pounders.  The 
approach  from  Warsaw  Sound,  through  Wilmington 
Creek,  was  protected  by  a  battery  of  seven  guns  on 
Skidaway  Island,  and  another  battery  of  six  or  seven 
guns  at  Thunderbolt,  further  up  the  creek,  and  quite 
out  of  range  of  the  first.  Both  of  these  fortifications 
were  newly  made  earthworks,  entirely  open  in  rear,  and 
the  guns  were  mounted  in  barbette. 

The  United  States  ships  at  anchor  off  the  entrance  to 
Eomerly  Marsh  were  just  out  of  gunshot  from  the 
Skidaway  battery.  They  lay  there  for  days,  and  so  far 
as  I  could  discover,  never  made  a  reconnaissance. 
There  was  no  sleeping  accommodation  for  the  garrison 
inside  the  works  at  Skidaway,  and  the  men  lived  in 
tents  and  huts  some  distance  in  the  rear,  a  guard  only 
being  actually  in  the  battery  night  and  day.  Among 
the  blockading  vessels  was  one  fine  steamship  of  the 
Iroquois  class,  and  I  often  wondered  why  they  did  not 
come  inside  some  dark  night  with  boats,  get  round  the 
flank  of  the  battery,  and  spike  the  guns.  The  garrison 
were  sturdy  fellows,  and  would  have  been  formidable  in 
a  stand-up  fight,  but  the  attacking  party  always  have 
the  advantage  in  a  night  surprise,  and  the  ships  could 
not  only  have  chosen  their  time,  but  could  have  greatly 
outnumbered  the  guard. 

The  blockading  squadron  at  Tybee  was  also  very 
apathetic,  and  never,  while  I  was  there,  came  within 
range  of  Fort  Pulaski.  Among  the  vessels  off  Tybee,  I 
recognised  my  old  ship  the  Bienville,  or  it  might  have 
been  the  De  Soto — they  were  sister  ships.  The  gun 
boats  could  have  run  past  the  batteries  on  Wilmington 
Creek  at  any  time,  and  so  have  got  into  the  rear  of  Fort 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EVEOPE.  143 

Jackson,  driven  the  men  out  of  it,  and  then  gone  on 
into  the  Savannah  river,  completely  isolating  Fort 
Pulaski.  The  men,  working  the  guns  in  barbette,  could 
not  have  stood  a  rapid  fire  from  the  ships  ;  grape  and 
canister  would  have  swept  them  off  the  parapet. 

I  do  not  know  who  commanded  the  United  States 
blockading  squadron  at  that  time.  Either  Farragut  or 
David  Porter  would  have  tried  to  get  inside,  if  they  had 
been  there  ;  at  least,  they  would  have  made  some  effort 
to  discover  the  means  of  resistance.  The  Confederate 
naval  forces  at  Savannah  were  commanded  by  Flag- 
officer  Josiah  Tattnall,  as  gallant  a  seaman  as  ever  trod 
a  plank.  I  suppose  no  officer  of  his  rank  and  quality 
was  ever  doomed  to  the  indignity  of  such  an  inefficient 
command.  His  flag- ship,  the  Savannah,  was  a  paddle 
river-boat,  with  engines  and  boilers  on  deck,  and  her 
battery  consisted  of  one  smooth-bore  32 -pounder  gun, 
on  a  traversing  carriage.  A  rocket  exploding  among 
the  flimsy  joiner- work  of  her  deck  cabins  would  have 
set  her  on  fire,  and  a  single  shell  from  one  of  the  gun 
boats  outside  would  have  blown  her  up.  When  Tattnall 
would  come  down  the  river,  as  he  often  did,  with  his 
so-called  *  Musquito  fleet/  and  flaunt  his  flag  as  a  seem 
ing  challenge  to  the  formidable  ships  of  the  enemy  at 
Tybee,  nothing  saved  the  display  from  the  appearance 
of  bravado,  or  the  manoeuvre  from  ridicule,  but  the 
natural  grace  and  dignity  with  which  the  fine  old 
gentleman  performed  every  act  of  his  life. 

Josiah  Tattnall  was  a  man  out  of  the  common,  the 
beau  ideal  of  a  naval  officer  of  what  must  now  be 
called  the  old  school,  £the  sublime  of  Jack-tar.'  He 
was  punctilious  on  a  point  of  honour,  and  rigid  in 
the  practice  of  official  propriety  ;  but  he  was  genial, 
modest  and  unassuming  in  his  private  intercourse  with 


144  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

friends,  and  his  manners  were  courtly,  yet  easy  and  unre 
strained.  He  was  charmingly  fluent  and  entertaining  in 
conversation,  and  had  a  very  special  gift  for  telling  a 
story  with  liveliness  and  spirit,  always  illustrating  the 
sense  and  point  of  his  narrative  with  appropriate  action 
and  gesture.  In  positions  of  command  fully  testing  his 
tact,  judgment,  courage,  and  professional  skill,  he  almost 
invariably  exhibited  higher  faculties  than  the  occasions 
required,  and  no  one  can  therefore  fix  the  limit  of  his 
ability.  He  possessed  all  the  traits  which  are  found  in 
heroic  characters,  and,  with  suitable  opportunities,  would 
have  set  his  name  among  the  great  naval  worthies  who 
are  historic.  He  was  a  high  type  of  human  nature — 
a  '  perfect '  man  in  the  Scriptural  sense — that  is  to  say, 
complete  in  all  his  parts.  He  died  in  Savannah,  his 
native  place,  and  was  buried  near  there  in  a  grove  of  old 
live-oak  trees  planted  to  commemorate  the  wedding  of 
the  first  of  his  ancestors  who  settled  in  the  Colony  of 
Georgia.  A  couplet  from  the  touching  requiem  to 
'  Tom  Bowling '  would  be  a  fitting  epitaph  to  one  who 
has  been  called  the  '  Bayard  of  the  sea': — 

*  Though  bis  body's  under  hatches 
His  soul  has  gone  aloft' 

The  prediction  that  Savannah  would  be  sealed  up  for 
the  remainder  of  the  war  was  fulfilled,  and  the  FingaCs 
proposed  voyage  to  Europe  was  definitely  abandoned. 
She  was  not,  however,  lost  to  the  Confederate  States. 
The  Navy  Department  took  her  into  the  service,  and  she 
was  converted  into  an  armour-clad,  and  christened 
Atlanta.  To  effect  this  conversion  she  was  first  cut 
down  to  her  deck,  which  throughout  about  150  or 
160  feet  amidships  was  widened  (6  feet  on  each  side, 
widest  part,  but  tapering  towards  the  ends)  by  a  *  heavy 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  145 

solid  overway  of  wood  and  armour/  sloping  from  a  point 
several  feet  below  the  water-line  to  the  edge  of  the  deck. 
Upon  this  widened  portion  of  the  deck  a  casemate  was 
built,  the  sides  and  ends  inclining  at  an  angle  of  about  30°. 
The  top  of  the  casemate  was  flat,  and  the  house  to  cover 
the  steersman  and  officer  directing  the  fire  rose  above  the 
roof  about  three  feet.  The  sloping  sides  and  ends  of  the 
casemate  were  covered  with  two  layers  of  iron  plates, 
each  being  two  inches  thick,  screwed  to  a  backing  com 
posed  of  three  inches  of  oak  upon  fifteen  inches  of  pine. 
The  bolts  were  one  and  a  quarter  inch,  countersunk  on 
the  outside  of  the  plates,  and  drawn  up  by  nuts  and 
washers  on  the  inside.  She  was  provided  with  a  beak 
or  ram  at  the  bow ;  and  a  pole  and  lever,  which  could 
be  lowered  at  will,  was  also  fitted  at  the  bow,  long- 
enough  to  project  beyond  the  ram.  The  pole  was  in 
tended  to  carry  a  percussion  torpedo.  Her  armament 
consisted  of  two  7 -inch  rifled  guns  on  bow  and  stern 
pivots,  and  two  6 -inch  rifled  guns  in  broadside.  The 
7-inch  guns  were  so  arranged  that  they  could  be  worked 
in  broadside,  as  well  as  for  fore  and  aft  fire,  and  the 
Fingal  could  therefore  fight  three  guns  (two  7 -inch 
and  one  6-inch)  on  either  side.  The  guns  were  cast-iron 
with  wrought  iron  bands,  and  were  of  the  '  Brooke ' 
pattern. 

As  soon  as  the  Atlanta  was  finished,  the  Navy  De 
partment  was  desirous  that  she  should  be  tried  against 
the  enemy's  ironclads,  eight  or  nine  of  which  were 
known  to  be  in  the  neighbourhood,  off  Charleston  and 
the  entrances  to  Savannah,  or  at  Port  Royal.  The  senior 
officers  of  the  Confederate  navy  at  Savannah  did  not 
think  that  she  would  be  a  match  for  the  United 
States  Monitor  class  at  close  quarters,  and  they  did  not 
think  it  prudent  to  take  her  out  into  Warsaw  Sound, 

VOL.  i.  10 


146  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

where  two  '  Monitors  '  were  lying,  except  under  favour 
able  circumstances  of  spring-tide,  because  her  draft  had 
been  increased  by  the  weight  of  armour,  ordnance,  and 
necessary  stores,  and  the  channels  were  not  only  in 
tricate,  but  the  depth  of  water  very  scant  at  best,  and 
besides  this,  the  ship  steered  badly  in  consequence  of 
the  increased  draft  and  the  alteration  of  form  caused  by 
the  projecting  overway,  which  extended  several  feet 
below  the  water-line. 

Flag-officer  Tattnall's  advice  was  to  wait  until  the 
enemy  collected  his  ironclads  for  a  second  attack  upon 
Charleston,  and  then  to  send  the  Atlanta  out  on  the  first 
spring-tide,  when  she  could  be  got  to  sea  without  the 
risk  of  being  taken  at  a  disadvantage  in  the  narrow  and 
shoal  waters  of  the  Eomerly  Marshes  and  Warsaw 
Sound.  Once  fairly  afloat,  and  with  ample  sea-room,  he 
thought  she  could  strike  a  telling  blow,  either  at  Port 
Royal,  where  the  enemy  had  a  large  collection  of  trans 
ports,  or  at  some  other  point.  This  wise  counsel  was 
unhappily  overborne  by  the  weight  of  public  clamour, 
and  the  Navy  Department  yielded  to  the  outside  pressure. 

Commander  Wm.  A.  Webb,  a  clever  and  spirited 
officer,  was  ordered  to  the  Atlanta,  and  the  condition  of 
his  appointment  appeared  to  be  that  he  should  at  once 
'  do  something.'  Before  daylight  on  the  morning  of 
June  17,  1863,  Webb  got  under  w^eigh,  and  steaming 
past  the  old  batteries  on  Skidaway  Island,  which  had 
ere  this  been  abandoned,  entered  Warsaw  Sound.  The 
United  States  '  Monitors  '  Weehawken  and  Nahant  were 
at  anchor  in  the  sound.  They  made  out  the  Atlanta  at 
about  4  a.m.,  and  the  Weehawken  immediately  slipped 
her  cable  and  steamed  towards  her,  followed  closely  by 
the  Nahant  At  about  600  yards  from  the  Weehawken 
the  Atlanta  grounded,  but  was  backed  off  with  some 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  147 

difficulty.  Shortly  after,  the  Atlanta  took  the  bottom 
again,  and  stuck  fast.  The  Weehawken  approached  to 
within  about  300  yards,  and  choosing  a  position  so  that 
*  the  Atlanta  could  bring  her  guns  to  bear  with  difficulty,' 
opened  fire.  The  engagement,  if  it  can  be  called  one, 
lasted  about  fifteen  minutes.  The  Naliant  did  not  fire 
a  shot,  but  the  Weehawken  hit  the  Atlanta  four  times, 
twice  with  15-inch  '  cored  shot/  and  twice  with  11 -inch 
solid  shot.  The  Atlanta's  pilot-house  was  knocked  off, 
and  one  of  the  port -stoppers,  or  shutters,  was  driven  in ; 
the  armour  was  crushed  in  at  several  points,  although 
not  pierced,  and  the  backing  was  much  damaged.  One 
15 -inch  shot  struck  fairly  on  the  inclined  side  of  the 
Atlanta,  breaking  the  armour  plate  and  driving  a  shower 
of  splinters  from  the  backing  into  the  ship.  Captain 
Webb  has  told  me  that  the  concussion  knocked  down 
about  forty  men,  and  sixteen  were  more  or  less  wounded 
by  the  splinters. 

Webb  was  in  a  sad  plight.  It  can  hardly  be  said  that 
he  was  fighting  his  ship — he  was  simply  enduring  the 
fire  of  his  adversary. 

It  was  manifest  that  a  few  more  concussions,  and  a 
15 -inch  shot,  perhaps  a  shell,  would  find  its  way  into 
the  casemate,  and  there  would  be  great  and  useless 
slaughter  among  his  men.  When  further  resistance 
ceases  to  hold  out  any  hope  of  final  success,  the  dictates 
of  humanity  extort  an  acknowledgment  of  defeat,  and 
the  Atlanta's  flag  was  hauled  down. 

The  foregoing  brief  statement  has  been  made  up 
almost  exclusively  from  the  Confederate  accounts.  I 
have  before  me,  while  writing,  a  copy  of  the  report  of 
the  commander  of  the  Weehawhen,  and  if  it  contained 
anything  in  conflict  with  the  above,  I  would  either 
mention  the  fact  or  give  the  report  in  full.  Captain 

10—2 


148  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

John  Rodgers,  of  the  Weehawken  (I  hope  I  may  still 
speak  of  him  in  the  present  tense),  is  an  able  officer. 
He  accepted  with  promptness  the  Atlanta's  invitation  to 
battle,  and  handled  his  ship  with  skill  and  judgment. 
He  took  up  a  good  position,  awkward  for  his  adversary 
and  advantageous  to  himself,  which  he  was  bound  to 
do,  for  it  is  clearly  the  duty  of  a  commander  so  to  dis 
pose  his  force  as  to  defeat  the  enemy  with  as  little  loss 
to  himself  as  possible,  and  finally  he  reported  the  result 
of  the  engagement  in  a  plain,  manly,  straightforward 
document,  without  the  least  brag  or  unbecoming  elation. 
As  a  pleasing  but  somewhat  unique  feature  in  the  report 
of  Captain  Rodgers,  I  may  mention  that  he  called  the 
Atlanta  the  'enemy/  and  not  the  '  rebel/  an  epithet 
chosen  by  the  politicians  at  Washington  for  a  purpose, 
and  used  by  them  as  a  reproach.  It  crept  into  the  mili 
tary  and  naval  phraseology  of  the  war,  and  was  thrown 
broadcast  over  the  correspondence  of  civil  functionaries 
and  United  States  Consuls  ;  but  the  old  officers  of  the 
army  and  navy,  for  the  most  part,  either  avoided  it,  or 
at  any  rate*seemed  to  use  it  as  a  technical  phrase,  with 
out  opprobrious  meaning. 

The  encounter  between  the  Federal  '  Monitors '  and 
the  Atlanta  illustrates  no  general  principle  applicable 
to  engagements  between  iron -cased  ships.  The  15 -inch 
guns  of  the  Weehawken  were  superior  in  battering  power 
at  close  quarters  to  the  6 -inch  and  7 -inch  guns  of  the 
Atlanta,  and  the  only  chance  of  success  for  the  latter 
would  have  been  to  get  into  deep  and  broad  waters, 
where  she  could  manoeuvre,  and  thus  use  her  guns  effi 
ciently,  and  choose  her  distance  as  well  as  position. 
Lying  helplessly  aground,  she  was  at  the  mercy  of  her 
opponent,  who  was  able  to  come  within  the  most  effec 
tive  range  for  her  own  guns,  and  to  avoid  almost 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  149 

entirely  the  return  fire  of  her  adversary.  Captain 
Rodgers  does  not  mention  that  his  ship  was  hit,  or  that 
she  received  any  injury  whatever,  except  by  collision 
with  his  own  consort,  the  Nahant,  after  the  surrender  of 
the  Atlanta. 

When  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  directed  me  to  turn 
over  the  Fingal  to  Lieutenant  G.  T.  Sinclair,  and  to  pro 
ceed  to  England  by  any  practicable  route,  I  commu 
nicated  at  once  with  Messrs.  John  Eraser  and  Co.,  of 
Charleston,  and  they  kindly  offered  me  and  my  party 
passage  in  either  of  two  steamers  they  were  about  to 
despatch,  one  from  Charleston  and  one  from  Wilmington. 
The  Charleston  steamer  would  try  the  blockade  first, 
but  she  was  small,  and  would  only  go  as  far  as 
Nassau,  from  which  place  I  would  have  to  find  my  way 
to  Havana,  and  thence  round  by  St.  Thomas  to  South 
ampton,  a  circuitous  route,  and  very  uncertain  as  re 
gards  connection  with  packets,  etc.  The  Wilmington 
steamer  was  larger,  having  been  built  for  the  coasting 
trade  to  Boston,  and  the  purpose  was  to  send  her  direct 
to  Liverpool,  only  stopping  at  Fayal  in  the  Azores  to 
replenish  her  coals.  I  chose  the  latter  ship  and  route, 
and  went  on  to  Wilmington,  arriving  there  January  24, 
1862.  The  steamer's  name  originally  was  North  Caro 
lina,  but  it  had  been  changed  to  Annie  Cliilds.  She  was 
coaling  and  taking  in  cotton,  rosin,  tobacco,  and  other 
cargo,  until  February  1st,  when  her  commander,  Captain 
Hammer,  took  her  down  to  Orton  Point,  about  twelve 
miles  above  the  mouth  of  the  river,  from  which  position 
the  ship  was  concealed  from  the  blockaders. 

General  J.  R.  Anderson,  commander  of  the  Con 
federate  forces  at  Wilmington,  kindly  put  a  small  screw 
tug-boat  at  my  disposal,  and  Captain  Hammer  and  I 
went  down  to  Fort  Caswell,  at  the  mouth  of  the  river, 


150  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

every  day  to  reconnoitre.  The  New  Inlet  bar  was  too 
shoal  for  the  Annie  Clrilds,  and  the  only  possible  egress 
was  by  the  main  ship  channel.  Two  gunboats  were 
generally  lying  at  anchor  during  the  day  about  one  mile 
west-south-west  from  the  bar,  and  were  sometimes  joined 
by  another  from  New  Inlet.  We  learned  from  the  coast 
guard  pickets  that  they  did  not  get  under  weigh  at  night. 
The  nights  continued  to  be  clear  until  February  5th, 
and  there  was  no  chance  for  a  run.  I  find  the  following 
entry  in  my  diary  under  February  5th,  1862  : 

'  Early  part  of  the  day  clear,  but  wind  north-east, 
with  passing  clouds  towards  noon.  In  the  afternoon 
got  ready  for  a  start.  At  10  p.m.  under  weigh,  moon 
shining,  but  light  haze.  Full  tide  at  12.7;  moon  set  at 
same  time.  Timed  the  ship's  speed  so  as  to  reach  the 
bar  just  after  the  setting  of  the  moon.  Crossed  12.15  ; 
low  fog,  stars  over  head,  smooth  sea,  calm,  might  have 
heard  the  dip  of  an  oar  or  the  swash  of  the  screw  a  long 
way.  Blockaders  must  have  been  fast  asleep.  Scarcely 
clear  of  the  bar  when  the  heating  of  a  bearing  made  it 
necessary  to  stop  the  engine  for  at  least  half  an  hour. 
Fortunately  it  began  to  rain.  The  bearing  being  all 
right,  we  started  again,  and  were  soon  safe  in  a  thick 
drizzle,  which  lasted  until  we  got  to  the  eastward  of  the 
Gulf  Stream.' 

The  Annie  Childs  had  a  single  engine,  one  inverted 
cylinder,  and  was  badly  found  for  a  voyage  across  the 
North  Atlantic  in  the  month  of  February,  but  she  was 
a  capital  sea-boat  and  behaved  admirably  in  a  heavy 
north-west  gale  which  we  caught  in  the  *  roaring  forties/ 
At  Fayal  the  American  Consul  gave  a  great  deal  of 
trouble,  and  if  it  had  not  been  for  Lloyds'  agent  we 
should  not  have  got  any  coal  at  all.  As  it  was,  we  had 
to  be  content  with  a  scant  supply.  At  2.30  p.m.  on  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  151 

afternoon  of  March  8th,  1862,  we  made  the  Old  Head  of 
Kinsale,  took  a  Cork  pilot  on  board,  and  went  into 
Queenstown  that  night,  burning  the  sweepings  of  the 
bunkers  mixed  with  rosin,  and  the  spare  spars  cut  into 
short  lengths.  The  next  day  I  took  train  for  Liverpool 
vid  Dublin  and  Holy  head,  and  arrived  there  at  4  p.m. 
on  the  10th. 


152  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 


CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Florida. — Captain  Duguid. — Correspondence  concerning  the 
Florida. — Her  arrival  at  Nassau. — Commander  Maffitt. — The 
United  States  blockade  of  the  British  Bahama  Channel. — The 
equipping  of  the  Florida. — Yellow  fever. — The  Florida  runs 
the  blockade  at  Mobile. — An  unparalleled  chase. — The  Florida's 
cruise  in  the  West  Indies. — Vessels  captured  by  the  Florida. — Her 
stay  at  Brest. — Her  second  cruise. — Her  assassination  by  the 
Wachusett. — Justification  of  the  use  of  the  term  'assassination/ 
— The  Brazilian  Government  and  the  capture  of  the  Florida. — 
United  States  treatment  of  prisoners-of-war. 

BEFORE  leaving  England  with  the  Fingal  in  October, 
1861,  I  drew  up  very  particular  and  specific  instructions 
with  reference  to  the  outfit  of  the  Oreto  (Florida),  with 
the  purpose  of  preventing  any  possible  violation  of  the 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  as  it  had  been  explained  to  me 
by  counsel,  and  to  ensure  that  the  ship  when  delivered 
to  me  should  be  prepared  to  fulfil  the  conditions  essen 
tial  to  a  sea-going  steamer  of  her  class  and  nothing 
more. 

On  my  arrival  in  Liverpool  from  the  Confederate 
States  (March  10th,  1862),  the  Oreto  (Florida)  was 
ready  to  take  the  sea.  She  had  made  a  satisfactory  trial 
trip,  and  was  already  provisioned  for  her  outward  voyage. 
I  made  a  thorough  investigation,  and  satisfied  myself 
that  not  a  single  article  contraband  of  war  was  on  board 
the  ship — not  a  weapon,  not  an  appliance  for  mounting 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  153 

a  gun.  In  this  condition  I  was  advised  that  according 
to  the  Municipal  Law  of  Great  Britain,  she  was  a  per 
fectly  lawful  article  of  traffic,  that  the  builder  could 
deliver  her,  and  I  could  pay  for  and  receive  her,  without 
infringing  any  statute,  or  transgressing  any  requirement 
of  commercial  propriety. 

Captain  James  Alexander  Duguid,  a  duly  certificated 
master  mariner,  was  appointed  to  command  the  ship, 
and  the  crew  and  engineer's  staff  were  engaged  in  strict 
conformity  with  the  conditions  of  the  Merchant  Shipping 
Act,  signing  articles  for  a  voyage  from  Liverpool  to 
Palermo,  and  thence,  if  required,  to  a  port  or  ports  in 
the  Mediterranean  Sea,  or  the  West  Indies,  and  back  to 
a  port  of  discharge  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  voyage 
not  to  exceed  six  months.  Not  a  single  officer  or  man 
was  enlisted  for  the  service  of  the  Confederate  States, 
nor  was  a  hint  thrown  out  to  the  crew  that  the  voyage 
would  be  other  than  the  route  specified  in  the  shipping 
articles.  Captain  Duguid  and  the  chief  engineer  were 
informed  that  the  ship  would  go  first  of  all  to  Nassau, 
but  they  knew  perfectly  well  that  a  shipowner  has  the 
right  to  vary  the  order  of  visit  to  the  ports  specified  in 
the  shipping  articles,  and  that  it  is  not  unusual  to  exer 
cise  that  privilege  when  his  interests  or  the  special  cir 
cumstances  of  the  voyage  suggest  or  require  a  variation 
within  the  general  limits  of  the  original  engagement. 
Neither  the  captain  nor  the  engineer  were,  however,  em 
ployed,  nor  in  any  way  pledged  to  depart  from  the 
general  conditions  set  out  in  the  articles,  and  they  did 
not  at  any  future  time  enter  the  service  of  the  Con 
federate  States,  so  far  as  I  know. 

In  '  The  Case  of  the  United  States/  laid  before  the 
Tribunal  of  Arbitration  at  Geneva,  it  is  affirmed,  on  the 
authority  of  a  despatch  from  the  United  States  Consul 


154  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

at  Liverpool,  to  Mr.  Seward,  that  the  Ore  to  '  took  her 
gun-carriages  on  board  at  Liverpool/  and  it  is  further 
more  stated  that  she  sailed  with  '  a  crew  of  fifty-two  men 
and  some  guns/*  In  refutation  of  the  foregoing,  the  evi 
dence  of  the  Customs  officers  at  Liverpool  was  that  they 
kept  '  watch  on  the  proceedings  of  the  vessel  Oreto  from 
the  time  she  left  the  Toxteth  Dock,  on  the  4th  of  March 
last  (1862),  till  the  day  she  sailed,  the  22nd  of  the 
same  month.  ...  we  did  not  see  at  any  time  any  arms, 
or  warlike  ammunition  of  any  kind,  taken  on  board,  and 
we  are  perfectly  satisfied  that  none  such  was  taken  on 
board  during  her  stay  in  the  river.' 

One  of  the  statements  was  very  specific. 

'  I  am  one  of  the  Surveyors  of  Customs  at  this  port 
(Liverpool).  Pursuant  to  instructions  I  received  from 
the  Collector  on  the  21st  February  in  the  present  year 
(1862),  and  at  subsequent  dates,  I  visited  the  steamer 
Oreto  at  various  times,  when  she  was  being  fitted  out  in 
the  dock,  close  to  the  yard  of  Messrs.  Miller  and  Sons, 
the  builders  of  the  vessel.  I  continued  this  inspection 
from  time  to  time  until  she  left  the  dock,  and  I  am  cer 
tain  that  when  she  left  the  river  she  had  no  warlike 
stores  of  any  kind  whatever  on  board.  After  she  went 
into  the  river  she  was  constantly  watched  by  the  board 
ing  officers,  who  were  directed  to  report  to  me  whenever 
any  goods  were  taken  on  board  ;  but,  in  reply  to  my 
frequent  inquiries,  they  stated  nothing  was  put  in  the 
ship  but  coals. 

'  (Signed)         EDWARD  MORGAN, 

'  Surveyor.' 

The  foregoing  and  other  statements  of  like  import  will 
be  found  in  the  evidence  laid  before  the  Tribunal  of 

*  '  United  States  Case,'  p.  65. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  155 

Arbitration  at  Geneva.*  They  are  confirmatory  of  my 
own  declarations  to  the  same  effect,  and  the  fact  is 
therefore  established  beyond  dispute  that  the  Oreto  left 
the  Mersey  wholly  unarmed,  and  without  any  portion  of 
her  outfit  which  could  render  her  liable  to  seizure  or 
detention  for  violation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act. 
As  she  lay  in  the  river  off  the  Egremont  Ferry,  she 
looked  a  comely  craft,  as  much  within  her  legal  rights 
as  a  hundred  cases  of  Birmingham  rifles,  or  as  many 
tons  of  gunpowder,  about  to  start  for  New  York  in  any 
other  ship.  This  is  not  the  rash  assertion  of  an  in 
terested  party,  pronounced  in  a  spirit  of  bravado,  or  by 
way  of  a  retort  ;  it  is  founded  upon  the  decision  of  one 
of  Jfche  highest  Courts  in  the  realm,  as  will  be  shown  in 
due  course. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  orders  of  the  Navy 
Department,  dated  November  30th,  1861,  directed  me  to 
take  personal  command  of  the  first  ship  completed  in 
England,  and  to  proceed  to  cruise  against  the  enemy's 
commerce.  But  other  duties  assigned  to  me  in  Europe 
were  largely  increased  before  my  departure  from  the 
Confederate  States,  and  I  was  also  instructed  to  examine 
into  the  subject  of  ironclads,  and  report  whether  vessels 
of  that  class  could  be  built  in  England  or  France.  When 
I  called  the  attention  of  the  Navy  Department  to  the  fact 
that  the  first  ship  would  probably  be  ready  for  sea  by 
the  time  I  could  reach  England  (I  have  already  men 
tioned  that  the  original  orders  were  modified  to  suit  the 
new  conditions),  I  was  directed  to  set  in  train  the 
general  business  of  the  Navy  Department  in  Europe, 
and  to  take  command  of  the  second  ship  (the  Alabama}. 

It  was  not  anticipated  that  this  change  would  occa 
sion  any  perplexity,  because  the  Nashville  (Captain  R. 

*  See  'British  Case/  p.  58,  etc. 
VOL.    L*  10 


156  .      THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

B.  Pegram)  was  supposed  to  be  in  England  at  that 
time,  and  thus  a  commander,  with  a  complete  staff  of 
officers,  could  be  provided  for  the  Oreto  with  little  or  no 
trouble.  The  two  vessels  could  be  cleared  for  an 
appointed  rendezvous,  and  the  transfer  easily  and  safely 
effected.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  informed  me  that 
he  had  written  Captain  Pegram  to  order  such  officers 
to  the  Oreto  as  I  might  require,  and  that  officer  would 
have  been  only  too  happy  to  find  that  under  the  changed 
circumstances  he  would  have  the  opportunity  to  com 
mand  the  Oreto  himself.  Unhappily,  the  instructions 
did  not  reach  Captain  Pegram,  and  when  I  arrived  in 
Liverpool  I  learned  with  regret  that  he  had  sailed  for 
a  Confederate  port,  and  was  far  beyond  reach.  The 
situation  was  perplexing.  The  ship  was  an  object  of 
suspicion  and  disquietude  to  the  United  States  Minister, 
who  was  pressing  her  Majesty's  Government  to  detain 
her,  and  his  importunities  might  prevail.  No  inquiries 
could  discover  that  she  was  thus  far  in  default — of  this 
I  felt  assured  ;  but  still,  the  Confederate  Government 
had  no  acknowledged  advocate,  and  the  Government 
might  '  strain  the  law/  as  the  Attorney- General  ad 
mitted  they  did  at  a  later  period. 

It  was  imperative  to  send  the  ship  away.  Lieutenant 
(afterwards  Commander)  J.  N.  Maffitt,  had  been  sent  to 
Nassau  on  special  duty,  and  I  had  reason  to  believe  he 
was  there  at  that  time.  I  knew  Maffitt  well.  He 
was  a  man  of  great  natural  resources  —  self-reliant, 
and  fearless  of  responsibility.  I  determined  to  de 
spatch  the  ship  to  him  at  once,  and  I  ordered  Low 
to  go  in  her.  The  Oreto  sailed  from  Liverpool  on 
the  22nd  of  March,  and  Mr.  Low's  instructions  were  as 
follows  : — 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  157 

<  Liverpool,  2lst  March,  1862. 
'SIR, 

'  You  will  take  passage  in  the  steam  vessel* 
Florida,  now  about  to  sail  for  the  Bahamas.  This 
vessel,  for  reasons  already  explained  to  you,  is  sent  out 
under  the  British  flag,  and  in  command  of  an  English 
captain,  and  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  nothing 
shall  be  done  to  compromise  her  character  as  a  neutral 
vessel  until  she  is  safely  delivered  to  an  officer  of  the 
Confederate  navy,  or  some  agent  especially  appointed 
by  the  Confederate  Navy  Department.  You  are  hereby 
charged  with  the  care  of  all  public  property  on  board,  a 
duplicate  list  of  which  is  herewith  furnished  you,  and 
the  captain  has  been  instructed  after  arrival  at  the  first 
port  of  destination  to  be  governed  by  your  orders  as  to  the 
movements  and  disposal  of  the  ship.  As  soon  as  you 
arrive  at  the  Bahamas,  you  will  communicate  with  Cap 
tain  J.  N.  Maffitt,  Confederate  States  navy,  whom  you 
will  hear  of  through  Messrs.  Adderley  and  Co.,  of 
Nassau,  and  you  will  forward  the  accompanying  des 
patch  to  the  Hon.  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  reporting  also 
your  arrival  to  him  in  writing.  If  Captain  Maffitt  or 
any  other  commissioned  officer  of  the  Confederate  States 
navy  is  at  Nassau,  give  him  all  the  information  you 
have  in  reference  to  the  ship,  hand  him  the  invoice  of 
stores,  with  the  enclosed  letter  addressed  to  Captain 
Maffitt,  and  make  the  best  of  your  way  back  to  this 
country  as  quickly  as  possible,  as  I  have  duties  of  great 
importance  for  you  here.  Should  you  not  find  Captain 

*  The  Florida's  dockyard  name  was  Oreto  ;  the  name  first  assigned 
to  her  by  the  Navy  Department  was  Manasas,  by  which  she  is  men 
tioned  in  some  of  the  correspondence,  but  to  avoid  confusion,  or  fre 
quent  explanation,  she  will  hereafter  be  mentioned  in  this  narrative 
as  the  Florida. 


158  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Maffitt  in  Nassau,  put  yourself  in  communication  through 
Mr.  Adderley  with  Major  Charles  J.  Helm  or  Mr.  Louis 
Heyleger,  one  of  whom  will  doubtless  be  in  Nassau. 
Consult  with  those  gentlemen  as  to  the  propriety  of 
keeping  the  ship  in  Nassau,  and  remain  with  her  until 
you  hear  from  the  Navy  Department.  You  must  be 
careful  to  appear  always  as  a  private  gentleman  travelling 
on  his  own  affairs,  and  let  your  intercourse  with  all 
persons  known  to  be  connected  with  the  Confederate 
Government  be  very  guarded  and  cautious.  With  the 
gentlemen  mentioned  above,  you  can  of  course  speak 
freely,  but  let  your  interviews  be  private,  so  as  to  escape 
notice  as  much  as  possible. 

4  It  is  impossible  to  give  you  instructions  to  cover 
every  emergency.  I  have  had  experience  of  your  discretion 
and  judgment,  and  must  rely  upon  them  now.     You 
will   be   furnished   with   money  to  pay  your  personal 
expenses,  and  to  meet  any  small  demands  against  the 
ship.     As  the  Florida  has  an  extra  quantity  of  coal  on 
board,  and  the  captain  has  been  ordered  to  make  the 
passage  mostly  under  canvas,  it  is  presumed  no  material 
outlay  will  be  required  for  some  time.     Should  there  be 
absolute   need   of  additional   funds,  you  will  apply  to 
Messrs.  Adderley  and  Co.,   or  to  either   of  the  afore 
mentioned  gentlemen,  pledging  the  Navy  Department, 
through  me,  for  the  amount.     You  will,  however,  under 
all   circumstances,    practise   the    most    rigid   economy. 
You  will  keep  a  careful  memorandum  of  the  ship's  per 
formances,   under  steam  and   sail,  noting  her  steering, 
working,  stability,  and  all  particulars  of  the  speed  under 
different  circumstances,  and  the  degree  of  pitching  and 
rolling  under  various  conditions  of  sea  and  weather. 
Furnish  information  on  these  points  to  the  officer  who 
may  relieve  you,  and  keep  a  copy  for  me. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  159 

'  Among  the  papers  are  drawings  to  show  how  the 
sweeps  and  traverses  for  the  pivot  guns  are  to  be  put 
down.  These,  with  the  guns  and  all  necessary  equip 
ments,  are  on  board  the  steamship  Bahama,  now  about 
to  sail  for  Nassau.  If  the  officer  who  will  take  charge 
on  the  part  of  the  Navy  Department  needs  your  services 
for  a  short  time,  you  are  at  liberty  to  remain  with  him, 
but  unless  otherwise  directed  by  the  Hon.  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  himself,  after  he  has  received  the  enclosed 
letter,  you  will  return  to  England  at  latest  by  the  first 
day  of  June,  as  your  services  will  then  be  indispensable 
to  me. 

'  Wishing  you  a  safe  and  speedy  passage,  and  a  satis 
factory  consummation  of  the  purposes  of  your  voyage, 

'  I  am,  etc., 
4  (Signed)         JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 

*  Master  John  Low, 

'  Confederate  States  Navy.' 


The  following  letters  were  given  to  Mr.  Low,  along 
with  his  instructions,  to  be  delivered  to  Captain  Maffitt, 
and  to  be  forwarded  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  from 
Nassau  : — 

'Liverpool,  21  st  March,  1862. 
1  SIR — 

1  Day  after  to-morrow  I  despatch  for  Nassau  a 
gun- vessel,  built  in  England  under  contract  with  me  for 
the  Confederate  navy.  In  all  sailing  and  steaming 
equipment  she  is  very  complete,  but  I  have  been  forced  to 
dispense  with  all  outfit  suited  to  her  true  character.  It 
has  been  with  much  difficulty,  and  only  by  the  most 
cautious  management,  that  she  has  escaped  seizure  or 


160  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

indefinite  detention  here,  and  I  send  her  as  she  is,  the 
first  regularly  built  war-vessel  for  our  navy,  to  your 
care.  Mr.  Low,  Master,  Confederate  States  navy,  goes 
in  her  to  take  charge  of  the  public  property  on  board, 
and  to  place  her  in  the  hands  of  any  Confederate  officer 
who  may  be  in  the  West  Indies  on  her  arrival.  I  hope 
it  may  fall  to  your  lot  to  command  her,  for  I  know 
of  no  officer  whose  tact  and  management  could  so 
well  overcome  the  difficulties  of  equipping  her,  or 
who  could  make  better  use  of  her  when  in  cruising 
order. 

4  It  has  been  impossible  to  get  the  regular  battery  in 
tended  for  her  on  board,  but  I  have  sent  out  four  7 -inch 
rifled  guns,  with  all  necessary  equipments  in  the  steamship 
Bahama,  bound  to  Nassau,  and  Mr.  Low  will  give  you 
all  particulars  as  to  her  probable  time  of  arrival,  and  will 
also  hand  you  a  list  of  everything  on  board  the  gun- 
vessel,  as  well  as  an  invoice  of  the  shipment  by  the 
Bahama.  Another  ship  will  be  ready  in  about  two 
months,  and  I  will  take  the  sea  in  her  myself  by  some 
means  or  other,  although  I  perceive  many  difficulties 
looming  in  the  future. 

1  The  country  seems  to  be  hard  pressed,  but  I  hope  no 
one  at  home  despairs  of  the  final  result.  .  Two  small 
ships  can  do  but  little  in  the  way  of  materially  turning 
the  tide  of  war,  but  we  can  do  something  to  illustrate 
the  spirit  and  energy  of  our  people,  and  if  we  can 
arrange  to  meet,  may  yet  repay  upon  the  enemy  some  of 
the  injuries  his  vastly  superior  force  alone  has  enabled 
him  to  inflict  upon  the  States  of  the  Confederacy.  Write 
me  as  soon  as  you  receive  this,  and  give  me  full  infor 
mation  of  the  state  of  affairs  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Atlantic,  and  if  you  get  to  sea  in  the  little  cruiser  I  send 
out,  appoint  a  rendezvous.  I  am  too  much  pressed  for 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  161 

time,  and  have  too  lately  arrived,  to  write  more  fully 
now,  but  will  communicate  with  you  again  soon. 

'  I  am,  etc., 
'  (Signed)         JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 

*  Captain  J.  N.  Maffitt, 

( Confederate  States  Navy. ' 

'Liverpool,  March  21,  1862. 

<  SIR,— 

'  On  the  14th  inst.,  in  a  necessarily  short  letter, 
I  informed  you  of  the  safe  arrival  of  myself  and  party 
in  England,  and  will  now  report  more  in  detail  upon  the 

matters  which  relate  to  my  especial  duties  here 

Although  arrangements  have  been  made  by  which  cor 
respondence  with  the  Confederate  States  can  be  carried 
on  with  more  freedom  than  formerly,  yet  as  there  is 
always  a  probability  of  letters  going  astray,  such  as  treat 
of  public  affairs  must  obviously  be  worded  with  caution, 
and  names  of  persons  and  places  be  suppressed 

'  The  M.  (Florida)  is  ready  for  sea,  with  crew,  pro 
visions,  and  all  boatswains',  carpenters',  and  sailmakers' 
stores  necessary  for  several  months  on  board,  and  I 
will  despatch  her  on  the  day  after  to-morrow  to  a  West 
Indian  port,  the  exact  locality  of  which  will  be  reported 
to  you  in  a  subsequent  letter,  as  well  as  from  the  ship  as 
soon  after  her  arrival  as  possible.  It  is  hoped  that  she 
will  be  able  to  communicate  immediately  upon  arrival 
with  the  officer  you  have  already  detailed  for  duty  be 
tween  the  southern  coast  and  the  Bahamas,  and  for  this 
purpose  I  will  send  in  her  the  very  trusty  and  prudent 
officer  you  appointed  especially  to  assist  me  in  such 
affairs  as  require  me  to  keep  in  the  background. 

1  It  has  been  found  impossible  to  place  any  munitions  of 
war  on  board  the  M.  She  has  been  twice  inspected  by 

VOL.  i.  11 


162  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  TEE 

the  Custom  House  authorities,  in  compliance  with 
specific  orders  from  the  Foreign  Office,  to  see  that 
nothing  contraband  of  war  has  been  placed  in  her,  and 
notice  has  been  given  that  any  attempt  to  smuggle  such 
articles  on  board  would  at  once  be  followed  by  her 
seizure.  The  hammock -nettings,  ports,  and  general 
appearance  of  the  ship  sufficiently  indicate  the  ultimate 
object  of  her  construction,  but  there  is  nothing  to  com 
promise  the  pacific  character  she  must  necessarily  assume 
for  this  voyage.  Eegistered  as  an  English  ship,  in  the 
name  of  an  Englishman,  commanded  by  an  Englishman, 
with  a  regular  official  number,  and  her  tonnage  marked 
upon  the  combings  of  the  main-hatch,  under  the  direction 
of  the  Board  of  Trade,  she  seems  to  be  perfectly  secure 
against  capture,  or  even  interference,  until  an  attempt  is 
made  to  arm  her,  or  to  change  the  flag,  and  this,  it 
appears  to  me  now,  can  only  be  effected  at  sea.  The 
late  unseemly  conduct  of  the  captain  of  the  Federal  ship 
Tuscarora  has  caused  the  British  Admiralty  to  issue 
very  stringent  orders  in  reference  to  the  treatment  of 
United  States  and  Confederate  vessels  in  English  ports, 
whether  home  or  colonial.' 

Here  follow  specifications  of  the  Admiralty  Orders, 
which  have  been  already  mentioned  in  a  previous 
chapter,  and  some  details  in  reference  to  the  shipment 
per  steamship  Bahama,  sending  out  officers,  pay  of 
crews  for  the  cruising  ships,  etc. 

'  I  am,  etc., 

'  (Signed)         JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 
'  Hon.  S.  K.  Mallory, 

'  Secretary  of  the  Navy.' 

The  Florida  arrived  at  Nassau  on  the  28th  of  April, 
and  the  subjoined  letter  is  Mr.  Low's  report : 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  163 

'Nassau,  1st  May,  1862. 

'  SIR,— 

4 1  have  the  honour  to  report  to  you  the  safe 
arrival  at  this  port  of  the  Confederate  States  steamer 
Florida,  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  of  April,  after  a 
passage  of  thirty- seven  days,  which,  in  compliance  with 
your  instructions,  has  been  made  principally  under 
canvas.  We  wished  to  be  as  economical  as  possible  in 
regard  to  the  consumption  of  fuel,  but  were  rather  un 
fortunate  in  having  light  winds  and  frequent  calms,  more 
especially  in  the  Trades.  During  the  latter  we  thought 
it  prudent  to  steam,  thinking  that  if  we  made  too  long 
a  passage  the  steamship  Bahama  would  be  here  some 
time  before  us.  The  amount  of  coal,  as  you  are  aware, 
was  one  hundred  and  seventy -five  tons,  including  Welsh 
and  English.  Our  consumption  of  the  former  was 
eighteen  tqns  per  day,  and  of  the  latter  twenty-four. 
We  have  now  on  board  good  two  days'  coal,  so  I  trust 
you  will  find,  after  taking  into  consideration  the  weather, 
and  our  reasons  for  not  making  a  long  passage,  that  we 
have  been  as  economical  as  possible,  not  only  as  regards 
fuel,  but  with  everything  on  board. 

*  I  took  particular  notice  of  the  vessel  as  regards  her 
speed  under  steam  and  canvas,  and  am  happy  to  report 
most  favourably  of  her  in  all  respects.  Our  average 
steaming  is  nine  knots  and  a  half ;  her  sailing  averages, 
with  the  wind  abeam  or  quarterly,  so  that  the  fore  and 
aft  canvas  will  draw,  twelve  knots.  The  above  is  the 
average ;  I  now  give  you  what  I  have  seen  her  do  during 
the  passage.  Under  steam,  with  smooth  water,  ten  and 
a  half  knots,  and  under  canvas  alone,  with  quartering 
wind,  so  that  we  could  carry  main  top -gallant  studding- 
sail,  thirteen  and  a  half  good. 

'As   regards    stability,   I   do   not   think   there   is   a 

11—2 


164       %  TEE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

stronger  vessel  of  her  class  afloat ;  when  pitching,  you 
could  not  see  her  work  in  the  least,  not  so  much  as  to 
crack  the  pitch  in  the  waterway  planks,  where  I  believe 
a  vessel  pitching  is  as  likely  to  show  weakness  as  any 
where  else. 

c  I  am,  etc., 

'(Signed)         JOHX  Low. 
*  Commander  J.  D.  Bulloch.' 

In  the  concluding  portion  of  the  above  letter,  Mr. 
Low  reported  that  Captain  Maffitt  was  not  at  Nassau 
when  he  arrived,  but  was  expected  shortly,  and  by  the 
advice  of  Mr.  Heyleger  he  determined  to  keep  the  ship 
there,  but  moved  her  to  '  Cochrane's '  or  the  c  New 
Anchorage/  about  six  miles  from  the  town,  where  there 
was  deeper  water,  and  where  the  ship  would  be  less  con 
spicuous.  I  received  several  reports  from  Mr.  Low 
while  he  was  detained  at  Nassau,  and  the  subjoined 
extract  from  one  of  them  will  be  interesting  as  evidence 
of  the  rigorous  l  blockade '  which  the  United  States 
cruisers  had  established  over  the  British  Bahama 
channels,  even  at  that  early  date : — 

1  The  steamer  Stettin  arrived  here  on  the  30th  of  April 
from  Falmouth.  A  short  distance  off  the  island  she 
was  chased  and  fired  at  several  times  by  a  United  States 
gunboat,  but  the  Stettin  being  a  faster  vessel,  she  ran 
away  from  her.  The  gunboat  fired  twelve  shot  and 
shell  at  the  Stettin — several,  as  the  passengers  inform  me, 
came  very  near.  During  the  firing  the  Stettin  had  the 
English  ensign  flying,  but  it  appears  they  have  no 
respect  for  that.7 

On  the  13th  of  May  Low  had  the  happiness  to  advise 
me  of  Maifitt's  arrival,  and  that  he  had  taken  charge  of 
the  Florida ;  he  reported  that  although  everything  had 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  165 

been  kept  as  quiet  as  possible,  yet  there  had  been  many 
surmises  in  reference  to  the  movements  of  the  ship,  and 
he  feared  there  would  be  trouble  if  she  was  detained 
much  longer  at  Nassau.  Fearing  this  myself,  I  had 
advised  that  she  should  be  run  into  a  Confederate  port 
at  once,  if  there  seemed  likely  to  be  any  difficulty,  and 
there  equipped,  and  this  was  eventually  done;  but 
Maffitt,  on  the  spot,  was  encouraged  to  hope  that  he 
might  get  her  guns  shipped  to  some  neighbouring  Cay 
or  some  point  on  the  banks,  and  there  complete  the 
equipment  without  the  delay  and  risk  of  running  the 
blockade. 

I  never  permit  myself  to  criticize  the  action  of  an 
intelligent  energetic  officer  when  he  is  present  on  the 
scene  and  I  am  not.  Throughout  all  the  trying  diffi 
culties  Maffitt  showed  great  patience,  astonishing  en 
durance,  and  unflinching  pluck.  He  wrote  me  a  number 
of  letters  about  the  troubles  and  delays,  but  the  details 
of  the  seizure  of  the  ship  and  the  proceedings  against  her 
in  the  Vice- Admiralty  Court  at  Nassau  are  fully  reported 
in  the  proceedings  before  the  Tribunal  of  Arbitration 
at  Geneva,  and  need  not  be  repeated  here.  A  short 
summary  will  suffice. 

The  United  States  Consul  at  Nassau  had  his  sus 
picions  aroused  very  shortly  after  the  arrival  of  the 
Florida,  and  began  at  once  to  press  the  authorities  to 
examine  and  then  to  detain  her.  She  was  several  times 
inspected  by  officers  of  the  Koyal  Navy,  who  reported, 
what  was  quite  manifest,  that  she  was  in  all  respects 
suited  for  the  purposes  of  a  vessel-of-war,  but  that  she 
was  not  armed,  and  had  no  warlike  stores  on  board. 
On  the  15th  of  June  some  of  the  crew  of  the  Florida 
(she  was  still  called  Oreto)  went  011  board  of  her 
Majesty's  ship  Greyhound,  and  stated  to  Commander 


166  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Hinckley  that  they  had  left  the  Oreto  because  they  were 
not  able  to  ascertain  her  destination,  and  that  she  was 
endeavouring  to  ship  another  crew.  Thereupon  Com 
mander  Hinckley  seized  the  vessel,  but  on  the  morning 
of  the  17th  she  was  released,  the  Attorney -General  being 
of  the  opinion  that  there  was  not  evidence  sufficient  to 
justify  a  seizure.  Notwithstanding  this  opinion,  how 
ever,  she  was  again  seized  on  the  same  day  (June  17th) 
by  orders  of  the  Governor,  and  proceedings  were  forth 
with  instituted  against  her  in  the  Vice-Admiralty  Court 
of  the  colony  for  violation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment 
Act.  Many  witnesses  were  examined,  and  the  trial  was 
continued  until  August  2nd,  when  the  judge  pronounced 
judgment.  After  reviewing  the  evidence,  he  declared  it 
to  be  insufficient,  and  made  a  decree  for  the  restoration 
of  the  vessel  '  to  the  master  claiming  on  behalf  of  her 
alleged  owner.' 

Under  date  of  August  1st,  1862,  Maffitt  wrote  me 
from  Nassau :  '  The  arguments  (in  re  Oreto}  were 
brought  to  a  close  last  evening,  and  the  judge  reads  in 
court  to-morrow  his  decree.  We  have  a  clear  case,  but 
if  the  decision  is  favourable  to  us,  I  fear  the  Governor 
will  order  an  appeal.  Notwithstanding  all  I  say,  the 
0.  may  be  released  ;  in  that  event,  six  hours  will  not 
find  her  here.' 

Having  been  released  by  the  decree  of  the  Vice- 
Admiralty  Court,  Maffitt,  acting  always  through  the 
consignees  of  the  ship,  cleared  the  Florida  outward  as  a 
vessel  in  ballast  for  St.  John's,  New  Brunswick,  and 
went  out  of  the  harbour  to  a  position  near  Hog  Island, 
to  try  the  machinery  and  to  refit.  The  ship  had  been 
much  neglected  while  under  seizure,  and  many  articles 
had  been  taken  out  of  her  which  could  not  be  recovered. 
At  this  time  vessels  were  loading  daily  at  Nassau  for 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  167 

the  purpose  of  running  the  blockade.  The  schooner 
Prince  Alfred  was  engaged  by  the  consignees  of  the 
steamship  Bahama,  and  was  loaded  with  the  armament 
and  other  stores  intended  for  the  Florida,  but  unfortu 
nately  Maffitt  was  not  able  to  personally  supervise  the 
transhipment,  and  many  essential  articles  were  over 
looked. 

This  was  one  of  the  great  difficulties  the  Confederates 
had  to  encounter  during  the  whole  war.  Agents  of  the 
United  States  Government  could  ship  war  material  of 
every  description  without  disguise  or  the  fear  of  inter 
ference.  There  were  no  Confederate  Consuls  to  make 
up  and  forward  affidavits  affirming  that  the  vessels  thus 
loading  were  intended  to  be  armed  as  cruisers,  and  the 
statement  that  many  vessels  were  loaded  in  British  ports 
with  rifles,  cannon,  ammunition,  and  military  equip 
ments  for  the  United  States,  expressly  for  use  in  the 
war  against  the  Confederate  States,  requires  no  proof  at 
this  late  date. 

Maffitt' s  open  personal  interference  with  the  Florida 
would  have  resulted  in  further  detention,  probably  in 
another  seizure.  Every  detail  was  necessarily  left  to 
agents,  who  in  this  case  acted  certainly  with  absolute 
good  faith,  but  who  did  not  comprehend  the  full  extent 
of  his  necessities.  About  August  9th  the  Prince  Alfred 
cleared  out  for  St.  John's,  and  proceeded  to  sea  as  if 
with  the  purpose  to  run  the  blockade.  The  Oreto 
(Florida)  being  already  outside  near  Hog  Island,  soon 
followed  her,  and  both  vessels  proceeded  in  company  to 
Green  Cay,  a  small  desert  island  on  the  edge  of  the  great 
Bahama  Bank,  about  sixty  miles  from  Nassau.  The 
United  States  ships  Adirondack  and  Cuyler  were  in  the 
neighbourhood,  and  they  were  informed  of  the  Prince 
Alfred's  movements  and  her  probable  connection  with 


168  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

the  Florida,  as  appears  from  a  despatch  from  the  United 
States  Consul  at  Nassau  to  Mr.  Seward,  dated  August 
12th,*  but  they  either  kept  an  indifferent  look-out  or 
Maffitt  gave  them  the  slip.  At  Green  Cay  the  armament 
and  other  stores  were  transferred  from  the  Prince  Alfred 
to  the  Ore  to,  the  Confederate  flag  was  hoisted  for  the 
first  time,  but  not  until  she  was  quite  clear  of  the  Bank. 
The  ship  was  then  regularly  commissioned,  and  the 
name  was  finally  changed  to  Florida. 

Although  Maffitt  was  now  afloat  in  a  Confederate 
ship-of-war,  he  was  in  no  condition  to  begin  a  cruise. 
The  necessarily  quick  departure  from  Nassau  after  es 
caping  from  the  clutches  of  the  Vice-Admiralty  Court  had 
made  it  impossible  to  engage  a  sufficient  number  of  men 
to  work  the  ship,  far  less  to  fight  a  battery.  He  had, 
moreover,  only  one  officer  of  experience,  Lieutenant  J- 
M.  Stribbling. 

The  work  of  transferring  the  armament  was  very 
laborious.  The  hot  August  sun.  combined  with  night 
exposure  and  general  want  of  physical  comforts,  told 
upon  them  all,  and  the  much-dreaded  yellow  fever,  that 
scourge  of  the  West  Indies,  broke  out  among  the 
men.  There  was  no  surgeon  on  board,  and  the  care 
of  the  sick  was  added  to  Maffitt's  other  responsibilities. 
United  States  cruisers  were  following  him  ;  he  himself 
was  ill ;  it  would  have  been  folly  to  keep  the  sea — 
indeed,  it  was  impossible.  He  succeeded  in  evading  the 
United  States  ships  which  were  blockading  the  Bahama 
channels,  and  finally  found  his  way  to  the  port  of 
Cardenas,  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  where  he  was  kindly 
received  by  the  citizens,  and  the  authorities  made  no 
objection  to  his  obtaining  such  supplies  as  were  needed. 

*  The  letter  is  among  the  documents  laid  before  the  Tribunal  of 
Arbitration  at  Geneva. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  169 

From  Cardenas  Maffitt  wrote  me  the  subjoined  hasty 
note  : — 

*  Cardenas,  August  20,  1862. 
'  MY  DEAR  BULLOCH, 

4  I  took  on  board  at  sea  all  my  battery,  but  many 
things  in  the  haste  and  confusion  were  forgotten,  such 
as  rammers,  sponges,  etc.  Had  but  two  firemen  and 
eleven  men ;  have  run  the  gauntlet  splendidly,  my  Coast 
Survey  experience  being  of  great  service.  Where  I  went 
the  Federal  ships  dared  not  follow,  and  here  I  am,  with 
prospects  of  filling  up  my  crew  and  obtaining  what  is 
necessary.  The  " prize-crew  "  committed  many  acts  of 
robbery,  and  left  the  vessel  in  a  terrible  plight.  ...  I 
hope  to  give  a  good  account  of  myself  soon,  if  I  get  the 
men.  I  write  in  great  haste.  Have  Lieutenant  Strib- 
bling — good  officer  ;  acting-master  Bradford,  acting- 
midshipmen  Bryan,  Floyd,  Sinclair — young  men  of  no 
nautical  experience.  No  doctor,  no  paymaster.  I  have 
now  three  cases  of  yellow  fever ;  have  had  seven.  Am 
doing  well  in  that  line.  You  remember  my  fondness 
for  doctoring  the  crew.  I  was  fortunate  enough  to  avoid 
any  connection  with  the  Oreto  until  the  day  before  we 
gave  the  Yankees  the  slip.  Semmes  was  looked  upon  as 
the  person  ordered  to  command  her,  and  after  he  left, 
that  Stribbling  was  to  take  her  to  him  at  a  rendezvous. 
.  .  .  This  is  written  in  extreme  haste,  to  catch  a  chance 
to  send  it  to  Helm  at  Havana.  Good  luck,  and  a  God's 
blessing. 

4  Yours  affectionately, 

1  (Signed)          J.  K  MAFFITT.' 

In  the  foregoing  letter  Maffitt  complained  bitterly  of 
the  heedless  conduct  of  a  Confederate  officer  to  whose 
indiscreet  and  uncontrollable  looseness  in  conversation 


170  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

he  attributed  the  seizure  of  the  Oreto  and  her  subsequent 
troubles.  It  would  be  as  painful  to  my  own  feelings  as 
to  those  of  Mafiitt  to  mention  any  name  in  such  a  con 
nection,  because  the  loyalty  and  good  intentions  of  the 
person  to  whom  he  alluded  were  beyond  suspicion  ; 
indeed,  it  may  be  fairly  said  that  he  was  probably  un 
conscious  of  his  failings,  and  a  secret  leaked  through  his 
mind  and  found  expression  from  his  lips  just  as  the 
breath  permeating  through  the  lungs  passes  by  its 
natural  channels  to  the  open  air.  There  are  some  men 
who  are  wholly  without  the  faculty  of  concealment,  who 
cannot  disguise  or  suppress  their  knowledge  of  important 
events  which  are  in  course  of  secret  preparation,  who 
have  not  the  patience  to  await  results  and  then  to  take 
their  share  in  the  credit  of  having  contributed  to  success, 
but  who  are  irresistibly  impelled  to  manifest  by  their 
manner  and  speech  that  weighty  concerns  have  been 
confided  to  them,  and  that  the  issues  thereof  are  likely 
to  be  momentous.  Many  carefully  laid  schemes  were 
frustrated  during  the  late  war  by  lack  of  prudence  and 
for  want  of  self-control  on  the  part  of  men  who  were 
devoted  to  the  South,  and  from  whom  nothing  to  its 
injury  could  have  been  wrung  by  violence. 

From  Cardenas  Mafiitt  sent  Lieutenant  Stribbling  to 
Havana,  to  communicate  with  Major  Charles  J.  Helm, 
who  was  the  Confederate  agent  at  that  place,  and  to  see 
what  could  be  done  there  in  the  way  of  engaging  men. 
In  three  or  four  days  Stribbling  returned  with  twelve 
men,  and  on  the  28th  of  August  Major  Helm  telegraphed 
that  the  Captain-General  desired  that  the  Florida  would 
come  round  to  Havana.  On  the  30th  Mafiitt  got  under 
weigh  and  proceeded  to  Havana,  where  he  arrived  on  the 
31st,  but  finding  the  restrictions  so  severe  that  it  was 
impossible  for  him  either  to  increase  his  crew  or  to  make 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  171 

good  his  other  deficiencies,  he  resolved  to  run  the  ship 
into  Mobile. 

While  the  Florida  was  at  Cardenas  Maffitt  himself  was 
forced  to  succumb  to  the  fever,  which  had  already  more 
than  decimated  his  small  crew.  His  strong  constitution, 
and  the  hourly  demand  upon  all  his  faculties,  had  kept 
him  up  until  the  ship  was  safe,  but  with  the  rest  and 
relief  from  incessant  care  there  came  a  reaction,  and  the 
fever  took  advantage  of  his  relaxed  energies  and  made  a 
well-nigh  fatal  attack.  Dr.  Gilliard,  a  surgeon  in  the 
Spanish  navy,  kindly  volunteered  his  services,  and 
Maffitt  probably  owes  his  life,  partly  at  least,  to  the 
skill  and  benevolent  efforts  of  that  philanthropic  gentle 
man. 

Dr.  Bennett,  of  Georgia  (I  wish  I  knew  his  Christian 
name),  was  at  that  time  in  Cuba.  He  heard  of  the 
Florida!  s  helpless  condition,  volunteered  his  services  as 
surgeon  of  the  ship,  and  joined  her,  thus  facing  all  the 
perils  of  her  hapless  condition,  with  no  visible  motive, 
except  the  wish  to  be  helpful  to  those  in  distress,  and 
no  expectation  of  reward  except  the  '  answer  of  a  good 
conscience/ 

The  object  of  the  Captain -General  in  requesting 
Major  Helm  to  get  the  Florida  away  from  Cardenas,  and 
to  induce  Maffitt  to  bring  her  to  Havana,  is  not  fully 
apparent.  He  may  have  thought  that  she  could  be 
better  protected  from  violence  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  ships  at  the  latter  than  at  the  former  port  ;  or  he 
may  have  wished  to  have  her  more  completely  under 
his  own  eye,  and  where  he  could  with  more  certainty 
prevent  her  obtaining  any  supplies  or  reinforcement  of 
her  crew  which  would  constitute  a  violation  of  Spanish 
neutrality. 

The  stringent  orders  Maffitt  found  in  force  on  his 


172  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

arrival  at  Havana  suggest  that  the  latter  object  was  the 
reason  ;  and  finding  that  he  could  neither  refit  nor 
obtain  men  at  Havana,  he  promptly  determined  to  run 
into  Mobile.  On  the  afternoon  of  September  1st,  the 
Florida  was  clear  of  the  Moro  Castle,  and  was  steering 
boldly  across  the  Gulf,  which  was  then  the  highway  for 
United  States  transports  she  had  not  the  power  to 
attack,  and  which  was  swarming  with  United  States 
cruisers  she  was  helpless  to  resist. 

At  2  p.m.  on  the  4th  the  lighthouse  on  Sand 
Island,  and  then  Fort  Morgan,  at  the  entrance  to  Mobile 
Bay,  were  made  ;  but  between  the  sheltering  port  and 
the  devoted  little  craft  lay  three  of  the  enemy's  war 
ships.  Maffitt  had  no  purpose  to  retire  and  draw  off 
the  blockaders,  and  then  endeavour  to  double  and  get  in 
shore  of  them.  His  determination  from  the  first  was 
to  dash  straight  in  whenever  he  made  the  land.  But  he 
hoped  to  get  fairly  among  them,  or  even  a  little  beyond, 
before  they  suspected  his  true  character  or  purpose. 
With  this  object  in  view,  he  hoisted  the  British  ensign 
and  pennant,  and  stood  on  directly  for  the  blockading 
squadron. 

Commander  Preble  was  the  senior  officer  of  the 
blockading  force,  and  he  placed  his  ship,  the  Oneida, 
directly  in  the  Florida 's  course,  the  other  ships  taking 
up  good  supporting  positions.  When  the  Florida  got 
close  to  the  Oneida,  Preble  hailed  and  ordered  her  to 
stop.  Maffitt  perceived  that  he  must  either  obey  or 
draw  upon  the  British  flag  an  indignity,  and  he  hauled 
it  down  and  steered  so  direct  for  the  Oneida  that  Preble 
was  forced  to  reverse  his  engines  to  avoid  a  collision. 
There  was  no  longer  any  disguise ;  the  Florida  was 
recognised,  and  Maffitt  pushed  on  past  the  Oncida,  taking 
her  broadside  at  little  more  than  pistol-shot.  There  is, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  173 

so  fur  as  I  know,  no  record  of  such  a  scramble  as 
followed.  The  Florida  stood  steadily  on  for  the  bar, 
receiving  broadside  after  broadside  from  the  three  United 
States  ships.*  She  did  not  even  cast  loose  a  gun,  because 
there  were  no  men  to  fight  them,  and  as  there  was 
nothing  to  distract  the  enemy's  fire,  it  is  marvellous 
they  did  not  literally  blow  her  to  pieces.  For  nearly 
two  hours  the  Florida  stood  this  pelting  feu  (Fenfer, 
drawing  away  little  by  little  from  her  relentless  pursuers, 
and  at  last  the  poor  little  crippled  craft  limped  like  a 
wounded  stag  into  the  friendly  port,  and  anchored  under 
the  protection  of  Fort  Morgan. 

No  shot  or  shell  had  got  among  the  Florida! s 
machinery,  but  she  was  much  cut  up.  The  fore-top 
mast  and  fore-gaff  were  shot  away,  all  the  boats  were 
cut  to  pieces,  the  hammock-nettings  were  nearly  all 
swept  off  on  one  side,  the  main  rigging  was  cut  adrift, 
and  she  was  hulled  in  many  places.  One  11 -inch 
shell  had  passed  clean  through  her  just  above  the  water- 
line,  and  another  had  entered  the  captain's  cabin,  for 
tunately  without  exploding. 

During  this  unparalleled  chase  and  escape,  Maffitt  sat 
most  of  the  time  on  the  quarter-rail,  and  steered  straight 
for  the  bar;  Stribbling  was  cool  and  self-possessed,  and  not 
one  of  the  young  officers  or  men  flinched.  Every  man 
of  true  courage  will  say  that  this  was  a  gallant  deed,  and 
will  feel  a  generous  regret  that  men  of  so  much  fortitude 
should  have  had  no  opportunity  to  show  their  metal 
except  in  the  test  of  passive  endurance. 

It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  history  to  narrate  in 
detail  the  cruises  of  the  several  vessels  which  were  built 

*  Two  of  the  blockaders,  the  Winona  and  the  Rachel,  Seaman  did 
not  get  to  very  close  quarters,  but  still  they  had  a  good  chance  for 
gun  practice  at  the  Florida. 


174  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

or  bought  in  Europe  for  the  Confederate  States.  The 
late  Admiral  Semmes  published  before  his  death  a  full 
account  of  his  adventures  in  the  Sumter  and  Alabama, 
the  journals  of  the  Florida  have  been  also  published, 
and  there  have  been  accounts  more  or  less  complete  of 
the  performances  of  the  other  ships.  I  shall  therefore 
give  mere  summaries  of  their  movements,  limiting  my 
remarks  upon  their  cruising  careers  to  such  incidents  as 
suggest  general  reflections  in  respect  to  maritime  war 
fare,  or  which  have  some  special  bearing  upon  the 
question  of  belligerent  rights  and  practices. 

The  Florida  needed  extensive  repairs  and  almost  a 
new  outfit,  to  make  good  her  losses  and  injury  at 
Nassau,  and  the  terrible  punishment  she  had  received 
from  the  Oneida  and  her  consorts;  but  at  Mobile  there 
was  no  dock,  not  even  a  slip  upon  which  she  could  be 
placed,  and  almost  everything  required  for  outfit  and 
armament  had  to  be  brought  from  a  distance,  the 
ordnance  stores  from  far-away  Richmond. 

It  was  not  until  December  that  all  necessary  work 
was  finished,  and  the  Florida  did  not  get  to  sea  until 
some  time  in  January,  1863.  The  blockading  force  had 
meanwhile  been  largely  increased,  with  the  special  pur 
pose  to  prevent  the  Florida }s  escape,  and  she  had  to  wait 
some  weeks  before  there  was  a  favourable  opportunity. 
The  bold  run  into  Mobile  was  justifiable  only  on  the 
ground  of  its  seeming  necessity.  An  attempt  to  pass 
outward  through  the  blockaders  in  the  same  daring 

manner  would   have   been   reckless   and    unworthy  of 

«/ 

Maintt's  reputation  for  prudence  as  well  as  courage. 
The  opportunity  came  at  last.  One  day,  January  15th, 
1863,  there  were  signs  of  a  '  norther '  and  everything 
was  got  ready  for  a  run.  At  nightfall  the  gale  began. 
There  was  no  sheltering  rain,  but  the  wind  was  almost 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  175 

dead  off -shore,  the  dark-blue  surface  of  the  Gulf  was 
lashed  into  foam,  and  the  spume  of  the  sea  was  flying 
half-mast  high.  These  northers  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
are  spiteful,  but  no  good  well-found  ship  need  fear 
leaving  the  weather- shore  in  one  of  them.  The  blockaders 
were  no  doubt  doing  their  best  to  hold  on  to  the  land, 
for  they  must  have  thought  the  Florida  would  make  the 
attempt  to  escape.  She  did,  and  got  clear,  although  she 
was  seen,  and  chased  nearly  across  to  Havana. 

Maffitt  did  not  remain  long  in  the  confined  waters  of 
the  Gulf,  but  reappeared  at  Nassau,  the  scene  of  his  first 
troubles,  on  the  25th  of  January,  1863,*  where  he 
remained  only  one  day.  From  Nassau  he  cruised  down 
to  the  southward  through  the  West  Indian  Islands, 
touching  at  Barbadoes,  February  24th,  and  Pernambuco, 
in  Brazil,  May  8tn.  At  the  last  named  place  he 
stopped  four  days  to  get  fresh  provisions  and  make  some 
repairs  to  his  engines.  Getting  away  from  Pernambuco, 
May  12th,  he  cruised  for  a  short  time  off  the  coast  of 
Brazil,  and  worked  his  way  up  to  St.  George's,  Bermuda, 
where  he  arrived  July  16th,  1863. 

During  the  Florida's  run  through  the  West  Indies, 
Rear-Admiral  Wilkes,  of  Trent  notoriety,  was  com 
manding  the  United  States  naval  forces  in  those  lati 
tudes,  and  he  seems  to  have  been  looking  especially  after 
Maffitt,  and  to  have  had  some  inkling  of  his  necessities, 
although  not  particularly  well  informed  in  regard  to  his 
whereabouts.  On  the  26th  of  February  Admiral  Wilkes 
wrote  to  his  Government  thus :  c  The  fact  of  the  Florida's 
having  but  a  few  days'  coal  makes  me  anxious  to  have 
our  vessels  off  the  Martinique,  which  is  the  only  island 
at  which  they  can  hope  to  get  any  coal  or  supplies,  the 
English  islands  being  cut  off  under  the  rules  of  her 
*  '  British  Case,'  p.  68. 


176  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Majesty's  Government  for  some  sixty  days  yet,  which 
precludes  the  possibility,  unless  by  chicanery  or  fraud, 
of  the  hope  of  any  coal  or  comfort  there/*  Two 
days  before  the  date  of  Admiral  Wilkes's  letter,  i.e., 
February  24th,  1863,  the  Florida  went  into  Barbadoes, 
and  got  what  coal  she  required  without  practising  either 
4  chicanery '  or  4  fraud,'  but  upon  Captain  Maffitt's  simple 
statement  that  his  fuel  had  been  exhausted  from  stress 
of  weather.  In  the  4  British  Case,  Geneva  Arbitration,' 
p.  68,  it  is  stated  on  the  authority  of  the  Governor  that 
both  the  United  States  ship  San  Jacinto  and  the  Con 
federate  ship  Florida  had  been  permitted  to  obtain  coal 
at  Barbadoes  within  a  less  period  than  three  months 
after  they  had  respectively  coaled  at  another  British 
colonial  port,  the  commander  of  each  vessel  having 
alleged  that  his  supply  of  fuel  had  been  exhausted  by 
stress  of  weather. 

In  the  '  Case  of  the  United  States '  it  is  demonstrated 
by  official  documents  that  the  Governor  of  Barbadoes 
was  mistaken  in  the  supposition  that  the  San  Jacinto 
had  received  a  supply  of  coal  at  a  British  port  within 
three  months ;  but  it  is  not  pretended  that  he  had 
reason  to  doubt  the  fact  at  the  time  of  the  occurrence, 
because  he  mentioned  it  in  a  subsequent  conversation 
with  Admiral  Wilkes,  as  the  precedent  which  he  had 
followed  in  extending  a  like  privilege  to  the  Florida. 
The  Governor  did  not  construe  the  regulations  as 
applicable  to  cases  of  distress,  and  in  his  report  he 
states  that  both  vessels  were  'dealt  with  as  being 
in  distress.'!  The  Florida  was,  however,  only  per 
mitted  to  take  on  board  about  ninety  tons  of  coal,  which 
act  of  grace  nevertheless  offended  Admiral  Wilkes,  and 

*  See  'United  States  Case,  Tribunal  of  Arbitration,'  p.  96. 
t  *  British  Appendix,'  vol.  i.,  p.  92. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  177 

afforded  the  occasion  for  an  indiscreet  and  intemperate 
protest.  It  is  surprising  to  perceive  how  quickly  a 
certain  class  of  the  United  States  naval  officers  adopted 
the  phraseology  of  the  politicians  at  Washington,  and 
soiled  their  reports  and  marred  the  dignity  of  their 
official  correspondence  by  the  use  of  inelegant  and 
opprobrious  epithets  in  describing  the  conduct  of  their 
opponents,  whose  only  oifence  was  that  they  had 
conscientiously,  and  manifestly  to  their  own  injury,  taken 
a  different  view  of  a  great  political  question. 

The  Florida's  short  cruise  in  the  West  Indies  and  on 
the  coast  of  Brazil  caused  much  uneasiness  in  the 
commercial  ports  of  the  United  States.  The  war 
premium  advanced,  and  merchants  hastened  to  register 
their  ships  in  the  names  of  British  subjects,  and  to  put 
them  under  the  British  flag.  The  Alabama  was  also  by 
this  time  at  sea  and  actively  at  work,  as  will  afterwards 
appear,  and  her  operations  added  to  the  panic. 

The  principal  ships  captured  and  destroyed  by  the 
Florida  during  the  cruise  above  mentioned  were  the 
Al  debar  an )  Commonwealth,  General  Berry,  Crown  Point, 
Lapwing,  M.  J.  Colcord,  Southern  Cross,  Oneida,  Star  of 
Peace,  Rienzi,  William  B.  Nash,  Red  Gauntlet  and 
Henrietta.  I  have  before  me,  at  the  moment  of  writing", 

7  o" 

the  ransom  bonds  of  four  other  vessels  which  were 
taken  by  Maffitt  from  their  respective  captains,  it 
appearing  upon  investigation  that  they  were  loaded  on 
account  of  neutrals.  Ship  Sunrise,  $60,000,*  ship  Kate 
Dyer,  $40,000,  ship  F.  B.  Cutting,  $40,000,  schooner 
V.  H.  Hill,  $10,000.  The  Florida  left  Bermuda  July 
25th,  1863,  and  arrived  at  Brest  August  23rd.  On  the 
passage  she  captured  the  American  ships  F.  B.  Cutting 
and  the  Avon,  but  released  the  former. 

*  See  p.  199  for  copy  of  bond. 
VOL.    I.  12 


178  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  TEE 

Besides  the  vessels  above  mentioned  which  Maffitt 
captured  with  the  Florida,  he  captured  the  Clarence  off 
the  coast  of  Brazil,  and  fitted  her  out  as  a  tender,  and 
with  her  destroyed  the  Kate  Stuart,  the  Mary  Alvina, 
the  Mary  Schindler,  and  the  Whistling  Wind.  On  May 
10th,  1863,  he  captured  the  Tacony,  and  finding  her 
better  suited  to  his  purpose  than  the  Clarence,  he  burnt 
the  latter,  and  transferred  her  crew  and  armament  to  the 
Tacony.  In  conjunction  with  this  vessel  he  captured 
the  Ada,  Byzantian,  Elizabeth  Ann,  Goodspeed,  L.  A. 
Macomber,  Marengo,  Ripple,  Rufus  Choate,  and  Umpire. 

On  June  25th,  1863,  he  captured  the  Archer,  trans 
ferred  guns  and  crew  from  Tacony  to  Archer,  and  burned 
the  former,  and  a  few  days  after  the  boats  of  the  Archer 
went  into  the  harbour  of  Portland,  Maine,  and  destroyed 
the  United  States  revenue  cutter  Caleb  Gushing* 

The  Florida's  arrival  at  a  European  port  at  that  time 
was  wholly  unexpected  by  me,  for  I  had  received 
no  communication  from  Captain  Maffitt  since  his  escape 
from  Mobile,  and  had  no  advice  of  his  intended  move 
ments.  Maffitt,  on  his  part,  was  ignorant  where  I  was, 
although  he  knew  that  Liverpool  was  the  most  likely 
place  to  find  me.  Immediately  upon  the  Florida's 
arrival  at  Brest,  Maffitt  reported  to  the  Prefet  Maritime, 
Vice-Admiral  Count  de  Gueyton,  the  necessity  which 
had  compelled  him  to  seek  the  shelter  of  a  French  port; 
and  the  first  reply  of  the  Admiral  was  that  the  ship 
might  receive  coals  and  other  supplies,  and  effect 
necessary  repairs  on  the  same  conditions  as  any  i  merchant 
ship.'  But  the  Florida  needed  a  thorough  refitting. 
On  the  3rd  of  September  Maffitt  sent  an  officer  to 

*  The  officer  who  commanded  the  Flwida's  tenders  and  who 
executed  the  dashing  affair  at  Portland  was  Lieutenant  C.  W.  Read. 
The  whole  number  of  prizes  taken  during  Maffitt's  cruise  was  fifty-five. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  179 

Liverpool  to  see  me  personally,  and  to  report  defects 
and  requirements,  which  were  many  and  important. 
The  officer  brought  me  a  letter  from  Maffitt,  from  which 
the  following  is  ah  extract  : 

4  We  must  dock,  relieve  our  shaft,  which  has  got 
out  of  line,  and  replace  some  of  our  copper.  We  want 
also  a  blower  to  get  steam  with  the  bad  coal  we 
are  often  obliged  to  put  up  with.  While  in  Mobile  we 
did  all  that  could  be  done,  and  that  was  but  precious 
little,  for  we  lay  in  the  middle  of  the  bay,  and  the 
poverty  of  the  city  was  painful  in  the  extreme.  Since 
leaving  Mobile  we  have  been  under  a  constant  pressure, 
without  a  friendly  port  in  which  to  overhaul  or  give 

ordinary  attention  to  the  engines/ 

• 

I  immediately  sent  a  competent  representative  of  the 
builders  of  the  ship  and  engines  to  Brest  to  examine 
the  Florida,  and  to  report  her  condition.  There  was  no 
commercial  dock  at  Brest,  but  after  some  demur  per 
mission  was  given  to  use  a  Government  dock.  The 
Florida  remained  in  dock  five  or  six  weeks,  and  the 
French  authorities,  when  they  became  satisfied  of  her 
real  wants,  permitted  them  to  be  supplied  in  full.  The 
rough  handling  to  which  the  Florida  had  been  sub 
jected  had  told  upon  her  armament  as  well  as  upon  her 
general  equipment.  Permission  was  given  to  land  the 
small  arms  to  be  overhauled  by  a  local  gunsmith,  upon 
a  guarantee  through  the  Customs  authorities  that  they 
would  be  re -shipped  without  any  addition  in  quantity. 
Application  was  made  to  land  some  of  the  gun-carriages 
for  the  same  purpose,  but  this  was  refused.  However, 
two  carriages  and  the  necessary  gear  were  made  at 
Nantes  for  the  pivot  guns,  and  were  delivered  to  the 
ship  off  the  island  of  Belle  Isle,  together  with  some 

12—2 


180  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

fusees  and  other  articles  contraband  of  war,  without  in 
any  Avay  violating  the  neutrality  of  France. 

The  repairs  at  Brest  occupied  several  months,  because 
applications  had  to  be  frequently  made  to  the  authorities 
for  leave  to  do  what  was  necessary  as  the  need  was  dis 
covered  ;  and  the  requests  had  not  only  to  be  considered 
by  the  local  authorities,  but  often  referred  to  Paris.  But 
there  was  difficulty,  embarrassment,  and  delay  from 
circumstances  relating  to  the  personnel  of  the  Florida,  as 
well  as  from  the  wear  and  tear  of  her  hull,  machinery, 
and  armament.  On  the  3rd  of  September  Captain 
Maffitt  informed  me  officially  by  letter  that  he  had  been 
compelled  to  discharge  a  large  number  of  his  men  at 
Brest,  and  had  supplied  each  of  them  with  money  suffi 
cient  to  carry  him  to  Liverpool.  He  said  that  he  had 
informed  the  men  that  they  would  not  be  entitled  to  be 
paid  their  wages  in  full  unless  they  returned  to  the  Con 
federate  States,  but  they  would  be  directed  on  the  subject 
by  me. 

In  writing  an  historical  narrative  it  is  necessary  to 
record  events  which  are  often  not  of  especial  moment  in 
themselves,  but  which  in  their  consequences  cause  diffi 
culties  and  create  obstacles  to  the  achievement  of  pur 
poses  with  which  they  seem  at  first  to  have  no  connection, 
and  they  cannot  therefore  be  omitted. 

It  will  appear  in  a  subsequent  chapter  that  the 
Florida 's  arrival  and  delay  in  Brest,  but  especially  the 
discharge  of  a  portion  of  her  crew  there,  caused  infinite 
embarrassment,  and  contributed  to  the  failure  of  an 
enterprise  which  would  have  been  of  incalculable  ad 
vantage  to  the  Confederate  cause.  Maffitt,  of  course, 
knew  only  of  his  own  necessities,  and  his  duty  was 
therefore  to  do  his  best  under  the  circumstances  in 
which  he  was  placed.  His  ship  required  overhauling, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  181 

and  he  brought  her  to  a  port  at  which  the  defects  could 
be  made  good,  and  from  which  he  could  communicate 
with  the  agent  of  the  Confederate  Navy  Department,  and 
he  did  not  anticipate,  neither  could  he  have  foreseen, 
that  he  would  thus  cause  any  trouble  elsewhere. 

The  discharge  of  the  men  referred  to  above  left  the 
Florida  so  weak-handed  that  she  would  not  have  been 
fit  to  resume  her  cruise,  and  it  was  necessary  to  replace 
them.     Application  was  made  to  the  French  authorities 
for  leave  to  fill  up  the  vacancies.     There  was  at  first 
some   hesitation,  and   the   application   was   referred    to 
Paris.      It    appears   from    the   proceedings    before   the 
Tribunal  of  Arbitration  at  Geneva  that  there  was  a  good 
deal   of    correspondence   on   the    subject   between    Mr. 
Dayton,  the  United    States   Minister,  and    M.  Drouyn 
de  1'Huys,  the   French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  of 
which  at  the  time  we  could  know  nothing.     Mr.  Slidell 
(the   Confederate  Commissioner),  however,  knew  that 
the  matter  had  been  discussed  by  the  Imperial  Cabinet, 
and  after  due  process  of  gestation  the  application  was 
granted.     M.  Drouyn  de  1'Huys  stated  to  Mr.  Dayton 
that  the  Government  had  caused  inquiries  to  be  made? 
and  had  ascertained  that  seventy  or  seventy-five  men 
had  been  discharged  from  the  Florida  at  Brest,  because 
the  period  for  which  they  had  been  shipped  had  expired, 
and  that  the  Government  had  concluded  not  to  prohibit 
'  an  accession  to  the  crew,  inasmuch  as  such  accession 
was  necessary  to  her  navigation.'* 

This,  it  must  be  admitted,  was  a  strange  and  some 
what  unusual  proceeding,  but  we  Confederates  had  no 
conceni  with  the  matter  as  a  diplomatic  controversy,  or 
as  a  question  of  international  law.  The  Florida  wanted 

*  See  'British  Case,' North  America,  No.   1  (1872),  pp.  71,  72. 
Correspondence  of  Mr.  Dayton. 


182  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

a  number  of  seamen,  and  the  only  question  with  Maffitt 
was,  how  to  get  them  without  violating  the  municipal 
laws  of  France,  or  imposing  upon  the  credulity  and 
friendly  consideration  which  he  had  received  from  the 
local  authorities  at  Brest.  It  would  seem  to  be  an  easy 
matter  to  engage  and  get  on  board  seventy  seamen  in  a 
maritime  port,  but  there  was  very  great  difficulty,  and 
much  time  was  consumed  in  accomplishing  that  ap 
parently  simple  purpose.  The  permission  to  replace  the 
discharged  men  did  not  carry  with  it  the  right  to  enlist 
them  for  the  Confederate  service  even  in  France,  and  of 
course  it  gave  not  the  semblance  of  a  right  to  do  so  in 
England.  The  Florida  wanted  English-speaking  sea 
men,  and  these  had  to  be  sought  for  chiefly  across  the 
channel.  The  men  were  engaged  in  small  groups  wher 
ever  they  could  be  found,  and  were  forwarded  to  Calais 
and  other  French  channel  ports,  and  then  taken  by  rail 
to  Brest.  This  was  the  only  possible  arrangement,  and 
it  required  the  employment  of  several  agents,  whose  dis 
cretion  was  not  always  reliable.  Manifestly  the  men 
could  not  be  told  what  they  were  wanted  for  until  they 
got  on  board  the  Florida.  The  mystery  of  the  proceed 
ings  attracted  notice,  the  suspicion  of  several  of  the 
United  States  Consuls  was  aroused,  and  they  did  their 
best  to  discover  the  true  purpose  of  the  unusual  but 
systematic  movement  of  nautical-looking  men,  with  con 
ductors  in  charge,  and  to  defeat  it. 

With  so  much  to  accomplish,  and  by  such  indirect 
and  tedious  means,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Florida 
was  detained  a  long  time  in  Brest  ;  in  fact,  she  was  not 
ready  for  sea  until  February,  1864.  All  that  the  Florida 
required  could  have  been  completed  satisfactorily  in  a 
few  weeks,  if  she  could  have  gone  to  any  of  the  large 
English  building-yards — say  on  the  Clyde  or  Mersey — 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  183 

and  there  have  done  the  work  openly  and  in  the  ordinary 
commercial  way,  and  the  expense  would  have  been 
moderate.  But  the  constant  peril  of  being  stopped  for 
an  alleged  violation  of  neutrality,  the  necessary  appli 
cations  to  official  personages  on  every  small  matter  of 
detail,  the  hesitations,  references  to  Paris,  and  general 
circumlocution,  caused  great  loss  of  time,  and  a  large 
increase  in  the  expenditure.  The  local  authorities  were 
most  considerate  and  courteous,  and  for  that  very  reason  it 
was  imperative  to  scrupulously  respect  their  instructions 
and  limitations,  so  as  not  to  involve  them  in  any  trouble. 

I  have  given  the  simplest  possible  synopsis  of  the  cost 
and  labour  of  refitting  a  Confederate  ship.  Full  details 
would,  I  really  think,  astonish  the  reader,  but  the  fore 
going  will  suffice  to  suggest,  if  it  does  not  abundantly 
demonstrate,  the  immense  disadvantages  under  which 
the  Confederate  Government  laboured  in  the  effort  to 
keep  a  small  naval  force  at  sea. 

Yery  shortly  after  the  arrival  of  the  Florida  at  Brest, 
Maffitt's  health  completely  gave  way.  The  attack  of 
yellow  fever  at  Cardenas  had  left  him  in  a  weak  state. 
Subsequent  exposure  brought  on  rheumatism  of  the 
heart.  When  at  Bermuda  in  July,  1863,  he  had  in 
formed  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  that  he  would  feel 
bound  to  obtain  a  relief  on  the  arrival  of  the  ship  in 
Europe,  if  he  did  not  get  much  better,  and  as  soon  as 
the  arrangements  for  the  repairs  were  fairly  in  train,  he 
resigned  the  command.  Several  Confederate  naval 
officers  were  then  in  Paris,  for  purposes  which  will  be 
subsequently  explained.  One  of  these,  Commander  J. 
N.  Barney,  relieved  Maffitt,  and  he  had  much  of  the 
worry  and  labour  of  refitting  the  ship,  but  his  health 
was  not  strong,  and  in  January  it  became  so  feeble  that 
he  was  compelled  to  retire,  and  he  was  relieved  in  the 


184  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

command  by  Lieutenant  C.  Manigault  Morris,  about 
January  4th. 

The  Florida  was  still  short-handed,  but  there  were 
men  enough  to  handle  the  ship  and  work  her  pivot  guns, 
and  the  Confederate  cruisers  were  always  able  to  recruit 
from  prizes. 

Morris  got  to  sea  from  Brest  .011  the  12th  of  February, 
1864,  took  his  new  gun-carriages  on  board  off  Belle  Isle, 
February  19th,  and  then  proceeded  to  cruise  through 
the  West  Indies,  and  up  to  the  northward  in  the  direc 
tion  of  the  American  coast.  He  touched  at  Martinique, 
April  26,  for  coal  and  supplies,  called  at  Bermuda,  May 
12th,  merely  to  communicate  and  land  a  sick  officer,  and 
went  to  that  island  again  on  June  18th,  where  he  was 
permitted  to  make  some  necessary  repairs  and  take  in  a 
small  supply  of  fuel.  July  27th  he  was  off  again,  and 
made  a  bold  dash  straight  in  for  the  enemy's  coast,  which 
took  him  across  the  track  of  outward-bound  ships.  On 
the  10th  of  July,  thirty  miles  off  the  Capes  of  the  Dela 
ware,  he  captured  the  United  States  mail  steamer  Electric 
Spark,  bound  from  New  York  to  New  Orleans,  with  the 
mails  and  a  number  of  passengers  on  board.  Morris 
transferred  the  crew  and  passengers  to  a  passing  English 
schooner,  which  he  chartered  for  the  purpose,  and  then 
cut  the  steamer's  pipes,  opened  her  valves  and  ports,  and 
thus  permitted  her  to  sink.  During  the  run  in  shore 
from  Bermuda  the  Florida  captured  and  burned  the 
following  ships : — Harriet  Stevens,  Golconda,  Margaret 
Y.  Davis,  and  Mondamin.  Manifestly  the  little  Con 
federate  cruiser  could  not  remain  in  that  neighbourhood 
long.  The  purpose  was  to  alarm  the  enemy  by  a  '  raid ' 
on  the  line  of  his  coasting  trade,  and  having  struck  the 
blow,  Morris  ran  across  to  Teneriffe,  and  then  cruised 
leisurely  across  the  line  towards  the  north-eastern  coast 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  185 

of  Brazil,  burning  whatever  prizes  he  made  (in  all  about 
thirteen),  including  those  captured  during  the  run  in 
and  off  the  American  coast. 

On  the  4th  of  October,  at  9  p.m.  the  Florida 
anchored  at  Bahia,  the  purpose  being  to  get  supplies, 
make  some  slight  repairs,  and  refresh  the  crew  after  a 
long  and  active  cruise  ;  for,  in  point  of  fact,  there  had 
been  no  chance  to  give  the  men  a  run  on  shore  since  the 
departure  from  Brest  on  the  12th  of  February.  By 
this  time  the  Florida  was  in  good  condition  to  fulfil  the 
objects  of  those  for  whose  service  she  was  built.  Officers 
and  crew  were  in  fine  spirits,  and  hoped  to  accomplish  a 
good  deal  of  work  still,  although  American  ships  were 
fast  disappearing  from  the  high  seas,  or  at  least  they 
were  rapidly  sheltering  from  capture  under  the  British 
mercantile  flag.  But  there  was  another  fate  in  waiting 
for  the  gallant  little  ship.  She  had  braved  and  survived 
the  lawful,  though  murdering,  attack  of  the  United 
States  ships  off  Mobile ;  she  surrendered  to  the 
treacherous  and  illegal  assault  of  another  United  States 
ship  at  Bahia.  The  first  encounter  was  a  fair  open 
'  stand  and  deliver/  the  second  was  an  assassination. 
This  is  a  harsh  word.  It  has  been  forced  from  me.  The 
English  language  does  not  offer  a  milder  phrase  to  fitly 
distinguish  the  occurrence,  or  I  would  gladly  adopt  it, 
but  I  feel,  nevertheless,  bound  to  justify  the  epithet. 

It  was  dark  when  the  Florida  anchored,  on  the 
evening  of  October  4th.  At  an  early  hour  on  the 
morning  of  the  5th  the  customary  visit  of  ceremony 
and  inquiry  was  paid  to  her  by  the  Brazilian  naval 
authorities,  and  it  was  perceived  that  a  United  States 
ship- of- war  was  at  anchor  not  far  off,  which  proved  to 
be  the  United  States  steam  corvette  Wachusett,  Com 
mander  N.  Collins.  At  about  noon  of  the  same  day 


186  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  TEE 

Morris  had  an  interview  with  the  President  of  the 
Province,  by  special  appointment,  to  explain  his  wants, 
and  to  get  a  reply  to  the  request  he  had  made  to  the 
Brazilian  Admiral  for  permission  to  remain  the  neces 
sary  time  to  make  some  repairs  to  the  engine,  which 
request  the  Admiral  had  referred  to  his  Excellency. 
The  Admiral  was  present  at  the  interview,  and  the 
result  was  very  satisfactory  to  Morris.  The  President 
promptly  consented  to  his  remaining  the  customary 
forty-eight  hours,  to  which  time  all  belligerent  vessels 
were  limited,  but  added  that  if  upon  the  report  of  a 
marine  engineer,  who  would  be  sent  on  board  to  inspect, 
it  should  appear  that  the  repairs  could  not  be  com 
pleted  in  that  time,  he  would  grant  an  extension  suffi 
cient  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  case. 

The  President,  in  the  course  of  further  conversation, 
remarked  upon  the  presence  of  a  United  States  ship-of- 
war  in  the  bay,  and  impressed  upon  Morris  that  he 
would  expect  and  rely  upon  him  to  do  nothing  that 
might  occasion  a  hostile  collision  with  her.  He  added 
that  the  United  States  Consul  had  given  him  a  solemn 
assurance  on  behalf  of  Captain  Collins  that  the 
Wachusett  would  do  nothing  while  in  the  port  which 
was  contrary  to  the  laws  of  nations,  or  in  violation  of 
the  neutrality  and  sovereignty  of  Brazil,  and  expressed 
the  desire  that  Morris  would  give  him  a  corresponding 
promise,  which  he  did.  At  this  point  the  Admiral 
remarked  that  the  Florida  and  Wachusett  were  lying  in 
close  proximity,  and  he  suggested  that  Morris  should 
move  the  Florida  to  a  position  between  his  (the 
Admiral's)  ship  and  the  shore.  After  the  interview 
with  the  President,  Morris  went  immediately  on  board 
and  shifted  his  berth  to  the  anchorage  suggested  by  the 
Admiral.  The  marine  engineer  spoken  of  by  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  187 

President  had  preceded  him,  and  soon  reported  that 
the  repairs  would  require  four  days. 

Morris  now  being  quite  easy  in  mind  with  regard  to 
the  privilege  of  remaining  in  port,  and  feeling  no  appre 
hension  of  an  unpleasant,  and  certainly  believing  that 
there  could  be  no  hostile,  collision  with  the  Wachusett  ^ 
or  any  of  her  belongings,  determined  to  give  his  crew 
'  liberty.1  The  ship  was  put  in  usual  harbour  trim, 
the  guns  were  unloaded,  the  running  gear  was  flemished 
down,  the  awnings  spread,  and  the  port  watch  (one 
half  the  crew)  were  permitted  to  go  on  shore.  The 
next  day,  October  6th,  the  '  liberty  men '  began  to 
return  on  board  at  an  early  hour,  and  when  most  of 
them  had  returned,  the  starboard  watch  was  sent  on 
shore,  Captain  Morris  and  a  party  of  the  officers  going 
at  the  same  time. 

When  night  set  in  on  that  6th  of  October,  1864,  the 
state  of  affairs  was  this:  The  Florida  was  lying  in 
shore  of  the  Brazilian  Admiral's  ship  (a  small  wooden 
sailing  sloop- of- war),  and  the  Wachusett  was  some 
distance  off,  and  on  the  other  or  off-shore  side  of  the 
Admiral.  The  first-lieutenant,  J.  K.  Porter,  with  ten 
officers  of  all  grades,  and  about  seventy  men,  most  of 
whom  had  just  returned  from  '  liberty/  were  on  board 
the  Florida,  and  Captain  Morris,  four  officers,  and  the 
remainder  of  the  crew  were  on  shore.  At  about  3  a.m. 
on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  Lieutenant  Porter  was 
aroused  by  the  officer  of  the  deck,  Acting -master 
T.  T.  Hunter,  who  reported  to  him  that  the  Wachusett 
was  under  weigh,  and  was  standing  towards  the  Florida. 
Lieutenant  Porter  had  not  turned  in,  but  was  asleep  on 
a  sofa  in  the  commander's  cabin,  and  being  dressed,  he 
got  very  quickly  on  deck,  when  he  saw  the  Wachusett 
close  aboard,  and  steering  directly  for  them.  Before  he 


188  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

could  give  an  order,  or  even  hail  the  approaching  ship, 
she  ran  violently  into  the  Florida,  striking  her  on  the 
starboard  quarter.  The  force  of  the  collision  crushed  in 
the  bulwarks,  started  several  beams,  broke  the  main- 
yard,  and  carried  away  the  mizen-mast,  which  came 
down  in  three  pieces.  The  Wachusett  at  or  about  the 
same  time  fired  two  shots  from  her  battery,  and  opened 
a  musketry  fire  upon  the  startled  crew  of  the  Florida, 
who,  thus  unexpectedly  aroused,  could  have  made  no 
effective  resistance,  even  if  they  had  been  armed,  being 
embarrassed,  and  indeed  prevented  from  even  seeing  the 
attacking  ship,  by  reason  of  the  awning,  which,  borne 
down  by  the  wreck  of  the  mizen-mast  and  its  gear, 
covered  and  confined  them  as  if  in  a  net. 

In  the  confusion  of  the  collision,  Lieutenant  Stone 
managed  to  get  clear  of  the  awning,  and  standing  upon 
a  gun,  he  fired  one  shot  from  his  revolver.  About 
fifteen  of  the  crew  jumped  overboard,  but  only  six 
reached  the  shore.  Those  who  succeeded  in  swimming 
safely  to  the  shore  reported  to  Captain  Morris  that  they 
had  been  fired  at  while  in  the  water  by  the  men  on  the 
forecastle  and  in  the  boats  of  the  Wachusett,  and  that 
the  missing  men  had  probably  been  killed  or  drowned. 
Immediately  after  the  collision  the  Wachusett  backed  off 
a  short  distance  and  hailed  the  Florida,  demanding  an 
immediate  surrender,  on  pain  of  being  sunk  there  and 
then.  After  a  moment's  hesitation,  and  a  hasty  consul 
tation  with  Lieutenant  Stone,  Lieutenant  Porter  replied 
that  he  would  surrender.  The  Florida  was  then  boarded, 
a  hawser  was  made  fast  to  her,  and  the  Wachusett  towed 
her  to  sea. 

I  have  condensed  the  foregoing  statement  into  the 
smallest  possible  space  and  into  the  briefest  possible 
phrases,  because  I  have  thought  it  would  be  best  and 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  189 

<f 

fairest  to  all  parties  to  let  them  give  their  own  version, 
and  the  official  reports  and  statements  with  reference  to 
the  whole  occurrence,  together  with  the  correspondence 
between  the  Brazilian  Legation  at  Washington  and  the 
United  States  Secretary  of  State,  will  be  found  in  full  at 
the  end  of  the  chapter. 

That  portion  of  Captain  Morris7  report  which  refers 
to  what  took  place  on  board  the  Florida  during  the 
attack  was,  as  he  himself  says,  gathered  from  the  six 
men  who  succeeded  in  swimming  ashore,  and  I  am 
satisfied  they  were  mistaken  in  saying  that  there  was 
repeated  firing  on  either  side.  From  personal  inquiry  I 
feel  assured  that  not  more  than  two  pistol-shots  were 
fired  from  the  Florida.  I  am  inclined  to  think  there 
was  only  one,  by  Lieutenant  Stone,  in  the  manner  related 
above ;  on  the  other  hand,  I  cannot  learn  that  the 
Wachusett  fired  into  the  Florida  after  backing  clear, 
although  the  men  who  escaped  asserted  that  they  were 
fired  at  in  the  water. 

My  object  in  giving  a  brief  summary  of  the  circum 
stances  attending  the  capture  of  the  Florida  is  to  supply 
the  text  for  the  general  remarks  I  feel  called  upon 
to  make  upon  the  whole  occurrence,  in  order  to  justify 
the  use  of  the  word  4  assassination  '  which  I  have  applied 
to  it,  without  being  forced  to  refer  frequently  to  the 
official  documents,  which  the  reader  can  consult  at  his 
convenience.  There  could  hardly  be  a  more  flagrant  and 
offensive  violation  of  national  sovereignty  than  that  which 
Captain  Collins  committed  upon  the  Empire  of  Brazil ; 
but  it  is  no  part  of  my  purpose  to  discuss  the  incident 
with  reference  to  its  diplomatic  or  legal  bearings. 
I  have  no  sentimental  notions  in  regard  to  the  precepts 
of  public  law,  or  the  demands  of  international  comity. 
I  know  full  well  that  strong  Powers  have  treated  such 


190  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

considerations  with  indifference  and  contempt,  whenever 
it  suited  their  purpose  to  do  so.  Nelson  sailed  into 
Copenhagen  and  destroyed  a  great  part  of  the  Danish 
fleet  without  orders,  even  if  not  in  violation  of  them, 
when  England  and  Denmark  were  not  at  war,  and 
he  set  up  no  pretence  in  justification,  but  simply  affirmed 
that  the  safety  and  interests  of  his  own  country  required 
him  to  act  in  that  energetic  way.*  Captain  Hillyar, 
with  the  British  ships  Phoebe  and  Cherub,  followed  the 
United  States  ship  Essex  into  the  harbour  of  Valparaiso, 
attacked,  and  after  a  desperate  resistance  captured  her 
under  the  very  guns  of  a  Chilian  battery,  but  both 
of  those  acts  were  done  openly  in  the  light  of  day,  and 
in  bold  defiance  of  all  consequences.  When  Buenos 
Ay  res  was  fighting  her  war  of  independence  with 
Spain,  a  ship-of-war  of  the  ;  so-called '  insurgents,  the 
Federal,  boarded  an  American  vessel  on  the  high  seas, 
and  took  out  of  her  some  goods  alleged  to  be  Spanish 
property.  The  Federal  put  into  the  Danish  island  of 
St.  Bartholomew  soon  after,  and  found  there,  or 
was  followed  in  by,  the  United  States  ship  Erie, 
Captain  Daniel  Turner.  Captain  Turner  made  a 
demand  upon  the  Governor  for  the  surrender  of  the 
Federal  to  him,  she  having  done  violence  to  the 
American  flag.  The  Governor  refused,  on  the  ground 
that  the  ship  in  question  was  a  commissioned  vessel- 
of-war,  belonging  to  a  recognised  belligerent  Power,  and 
Captain  Turner  sent  in  the  Erie's  boats,  under  command 
of  his  first-lieutenant,  Josiah  Tattnall,  and  cut  her 
out  from  under  the  guns  of  the  fort.  The  acts  of 

*  '  Pictorial  History  of  England,' vol.  vi.,  book  x.,  p.  162.  When 
asked  by  the  Crown  Prince  of  Denmark  why  the  British  fleet  had 
forced  its  way  up  the  Baltic,  Nelson  replied,  *  To  crush  and  annihilate 
a  confederacy  formed  against  the  dearest  interests  of  England.' 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  191 

the  two  Captains  Hillyar  and  Turner  were  indefensible 
upon  the  principles  of  international  law  and  comity  as 
generally  understood,  but  in  neither  case  was  the 
commander  under  a  personal  engagement,  implied 
or  otherwise,  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  the  countries  in 
whose  waters  the  offences  were  committed.  They 
simply  acted  in  defiance  of  law,  and  were  prepared 
to  take  the  consequences. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  Captain  Collins  gave  any 
personal  assurance  to  the  President  of  Bahia  in 
reference  to  his  conduct  while  in  that  port.  He  makes 
no  allusion  to  the  subject  in  his  official  report  ;  but 
that  is  not  conclusive  either  one  way  or  the  other.  I 
think  those  who  read  the  various  reports  will  not  doubt 
that  the  Consul,  Mr.  Thomas  F.  Wilson,  did  give  the 
assurance  required  by  the  President  on  behalf  of  the 
Wachusett,  and  it  was  his  business,  his  imperative  duty, 
to  inform  Captain  Collins  what  he  had  done. 

But  apart  from  all  technicalities  and  quibbles,  it  is 
perfectly  well  known,  that  the  regulations  under  which 
the  Neutral  Powers  permitted  the  ships  of  the  two 
belligerents  in  the  American  Civil  War  to  enter  and 
remain  in  their  ports,  were  founded  upon  the  assumption 
that  in  return  for  the  hospitalities  and  shelter  granted, 
there  was  an  honourable  and  unqualified  undertaking  to 
respect  the  neutrality  of  the  ports.  Whenever  a  United 
States  or  a  Confederate  ship  let  go  her  anchor  in  a 
neutral  port  and  asked  leave  to  remain,  her  commander 
could  only  accept  the  privileges  he  asked  under  the 
above  conditions,  and  when  the  alternative  of  compliance 
or  departure  was  not  directly  and  specifically  proposed, 
it  was  from  a  feeling  of  delicacy  on  the  part  of  the  local 
authority,  and  of  confidence  in  the  good  faith  of  the 
individual  commander. 


192  TEE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

We  come,  then,  to  this  final  proposition.  In  stating 
it  I  hope  to  avoid  the  appearance  of  exaggeration.  The 
United  States  ship  Wachusett  lay  in  the  harbour  of 
Bahia,  in  company  with  the  Confederate  ship  Florida 
two  days,  both  ships  being  under  an  obligation  to  keep 
the  peace  as  the  condition  of  their  leave  to  remain.  But 
when  the  Wachusett,  by  her  quiet  demeanour,  had 
dispelled  all  doubt  and  apprehension,  not  only  in  the 
mind  of  Captain  Morris,  but  in  the  minds  of  the  Brazilian 
authorities  as  well,  she  crept  stealthily,  under  cover  of 
night,  and  struck  her  adversary  a  foul  blow  when  there 
was  no  power  to  ward  it  off,  and  no  possible  ground  for 
suspecting  it.  If  Captain  Collins  had  dashed  into  the 
harbour  in  the  full  light  of  day,  and  had  made  his  attack 
upon  the  Florida  without  fear  of  the  consequences,  the 
proceeding  would  not  have  been  more  offensive  to 
Brazil,  nor  would  it  have  been  a  greater  violation  of  her 
sovereign  rights  than  the  course  he  adopted,  and  he 
would  have  been  equally  sure  of  capturing,  or  at  least 
destroying  his  enemy,  because  she  would  have  been 
quite  unprepared  to  make  effective  resistance,  and  the 
whole  transaction  demonstrates  that  the  Brazilian 
Admiral's  ship  was  too  weak  and  inefficient  to  exercise 
any  preventive  force.*  If  the  Wachusetfs  assault  upon 
the  Florida  had  been  in  the  above  manner,  it  could  have 
been  classed  with  that  of  the  Phoebe  and  Cherub  upon  the 
Essex,  or  the  boats  of  the  Erie  upon  the  Federal,  and  I 
should  have  been  spared  the  pain  of  denouncing  it  as  an 
assassination. 

Captain  Collins  offers  in  justification,  or  at  least  in 
palliation  of  his  offence  against  the  sovereign  rights  of 
Brazil,  the  allegation  that  the  Alabama  had  been  per 
mitted  to  burn  some  American  ships  near  the  island  of 
*  See  'Admiral's  Eeport,'  p.  210. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  193 

Fernando  de  Noronha,  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Empire  without  remonstrance,  and  he  therefore  thought 
it  i  probable '  that  his  attack  upon  the  Florida  would  be 
treated  with  the  same  leniency.  Captain  Collins  could 
have  had  no  personal  knowledge  of  the  occurrence  he 
mentions,  and  probably  got  the  alleged  fact  from  the 
United  States  Consul,  who  also  put  it  in  his  letter  to 
the  President,  requesting,  or  rather  '  claiming/  that  the 
Florida  should  in  effect  be  treated  as  a  pirate.*  Admiral 
Semmes,  in  his  history  of  the  Alabama's  cruise,  writing 
from  his  diary,  and  without  any  knowledge  of  Captain 
Collins's  counter  allegation,  gives  the  true  version, 
wrhich  is  that  he  burned  the  Louisa  Hatch  and  the  Kate 
Cory,  '  taking  the  pains  to  send  them  both  beyond  the 
marine  league,  that  I  might  pay  due  respect  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  Brazil. 'f 

The  letter  of  Mr.  Thomas  F.  Wilson  to  the  President 
of  Bahia  is  a  fair  example  of  the  diplomatic  literature 
with  which  the  consular  agents  of  the  United  States  tried 
the  patience  and  vexed  the  polite  sensibilities  of  the 
local  authorities  to  whom  they  were  accredited  during 
the  Civil  War.  Brazil,  in  common  with  all  the  other 
Powers,  great  and  small,  had  acknowledged  the  Con 
federate  States  as  a  belligerent,  with  a  de  facto  Govern 
ment,  which  conceded  to  them  the  same  right  to  com 
mission  ships -of- war  as  the  United  States  had  ;  and  yet 
Mr.  Thomas  F.  Wilson  was  apparently  unconscious  of 
the  incivility  and  impolicy  of  asserting  in  an  official 
communication  to  a  high  civil  officer  of  the  empire  that 
the  Florida  was  '  not  commissioned  by  any  recognised 
Government  whatever/  that  her  officers  and  crew  were 

*  See  '  British  Case,'  p.  74. 

t  '  JMy  Adventures  Afloat,'  by  Admiral  Raphael  Semmes.    London : 
Bentley,  1869. 

VOL.  I.  13 


194  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

'  not  subject  to  any  international  or  civilized  law,1  and 
were  consequently  '  not  entitled  to  the  privileges  and 
immunities  conceded  to  vessels  navigating  under  the 
flag  of  a  civilized  nation/  and  then  in  conclusion  setting 
up  a  £  claim '  that  the  '  piratical  cruiser  '  should  be  '  de 
tained  to  answer,'  etc.,*  by  which  the  writer  probably 
meant  that  the  officers  and  crew  should  be  looked  upon 
as  Malay  pirates,  and  treated  accordingly. 

The  Brazilians  are  a  very  polite  race.  They  are 
punctilious  in  the  practice  of  official  propriety  and  de 
corum.  Their  officials  are  easily  conciliated  by  defe 
rential  treatment  and  outward  forms  of  respect.  They 
are  very  affable  and  obliging  when  approached  with 
complaisance  and  frankness,  but  are  reticent,  suspicious, 
and  unyielding  at  the  slightest  approach  to  rudeness  or 
duplicity.  I  can  well  imagine  the  mingled  feelings  of 
surprise  and  repulsion  with  which  his  Excellency 
Antonio  Joaquim  da  Silva  Gomes,  President  of  the  Pro 
vince  of  Bahia,  read  the  letter  of  Thomas  F.  Wilson, 
Consul  of  the  United  States,  and  the  effort  it  must  have 
cost  him  to  suppress  his  feelings  within  the  limits  of  the 
mild  and  gentlemanly  rebuke  contained  in  the  last  para 
graph  of  his  reply. 

When  the  Wachusett  steamed  out  of  the  bay  of  Bahia 
with  the  Florida  in  tow,  the  Brazilian  Admiral  pursued 
her  with  the  force  at  his  disposal  ;  but  his  three  vessels 
were  so  small  and  so  inefficiently  armed,  that  he  could 
have  had  no  expectation  of  compelling  the  release  of  the 
Florida,  and  his  demonstration  was  therefore  only  a 
spirited  protest  against  the  act  of  violence  which  had 
been  committed  under  his  eye.  The  Wachusett,  towing  the 
Florida,  and  with  sail  on  both  vessels,  had  no  difficulty 
in  getting  away  from  her  pursuers,  and  she  finally 
*  Letter,  p.  200. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  195 

arrived  at  Hampton  Roads  with  her  prize  on  the  12th 
of  November. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  two  ships  at  Hampton  Roads 
the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  William  H.  Seward,  must 
have  been  promptly  informed  of  the  occurrence,  and  he 
must  have  known  that  the  act  of  Captain  Collins  was 
wholly  indefensible.  His  duty  as  a  statesman,  careful 
and  jealous  for  the  honour  of  his  country  as  well  as  for 
its  safety,  would  seem  to  have  been  quite  clear.  He 
admits,  in  his  reply  to  the  complaint  of  the  Brazilian 
Minister  at  Washington,  that  4  the  capture  of  the  Florida 
was  an  unauthorized,  unlawful,  and  indefensible  exercise 
of  the  naval  force  of  the  United  States  within  a  foreign 
country,  in  defiance  of  its  established  and  duly  recognised 
government.'  It  is  hardly  possible  to  conceive  that  he 
should  have  hesitated  one  moment  in  deciding  to  release 
the  Florida,  and  in  offering  an  apology  to  Brazil,  which 
would  have  been  so  much  more  gratifying  to  the  re 
cipient,  and  honourable  to  the  giver,  if  promptly  and 
spontaneously  tendered.  But  Mr.  Seward  waited  to  see 
what  the  Brazilian  Government  would  do.  He  knew 
that  it  would  be  some  time,  probably  two  or  three 
months,  before  that  Government  could  instruct  their 
Minister  at  Washington,  and  he  seems  to  have  preferred 
yielding  to  a  demand  rather  than  to  proffer  a  frank 
explanation. 

At  last  the  demand  came,  on  the  12th  December, 
through  the  Brazilian  Legation  at  Washington,  and  Mr. 
Seward  made  the  amende,  in  a  despatch  hardly  ever 
paralleled  in  its  tone  of  arrogant  and  offensive  recri 
mination. 

Brazil  was  too  weak  to  protect  the  Florida.  She  was 
equally  powerless  to  resent  the  injury  this  ungracious 
apology  must  have  inflicted  upon  her  pride.  Diplo- 

13—2 


196  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

matically,  her  demands  were  complied  with,  but  the 
status  quo  was  never  restored.  Pending  the  arrival  of 
the  anticipated  complaint  from  Kio  de  Janeiro,  the 
Florida  was  permitted  to  founder  in  Hampton  Roads, 
by  a  judiciously  managed  oversight  in  examining  her 
valves,  so  Mr.  Seward  could  not  restore  the  ship, 
There  were  twelve  or  thirteen  thousand  dollars  in  gold 
in  the  paymaster's  safe  when  the  Florida  was  captured, 
a  part  of  which  belonged  to  the  officers'  mess.  Mr. 
Seward  did  not  mention  that  fact  to  the  Brazilian 
Minister,  nor  was  a  single  penny  of  it  supplied  to  the 
officers  when  they  were  discharged  from  Fort  Warren, 
after  a  rigorous  confinement  of  about  three  months.* 

The  treatment  of  those  officers  is  one  of  the  most 
painful  and  discreditable  incidents  in  this  unhappy  affair. 
"When  the  Waclmsett  arrived  in  Hampton  Roads  the 
prisoners  were  sent  en  masse  to  the  military  prison  at 
Point  Look-out,  where  the  officer  sand  men  were  separated, 
and  the  officers  were  in  a  few  days  transferred  to  the 
'  Old  Capitol  Prison '  at  Washington.  After  three  or 
four  days'  confinement  in  that  gaol,  they  were  sent  back 
to  the  Wacliusett  at  Hampton  Roads,  and  were  all  con 
veyed  by  her  to  Fort  Warren,  a  fortress  on  an  island  in 
the  harbour  of  Boston,  which  had  been  converted  into  a 
'  lock-up '  for  prisoners -of- state  as  well  as  of  war.  In 
this  cheerless  place,  and  under  the  trying  conditions 
specified  in  Lieutenant  T.  K.  Porter's  official  report,  f 
they  were  imprisoned  until  February  1st,  1865,  which 
was  nearly  seven  weeks  after  Mr.  Seward  had  stated,  in 
an  official  despatch  to  the  Brazilian  Minister  at  Wash 
ington,  J  that  'the  capture  of  the  Florida  was  an  un- 

*  See  Lieutenant  Porter's  official  letter  to  Mr.  Secretary  Gideon 
Welles,  p.  223. 

t  See  Report,  p.  219.  J  Letter,  p.  216. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  197 

authorized,  unlawful,  and  indefensible  exercise  of  the 
naval  force  of  the  United  States,'  and  that  the  crew  of 
the  Florida  were  *  unlawfully  brought  into  the  custody 
of  this  Government/  namely,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States. 

But  this  is  not  all.  When  the  officers  were  set  at 
liberty,  they  were  forced  to  sign  an  undertaking  that 
they  would  leave  the  United  States  within  ten  days 
from  the  date  of  their  release.  They  were  without  any 
means  to  pay  their  expenses,  and  Lieutenant  Porter 
wrote  an  application  to  Mr.  Gideon  Welles,  the  Secretary 
of  the  United  States  Navy,  for  a  return  to  him  of  the 
money  which  had  been  captured  in  the  Florida,  and 
which,  to  the  extent  of  the  amount  of  pay  due  them,  was 
iis  much  the  private  property  of  the  captured  officers  as 
Mr.  Gideon  Welles'  watch  was  his,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
obligation,  under  the  conditions  of  the  amende  to  Brazil, 
to  restore  the  whole  of  it  to  Lieutenant  Porter  as  the 
senior  officer  of  the  Florida. 

To  that  application  Mr.  Gideon  Welles  did  not  see  fit 
to  reply;  he  did  not  even  practise  the  commonplace 
courtesy  of  acknowledging  its  receipt,  and  the  officers 
were  turned  into  the  streets  of  Boston,  and  among  a 
population  which  was  then  hostile,  with  no  means  to  pay 
their  way  out  of  the  country,  and  yet  under  a  forced 
engagement  to  depart  within  ten  days.  Lieutenant 
Porter  was  able  to  arrange  for  a  passage  for  himself  and 
party  to  England  in  the  Cunard  steamship  Canada,  by 
giving  a  draft  on  the  Confederate  financial  agent,  and 
they  reached  Liverpool  about  the  middle  of  that  month, 
and  came  to  me  very  much  in  the  condition  of  distressed 
seamen  sent  home  under  consular  certificate. 

I  submit  the  foregoing  without  comment,  as  a  plain 
unvarnished  statement  of  the  manner  in  which  Mr. 


198  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Secretary  Seward  made  the  amende  to  Brazil  for  what 
lie  himself  denounced  as  an  '  unauthorized,  unlawful, 
and  indefensible  defiance '  of  her  neutral  rights,  and  of 
the  spirit  in  which  he  affected  to  restore  the  status 
quo. 

An  historical  narrative  cannot  be  limited  to  a  mere 
record  of  events  in  the  form  of  a  diary.      The  occur 
rences  must  be  illustrated  sometimes  by   explanatory 
comments,  and  by  comparing  or  contrasting  them  with 
events  or  with  actions  upon  which  public  judgment  has 
already  been  pronounced.     A  military  or  naval  officer  in 
command  of  a  national  force  loses,  to  a  certain  extent, 
his  personal  identity.      He  is  merged  in  his  office,  and 
may   thus   be  criticized  without  reference  to  his  indi 
viduality  or  the  personal  qualities  which  make  up  his 
private  character.      Captain  Collins  was  always  looked 
upon  as  an  honourable  and  truthful  man  in  his  intercourse 
with  friends  and  acquaintances.      If  a  proposition  of 
doubtful  propriety  wrere  suggested  to  him,  I  should  feel 
sure  that,  if  left  to  himself,  he  would  come  to  a  fair  and 
just  resolution,  and  that  he  would  not  leave  it  in  the 
power  of  friend  or  foe  to  charge  him  with  bad  faith. 
With  reference  to  his  conduct  in  the  adventure  with  the 
Florida,  upon  which  it  has  been  my  painful  office  to 
comment,  it  seems  to  me  that  he  made  the  mistake  of 
placing  himself  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Consul  Thomas  F. 
Wilson,  who  appears  to  have  imbibed  the  acrimonious 
temper  of  his  departmental  chief,  and  to  have  adopted 
the  harsh  epithets  and  the  opprobrious  phrases  which 
that  high  officer  of  State  did  not  think  it  unbecoming  to 
introduce   into  his  diplomatic  correspondence  when  it 
was   necessary  to  mention  those  who  were  opposed  to 
him  in  the  great  Civil  War. 

Since  Mr.  Seward  has  thought  it  proper  and  dignified 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  199 

to  maintain  in  an  official  despatch*  that  *  that  vessel  (the 
Florida),  like  the  Alabama,  was  a  pirate,7  and  to  further 
state  in  the  same  document  that  '  the  crew,'  among  whom 
he  contemptuously  includes  the  officers,  '  were  enemies 
of  the  human  race,7  it  seemed  imperative  upon  me,  as 
the  historian  of  the  little  craft7s  origin  and  adventures, 
not  only  to  relate  the  closing  events  of  her  brief  career, 
but  to  comment  upon  the  manner  of  bringing  them 
about.  I  have  no  feeling  of  enmity  against  anyone.  It 
would  grieve  me  to  know  that  I  had  wounded  the 
feelings  of  one  who  was,  in  former  years,  a  brother 
officer,  or  that  I  had  cast  an  aspersion  upon  the  service 
in  which  I  once  held  a  commission,  by  heedless  state 
ments  or  ill-digested  comments.  I  confidently  believe 
that  in  what  I  have  felt  it  my  duty  to  write  there  has  been 
no  warping  of  the  facts,  but  that  I  have  kept  faithfully 
to  the  record.  But  the  reader  himself  can  judge,  because 
I  have  annexed  the  official  reports  of  all  the  persons  in 
volved  in  the  affair. 

DOCUMENTS  ABOVE  REFERRED  TO. 

FORM  OF  KANSOM  BOND   TAKEN  FROM  FRIZES  WHEN 
RELEASED  (SEE  P.  177). 

This  bond,  made  and  entered  into  this  seventh  of  July,  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-three  (A.D.  1863),  by  and  between 
Richard  Luce,  master  and  commander  of  the  American  ship  Sunrise 
of  the  first  part,  and  John  N.  Maffitt,  lieutenant-commanding  in  the 
navy  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America  of  the  second  part, 
witnesseth : 

That  the  said  party  of  the  first  part  is  held  and  firmly  bound  (for 
himself,  the  ship  and  her  owners)  unto  Jefferson  Davis,  President  of 
the  Confederate  States  of  America,  or  his  successors  in  office,  in  the 
full  and  penal  sum  of  sixty  thousand  dollars  ($60,000),  to  be  well 
and  truly  paid,  in  gold  or  its  equivalent,  within  six  calendar  months 

*  See  p.  216. 


200  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

after  the  ratification  of  a  treaty  of  peace  between  the  Confederate 
States  and  the  United  States. 

The  condition  of  this  bond  is  such  that  the  aforesaid  party  of  the 
first  part  has  this  day  been  captured  on  the  high  seas,  while  in 
command  of  the  ship  aforesaid,  by  the  Confederate  States  sloop-of- 
war  Florida,  whereof  the  party  of  the  second  part  is  commander* 
and  has  been  allowed  to  proceed  on  his  voyage  without  injury  or 
detriment  to  the  ship  or  cargo,  and  has  been  guaranteed  against 
molestation  during  the  present  voyage  from  any  and  all  armed 
vessels  in  the  service  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America. 

Done  in  duplicate  on  board  the  Confederate  States  sloop-of-war 
Florida,  the  day  and  date  above  written. 

Witness :  THOMAS  BARRY,  RICHARD  LUCE  (seal), 
First  Officer.  Master-Comdg. 

Witness :  G.  D.  BRYAN,  J.  N.  MAFFITT  (seal), 

Mdn.  C.S.N.  Lieut.-Comdg.  C.S.N. 


[Copy.} 

THE  UNITED  STATES  CONSUL  TO  THE  PRESIDENT  OF 
THE  PROVINCE  OF  BAHIA. 

To  his  Excellency  Antonio  Joaquim  da  Silva  Gomes,  President  of 
the  Province  of  Bahia, 

Consulate  of  the  United  States  of  America, 

Bahia,  October  5th,  1864,  9  a.m. 

SIR,— 

This  morning  a  steamer  anchored  in  this  port,  bearing  the 
flag  adopted  by  those  who  are  involved  in  the  rebellion  against  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  I  am  informed 
that  the  said  vessel  is  the  Florida,  which  is  engaged  in  capturing 
vessels  navigating  under  the  flag  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
and  in  destroying  them  by  making  bonfires  of  them  and  their  cargoes. 

The  vessel  in  question  is  not  commissioned  by  any  recognised 
Government  whatever,  and  her  officers  and  crew  are  composed  of 
persons  of  various  nationalities,  who  are  not  subject  to  any  inter 
national  or  civilized  law,  and  are  consequently  not  entitled  to  the 
privileges  and  immunities  conceded  to  vessels  navigating  under  the 
flag  of  a  civilized  nation.  I  therefore  protest,  in  the  name  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  against  the  admission  of  this  vessel  to  free 
practice,  by  which  she  might  be  enabled  to  supply  herself  with  coal, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  201 

provisions,  tackle,  or  utensils  of  any  kind  whatever,  or  receive  on 
board  any  persons  whatever ;  finally,  against  any  assistance,  aid  or 
protection  which  might  be  conceded  to  her  in  this  port,  or  in  any 
other  belonging  to  this  province. 

I  likewise  claim  that  the  piratical  cruiser,  which  in  combination 
with  the  pirate  Alabama  violated  the  sovereignty  of  the  Imperial 
Government  of  Brazil,  by  capturing  and  destroying  vessels  belonging 
to  citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America  within  the  territorial 
waters  of  Brazil,  near  the  island  of  Fernando  de  Noronha,  in  April, 
1863,  be  detained,  with  all  her  officers  and  crew,  in  order  to  answer 
for  so  flagrant  a  violation  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  Government  of 
Brazil,  and  of  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Brazilian  Government. 

I  avail,  etc., 
(Signed)        THOMAS  F.  WILSON, 

Consul  of  the  United  States. 


THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  PROVINCE  TO  MR  WILSON. 

Palace  of  the  Government  of  the  Province  of  Bahia, 

October  5th,  1864. 

In  a  note  dated  this  day,  Mr.  Thomas  F.  Wilson,  Consul  of  the 
United  States,  claims  that  the  steamer  Florida,  now  anchored  in 
this  port,  shall  not  be  admitted  to  free  pratique,  nor  obtain  per 
mission  to  provide  herself  with  coal,  provisions,  supplies,  and  utensils 
of  any  kind  whatever,  nor  receive  on  board  any  person  whatever  j  he 
likewise  requests  that,  as  the  cruiser,  in  combination  with  the 
Alabama,  violated  the  sovereignty  of  the  Imperial  Government  of 
Brazil  by  capturing  and  destroying  vessels  belonging  to  citizens 
of  the  United  States  of  America  within  the  territorial  waters  of  the 
Empire,  near  the  island  of  Fernando  de  Noronha,  in  April,  1863,  she 
may  be  detained,  with  all  her  officers  and  crew,  in  order  to  answer 
for  this  flagrant  violation  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  Government  of 
Brazil,  and  of  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United  States,  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Brazilian  Government. 

In  reply  to  the  Consul,  I  have  to  inform  him  that,  as  the  said 
vessel  belongs  to  the  Confederate  States,  in  whom  the  Imperial 
Government  recognised  the  character  of  belligerents,  all  the  assist 
ance  required  by  humanity  may  be  furnished  her,  which  does  in  no 
wise  constitute  assistance  for  warlike  purposes,  as  laid  down  by  inter 
national  law,  and  does  not  conflict  with  that  neutrality  which  this 


202  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Government  studiously  seeks  to  preserve,  and  has  always  preserved, 
in  the  contest  between  the  States  of  North  America.  The  under 
signed  cannot,  therefore,  admit  the  first  portion  of  the  claim  of  the 
Consul,  in  the  general  manner  in  which  it  was  presented,  and  particu 
larly  in  relation  to  those  articles  considered  as  contraband  of  war,  in 
conformity  with  instructions  issued  on  that  subject  by  the  Imperial 
Government,  and  according  to  which  the  said  vessel  will  only  be 
permitted  to  remain  in  this  port  for  the  length  of  time  absolutely 
indispensable. 

In  regard  to  the  second  part  of  his  note,  it  is  my  duty  to  observe 
to  the  Consul  that,  even  if  it  were  fully  established  that  the  Florida 
had  previously  violated  neutrality,  such  a  proceeding  would  scarcely 
authorize  us  to  refuse  her  permission  to  enter  the  ports  of  the  Empire, 
and  would  never  warrant  us  to  commit  the  acts  required  by  the 
Consul,  which  would  be  equivalent  to  a  hostile  rupture,  without  the 
intervention  of  the  supreme  Government  of  the  State,  which  is  alone 
competent  to  authorize  such  a  rupture. 

I  renew,  etc., 
(Signed)       ANTONIO  JOAQUIM  DA  SILVA  GOMES. 

To  Mr.  Thomas  F.  Wilson,  Consul  of  the  United  States.* 


[Copy.     No.  38.] 
To  the  Honourable  Gideon  Welles,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

United  States  steamer  Waclmsett, 

St.  Thomas,  W.  L,  October  31st,  1864. 

SIR,— 

The  following  is  a  detailed  report  of  the  capture  of  the 
rebel  steamer  Florida  in  the  bay  of  San  Salvador,  Brazil,  by  the 
officers  and  crew  of  this  vessel,  without  loss  of  life : — 

At  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  seventh  day  of  October 
instant,  we  slipped  our  cable  and  steered  for  the  Floiida,  about  five- 
eighths  of  a  mile  distant.  An  unforeseen  circumstance  prevented  us 
from  striking  her  as  intended  ;  we,  however,  struck  her  on  the  star 
board  quarter,  cutting  down  her  bulwarks,  and  carrying  away  her 
mizen-mast  and  mainyard.  This  ship  was  not  injured. 

*  For  the  letter  from  the  United  States  Consul  to  the  President 
of  Bahia  and  the  reply  of  the  President,  see  'British  Case,'  pp. 
74,  75. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  203 

Immediately  upon  striking  we  backed  off,  believing  she  would 
sink  from  the  effects  of  the  blow. 

In  backing  clear  we  received  a  few  pistol-shots  from  the  Florida, 
which  were  returned  with  a  volley,  and  contrary  to  my  orders  two  of 
our  broadside  guns  were  fired,  when  she  surrendered. 

In  the  absence  of  Captain  Morris,  who  was  on  shore,  Lieutenant 
Thomas  K.  Porter,  formerly  of  the  United  States  Navy,  came  on 
board  and  surrendered  the  Florida,  with  fifty-eight  men  and  twelve 
officers,  making  at  the  same  time  an  oral  protest  against  the  capture. 

Five  of  the  Florida's  officers,  including  her  commander,  and  the 
remainder  of  her  crew,  were  on  shore. 

We  took  a  hawser  to  the  Florida  and  towed  her  to  sea. 

In  contemplating  the  attack  on  the  Florida  in  the  bay,  I  thought 
it  probable  the  Brazilian  authorities  would  forbear  to  interfere,  as 
they  had  done  at  Fernando  de  Noronha,  when  the  rebel  steamer 
Alabama  was  permitted  to  take  into  the  anchorage  three  American 
ships,  and  to  take  coal  from  the  Louisa  Hatch  within  musket-shot  of 
the  fort,  and  afterward,  within  easy  range  of  their  guns,  to  set  on  fire 
those  unarmed  vessels. 

I  regret,  however,  to  state  that  they  fired  three  shotted  guns  at  us 
while  we  were  towing  the  Florida  out. 

Fortunately  we  received  no  damage.  After  daylight  a  Brazilian 
sloop-of-war,  in  tow  of  a  paddle  gun-boat,  was  discovered  following 
us.  With  the  aid  of  sail  on  both  vessels  we  gradually  increased  our 
distance  from  them. 

We  had  three  men  slightly  wounded  ;  one  only  of  the  three  is  now 
on  the  sick  report. 

I  enclose  a  list  of  the  prisoners.  Those  who  have  a  star  opposite 
their  names  were  formerly  in  the  United  States  navy. 

This  vessel  is  ready  for  service.  The  Florida  will  require  repairs 
of  machinery,  a  new  mizen-mast,  etc. 

The  officers  and  crew  manifested  the  best  spirit.  They  have  my 
thanks  for  their  hearty  co-operation,  in  which  I  beg  to  include 
Thomas  F.  Wilson,  Esq.,  United  States  Consul  at  Bahia,  who  volun 
teered  for  any  duty. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully 

Your  obedient  servant, 

N.  COLLINS,  Commander. 


204  TEE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

[Copy.     No.  39.] 

To  the  Honourable  Gideon  Welles,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington 

City. 

United  States  Steamer,  Wachusett, 

Hampton  Roads,  Va.,  November  Uth,  1864. 
SIR,— 

The  following  is  a  supplement  to  my  report,  No.  38,  dated 
October  31st,  1864  :— 

1.  On  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  October  last,  I  directed  to  be 
cast  adrift  one  of  our  whale-boats,  just  returned  from  reconnoitring 
the  rebel  steamer  Flwida,  rather  than  attract  attention  of  outside 
persons  by  the  noise  of  hoisting  her. 

2.  At  the  time  of  starting  to  run  into  the  rebel  steamer  Florida 
on  the  7th  day  of  October  last,  I  ordered  thirty  fathoms  of  our 
cable  to  be  slipped  without  a  buoy,  as  I  feared  the  rope  of  the  latter 
might  possibly  foul  the  propeller. 

3.  Our  second  cutter  swamped  alongside  the  prize  steamer  Florida 
while  we  were  towing  the  ship  to  sea,  and  was  cut  adrift  to  avoid 
detention  in  range  of  the  Brazilian  guns.     As  the  tide  was  flood, 
both  the  whale-boat  and  cutter  will  probably  be  recovered  by  the 
United  States  upon  the  payment  of  salvage. 

Their  probable  value  was,  for  the  cutter,  one  hundred  and  fifty, 
and  for  the  whale-boat,  fifty  dollars. 

4.  Thomas  F.  Wilson,  United  States  Consul  at  Bahia,  desired  to 
remain  on  this  ship  during  the  nights  of  the  5th  and  6th  October 
last,  in  anticipation  of  a  probable  conflict  at  sea  with  the    rebel 
steamer  Florida,  and  was  on  board  at  the  time  of  the  capture  of  the 
latter  vessel,    As  it  was  not  convenient  to  land  him,  I  brought  him 
to  this  place. 

5.  At  the  island   of  St.  Bartholomew,  West  Indies,  where  we 
called  for  supplies,  every  facility  was  granted  us,  although  we  had 
one  case  of  varioloid  on  board.     I  trust  the  Department  may  make 
some  official  acknowledgment  to  the  Governor  of  that  island  for  his 
civility  to  us. 

6.  Walter  Dulany,  a  citizen  of  Baltimore,  a  passenger  on  the 
American  ship  Mondamin,  and  captured  by  the  rebel  steamer  Florida 
with  the  former  vessel,  was  found  on  the  Florida  when  we  captured 
her,  occupying  such  a  position  among  the  Florida's  officers,  some  of 
whom  were  former  friends  and  acquaintances,  that  I  would  suggest 
the  policy  of  either  holding  him  as  a  prisoner  or  of  compelling  him 
to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  205 

7.  The  authority  to  discharge  such  of  our  crew  as  have  served  out 
their  period  of  enlistment  is  respectfully   requested.      Some  have 
been  on  increased  pay  since  June  last,  consequent  upon  having  been 
detained  beyond  the  time  for  which  they  shipped. 

8.  We  touched  at  St.  Bartholomew,  West  Indies,   on  the  29th 
October  ult.,  and  at  St.  Thomas  on  the  30th,  where  we  remained  till 
the  2nd  inst.,  sailing  on  that  day,  and  arrived  here  on  the  12th. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

N.  COLLINS,  Commander. 


THE  SEIZURE  OF  THE  FLORIDA. 

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDING  MORRIS'S  OFFICIAL   STATEMENT. 

Bahia,  October  ISth,  1864. 

SIR,— 

It  is  with  great  pain  that  I  have  to  report  the  seizure  of 
the  Confederate  States  steamer  Flwida,  lately  under  my  command. 

I  arrived  at  this  port  on  the  4th  inst.,  at  9  p.m.,  to  procure  coal 
and  provisions,  and  also  to  get  some  slight  repairs  after  a  cruise 
of  sixty-one  days.  Just  after  anchoring,  a  boat  passing  around  us 
asked  the  name  of  our  vessel,  and,  upon  receiving  our  reply,  stated 
that  the  boat  was  from  her  Britannic  Majesty's  steamer  Curlew. 
Next  morning  I  found  that  the  United  States  steamer  Waclmsett 
was  at  anchor  near  us,  but  no  English  steamer,  so  I  at  once  concluded 
that  the  boat  which  had  hailed  us  the  evening  before  was  from  the 
Wacliusett. 

We  were  visited  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  by  a  Brazilian  officer, 
to  whom  I  stated  my  wants,  and  was  informed  by  him  that  he  would 
report  the  same  to  the  President,  and  that  until  his  answer  was 
received  we  could  hold  no  communication  with  the  shore.  At  noon 
I  received  a  communication— which  was  left  on  board  the  Florida — 
from  the  President,  stating  that  he  was  ready  to  receive  me.  At  our 
interview  he  informed  me  that  forty-eight  hours  would  be  allowed 
me  to  fit  and  repair,  but  that,  should  his  chief  engineer,  whom 
he  would  send  on  board  to  examine  the  machinery,  deem  the  time 
too  short,  he  would  grant  the  necessary  extension.  He  was  most 
urgent  in  his  request  that  I  should  strictly  observe  the  laws  of 
neutrality,  at  the  same  time  stating  to  me  that  he  had  received  the 
most  solemn  assurance  from  the  United  States  Consul  that  the 


206  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

United  States  steamer  would  do  nothing  in  port  contrary  to  the  laws 
of  nations  and  of  Brazil ;  and  that  he  desired  the  same  from  me, 
which  I  unhesitatingly  gave. 

The  Brazilian  admiral,  who  was  present  at  the  interview,  suggested 
that  I  had  better  move  my  vessel  in  between  his  ship  and  the  shore, 
as  our  proximity  to  the  Wachusett  might  cause  some  difficulty.  My 
assurance  to  the  President  seemed  to  set  his  mind  at  rest  on  the  score 
of  any  collision  between  the  two  vessels,  and  upon  leaving  him 
I  immediately  repaired  on  board  and  moved  the  Florida  close  inshore 
to  the  position  suggested  by  the  Admiral.  I  found  the  Brazilian 
engineer  on  board  and  was  informed  by  him  that  it  would  require 
four  days  to  repair  the  pipe  of  the  condenser.  Feeling  now  no 
apprehension  of  any  difficulty  occurring  while  in  port,  and  wishing 
to  gratify  the  crew  with  a  short  liberty,  not  only  on  the  score 
of  good  conduct,  but  also  of  health,  I  determined  to  permit  one  watch 
at  a  time  to  go  ashore  for  twelve  hours,  and  sent  the  port  watch  off 
that  afternoon.  About  7.30  p.m.  a  boat  came  alongside,  stating  that 
she  was  from  the  United  States  steamer  Wachusett,  with  the  United 
States  Consul,  who  had  an  official  communication  for  the  commander 
of  the  Florida.  The  letter,  with  the  card  of  the  Consul,  was  handed 
to  First-Lieutenant  Porter,  who,  after  examining  it,  and  finding  it 
directed  to  Captain  Morris,  "  sloop  Florida,"  returned  it  unopened 
to  the  Consul,  stating  that  it  was  improperly  addressed ;  that 
the  vessel  was  the  Confederate  States  steamer  Florida,  and  that  when 
the  letter  was  so  directed  it  would  be  received.  The  next  day  (6th) 
a  Mr.  de  Vidiky  came  on  board,  having  received  a  letter  from  the 
United  States  Consul,  enclosing  one  for  me.  He  requested  me,  before 
receiving  my  letter,  to  permit  him  to  read  to  me  the  one  sent 
to  him. 

It  was  a  request  of  Mr.  de  Vidiky  to  carry  a  challenge  to  the  com 
mander  of  the  Florida,  and  in  case  of  its  acceptance,  to  offer  his  (the 
Consul's)  influence  in  having  the  repairs  of  the  Florida  speedily 
finished.  I  informed  Mr.  de  Vidiky  that  I  had  heard  quite  enough, 
and,  finding  the  letter  to  me  improperly  addressed,  declined  receiving 
it ;  but  at  the  same  time  said  to  him  that  I  had  come  to  Bahia  for  a 
special  purpose,  which  being  accomplished,  I  should  leave ;  but  I 
would  neither  seek  nor  avoid  a  contest  with  the  Wachusett,  but 
should  I  encounter  her  outside  the  Brazilian  waters,  would  use  my 
utmost  endeavours  to  destroy  her.  That  afternoon,  the  port  watch 
having  returned,  I  sent  the  starboard  watch,  the  other  half  of  the 
crew,  ashore  on  liberty,  going  also  myself,  in  company  with  several 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  207 

of  the  officers.  From  our  nearness  to  the  Wachusett,  persons  on 
board  that  vessel  could  well  see  these  men  leave  the  ship.  At  3.30 
a.m.  I  was  awakened  by  the  proprietor  of  the  hotel  at  which  I  was 
staying,  and  told  that  there  was  some  trouble  on  board  the 
Florida,  as  he  had  heard  firing  and  cheering  in  the  direction  of  the 
vessel,  but  on  account  of  the  darkness  was  unable  to  discern  any 
thing.  I  immediately  hastened  to  the  landing,  and  was  informed  by 
a  Brazilian  officer  that  the  United  States  steamer  Wachusett  had  run 
into  and  seized  the  Florida,  and  was  then  towing  her  out  of  the 
harbour.  I  hurried  off  to  the  Admiral's  vessel,  and  was  told  by  him 
that  he  was  at  once  going  in  pursuit,  which  he  did  as  soon  as  steam 
was  raised  on  board  a  small  steamer  belonging  to  the  fleet. 

The  Admiral's  ship,  being  a  sailing  sloop-of-war,  was  taken  in 
tow  by  the  steamer  and  went  out  of  the  harbour.  He  returned 
in  the  afternoon  with  all  his  vessels,  having  been  unable  to  overtake 
the  Wachusett.  Upon  mustering  the  officers  and  crew  left  on  shore, 
I  found  there  four  officers,  viz.,  Lieutenant  Barron,  Paymaster  Taylor, 
Midshipman  Duke,  and  Master's-Mate  King,  and  71  men,  of  whom 
six  escaped  by  swimming  from  the  Florida  after  her  seizure.  Of  the 
actual  occurrences  and  loss  of  life  on  board  the  Florida,  I  have  been 
able  to  find  out  very  little.  The  substance  of  what  I  have  gathered 
from  the  six  men  who  escaped  is  as  follows:  That  at  3.15  a.m.  on  Oc 
tober  7th,  Master  T.  T.  Hunter,  Jr.,  being  in  charge  of  the  deck,  the 
Wachusett  left  her  anchorage,  and  taking  advantage  of  the  darkness, 
steamed  for  the  Florida,  from  which  she  was  not  seen  until  close  aboard, 
when  she  was  hailed  by  Mr.  Hunter,  who,  receiving  no  answer,  called 
'  all  hands '  to  quarters.  Before  the  officers  and  crew  were  all  on 
deck  the  Wachusett  Struck  the  Florida  on  her  starboard  quarter, 
cutting  her  rail  down  to  the  deck  and  carrying  away  her  mizen-mast, 
at  the  same  time  pouring  a  volley  of  musketry  and  a  charge  of  canister 
from  her  forecastle  pivot  gun  upon  our  decks.  The  Wachusett  then 
backed  off  and  demanded  our  surrender,  to  which  demand  Lieutenant 
Porter  declined  to  accede.  The  enemy  then  fired  again  and  again 
into  us,  which  was  returned  by  the  officers  and  crew  of  the  Florida. 

Another  demand  was  then  made  for  our  surrender,  and  Lieutenant 
Porter  answered,  *  I  will  surrender  conditionally.'  The  enemy  then 
stopped  firing,  and  the  commander  called  for  Captain  Morris  to  come 
on  board  ;  Lieutenant  Porter  answered  that  Captain  Morris  was  on 
shore,  and  that  he,  as  commanding  officer,  would  come  on  board  as 
soon  as  he  could  get  a  boat  ready.  The  enemy  then  sent  a  number 
of  armed  boats  to  take  possession  of  the  Florida.  As  soon  as 


208  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Lieutenant  Porter  was  heard  to  surrender,  fifteen  of  our  crew  jumped 
overboard  to  escape  capture,  of  whom  only  six  succeeded,  the  re 
maining  nine  having  been  shot  in  the  water  by  the  men  on  the  fore 
castle  and  in  the  boats  of  the  Wacliusett.  Mr.  Hunter  was  wounded 
and  a  number  of  men  killed.  The  enemy  made  fast  a  hawser  to  the 
foremast  of  the  Florida,  and,  after  slipping  her  cable,  towed  her  out 
to  sea. 

I  called  in  person  on  the  President  as  soon  as  possible,  but  could 
get  no  further  information  from  him.  On  the  8th  I  sent  a  protest 
to  the  President,  of  which  I  send  you  a  copy,  marked  2.  On  the 
10th  our  agent  was  informed  by  the  interpreter  that  the  President 
did  not  intend  to  answer  my  protest,  as  the  Confederate  Government 
had  not  been  recognised  by  Brazil,  and  that  I  could  find  all  the  official 
correspondence  in  the  newspapers. 

I  then  wrote  a  letter  marked  3,  in  which  reference  is  made  to  a 
letter  marked  4.  Just  before  leaving  Bahia,  having  received  no 
answer,  I  sent  our  agent,  Mr.  James  Dwyer,  to  the  President.  The 
result  of  his  visit  is  contained  in  his  letter,  marked  5.  The  Bahia 
papers  contain  a  number  of  reports  as  to  the  killed  and  wounded  on 
board  the  Flwida,  all  of  which  I  have  thoroughly  sifted,  and  find  no 
foundation  for  the  same. 

At  the  time  of  her  seizure  there  was  about  twenty-five  tons  of 
coal  on  board,  most  of  which  was  dust.  The  list  of  officers  captured 
is  contained  in  the  report  of  Paymaster  Taylor,  marked  6. 

The  enclosed  newspaper  is  an  official  extract  containing  all  the 
Brazilian  correspondence  in  reference  to  the  Florida. 

I  am,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 
(Signed)  C.  MANIGAULT  MORRIS, 

Lieutenant-Commanding,  Confederate  States  Navy. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  209 

[Copy.} 

LETTER  OF  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  BAHIA  TO  THE 
AMERICAN  CONSUL. 

To  Mr.  Thomas  Wilson. 

Bahia,  October  7th,  1864. 

Palace. 
SlR,- 

Having  reached  this  Presidency  the  grave  attempt  committed 
by  the  steamer  Wachusett,  of  the  United  States  of  North  America, 
and  which,  violating  the  neutrality  of  the  Empire,  treasonably  and 
disrespectfully  during  the  night  set  at  defiance  the  respect  due  to 
the  Empire,  and  in  the  harbour  took  prisoner  the  steamer  Florida, 
setting  aside  the  most  sacred  rights  of  people  and  civilized  nations, 
that  guards  between  nations  belligerent  any  such  acts,  having  this 
Presidency  received  the  word  of  honour  of  the  Consul,  Mr.  Wilson, 
to  preserve  the  neutrality,  that  in  explicit  terms  promised  that  the 
Commander  of  the  steamer  Wachusdt  should  confine  himself  to  his 
duties,  and  respect  the  neutrality  due  to  the  Empire,  and  not 
practise  any  hostile  act  in  these  territorial  waters.  The  President 
cannot  refrain  from  solemnly  protesting  against  the  act  referred  to, 
the  more  so  that  the  Consul  is  therein  implicated,  seeing  that,  spite 
of  his  formal  promise,  he  has  not  taken  any  measure  to  withdraw 
from  the  responsibility  of  this  action.  And  as  this  fact  and  the 
silence  preserved  up  to  this  date  evidently  prove  that  the  President 
cannot  confide  in  his  endeavours  to  preserve  the  neutrality  and 
sovereignty  of  the  Empire,  it ,  is  resolved  to  at  once  interrupt  all 
official  relations  with  him  until  further  orders  from  the  Govern 
ment,  where  this  unexpected  and  deplorable  act  will  be  related,  and 
where,  in  its  higher  knowledge,  final  decision  will  be  given.  The 
Consul  is  in  the  meantime  duty  informed  that  orders  are  given  to 
the  respective  authorities  that  in  no  '  harbour '  of  the  Province  the 
steamer  Wachusett  will  be  allowed  entrance,  resorting,  if  necessary, 
to  force  for  this  end.  According  to  the  terms  of  the  instructions 
promulgated  on  the  23rd  of  June  past  by  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  this,  if  the  steamer  obstinately  and  criminally  persists  in 
continuing  in  this  manner,  to  infringe  the  rights  imposed  by  the 
dignity  of  its  own  flag. 

(Signed)        ANTONIO  JOACHIM  DA  SILVA  GOMES. 

VOL.    I.  14 


210  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 


LETTER  FROM  THE  COMMANDER  OF  THE  2nd   NAVAL 
DIVISION  TO  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  BAHIA. 

To  the  President. 

Steamer  Paraense,  Bahia,  October  7th,  1864. 

ILLUS.  E  Ex.  SENHOR, — 

It  is  my  duty  to  state  to  your  Excellency  that  to-day  at 
daybreak  the  United  States  of  America  steamer  Waclmsett,  without 
having  previously  given  any  symptom  of  moving,  suddenly  left  the 
anchorage  where  she  was,  and  approached  the  Confederate  States 
steamer  Florida.  When  she  passed  by  the  poop  of  the  corvette 
D.  Januaria,  where  I  was,  I  intimated  that  she  should  anchor,  and  not 
doing  so,  sent  an  officer  on  board  to  give  notice  that  all  the  ships  of 
the  division,  as  well  as  the  forts,  would  fire  if  she  attacked  the 
Florida.  To  this  intimation  the  commander  replied  that  he 
should  comply,  and  do  nothing  further,  and  that  he  would  return  to 
his  anchorage,  as  your  Excellency  will  see  by  the  paper  annexed 
signed  by  the  officer  who  gave  this  notice. 

Notwithstanding,  the  corvette,  to  ratify  the  intimation,  fired  a  gun 
loaded  with  ball.  Following,  notwithstanding,  her  way  outside,  as 
it  appeared  to  me  to  return  to  her  anchorage,  I  observed  as  she 
passed  by  the  bow  that  she  was  tugging  the  Florida.  Immediately 
this  steamer  fired  in  the  direction  of  the  steamer  Wachusett  cannon 
loaded  with  ball ;  but  escaping  this  attack,  sailing  in  the  direction  of 
the  bow,  thus  rendering  useless  the  fire  from  the  corvette,  and  I 
therefore  ordered  to  cease  firing.  Having  previously  ordered  that 
the  Paraense  should  be  made  ready  to  move,  I  immediately  that  this 
was  possible  sailed,  and  went  after  her,  seeing  that  the  breeze  was 
light,  and  made  signal  to  the  yacht  Rio  de  Contes  to  follow  us  to  the 
waters,  which  she  did  with  all  possible  speed,  sailing  in  our  wake. 

We  chased  the  Wachusett  outside  the  harbour  as  she  tugged  the 
Florida,  both  of  which  were  little  more  than  three  miles  off.  I  trust 
your  Excellency  will  believe  that  when  I  left  this  port  it  was  with 
the  decided  determination  of  sacrificing  every  consideration  present 
and  future  to  fight  her,  notwithstanding  the  small  amount  of  force 
on  which  I  could  reckon,  in  order  to  vindicate  the  insult  offered  to 
the  sovereignty  of  the  country,  thus  taking  by  main  force  the 
steamer  Florida;  and  this  thought  I  expressed  to  the  officers  on 
leaving  the  harbour  as  they  were  united  in  the  cabin,  showing  them 
the  requirement  in  which  we  found  ourselves  to  sacrifice  every  con- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  211 

sideration  without  a  thought  to  consequences,  seeing  that  the  pro 
ceeding  of  the  commander  of  the  Wachusett  was  of  a  nature  to  arouse 
the  indignation  of  every  Brazilian.  A  general  and  enthusiastic 
manifestation  of  complete  adhesion  to  my  opinion  was  the  reply 
given  by  all  the  officers ;  and  I  am  convinced  that  the  other  ships 
that  accompanied  me  felt  the  same  noble  sentiments. 

At  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  Paraense,  tugging  the  yacht, 
gained  considerably  on  the  two  American  steamers,  and  I  began  to 
nourish  the  hope  that  we  should  satisfy  our  desires,  when  the  wind 
calming,  which  the  Waclmsett  soon  perceived,  always  tugging  the 
Florida,  began  steaming,  increasing  gradually  the  distance  between 
our  ships  and  their  steamers  flying  before  our  bow,  and  being  of 
considerably  superior  swiftness.  Nevertheless,  we  chased  them 
until  eleven  o'clock  and  forty-five  minutes,  when  disappearing,  I 
determined  on  returning  to  the  port,  returning  to  the  Paraense, 
leaving  outside  the  corvette  and  the  yacht,  with  orders  also  to 
return  to  this  harbour,  where  I  dropped  anchor  at  a  quarter  past 
three. 

Before  finishing  this  communication,  I  ought  to  give  notice  that  a 
few  moments  before  leaving  this  harbour  I  received  offers  from  the 
Inspector  of  the  Arsenal  and  Captain  of  the  Port  of  assistance,  or 
anything  in  their  power,  which  I  accepted,  begging  them  to  send  me 
as  many  armed  sailors  as  was  possible.  But  it  being  necessary  to 
use  the  greatest  possible  urgency  in  order  to  catch  the  flying 
steamers,  I  believed  I  ought  not  to  wait,  and  immediately  quitted 
without  waiting  for  the  offered  help,  also  failing  to  wait  on  your 
Excellency  for  the  same  motive,  according  to  the  message  I  re 
ceived. 

God  preserve  your  Excellency. 

(Signed)        GERVASIO  MACEBO, 

Commander  of  the  Division. 

NOTE. — The  two  foregoing  letters  are  printed  verbatim  from  the 
translations  made  by  the  public  interpreter  at  Bahia,  at  the  time  of 
the  occurrence.  They  were  given  in  the  above  form  to  Captain 
Morris,  and  handed  by  him  to  me  on  his  arrival  in  England.  It  has 
been  thought  best  to  reproduce  them  without  putting  the  phraseology 
into  better  idiomatic  English,  for  fear  that  the  precise  meaning  of 
the  writers  might  be  inadvertently  altered  in  the  effort  to  express 
the  sense  in  an  easier  and  more  graceful  flow  of  language. 

14—2 


212  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

[Copy.} 

LETTER  FROM  THE  BRAZILIAN  MINISTER  AT  WASHING 
TON  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES'  SECRETARY  OF  STATE. 

(Translation.) 
To  his  Excellency  the  Hon.  William  H.  Seward. 

Imperial  Legation  of  Brazil, 

Washington,  December  12th,  1864. 

The  undersigned,  Charge  d' Affaires  ad  interim  of  his  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  Brazil,  has  just  received  orders  from  his  Government  to 
address  himself  without  delay  to  that  of  the  United  States  of  North 
America  about  an  act  of  the  most  transcendent  gravity  done  on  the 
morning  of  the  7th  day  of  October  last,  in  the  port  of  the  capital  of 
the  Province  of  Bahia,  by  the  war  steamer  Wachusett,  belonging  to 
the  navy  of  the  Union,  an  act  which  involves  a  manifest  violation 
of  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  Empire,  and  an  offence  to 
its  honour  and  sovereignty. 

On  the  4th  day  of  the  month  referred  to,  there  entered  that  port, 
where  already  had  been  lying  for  some  days  the  Wachmett,  the 
Confederate  steamer  Florida,  for  the  purpose  declared  by  her 
commander  to  the  President  of  the  province,  to  supply  herself  with 
alimentary  provisions  and  coal,  and  to  repair  some  tubes  of  her 
machinery. 

The  President,  proceeding  in  accordance  with  the  policy  of 
neutrality  which  the  Empire  resolved  to  adopt  on  the  question  in 
which  unfortunately  these  States  are  involved,  and  in  conformity  with 
the  instructions  in  this  respect  issued  by  the  Imperial  Government  on 
the  23rd  of  June  of  the  year  last  past,  assented  to  the  application  of 
the  Florida,  and  fixed  the  term  of  forty-eight  hours  for  taking  in 
supplies,  and  fixing,  in  dependence  on  the  final  examination  by  the 
engineer  of  the  Arsenal,  the  determination  of  the  residue  of  the 
time  which,  peradventure,  should  be  deemed  indispensable  for  the 
completion  of  the  repairs. 

The  same  authority  at  once  took,  with  the  greatest  impartiality, 
all  the  measures  necessary  to  avoid  any  conflict  between  the  two 
hostile  steamers. 

The  Florida  was  placed  under  cover  of  the  batteries  of  the 
Brazilian  corvette  D.  Jamiaria,  on  the  inshore  side,  at  the  request  of 
her  commander,  who,  reposing  on  the  faith  with  which,  without 
doubt,  the  chief  authority  of  the  province  could  not  fail  to  inspire 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  213 

him,  considered  himself  sheltered  from  any  attack  of  his  adversary, 
and  in  this  confidence  not  only  stayed  a  night  on  shore,  but 
gave  liberty  to  a  great  part  of  the  crew  of  his  vessel. 

It  behoves  me  to  say  that,  as  soon  as  the  Confederate  steamer 
entered  the  port  of  Bahia,  the  American  Consul,  Wilson,  addressed 
to  the  President  a  despatch  claiming  that  the  Florida  should  not  be 
admitted  to  free  pratique,  and  that  on  the  contrary  she  should  be 
detained,  alleging  for  this,  that  that  vessel  had,  in  concert  with  the 
Alabama,  violated  the  neutrality  of  the  Empire  by  making  captures 
in  1863,  near  the  island  of  Fernando  cle  Noronha. 

Such  exaggerated  pretensions,  founded  on  facts  not  proven,  which 
had  already  been  the  subject  of  discussion  between  the  Imperial 
Government  and  the  legation  of  the  United  States,  could  not  be  even 
listened  to. 

If  the  President  should  have  refused  the  hospitality  solicited 
by  the  commander  of  the  Florida,  he  would  have  infringed  not  only 
the  duties  of  neutrality  of  the  Empire,  but  also  those  of  humanity, 
considering  that  steamer,  coming  from  Teneriffe,  had  been  sixty-one 
days  at  sea,  was  unprovided  with  food,  and  with  machinery  in  the 
worst  condition. 

Afterwards,  the  President  having  stated  to  the  same  Consul  that 
he  hoped,  from  his  honour  and  loyalty  toward  a  friendly  nation,  that 
he  would  settle  with  the  commander  of  the  Wachusett  that  he  should 
respect  the  neutrality  and  sovereignty  of  the  Empire,  he  was 
answered  affirmatively,  the  Consul  pledging  his  word  of  honour. 
Things  were  in  this  condition,  the  term  of  forty-eight  hours  being  to 
expire  at  one  o'clock  of  the  afternoon  of  the  7th,  when,  about  dawn 
of  that  day,  the  commander  of  the  steamer  Wachusett,  suddenly 
leaving  his  anchorage,  passed  through  the  Brazilian  vessels-of-war 
and  approached  the  Florida. 

On  passing  across  the  bows  of  the  Brazilian  corvette  D.  Januaria, 
he  was  hailed  from  on  board  that  he  must  anchor ;  but,  as  he  did 
not  attend  to  this  intimation,  and  continued  to  approach  the  Florida, 
at  the  same  time  firing  a  gun  and  some  musketry,  the  Commander  of 
the  Naval  Division  of  the  Empire  stationed  in  those  waters  sent  an 
officer  to  board  the  Wachusett  and  inform  her  commander  that  the 
ships  of  the  division  and  the  forts  would  open  fire  upon  her  if  she 
should  attack  the  Florida.  The  Brazilian  officer  was  not  allowed  to 
make  fast  to  the  Wachusett,  but  the  officer  of  the  deck  hailed  him, 
saying  in  reply  that  he  accepted  the  intimation  given,  that  he  would 
do  nothing  more,  and  that  he  was  going  to  return  to  his  anchorage. 


2H  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

The  commander  of  the  Brazilian  division  then  thought  proper  to 
ratify  his  intimation  by  firing  a  gun,  upon  which  a  complete  silence 
followed  between  the  two  ships  Wachusett  and  Florida.  At  the  time 
this  was  passing  the  corvette  D.  Januaria,  on  board  which  the  com 
mander  of  the  division  had  hoisted  his  flag,  lay  head  to  flood,  the 
steamer  Florida  anchored  B.  B.,  side  by  side  of  her,  and  quite  close  to 
the  shore,  and  between  her  and  the  corvette  the  Wachusett  stopped 
her  wheels. 

The  Commander  of  Division  then  observing — notwithstanding 
the  darkness  of  the  night — that  the  Wachusett,  from  the  position  in 
which  she  was,  kept  moving  onward,  and  was  passing  ahead  of  the 
corvette,  in  a  course  E.B.,  became  convinced  that,  in  fact,  she 
was  steering  for  her  anchorage,  thus  complying  with  the  promise 
made. 

But  a  few  moments  afterwards,  perceiving  that  the  Florida  was  in 
motion,  the  commander  discovered  that  the  Waclmsett  was  taking 
her  off  in  tow  by  means  of  a  long  cable. 

Surprised  at  such  an  extraordinary  attempt,  the  commander 
immediately  set  about  stopping  this,  and  redressing,  at  the  same 
time,  as  behoved  him,  the  offence  thus  done  to  the  dignity  and 
sovereignty  of  the  Empire. 

But  availing  himself  of  the  darkness  of  the  night  and  other  circum 
stances,  the  commander  of  the  Wachusett  succeeded  in  carrying 
his  prize  over  the  bar,  and  escaping  the  just  punishment  he 
deserved. 

The  Consul,  Wilson,  preferred  to  abandon  his  post,  withdrawing 
on  board  the  Wachusett. 

The  Government  of  his  Majesty,  as  soon  as  it  had  official  informa 
tion  of  the  event,  addressed  to  the  legation  of  the  United  States  at 
Bio  Janeiro  a  note,  in  which,  giving  a  succinct  exposition  of  the  fact, 
it  declared  that  it  had  no  hesitation  in  believing  it  would  hasten  to 
give  to  it  all  proper  assurances  that  the  Government  of  the  Union 
would  attend  to  the  just  reclamation  of  the  Empire  as  promptly  and 
fully  as  the  gravity  of  the  case  demanded. 

In  correspondence  with  this  expectative  note,  the  worthy  represen 
tative  of  the  United  States  was  prompt  in  sending  his  reply,  in 
which  he  declares  he  is  convinced  that  his  Government  will  give  to 
that  of  the  Empire  the  reparation  which  is  due  to  it 

Such  are  the  facts  to  which  the  undersigned  has  received  order  to 
call  the  attention  of  the  Honourable  William  H.  Seward,  Secretary 
of  State  of  the  United  States. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  215 

The  principles  of  international  law  which  regulate  this  matter, 
and  in  respect  of  which  there  is  not  the  least  divergence  among  the 
most  distinguished  publicists,  are  common,  and  known  to  all  The 
undersigned  would  fail  to  recognise  the  high  intelligence  of  the 
Honourable  Mr.  Seward,  if,  perchance,  he  should  enter  in  this 
respect  into  fuller  developments. 

He  limits  himself  then  only  to  recall  a  memorable  example,  in 
which  these  principles,  invariably  sustained  by  the  United  States, 
had  entire  application.  In  1793,  the  great  Washington  then  being 
President  of  the  United  States,  and  the  illustrious  Jefferson  Secretary 
of  State,  the  French  frigate  L'Embuscade  captured  the  English  ship 
Grange  in  Delaware  Bay,  thus  violating  the  neutrality  and  the 
territorial  sovereignty  of  the  United  States.  The  American  Govern 
ment  remonstrated  energetically  against  this  violation,  and  required 
from  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic,  not  only  the  immediate 
delivery  of  the  captured  vessel,  but  also  the  complete  liberation  of 
all  the  persons  found  on  board.  This  reclamation  was  promptly 
satisfied.  Much  more  grave,  certainly,  is  the  occurrence  in  the  port 
of  the  province  of  Bahia  which  makes  the  subject  of  the  present 
note.  By  the  special  circumstances  which  preceded  and  attended  it, 
this  act  has  no  parallel  in  the  annals  of  modern  maritime  war. 

The  commander  of  the  Wac/iusett  not  only  gravely  offended  the 
territorial  immunities  of  the  Empire,  passing  beyond  the  laws  of 
war  by  attacking  treacherously,  during  the  night,  a  defenceless  ship, 
whose  crew,  much  reduced,  because  more  than  sixty  men  were  on 
shore  with  the  commander  and  several  officers,  reposed  unwary 
beneath  the  shadow  of  the  protection  which  the  neutrality  of  the 
Empire  guaranteed  to  them ;  and  so  open  was  the  violation,  so 
manifest  the  offence,  that  the  enlightened  American  press  was  almost 
unanimous  in  condemnation  of  the  inexcusable  proceeding  of  Com 
mander  Collins. 

On  this  occasion,  remembering  the  United  States,  whose  antece 
dents  are  well  known  and  noted  in  history  by  the  energetic  defence 
and  respect  for  neutral  rights,  of  these  unshaken  principles,  the 
undersigned  cannot  consider  the  event  which  occurred  at  Bahia 
otherwise  than  as  the  individual  act  of  the  commander  of  the 
Wachusett  not  authorized  or  approved  by  his  Government,  and  that 
it  will  consequently  give  to  the  Government  of  his  Majesty  the 
Emperor  the  explanations  and  reparation  which  in  conformity  with 
international  laws  are  due  to  a  power  which  maintains  friendly  and 
pacific  relations  with  the  United  States. 


216  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

The  just  reclamation  of  the  Imperial  Government  being  thus  pre 
sented,  the  undersigned  awaits  the  reply  of  the  Honourable  Mr. 
Seward,  and  fully  confiding  in  his  exalted  wisdom,  and  in  the  justice 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  he  has  not  even  for  a 
moment  doubted  but  that  it  will  be  as  satisfactory  as  the  incontest 
able  right  which  aids  the  Empire,  and  the  vast  gravity  of  the  offence 
which  was  done  to  it,  may  require. 

The  undersigned,  etc., 
(Signed)      IGNACIO  DE  AVELLAR  BARBOZA  DA  SILVA. 


ME.  SEWARD  TO  ME.  BARBOZA  DA  SILVA. 
To  Senhor  Ignacio  de  Avellar  Barboza  da  Silva,  etc. 

Department  of  State, 

Washington,  December  2Qth,  1864. 

SIR,— 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  note, 
which  sets  forth  the  sentiments  of  the  Imperial  Government  of 
Brazil  concerning  the  capture  of  the  Florida  by  the  United  States 
war-steamer  Waclmsett  in  the  port  of  Bahia. 

You  will,  of  course,  explain  to  your  Government  that  owing  to  an 
understanding  between  you  and  myself,  your  note,  although  it  bears 
the  date  of  the  12th  December,  was  not  submitted  to  me  until  the 
21st  inst. 

Jealousy  of  foreign  intervention  in  every  form,  and  absolute  non 
intervention  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  foreign  nations,  are  cardinal 
principles  in  the  policy  of  the  United  States.  You  have,  therefore, 
justly  expected  that  the  President  would  disavow  and  regret  the 
proceedings  at  Bahia.  He  will  suspend  Captain  Collins,  and  direct 
him  to  appear  before  a  court-martial.  The  Consul  at  Bahia  admits 
that  he  advised  and  incited  the  captain,  and  was  active  in  the  pro 
ceedings.  He  will  therefore  be  dismissed.  The  flag  of  Brazil  will 
receive  from  the  United  States  navy  the  honour  customary  in  the 
intercourse  of  friendly  maritime  powers. 

It  is,  however,  not  to  be  understood  that  this  Government  admits 
or  gives  credit  to  the  charges  of  falsehood,  treachery,  and  deception 
which  you  have  brought  against  the  captain  and  the  Consul.  These 
charges  are  denied  on  the  authority  of  the  officers  accused. 

You  will  also  be  pleased  to  understand  that  the  answer  now  given 
to  your  representation  rests  exclusively  upon  the  ground  that  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  217 

capture  of  the  Florida  was  an  unauthorized,  unlawful,  and  indefen 
sible  exercise  of  the  naval  force  of  the  United  States  within  a  foreign 
country  in  defiance  of  its  established  and  duly  recognised  Govern 
ment. 

This  Government  disallows  your  assumption  that  the  insurgents  of 
this  country  are  a  lawful  naval  belligerent ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  it 
maintains  that  the  ascription  of  that  character  by  the  Government  of 
Brazil  to  insurgent  citizens  of  the  United  States,  who  have  hitherto 
been,  and  who  still  are,  destitute  of  naval  forces,  ports,  and  courts, 
is  an  act  of  intervention  in  derogation  of  the  law  of  nations,  and  un 
friendly  and  wrongful,  as  it  is  manifestly  injurious,  to  the  United 
States. 

So,  also,  this  Government  disallows  your  assumption  that  the 
Florida  belonged  to  the  afore-mentioned  insurgents,  and  maintains, 
on  the  contrary,  that  that  vessel,  like  the  Alabama,  was  a  pirate, 
belonging  to  no  nation  or  lawful  belligerent,  and  therefore  that  the 
harbouring  and  supplying  of  these  piratical  ships  and  their  crews  in 
Brazilian  ports  were  wrongs  and  injuries  for  which  Brazil  justly  owes 
reparation  to  the  United  States,  as  ample  as  the  reparation  which  she 
now  receives  from  them.  They  hope,  and  confidently  expect,  this 
reciprocity  in  good  time  to  restore  the  harmony  and  friendship 
which  are  so  essential  to  the  welfare  and  safety  of  the  two  countries. 

In  the  position  which  I  have  assumed,  the  Imperial  Government 
will  recognise  an  adherence  to  rights  which  have  been  constantly 
asserted,  and  an  enduring  sense  of  injuries  which  have  been  the 
subject  of  earnest  remonstrance  by  the  United  States  during  the  last 
three  years.  The  Government  of  Brazil  is  again  informed  that  these 
positions  of  this  Government  are  no  longer  deemed  open  to  argu 
ment. 

It  does  not,  however,  belong  to  the  captains  of  ships-of-war  of  the 
United  States,  or  to  the  commanders  of  their  armies,  or  to  their 
consuls  residing  in  foreign  ports,  acting  without  the  authority  of 
Congress,  and  without  even  Executive  direction,  and  choosing  their 
own  time,  manner,  and  occasion,  to  assert  the  rights  and  redress  the 
wrongs  of  the  country.  This  power  can  be  lawfully  exercised  only 
by  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  As  a  member  of  the 
family  of  nations,  the  United  States  practise  order,  not  anarchy,  as 
they  always  prefer  lawful  proceedings  to  aggressive  violence  or 
retaliation.  The  United  States  are  happy  in  being  able  to  believe 
that  Brazil  entertains  the  same  sentiments.  The  authorities  at 
Bahia  are  understood  to  have  unsuccessfully  employed  force  to 


218  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

overcome  the  Wachu&ett  and  rescue  the  Florida,  and  to  have  con 
tinued  the  chase  of  the  offender  beyond  the  waters  of  Brazil,  out 
upon  the  high  seas.  Thus,  in  the  affair  at  Bahia,  subordinate  agents, 
without  the  knowledge  of  their  respective  Governments,  mutually 
inaugurated  an  unauthorized,  irregular,  and  unlawful  war.  In  de 
sisting  from  that  war  on  her  part,  and  in  appealing  to  the  Govern 
ment  for  redress,  Brazil  rightly  appreciated  the  character  of  the 
United  States,  and  set  an  example  worthy  of  emulation. 

The  disposition  of  the  captured  crew  of  the  Flwida  is  determined 
upon  the  principles  which  I  have  laid  down.  Although  the  crew  are 
enemies  of  the  United  States,  and,  as  they  contend,  enemies  of  the 
human  race,  yet  the  offenders  were,  nevertheless,  unlawfully  brought 
into  the  custody  of  this  Government,  and  therefore  they  could  not 
lawfully  be  subjected  here  to  the  punishment  which  they  have 
deserved.  Nor  could  they,  being  enemies,  be  allowed  to  enjoy  the 
protection  of  the  United  States.  They  will,  therefore,  be  set  at 
liberty,  to  seek  a  refuge  wheresoever  they  may  find  it,  with  the 
hazard  of  recapture  when  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Govern 
ment. 

The  Florida  was  brought  into  American  waters,  and  was  anchored 
under  naval  surveillance  and  protection  at  Hampton  Roads.  While 
awaiting  the  representation  of  the  Brazilian  Government,  on  the 
28th  November,  she  sank,  owing  to  a  leak  which  could  not  be 
seasonably  stopped.  The  leak  was  at  first  represented  to  have  been 
caused,  or  at  least  increased,  by  a  collision  with  a  war  transport. 
Orders  were  immediately  given  to  ascertain  the  manner  and  cir 
cumstances  of  the  occurrence.  It  seemed  to  affect  the  army  and  the 
navy.  A  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry  and  also  a  Military  Court  of  In 
quiry  were  charged  with  the  investigation.  The  Naval  Court  has 
submitted  its  report,  and  a  copy  thereof  is  herewith  communicated. 
The  Military  Court  is  yet  engaged.  So  soon  as  its  labours  shall 
have  ended,  the  result  will  be  made  known  to  your  Government.  In 
the  meantime  it  is  assumed  that  the  loss  of  the  Florida  was  a  conse 
quence  of  some  unforeseen  accident,  which  cast  no  responsibility  upon 
the  United  States. 

I  avail,  etc., 

(Signed)        WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD. 

NOTE. — The  two  foregoing  letters,  Senhor  Barboza  da  Silva  to  Mr. 
Seward,  and  the  reply  of  Mr.  Seward,  will  be  found  in  the  '  British 
Case,'  pp.  75-78. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  219 


COPY  OF  REPORT  OF  LIEUTENANT  T.  K.  PORTER  ON 
THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES 
STEAMER  FLORIDA  BY  THE  UNITED  STATES 
STEAMER  WACHUSETT. 

To  Lieutenant-Commander  C.  M.  Morris,  Confederate  States  Navy. 

Liverpool,  February  2Qth,  1865. 

SIR,— 

In  obedience  to  orders  I  submit  the  following  report  of 
the  capture  of  the  Confederate  States  steamer  Florida  at  Bahia, 
Brazil,  on  the  7th  of  October,  1864,  by  the  United  States  steamer 
Wachusett,  the  treatment  of  the  officers  and  crew  while  prisoners ; 
and  the  manner  of  our  release.  But  before  commencing  I  beg  to 
call  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  before  entering  the  harbour  our 
shot  were  withdrawn  from  the  guns ;  that  after  our  being  requested 
by  the  Brazilian  naval  commander  to  anchor  in-shore  of  his  squadron 
we  let  our  steam  go  down  and  hauled  fires. 

At  about  3  a.m.  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  October,  the  officer  of 
the  deck,  Acting- Master  T.  T.  Hunter,  sent  the  quarter-master  down 
to  call  me,  and  tell  me  that  the  Wachusett  was  under  weigh  and  standing 
towards  us.  I  immediately  jumped  on  deck,  when  I  saw  the  Wachusett 
about  twenty  yards  off,  standing  for  our  starboard  quarter.  A  moment 
after  she  struck  us  abreast  the  mizen-mast,  broke  it  into  three  pieces, 
crushed  in  the  bulwarks,  knocked  the  quarter-boat  in  on  deck, 
jammed  the  wheel,  carried  away  the  mainyard,  and  started  the 
beams  for  about  thirty  feet  forward.  At  the  same  time  she  fired 
about  two  hundred  shots  from  her  small  arms,  and  two  from  her  great 
guns.  She  then  backed  off  about  one  hundred  yards,  and  demanded 
our  surrender.  I  replied  to  the  demand  that  I  would  let  them  know 
in  a  few  moments.  The  reply  from  the  Wachusett  was  to  surrender 
immediately,  or  they  would  blow  us  out  of  the  water.  As  more  than 
half  our  crew  were  ashore,  and  as  those  on  board  had  just  returned 
from  liberty,  I  believed  that  she  could  run  us  down  before  we  could 
get  our  guns  loaded.  But  as  I  did  not  like  to  surrender  the  vessel 
without  knowing  what  some  of  the  other  officers  thought  of  it,  I 
consulted  Lieutenant  Stone,  the  second  officer  in  rank ;  and  finding 
that  he  agreed  with  me  that  we  could  not  contend  against  her  with 
any  hopes  of  success,  I  informed  the  commander  of  the  Wachusett 
that  under  the  circumstances  I  would  surrender  the  vessel.  I  then 
went  on  board,  and  delivered  to  Commander  Collins  the  ship's  ensign 


220  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

and  my  sword.  He  immediately  sent  a  prize-crew  on  board  the 
Florida,  and  towed  her  out  of  the  harbour.  During  the  day  he 
transferred  about  two-thirds  of  those  captured  to  the  Wachwett.  He 
then  paroled  the  officers,  and  put  the  men  in  double  irons.  As  there 
were  so  few  men  compared  to  the  WacUusett's  crew,  and  those  divided 
between  the  two  ships,  I  tried  to  get  Captain  Collins  to  allow  the 
irons  to  be  taken  off  of  all,  or  a  part  of  them,  during  the  day,  but  he 
refused  to  do  so.  Beyond  keeping  the  men  in  double  irons  for  nearly 
two  months,  there  were  but  two  cases  of  severity  towards  them  that 
were  reported  to  me.  Henry  Norman  (cox.)  was  ironed  to  a  stanchion 
with  his  hands  behind  him  for  having  the  key  of  a  pair  of  the  Florida's 
irons  in  his  pocket.  He,  as  well  as  all  the  other  men  on  the 
Wachusett,  was  ironed  with  the  irons  belonging  to  her  (the  Wachusetf). 
John  Brogan  (fireman)  was  kept  in  the  sweat-box.  Dr.  Emory 
reported  to  me  that  he  was  sick  and  could  not  stand  such  treatment. 
I  asked  Captain  Collins  to  tell  me  why  he  was  so  treated.  His  reply 
was  that  Brogan  was  seen  talking,  and  that  when  his  master-at-arms 
came  up  he  stopped.  He  also  said  that  Brogan  had,  the  day  the 
Florida  was  captured,  cursed  one  of  his  engineers,  who  tried  to  get 
him  to  show  him  something  about  our  engines.  He  said,  though, 
that  he  had  ordered  his  release  two  days  before,  and  thought  he  had 
been  taken  out.  This  was  about  three  weeks  after  our  capture. 
Brogan  informed  me  afterwards  that  he  had  been  confined  there  for 
several  days,  and  eighteen  nights.  A  few  days  before  going  into 
St.  Thomas,  I  went  to  Captain  Collins,  and  told  him  that  on  a 
previous  occasion  he  had  informed  me  that  he  was  going  to  put  our 
men  ashore  at  Pernambuco,  and  that  as  we  would  be  in  port  a  few 
days,  I  would  like  to  know  if  he  still  intended  to  put  them  ashore, 
at  the  same  time  telling  him  that  I  thought  the  Florida  would  be 
given  up  by  his  Government,  and  that  I  thought  any  honourable 
man  would  try  to  return  the  ship  and  crew  as  nearly  in  the  condition 
in  which  he  found  her  as  he  could.  His  reply  was,  'I  have  not 
thought  of  it — I  have  not  thought  of  it  to-day.'  After  further 
conversation  I  left  him,  believing  that  he  would  not  try  to  break  up 
the  crew.  But  before  leaving  St.  Thomas  our  men  were  informed 
that  all  of  them  who  wished  to  go  ashore  could  do  so,  and  that 
Master  George  D.  Bryan  and  one  other  officer  would  meet  them  to 
look  out  for  them.  They  asked  what  was  to  become  of  their  money, 
which  had  been  taken  for  them,  and  were  told  that  Mr.  Bryan  would 
take  it  ashore  for  them.  A  number  of  them  thought  this  was  a  trick 
to  get  rid  of  them,  and  would  not  go,  but  eighteen  were  foolish 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  221 

enough  to  believe  it,  and  had  their  irons  taken  off  on  the  berth-deck, 
and  were  put  in  a  boat  from  the  bow  port,  and  allowed  to  go  ashore. 
The  first  Mr.  Bryan  heard  of  his  part  of  the  affair  was  when  we  left 
the  JVachusett  and  had  an  opportunity  of  talking  to  the  other  men. 
After  the  men  had  time  to  get  ashore,  the  commander  of  the 
Wacliusett  called  away  his  boats,  and  sent  an  armed  force  after  the 
boat  in  which  our  men  had  left.  So  anxious  was  he  to  get  them 
ashore,  that  he  sent  them  when  the  quarantine  flag  was  flying  at  his 
fore  in  consequence  of  having  the  small-pox  on  board.  The  United 
States  steamer  Keasarge  left  St.  Thomas  while  we  were  there,  and 
Dr.  Charlton  and  the  eighteen  men  on  the  Florida  were  transferred 
to  her.  When  we  arrived  at  Fortress  Monroe,  we  were  sent  up  to 
Point  Look-out  Prison,  and  there  the  officers  were  separated  from 
the  men,  and  sent  to  the  Old  Capitol  Prison  in  Washington.  But  in 
three  or  four  days  we  were  sent  back  to  the  Wacliusett  at  Fortress 
Monroe  to  go  to  Fort  Warren,  Boston.  On  our  return  to  Fortress 
Monroe,  I  heard  that  the  Florida! 's  money-chest  had  been  opened,  and 
I  went  to  Captain  Collins  and  reminded  him  that  soon  after  we  were 
captured,  I  informed  him  that  there  were  three  hundred  and  twenty 
dollars  in  it  which  belonged  to  the  wardroom  mess,  which  I  had 
given  to  the  paymaster  the  evening  before  we  were  captured,  to  keep 
till  the  caterer,  Lieutenant  Stone,  should  return  from  shore.  He 
told  me  that  he  had  mentioned  it  to  Rear-Admiral  Porter,  but  that 
the  Admiral  refused  to  give  it  to  us.  We  saw  the  Florida  before  we 
left.  She  had  lost  her  jibboom  by  a  steam-tug  running  into  her.  A 
lieutenant-commander  told  me  that  if  the  United  States  Govern 
ment  determined  to  give  her  up,  the  officers  of  the  navy  would 
destroy  her.  Several  other  of  our  officers  were  told  the  same. 
Whilst  in  Fort  Warren  we  heard  these  threats  were  carried  out. 

From  Hampton  Roads  we  were  carried  in  the  WachuseM  to  Boston, 
but  before  we  were  sent  to  Fort  Warren,  Lieutenant-Commander 
Beardsly  went  to  the  men  and  informed  them  that  he  was  sent  by 
Captain  Collins  to  tell  them  that  if  they  would  take  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  United  States  Government  they  would  be  released. 
He,  meeting  with  no  success,  was  succeeded  by  the  master-at-arms  of 
the  vessel,  and  a  sergeant  from  the  fort,  who  told  them  that  all  the 
men  but  five  of  those  who  had  come  from  St.  Thomas  on  the  Keasarge 
had  taken  the  oath.  I  do  not  know  by  whose  orders  this  was  told 
them ;  but  we  found  on  arriving  at  the  fort  that  it  had  no  more  truth 
in  it  than  the  report  they  gave  the  men  at  St.  Thomas,  that  Mr. 
Bryan  was  to  meet  them  on  shore.  I  am  happy  to  say  that  but  one 


222  THE  SECEET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

of  the  crew  deserted  his  flag,  and  he  did  it  the  day  we  were  captured. 
When  we  arrived  at  Fort  Warren,  the  men  were  all  put  in  one  room, 
and  the  eleven  officers  were  put  into  one  with  thirty-two  other 
prisoners.  These  rooms  were  casemates,  and  were  fifty  feet  long 
and  about  eighteen  feet  wide.  At  sunset  we  were  locked  up  in  these 
casemates,  and  released  after  sunrise,  and  allowed  to  promenade  the 
extent  of  five  such  rooms.  At  8  a.m.  we  were  marched  around  to 
the  cookhouse,  and  were  all  given  one  loaf  of  bread  each,  weighing 
fourteen  ounces.  After  12  we  were  marched  around  again,  and  were 
given  our  dinner,  which  consisted  of  about  eight  ounces  of  cooked 
meat,  with  half  a  pint  of  thin  soup,  three  days,  and  two  potatoes, 
some  beans  or  hominy  the  other  days.  This  was  all  we  received  each 
day.  Many  of  the  prisoners  by  economizing  found  this  enough  to 
appease  their  hunger,  but  a  great  many  others  were  hungry  all  the 
time.  If  we  had  been  allowed  to  buy  sugar  and  coffee,  and  bread 
and  cheese,  a  great  many  would  have  been  able  to  do  so,  and  divide 
with  some  of  their  friends  who  had  no  means,  but  we  were  allowed 
to  buy  nothing  to  eat  without  a  certificate  from  the  Post  surgeon  that 
we  were  sick.  There  is  an  arrangement  between  our  Government 
and  that  of  the  United  States,  that  prisoners-of-war  may  be  allowed 
to  receive  boxes  of  provisions  and  clothing  from  their  friends  at 
home,  but  the  United  States  Government  now  interprets  this  to 
mean  that  all  boxes  must  come  by  a  flag  of  truce.  As  half  of  the 
Confederate  prisoners  have  their  homes  within  what  is  now  the 
United  States  military  lines,  this  agreement  works  almost  entirely 
for  the  Federals  and  against  us.  Half  of  the  Florida  s  officers  were 
in  this  situation,  and  they  were  compelled  to  decline  the  offers  of 
their  friends.  On  the  24th  December  all  the  Florida's  officers  except 
Dr.  Charlton  and  fourteen  other  prisoners  were  locked  up  in  a  case 
mate,  and  kept  in  close  confinement  both  day  and  night.  We  were 
not  allowed  to  go  out  under  any  circumstances,  except  that  for  the 
first  four  days  we  were  marched  under  a  heavy  guard  to  the  cook 
house  twice  a  day.  After  that  our  dinner  was  brought  to  us,  and 
two  of  us  were  marched  around  to  get  the  bread  for  all  of  those  con 
fined.  This  was  for  discussing  a  plan  to  capture  the  fort,  which  one 
of  the  prison  spies,  who  pretends  to  be  a  lieutenant-colonel  in  our 
army,  and  a  lieutenant  in  the  English  army,  revealed  to  the 
authorities.  We  were  kept  in  close  confinement  until  the  19th  of 
January,  when  Lieutenant  Woodman,  of  the  United  States  army,  sent 
for  me,  and  told  me  that  he  had  an  order  from  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  to  release  the  officers  and  crew  of  the  Florida  from  Fort 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  223 

Warren,  and  that  as  such  was  the  case  he  would  release  all  of  us  from 
close  confinement.  He  showed  me  the  order  from  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  which  was  that  we  would  be  released  on  condition  that  we 
signed  a  parole  to  leave  the  United  States  within  ten  days.  I  asked 
him  if  we  would  be  given  the  money  and  our  swords,  and  other 
articles  captured  on  the  Florida,  which  had  not  been  sunk  with  her. 
He  said  that  he  knew  nothing  about  them,  but  that  if  I  wished  to 
write  to  Mr.  Welles,  he  would  send  the  communication.  I  then  gave 
him  a  copy  of  the  following  note,  which  he  assured  me  was  sent  the 
same  day : 

'  To  the  Hon.  Gideon  Welles,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

*  Fort  Warren,  January  l$th,  1863. 

1  SIR,— 

'  I  have  just  been  informed  by  the  commanding  officer  of  this 
fort  that  the  officers  and  crew  of  the  Confederate  States  steamer 
Floiida  will  be  released  on  condition  of  leaving  the  United  States 
within  ten  days.  We  will  accept  a  parole  to  leave  at  any  time  when 
we  are  put  on  board  any  steamer  going  to  Europe,  but  we  would 
prefer  to  go  to  Richmond.  We  would  call  your  attention  to  the  fact 
that  there  were  somewhere  about  thirteen  thousand  dollars  in  gold 
on  the  Florida  when  she  was  captured,  which  was  taken  out  of  her  by 
order  of  Rear- Admiral  Porter.  And  to  leave  the  United  States  it 
will  be  necessary  to  have  that  to  take  us  out,  unless  the  United 
States  Government  send  us  away  as  they  brought  us  in.  If  you  will 
give  us  our  money  we  would  prefer  remaining  here  till  a  steamer  leaves 
here  for  Europe,  or  we  would  ask  for  a  guard  till  we  are  put  on  one 
in  New  York,  as  so  many  of  us  being  together  might  be  the  cause 
of  an  unnecessary  disturbance,  of  which  we  would  be  the  sufferers. 
*  Very  respectfully, 

'Your  obedient  servant, 

'THOMAS  K.  PORTER, 
'  First-Lieutenant,  Confederate  States  Navy.' 

Mr.  Welles  made  no  reply  to  this.  After  waiting  a  week  and 
finding  that  the  United  States  Government  neither  intended  to  pay 
our  passage  away,  nor  to  give  us  the  money  belonging  to  our  Govern 
ment,  and  not  even  our  private  money,  I  sent  Lieutenant  Stone  to 
Boston  with  directions  to  procure  a  passage  in  the  British  and  North 
American  steamer  Canada,  or  if  he  failed  in  that,  to  get  us  out  of  the 


224  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

United  States  in  any  manner  possible.  He  succeeded  in  getting 
passage  for  all  of  us  on  the  Canada,  by  my  giving  a  draft  to  be  paid 
at  Liverpool.  And  on  the  1st  of  February  we  signed  the  following 
parole :  '  We,  the  undersigned  officers  and  crew  of  the  steamer  Florida, 
in  consideration  of  being  released  from  confinement  in  Fort  Warren, 
do  jointly  and  severally  pledge  our  sacred  word  of  honour  that  we 
will  leave  the  United  States  within  ten  days  from  date  of  release, 
and  that  while  in  the  United  States  we  will  commit  no  hostile  act,' 
and  I  left  the  fort  for  the  steamer  Canada.  It  may  be  of  importance 
to  state  that  we  were  officially  informed  by  Major  Gibson,  command 
ing  the  Post  part  of  the  time  we  were  there,  that  we  could  hold  no 
communication  with  the  Brazilian  authorities. 
Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  K.  PORTER, 
First-Lieutenant,  Confederate  States  Navy. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  225 


CHAPTER  V. 

The  building  of  the  Alabama. — Suspicions  of  the  United  States  Consul 
at  Liverpool. — Captain  Butcher. — The  equipping  of  the  Alabama. 
— Quitting  Liverpool. — Bond,  the  Pilot. — Official  Correspondence. 
— Captain  Semmes. — The  Alabama  handed  over  to  his  charge. — 
Some  matters  connected  with  the  clearance  of  the  Alabama  from 
Liverpool. — Mr.  Price  Edwards,  the  Collector  of  Customs  at  that 
Port. — The  Alabama's  first  engagement. — The  Alabama  a  legitimate 
vessel-of-war. — Action  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  commission 
ing  vessels  at  sea. — Influence  of  the  cruisers  on  the  United  States 
carrying  trade. — The  Alabama's  action  with  the  Keasarge. — Mr. 
Seward  and  Earl  Kussell. 

WRITING  subjectively,  and  following  the  career  of  the 
Florida  from  her  birth  on  the  busy  but  peaceful  shores 
of  the  Mersey  to  her  violent  seizure  in  Bahia,  and  thence 
to  her  final  resting-place  among  the  oyster-beds  in  the 
estuary  of  the  Eiver  James,  the  narrative  has  been 
carried  far  beyond  the  regular  course  of  events,  and  we 
must  now  return  to  March,  1862,  and  pick  up  that 
thread  of  the  history  which  was  woven  into  the  general 
occurrences  of  the  period  by  the  Alabama. 

At  the  time  of  the  Florida's  departure  from  Liverpool, 
her  still  more  famous  consort  had  not  yet  been  dignified 
by  any  other  name  or  title  than  the  dockyard  number 
'  290.'  Her  comely  frame  had  been  covered  in  by  the 
binding  grip  of  the  outside  planking,  which  had 
developed  the  graceful  curves  of  her  counter  and  the 

VOL.  i.  15 


226  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

delicate  wave-lines  of  her  bow  ;  but,  nevertheless,  I  was 
disappointed  to  find  that  she  was  hardly  up  to  specified 
time. 

The  builders  were  determined  to  turn  out  a  first-class 
ship,  and  feeling  perhaps  that  their  obligation  to  do  so 
was,  if  possible,  increased  by  my  absence,  and  the  fact 
that  there  was  no  one  to  look  after  the  interests  of  the 
owner,  they  were  especially  critical  and  hard  to  please 
in  the  selection  of  the  timber  for  the  most  important 
parts,  and  had  discarded  two  or  three  stern-posts*  after 
they  had  been  partly  fitted  and  bored  to  take  the  screw 
shaft,  because  of  some  slight  defect.  This  creditable, 
satisfactory,  and  punctilious  care  had  caused  some  delay 
in  completing  the  hull,  but  all  the  other  work  was  in  an 
advanced  state,  and  the  engines  were  ready  to  go  into 
the  ship  as  soon  as  she  was  off  the  ways. 

The  Birkenhead  Ironworks  lie  some  distance  above 
the  chief  commercial  parts  of  Liverpool,  and  being  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  Mersey,  they  do  not  attract 
especial  notice  from  persons  engaged  in  business,  or 
passing  to  and  fro  by  the  Woodside  Ferry,  and  the  boats 
plying  to  the  lower  landings  on  the  river.  But  the 
large  number  of  people  passing  up  river  to  Tranmere, 
Rock  Ferry,  and  Eastham,  would  often  pass  along  the 
dock -walls  of  Messrs.  Laird's  establishment,  and  they 
could  not  fail  to  observe  the  gradual  development  of  the 
graceful  craft  that  stood  out  in  bold  relief  at  the  extreme 
south  end  of  the  yard,  and  to  contrast  her  with  the 
large  iron  structures  they  were  accustomed  to  see  upon 
the  adjoining  building  slips  and  ways. 

The  departure  of  the  Florida  without  being  called 
upon  to  give  a  particular  account  of  herself  and  her 

*  The  single  piece  of  timber  finally  used  for  the  stern-post  cost 
£100. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  227 

intentions  had  grieved  and  vexed  the  United  States 
Consul,  and  his  suspicions  having  been  once  aroused, 
his  mind  was  kept  in  a  wakeful  and  agitated  condition 
during  the  remainder  of  the  war.  The  voluminous 
correspondence  submitted  to  the  Geneva  Arbitrators, 
and  which  appeared  from  time  to  time  in  the  Parlia 
mentary  Blue-books,  gives  proof  of  his  nervous  activity 
and  the  irritable  and  sometimes  irritating  persistency 
with  which  he  pressed  the  local  authorities  to  seize,  or 
at  least  to  detain,  ships  which  he  affirmed  '  it  was  quite 
notorious  were  intended  to  be  armed  and  equipped  as 
privateers  '  for  the  l  so-called  ' — which  latter  appellation 
came  to  be  a  common  designation  of  the  Confederate 
States  among  those  United  States  officials  who  were 
sometimes  willing  to  drop  the  still  more  common 
epithets  of  i  rebel '  and  '  insurgent,'  to  which,  however, 
the  Liverpool  Consul  generally  adhered. 

The  people  who  saw  the  '290'  on  the  building- slip, 
and  were  attracted  by  her  appearance,  naturally  talked 
about  her,  and  no  doubt  remarks  were  often  made  in 
respect  to  her  fitness  for  a  cruiser,  and  it  is  not  therefore 
surprising  that  she  should  have  aroused  the  suspicions 
of  those  whose  business  it  was  to  keep  watch  over  the 
interests  of  the  United  States.  I  soon  learned  that  spies 
were  lurking  about,  arid  tampering  with  the  workmen  at 
Messrs.  Laird's,  and  that  a  private  detective  named 
Maguire  was  taking  a  deep  and  abiding  interest  in  my 
personal  movements  ;  but  my  solicitor  assured  me  that 
there  was  nothing  illegal  in  what  I  was  doing,  and 
there  was  nothing  therefore  to  be  done  but  to  maintain 
a  quiet  reserve,  to  hasten  the  completion  of  the  ship,  and 
to  get  her  away  as  soon  as  possible. 

On  the  loth  of  May  <  290  '  was  launched,  and  as  a 
matter  of  fact  left  that  numerical  title  on  the  signboard 

15—2 


228  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

at  the  top  of  the  slip  when  she  slid  off  into  the  Mersey, 
although  it  stuck  to  her  some  time,  and  continued  to  be 
the  term  used  when  mentioning  her  in  the  Consular 
affidavits,  and  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence,  until 
the  frequent  reports  of  her  performances  afloat  gave 
greater  notoriety  and  distinction  to  her  now  historical 
name  of  Alabama. 

But  this  ship,  like  the  Florida,  bore  more  than  one 
name  in  passing  through  the  various  phases  of  her  life, 
from  a  mere  entity  in  a  dockyard  to  the  position  of  a 
commissioned  ship-of-war.  It  is  one  of  the  peculiar 
anomalies  of  our  nautical  English  grammar  that  a  man- 
of-war  is  feminine,  and  we  should  say  of  a  frigate  whose 
name  was  Ajax,  or  which  bore  the  still  more  harsh  and 
masculine  appellation  of  Polyphemus,  i  She  is  a  fine  sea- 
boat.'  The  office  of  christening  a  ship  is  almost  invari 
ably  performed  by  a  lady,  which  is  an  aggravation  of 
the  anomaly  about  the  sex,  because  if  custom  justifies  a 
sailor  in  calling  his  ship  '  she,'  and  if  there  is  any 
propriety  in  his  passionate  affirmation,  '  my  barque  is 
my  bride,7  the  function  of  handing  her  into  her  natural 
element  would  be  more  fittingly,  though  not  so  grace 
fully  done,  by  one  of  the  'opposite  sex.'  I  could  not 
take  the  liberty  of  introducing  the  name  of  the  lady 
who  christened  '290,'  into  this  narrative.  She  graciously 
consented  to  perform  the  office,  and  fulfilled  it  in  a 
comely  manner,  little  knowing  that  she  was  construc 
tively  taking  part  in  a  great  Civil  War,  and  wholly 
unconscious  that  she  was  helping  to  make  work  for  five 
eminent  statesmen  at  Geneva  ten  years  after.  I  hope 
her  conscience  has  never  upbraided  her  since,  and  that 
she  has  not  felt  in  any  way  responsible  for  the  bill  of 
£3,000,000,  which  her  Most  Gracious  Majesty  had  to 
pay  on  account  of  the  'Alabama  Claims/ 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  229 

When  '290'  was  to  be  launched,  it  was  necessary  to 
provide  an  appellation  for  her.  The  Spanish  language 
furnished  a  flexible  and  mellifluous  equivalent  for  the 
Christian  name  of  the  lady  who  served  the  office,  and 
when  the  ship  got  free  of  the  blocks  and  glided  down 
the  ways,  she  had  been  christened  Enrica.  The  Spanish 
name  gave  rise  to  another  alleged  mystery,  and  it  was 
often  asserted  that  there  was  a  purpose  to  affect  that  the 
ship  was  intended  for  the  Spanish  Government,  or  at 
least  for  a  Spanish  firm  in  Spain  ;  but  I  now  state  that 
there  was  no  attempt  to  deceive  anyone  by  any  pretence 
whatever  in  the  business  of  building  and  despatching 
the  Alabama  from.  Liverpool.  I  have  already  described 
the  negotiations  with  Messrs.  Laird  for  the  building  of 
the  ship.  There  was  no  mystery  or  disguise  about 
them,  and  it  will  be  seen  that  all  the  further  manage 
ment  of  the  transaction  was  conducted  in  the  same 
ordinary  commonplace  way.  A  great  effort  was  made 
by  the  United  States  Minister  to  induce  her  Majesty's 
Government  to  seize  the  ship,  but  no  satisfactory 
evidence  was  produced  that  any  violation  of  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act  had  been  committed,  and  it  appears 
from  what  is  now  known  that  the  Government  were 
not  willing  to  '  strain  the  law '  at  that  early  date,  or 
'  to  seize  a  vessel  which  it  would  have  been  the  duty  of 
a  court  of  law  to  restore/ 

I  have  always  attributed  the  success  of  getting  the 
Alabama  finished  as  a  sea-going  ship,  and  then 
despatched,  to  the  fact  that  no  mystery  or  disguise  was 
attempted.  I  was  well  advised  as  to  the  law,  and  had 
the  means  of  knowing  with  well  nigh  absolute  certainty 
what  was  the  state  of  the  negotiations  between  the 
United  States  Minister  and  her  Majesty's  Government. 
For  the  rest,  I  merely  practised  such  ordinary  business 


230  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

prudence  and  reserve  as  a  man  would  be  likely  to  follow 
in  the  management  of  his  private  affairs.  I  never  told 
any  employe  more  than  wras  necessary  for  him  to  know, 
and  never  gave  any  reason  for  an  order  having  reference 
to  the  outfit  or  movements  of  the  ship.  Everything 
was  done  quietly,  without  any  excitement  or  appearance 
of  haste.  At  the  last  moment  she  was  hurried  off  with 
some  precipitancy,  but  this  will  be  explained  in  due 
course. 

The  Messrs.  Laird,  conscious  of  being  somewhat 
behind  time  with  the  hull,  appeared  desirous  to  make 
up  the  loss  by  quick  work  in  setting  up  the  engines  and 
completing  the  outfit.  The  ship  was  no  sooner  in  the 
water  than  two  tugs  took  her  to  the  entrance  of  the 
graving-dock,  and  she  was  warped  into  it,  and  placed 
over  the  blocks  at  once.  The  engineer  department  at 
the  Messrs.  Laird's  is  especially  efficient.  Before  the 
Enrica  was  fully  secured  in  her  berth  the  great  derrick 
was  swinging  over  her  decks,  and  the  first  heavy  pieces 
of  the  machinery  were  going  on  board.  The  work  was 
now  rapidly  pushed  forward,  and  the  progress  was 
satisfactory.  On  about  June  15th  the  ship  was  taken 
out  for  a  trial  trip,  and  was  run  over  the  usual  course 
until  all  parties  were  satisfied. 

As  the  ship  approached  completion,  it  was  necessary 
to  appoint  a  captain  who  held  a  Board  of  Trade 
certificate,  to  superintend  the  preparations  for  sea, 
to  engage  the  crew,  and  transact  all  such  business  as  by 
law  and  custom  falls  within  the  office  of  the  commander 
of  a  vessel.  The  selection  of  the  right  man  was  a 
matter  of  grave  consideration.  The  requirements  were 
professional  competency,  prudence,  control  over  the 
tongue,  and  absolute  integrity.  I  consulted  a  friend, 
and  he  soon  brought  to  me  Captain  Mathew  J.  Butcher, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  231 

a  gentleman  who  was  then  serving  as  first -officer  in  a 
Cunard  steamship  ;  but  he  held  a  master's  certificate, 
and  was  therefore  eligible. 

It  turned  out  that  I  had  met  Captain  Butcher  two  or 
three  years  before  in  Havana,  he  being  then  chief- officer 
of  the  Cunard  steamship  Karnak,  and  thus  he  was  not 
wholly  unknown  to  me.  A  conversation  of  a  half 
to  three-quarters  of  an  hour  brought  us  to  a  satisfactory 
understanding,  and  we  went  across  to  Messrs.  Laird's 
yard,  and  I  introduced  Captain  Butcher  as  the  com 
mander  of  the  Enrica,  through  whom  I  desired  them  to 
receive  all  further  instructions  with  reference  to  the 
outfit  of  the  ship.  To  prevent  repetition  hereafter,  I 
will  take  this  occasion  to  say  that  Captain  Butcher 
fulfilled  all  the  requirements  of  the  offices  he  engaged  to 
perform,  not  only  with  tact,  judgment  and  discretion, 
but  with  that  nice  and  discriminating  fidelity  which 
marks  the  man  of  true  honesty.  He  was  engaged 
merely  to  take  the  ship  to  an  appointed  place  without 
the  United  Kingdom;  and  he  was  especially  warned 
that  no  men  must  be  engaged  under  any  pretence  what 
ever,  except  to  navigate  the  ship  to  a  port  or  ports  in 
the  West  Indies,  with  the  privilege  of  stopping  at 
any  intermediate  port. 

It  may  be  stated  here,  once  for  all,  that  no  men 
were  hired  or  engaged  for  any  other  purpose  than  that 
of  navigating  an  unarmed  ship,  and  no  man  was  enlisted 
to  enter  the  Confederate  service,  nor  was  a  word  said  to 
any  man  to  induce  him  to  enter  that  service,  by  anyone 
having  the  slightest  authority  to  make  any  such  propo 
sition,  until  after  the  ship  had  passed  far  beyond 
British  jurisdiction.  It  would  have  been  quite  easy 
to  prove  that  the  affidavits  obtained  by  the  United 
States  Consul  at  the  time  were  either  the  fictitious 


232  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

conceits  of  the  men  who  made  them,  or  else  that  the 
men  had  been  themselves  deceived.  But  while  Captain 
Butcher  was  only  engaged  to  take  out  an  unarmed 
ship,  and  he  never  did  enter  the  Confederate  Service, 
yet  it  was  manifestly  necessary  to  confide  to  him  more 
than  what  appeared  on  the  surface.  He  therefore  knew 
enough  before  the  arrival  of  the  ship  at  Terceira  to 
place  the  success  of  the  whole  enterprise  in  his  power. 
An  indiscreet  remark,  or  a  hint  from  him  to  a  careless 
gossiping  acquaintance,  would  have  spoiled  all  of 
our  well-laid  plans.  I  shrink  from  seeming  to  suggest 
that  there  might  have  been  a  possibility  of  such  a 
catastrophe;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
United  States  would  have  given  a  considerable  sum 
to  frustrate  the  departure  of  the  ship,  and  a  much 
larger  sum  still  to  have  got  possession  of  her.  There 
was  a  time  when  the  commander  might  have  handed 
her  over  to  an  agent  of  the  United  States,  or  for 
that  matter  he  might  have  taken  her  to  New  York, 
instead  of  to  Terceira.  I  mention  this  to  demonstrate 
the  prodigious  trust  it  was  necessary  to  repose  in 
Captain  Butcher.  But  I  never  had  the  least  uneasiness  ; 
men  who  have  had  much  to  do  with  their  fellows, 
if  observant,  learn  to  understand  them,  and  after  our 
first  interview  I  never  hesitated  to  tell  Captain  Butcher 
all  that  was  necessary  for  him  to  fully  comprehend  the 
actual  state  of  affairs,  although  I  never  ceased  to  abide 
by  the  rule  of  burdening  no  one  with  more  of  a  secret 
than  it  seemed  good  for  him  to  know. 

I  was  fortunate  in  having  held  on  to  my  old  friend 
McNair,  the  engineer  of  the  Fingal,  and  he  took  charge 
of  that  department  on  board  the  Enrico,,  so  that  I  was 
quite  sure  nothing  would  be  neglected  in  the  way 
of  proper  outfit. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  233 

About  the  1st  of  July  the  Enrica  was  so  nearly 
ready  for  sea,  that  I  began  to  make  preparations  for  my 
own  departure  in  her.  Lieutenant  J.  R.  Hamilton  had 
arrived  in  England  from  the  Confederate  States  at  the 
end  of  April,  and  reported  to  me  for  duty  as  first- 
lieutenant  of  the  Alabama  ( still  Enrica}.  When  I  was  in 
Savannah  with  the  Fingal  in  February,  1862,  Lieutenant 
Hamilton  had  expressed  an  earnest  desire  to  get  afloat, 
and  asked  if  I  could  bring  it  about  that  he  should 
be  detailed  to  serve  with  me.  There  appeared  to  be 
some  difficulty  at  the  time,  but  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  bore  it  in  mind,  and  I  was  much  gratified  by 
Hamilton's  unexpected  arrival.  He  entered  with  much 
spirit  into  the  arrangements  for  our  cruise. 

In  the  original  instructions  the  Navy  Department  had 
left  me  a  large  discretion,  and  I  had  fully  arranged  and 
planned  what,  and  in  what  direction,  my  operations 
should  be.  Maffitt  and  I  had  both  served  together  on 
the  United  States  Coast  Survey.  Both  of  us  could  find 
our  way  into  about  every  harbour  from  Boston  to  the 
Mississippi.  I  had  proposed  a  rendezvous  with  him, 
and  a  joint  dash  at  a  given  point ;  but,  failing  the  ren 
dezvous,  I  had  sketched  out  my  own  course  separately. 
Just  about  this  time,  when  in  another  week  I  should 
have  been  off,  I  received  two  despatches  from  the  Navy 
Department  of  great  length,  the  contents  of  which 
greatly  disappointed  my  hopes  and  expectations  in  re 
ference  to  getting  afloat,  but  at  the  same  time  added 
largely  to  the  sphere  of  my  general  duties. 

The  first  despatch  notified  me  that  it  had  been  thought 
advisable  to  order  Captain  Semmes  to  return  to  England 
from  Nassau,  and  directing  me  to  put  him  in  command 
of  the  Alabama.  That  this  change  may  be  fully  under 
stood,  I  will  just  briefly  mention  that  Captain  Semmes, 


234  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

in  the  progress  of  his  cruise  in  the  Sumter,  had  found 
his  way  to  Gibraltar,  and  finding  it  impossible  to  make 
at  that  place  the  repairs  necessary  to  fit  her  for  further 
cruising,  and  being  also  unable  to  obtain  a  sufficient 
supply  of  fuel  to  fetch  the  ship  to  a  French  or  English 
port,  he  had  laid  her  up  and  was  en  route  with  his  staff 
of  officers  for  the  Confederate  States  when  the  fresh 
orders  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  met  him  at  Nassau.* 

The  Sumter  was  for  some  time  a  bete  noire  to  me. 
She  was  much  in  the  way  at  Gibraltar,  but  having  been 
turned  over  to  me  as  Confederate  property,  there  was 
both  the  necessity  and  the  obligation  to  look  after  her. 
The  United  States  kept  two  vessels  in  the  neighbour 
hood  to  watch  her,  which  was  some  offset  to  the  incon 
venience  and  expense,  but  when  it  became  apparent  that 
she  could  not  be  got  away,  and  we  began  to  have  better 
and  more  efficient  vessels  for  cruising,  I  sold  her,  and 
she  was  put  under  the  British  flag  by  her  new  owners, 
and  was  brought  round  to  Liverpool  and  converted  into 
a  blockade-runner.  She  was  never  caught,  but  ended 
her  days  in  the  natural  and  ship-shape  way  by  foundering 
somewhere  in  the  North  Sea. 

The  views  of  the  Navy  Department  at  this  time  will 
be  best  explained  by  quoting  from  the  second  of  the 
afore-mentioned  despatches  :  '  Captain  Semmes  returns 
to  England  to  assume  the  command  of  the  Alabama, 
and  you  will  please  afford  him  all  possible  assistance 
in  getting  her  to  sea  and  maintaining  her  as  a  cruiser/ 

The  Secretary  then  goes  earnestly  into  the  question 
of  ironclads  ;  directs  me  to  build,  if  possible,  two  more 
vessels  of  the  type  of  the  Alabama,  advises  in  what  way 

*  A  full  account  of  all  this  will  be  found  in  *  My  Adventures 
Afloat,'  in  which  Admiral  Seinmes  gives  a  history  of  his  cruises  in 
the  Sumter  and  Alalama.  \ 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  235 

he  hopes  to  provide  funds,  adds  orders  for  various  sup 
plies,  and  notifies  me  of  some  large  contracts  he  has 
made  with  private  parties,  and  instructs  me  to  supervise 
them  on  behalf  of  the  Government. 

It   may  be   interesting   to   the   reader  to  know  the 

opinion  of  a  member  of  the  Confederate  Cabinet  in  June 

—July,  1862,  in  respect  to  the  possible  intervention  of 

Great  Britain  and  France,  and  I  give  it  in  the  following 

extract  : — 

'  We  are  all  astonished  here  at  the  evident  apprehen 
sion  of  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  of  a  war  with 
the  United  States.  Mr.  Se ward's  gasconades  upon  this 
subject  excite  but  the  contempt  of  his  own  people.  .  .  . 
Should  Great  Britain  and  France  acknowledge  our  inde 
pendence,  and  send  their  products  in  their  own  ships  to 
our  ports,  the  war  would  not  only  cease,  but  their  course 
would  meet  the  approval  of  a  vast  majority  of  the  people 
of  the  United  States,  for  the  war  is  carried  on  by  a  party 
in  power,  and  not  by  the  people. 

'  Enclosed  you  have  a  copy  of  my  instructions  to 
Commander  Semrnes.  Your  services  in  England  are  so 
important  at  this  time,  that  I  trust  you  will  cheerfully 
support  any  disappointment  you  may  experience  in  not 
getting  to  sea.  The  experience  you  have  acquired 
renders  your  agency  absolutely  necessary.  .  .  . 

4 1  am,  etc., 
'  (Signed)         S.  R.  MALLOKY, 

4  Secretary  of  the  Navy. ' 

Simultaneously  with  the  notification  of  Captain 
Semmes's  appointment  to  the  Alabama,  I  received  a 
letter  from  that  officer  himself,  in  which  he  advised  me 
that  he  would  join  me  in  Liverpool  by  the  first  vessel 


236  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

leaving  Nassau,  and  requesting  me  to  make  such 
arrangements  to  get  the  enterprise  complete  as  I  might 
deem  best.  This  change,  coming  so  late,  when  the 
ship  was,  in  fact,  ready  for  sea,  and  had  been  delivered 
to  me  by  the  builders,  was  very  embarrassing.  We 
knew  that  the  American  Minister  was  pressing  the 
Government  to  seize  the  ship  ;  and  the  frequent  inquiries 
addressed  to  the  builders  by  the  Customs  authorities  at 
London,  and  the  active  watchfulness  of  the  local  officers 
of  that  department  at  Liverpool,  warned  me  that  the 
situation  was  critical. 

Meanwhile  the  Enrica  (Alabama)  was  taken  into  the 
Birkenhead  Dock,  where  she  was  coaled  and  all  her 
stores  were  put  on  board.  Everything  was  kept  in 
readiness  for  a  start  at  short  notice,  but  a  full  creAV  was 
not  shipped,  for  fear  that  the  men  would  be  restive  at  the 
delay,  and  attract  notice  by  their  numbers  and  indiscreet 
talking. 

In  order  to  preserve  due  consistency  in  the  order  of 
events,  it  is  now  necessary  to  give  an  account  of  the 
arrangements  for  '  equipping  '  the  Alabama — that  is  to 
say,  the  means  adopted  to  supply  that  portion  of  her 
furniture  which  would  complete  her  outfit  as  a  vessel-of- 
war.  It  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  long  upon  these 
arrangements.  The  battery  was  ordered  very  shortly 
after  the  contract  for  the  ship  was  made,  and  all  the 
ordnance  supplies  were  put  in  train  in  good  time  ;  but 
such  instructions  w^ere  given  as  would  ensure  their  being 
ready  not  much  before  the  ship,  although  the  parties 
contracted  with  were  not  informed  for  what  purpose 
they  were  wanted,  or  even  how  they  were  to  be  shipped, 
until  the  time  arrived  for  forwarding  them.  The 
necessary  number  of  revolvers,  short  rifles  with  cutlass 
bayonets,  ammunition,  made-up  clothing  for  150  men, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  237 

extra  stores  of  all  kinds,  hammocks,  and,  in  fact,  every 
thing  required  for  the  complete  equipment  of  a  man  of- 
war,  were  ordered,  and  instructions  were  given  that  the 
goods  when  ready  should  be  packed,  marked,  and  held 
for  shipping  orders. 

About  the  end  of  May  a  suitable  agent  was  instructed 
to  look  up  a  moderate- sized  sailing-vessel  in  London, 
fit  for  a  West  Indian  voyage,  to  carry  heavy  weights. 
She  was  to  be  staunch  and  in  good  condition  ;  but  high 
finish  not  wanted,  and  a  clipper  not  required.  We  got 
just  the  craft —a  barque  of  about  400  to  450  tons.  Her 
recommendation  was  that  she  had  lately  brought  home 
ordnance  stores — old  guns,  shot,  etc. — from  Gibraltar 
on  Government  account.  She  was  bought,  and  in  due 
time  was  entered  out  from  London  to  Demerara.  The 
agent  was  ordered  to  put  350  tons  of  coal  in  her,  and 
the  necessary  shipping  orders  were  given  to  the  parties 
holding  the  Alabama's  goods.  Our  barque  was  named 
Agrippina,  and  she  attracted  no  especial  notice  and  no 
suspicion  while  loading  in  the  London  Docks.  It  was 
easy  to  regulate  the  forwarding  of  the  cargo  and  the 
lading,  so  as  to  fit  in  with  the  movements  of  the  Enrico, 
at  Liverpool,  without  creating  the  suspicion  that  there 
was  any  connection  between  the  two  vessels. 

I  wished  to  know  something  definite  as  to  the  time  of 
Captain  Semmes's  arrival,  or  at  least  that  he  had 
started  from  Nassau,  before  despatching  the  two  ships, 
because  it  might  be  more  dangerous  to  have  them  wait 
ing  at  the  rendezvous,  where  a  passing  United  States 
cruiser  might  by  chance  fall  upon  them,  than  for  the 
Enrica  to  remain  in  Liverpool,  where  no  foreign  enemy 
could  touch  her.  But  there  was  a  domestic  enemy — the 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act — upon  whom  it  was  necessary 
to  keep  a  watchful  eye. 


238  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

On  Saturday,  July  26th,  1862, 1  received  information 
from  a  private  but  most  reliable  source,  that  it  would 
not  be  safe  to  leave  the  ship  in  Liverpool  another  forty- 
eight  hours.  I  went  immediately  to  Messrs.  Laird's 
office,  and  told  them  that  I  wished  to  have  a  thorough 
all  day  trial  of  the  ship  outside.  Although  the  testing 
trial  trip  had  already  been  made,  and  the  delivery  of 
the  ship  to  me  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the 
contract  was  complete,  yet  it  had  been  verbally  agreed 
that  there  should  be  another  trial,  w^hen  coals  and  stores 
were  all  on  board,  if  I  desired  it.  Captain  Butcher  was 
ordered  to  ship  a  few  more  hands,  and  to  have  every 
thing  ready  to  come  out  of  dock  on  Monday's  tide. 
None  of  the  crew  were  given  an  inkling  of  the  con 
templated  movement  ;  but  I  informed  Captain  Butcher 
confidentially  that  the  ship  would  not  return,  and 
directed  him  to  get  on  board  some  extra  tons  of  coal, 
and  to  complete  his  stores. 

It  was  important  to  have  as  many  trusty  and  intelli 
gent  men  on  board  as  possible,  and  I  had  already  detailed 
Mr.  John  Low  (now  a  master  in  the  Confederate  States 
Navy),  who  had  rejoined  me  after  going  out  to  Nassau 
in  the  Florida,  to  be  ready  to  accompany  Captain 
Butcher. 

On  Monday  the  28th  the  Enrico,  came  out  of  dock  and 
anchored  off  Seacombe,  and  every  preparation  was  made 
for  going  out  of  harbour  the  next  day.  A  small  party  of 
guests  were  invited  to  go  out  for  the  trial  trip,  and  the 
next  morning — Tuesday,  the  29th — the  ship  was  partially 
dressed  with  flags,  and  at  about  9  a.m.  we  got  under  weigh 
and  steamed  down  the  river  with  a  number  of  guests  on 
board,  and  a  party  of  riggers  and  additional  engineers' 
men  to  assist  if  any  help  was  needed.  We  had  also  in 
company  the  steam -tug  Hercules  as  a  tender. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  239 

The  day  was  fine  and  the  trials  were  very  satisfactory. 
We  ran  several  times  between  the  Bell  Buoy  and  the 
north-west  lightship.  The  average  speed  was  12*8,  the 
sea  being  quite  smooth,  and  the  wind  light  from  north 
west.  About  3  p.m.  I  explained  to  the  guests  that  it 
was  my  wish  to  keep  the  ship  out  all  night  to  complete 
her  trials,  and  that  the  sea  being  quite  smooth  we  would 
run  close  to  the  bar,  and  every  one  could  go  up  to  town 
in  the  tug.  Shortly  after  I  asked  Mr.  George  Bond,  the 
Liverpool  pilot,  if  he  knew  Moelfra  Bay.  He  said  'yes/ 
I  then  directed  Captain  Butcher  to  take  the  ship  down 
to  that  anchorage  as  soon  as  the  rest  of  u  s  left,  and  wait 
there  until  I  came  to  him,  which,  if  possible,  would  be 
the  next  afternoon.  At  4  p.m.  the  guests,  the  extra 
men,  and  I,  got  on  board  the  tug,  and  parting  company 
from  the  Enrica,  she  proceeded  to  her  place  of  anchorage 
on  the  Welsh  coast,  while  we  went  up  to  town.  On  the 
way  up  the  river  I  engaged  the  tug  to  be  at  the  Wood- 
side  landing-stage  at  6  a.m.  on  the  next  morning,  telling 
the  master  that  I  wished  him  to  take  a  few  articles  to 
the  ship,  which  would  probably  remain  outside  at  least 
for  a  day.  A  shipping-master  had  been  previously 
engaged  to  have  thirty  or  forty  men  on  the  landing- 
stage  at  the  same  time  to  join  a  ship  at  an  outport,  for  a 
voyage  to  the  Bahamas,  and  possibly  to  Havana. 

I  was  on  the  Woodside  landing-stage  by  7  a.m.  on  the 
30th.  The  Hercules  was  already  there,  and  the  articles 
wanted  for  the  Enrica  were  on  board.  They  were  a 
spare  anchor-stock,  a  large  piece  of  scantling,  intended 
for  the  frame  to  support  the  spare  spars,  and  a  few  brass 
pieces  belonging  to  the  engines.  There  is  reason  for 
some  particularity  in  these  small  details,  as  one  of  the 
Consular  affidavits  affirmed  that  gun-carriages  were 
taken,  which  is  quite  untrue.  The  shipping-master 


240  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

was  also  on  the  stage.  He  had  with  him  about 
thirty -five  or  forty  men,  and  nearly  as  many  women,  of 
that  class  who  generally  affect  a  tender  solicitude  for 
Jack  when  he  is  outward-bound,  and  is  likely  to  be  pro 
vided  with  an  advance -note.  I  told  him  to  get  the  men 
on  board,  but  of  course  the  women  could  not  go.  He 
replied  that  he  feared  it  was  a  case  of  all  or  none.  The 
women,  he  said,  stood  in  various  degrees  of  tender 
relationship  to  the  men,  and  would  not  part  with  them 
unless  they  could  first  get  a  month's  pay  in  advance  or 
its  equivalent.  There  was  no  time  for  parley  ;  the 
mixed  group  were  hurried  on  board,  and  we  proceeded 
down  the  river.  As  we  approached  New  Brighton  I 
told  the  master  of  the  tug  to  take  the  Rock  Channel, 
which  would  save  distance,  and  go  down  to  Moelfra  Bay. 
At  about  3  p.m.  we  sighted  the  Enrica,  and  at  four  got 
alongside  of  her.  It  had  been  raining,  and  the  afternoon 
was  dull  and  cloudy. 

There  had  been  nothing  to  eat  on  board  the  tug.  Jack 
and  his  fair  friends  were  therefore  hungry,  and  not  in  suit 
able  frame  of  mind  for  business.  The  steward  was 
ordered  to  prepare  a  substantial  supper  as  quickly  as 
possible,  and  when  it  was  ready  all  hands  were  refreshed 
with  a  fair  but  safe  allowance  of  grog,  to  add  zest  and 
cheerfulness  to  the  meal.  When  the  men  had  well  eaten, 
and  had  finished  their  pipes,  they  were  called  aft,  and  it 
was  explained  to  them  in  few  words  that  the  ship  had 
been  '  cruising  in  the  Channel  to  get  her  engines  in  good 
working  order,  and  as  everything  was  satisfactory  it  was 
proposed  to  proceed  on  the  voyage  without  going  back 
to  Liverpool,  which  would  be  an  unnecessary  delay  and 
expense.  Would  they  ship  for  the  run,  say  to  Havana, 
touching  at  any  intermediate  port  ?  If  the  ship  did  not 
return  to  England  they  would  be  sent  back  free  of 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  241 

expense,  or  some  other  satisfactory  settlement  would  be 
made  with  them.  They  should  have  one  month's  pay 
in  advance,  paid  down  on  the  capstan-head.  The  ship 
was  a  nice  comfortable  craft,  and  was  well  found,  and 
well  provisioned.'  After  a  short  consultation  among 
themselves,  all  but  two  or  three  of  the  men  agreed  to  go. 
Articles  expressing  the  terms  of  the  agreement  had  been 
prepared,  and  each  man  came  down  to  the  cabin  in  turn 
with  his  'lady/  and  signed,  the  latter  receiving  the 
stipulated  advance  in  money,  or  a  note  for  the  equivalent 
from  Captain  Butcher. 

It  was  near  midnight  Before  everything  was  arranged, 
and  the  tug  was  lying  uneasily  alongside ;  for  the  wind 
had  shifted  to  south-west,  and  was  blowing  in  spiteful 
squalls,  with  heavy  rain.  It  seemed  inhospitable  to 
turn  the  ladies  out  on  such  a  night,  but  there  was 
no  accommodation  for  them  on  board,  and  there  were 
reasons  why  the  Enrica  should  not  be  found  in  Moelfra 
Eoads  on  the  next  morning.  While  the  Enrica  was 
still  in  Liverpool,  it  came  to  my  knowledge  that  the 
United  States  ship  Tuscarora,  Captain  T.  A.  Craven, 
had  come  up  from  Gibraltar  to  Southampton,  some  time 
in  the  early  days  of  July,  and  that  she  continued  to 
remain  there,  or  in  the  near  neighbourhood. 

The  nervous  apprehension  of  the  United  States 
Consul  in  respect  to  the  Enrica  was  well  known,  and  it 
did  not  require  much  acumen  to  connect  the  presence 
of  the  Tuscarora  in  British  waters  with  the  supposed 
character  and  probable  destination  of  the  former  vessel. 
Arrangements  were  made  with  a  judicious  friend  at 
Southampton  to  keep  me  informed  of  the  Tuscarora's 
movements,  and  I  had  received  almost  daily  advices. 
Just  before  leaving  the  Woodside  landing-stage  in  the 
tug  with  the  men  and  women,  a  telegram  was  handed 

VOL.  i.  16 


242  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

me,  which  contained  the  announcement  that  the 
Tuscarora  had  left  Southampton,  and  it  was  believed 
that  she  had  gone  to  Queenstown.  Manifestly  we  were 
watched,  and  some  one  had  put  Captain  Craven  on  our 
supposed  track.  It  seemed  so  clear  that  he  would 
touch  at  Queenstown  for  news,  and  then  lie  off  Tuskar, 
or  somewhere  in  the  channel  to  intercept  the  Enrico,  on 
her  way  to  sea,  or  follow  her  out  by  the  usual  route, 
that  I  determined  to  go  '  north  about.'  I  had  already 
consulted  with  Captain  Butcher  and  our  excellent  pilot, 
Mr.  George  Bond,  on  that  point:  both  had  agreed  that  it 
was  the  best  course,  and  Bond  knew  that  route  as 
well  as  the  other. 

After  the  tug  left  us  the  weather  grew  worse.  By 
1  a.m.  it  was  blowing  hard  from  south-west,  and 
raining  heavily.  It  was  not  an  opportunity  such  as  a 
prudent  seaman  would  choose  to  leave  a  safe  roadstead 
and  venture  into  the  Irish  Sea,  but  the  circumstances 
appeared  to  justify  the  move;  indeed,  I  thought  them 
imperative.  At  2.30  a.m.  (31st),  we  got  under  weigh, 
and  stood  out  of  the  bay  under  steam  alone.  At  8  a.m. 
the  ship  was  off  the  Calf  of  Man,  the  sky  clearing  and 
wind  dropping.  We  set  all  sail  to  a  middling  fresh 
breeze,  and  bowled  along  13^  knots,  good.  By  1  p.m. 
the  wind  fell  light,  and  we  lost  the  effect  of  the  sails ; 
at  noon  passed  South  Kock,  and  steered  along  the  coast 
of  Ireland.  At  8  p.m.  entered  between  Rathlm  Island 
and  Fair  Head.  At  6  p.m.  stopped  the  engines  off  the 
Giant's  Causeway,  hailed  a  fishing-boat,  and  Bond  and  I 
went  ashore  in  a  pelting  rain,  leaving  Captain  Butcher 
to  proceed  with  the  Enrico,  in  accordance  with  his 
instructions. 

During  the  evening  it  rained  incessantly,  and  the 
wind  skirled  and  snifted  about  the  gables  of  the  hotel  in 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  243 

fitful  squalls.  Bond  and  I  sat  comfortably  enough  in 
the  snug  dining-room  after  dinner,  and  sipped  our 
toddy,  of  the  best  Coleraine  malt ;  but  my  heart  was  with 
the  little  ship  buffeting  her  way  around  that  rugged 
north  coast  of  Ireland.  I  felt  sure  that  Butcher  would 
keep  his  weather-eye  open,  and  once  clear  of  Innistrahull, 
there  would  be  plenty  of  sea-room ;  but  I  could  not 
wholly  shake  off  an  occasional  sense  of  uneasiness. 
Bond  gave  me  the  exact  distances  from  point  to  point, 
from  light  to  light,  and  having  been  taught  at  school  to 
work  up  all  sums  to  very  close  results,  I  made  the 
average  speed  of  the  Enrica  to  have  been  12*89  from 
Moelfra  to  the  Giants'  Causeway,  and  felt  well  satisfied 
with  the  performance.  The  next  morning,  August  1st, 
Bond  and  I  took  a  boat  and  pulled  along  the  coast  to 
Port  Rush.  The  weather  was  beautifully  fine,  and  the 
effect  of  the  bright  sun  and  the  gentle  west  wind  was  so 
exhilarating  that  I  felt  no  further  solicitude  about  the 
Enrica.  From  Port  Rush  we  took  rail  to  Belfast,  and 
then  steamer  and  rail  viA  Fleetwood  to  Liverpool,  where 
I  learned  that  the  Tuscarora  had  come  off  Point  Lynas 
on  the  1st,  and  then  looked  into  Moelfra  Bay,  but 
found  nothing  there  to  engage  her  special  attention. 

I  cannot  dismiss  Bond  without  a  passing  tribute ;  I 
came  to  know  him  well  during  the  war,  and  for 
years  afterwards.  He  was  one  of  those  men  who 
perform  every  office  of  life  with  earnestness  and 
zeal ;  who  never  complain  of  too  much  labour,  or 
too  little  reward ;  whose  conversation  is  without 
covetousness,  and  who  always  seem  content  with  the 
things  that  are  present.  His  position  was  not  elevated. 
He  began  as  a  river  and  channel  pilot,  and  ended 
his  career  as  master  of  the  Clarence  Dock  in  Liverpool ; 
but  there  was  something  in  the  heart  and  eye  and 

16—2 


244  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

manner  of  the  man  which  gave  an  importance  and 
dignity  to  his  employment  above  its  seeming  con 
sequence.  We  meet  such  men  occasionally  in  what  are 
called  the  humble  walks  of  life,  and  they  make  labour 
honourable.  After  his  short  cruise  in  the  Enrico,, 
it  would  have  been  useless  for  me  to  attempt  any 
special  mystery  in  dealing  with  him ;  but  he  never 
asked  an  inquisitive  question,  and  if  it  was  necessary  to 
give  him  any  information,  I  never  doubted  that  his  lips 
would  hold  it  as  a  sealed  envelope. 

When  it  became  manifest  that  the  Enrica  must  be 
sent  away  from  Liverpool,  I  telegraphed  the  agents 
who  were  loading  the  Agrippina  to  despatch  her  forth 
with,  and  sent  up  orders  which  the  captain  was  not  to 
open  until  all  hands  were  on  board  and  the  ship  was 
practically  off.  On  my  return  to  Liverpool,  I  learned 
with  satisfaction  that  she  was  clear  of  the  Channel,  and 
that  her  cargo  was  complete.  The  two  vessels  were 
thus  safely  on  their  way  to  the  rendezvous — that  quiet 
little  bay  on  the  east  side  of  Terceira,  whose  inviting- 
shelter  I  would  not  have  known  but  for  the  necessity  of 
putting  in  there  with  the  Fingal  for  water,  which  has 
been  mentioned  in  a  previous  chapter. 

I  have  thought  that  it  will  be  best,  in  the  further 
progress  of  this  narrative,  to  give  the  actual  official 
reports,  explaining  each  important  event,  which  were 
written  at  the  time  of  the  occurrence.  This  course  will 
perhaps  interfere  with  and  interrupt  the  symmetry  of 
the  narrative,  but  I  cannot  doubt  that  it  will  add  to  its 
weight  as  a  truthful  uncoloured  account  of  the  various 
enterprises,  and  it  wrill  only  be  necessary  to  fill  in  the 
time  between  the  dates  of  the  reports  with  brief  explana 
tory  remarks.  The  instructions  to  the  commanders  of 
the  two  vessels  should  come  first  in  order. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  245 

'London,  July  28th,  1862. 

'  CAPTAIN, — 

4  You  will  proceed  at  once  to  sea  with  the 
barque  Agrippina,  now  under  your  command,  and  make 
the  best  of  your  way  to  the  bay  of  Praya,  in  the  island 
of  Terceira,  one  of  the  Azores.  .  .  . 

4  Your  experience  as  a  seaman  renders  it  unnecessary 
to  give  you  special  advice  as  to  the  care  of  your  ship, 
and  you  will  of  course  use  all  proper  precautions  in 
approaching  the  land ;  but  it  is  advisable  to  give  you 
some  hints  in  respect  to  the  anchorage  at  Praya  and  its 
approach.  The  bay  of  Praya  is  open  to  the  east,  and 
is  easy  and  safe  of  access,  there  being  no  sunken  rocks 
or  danger  of  any  kind  not  visible  to  the  eye.  With  a 
leading  wind,  stand  boldly  in  for  the  middle  of  the 
bight  until  a  small  islet  off  the  north  point  is  in  range 
with  the  point  of  the  mainland  of  the  island  itself ;  then 
haul  up  for  the  town,  which  lies  in  the  northern  curve 
of  the  bay,  and  .anchor  by  the  lead  in  eight  to  ten 
fathoms  water.  With  the  wind  from  the  westward  you 
can  beat  in  by  the  lead,  standing  not  quite  so  far  on  the 
southern  as  on  the  northern  tack,  and  bring  up  in,  say, 
eight  to  ten  fathoms.  You  will  be  visited  soon  after 
anchoring  by  a  health  officer,  to  whom  you  will  simply 
report  that  you  are  from  London  for  Demerara,  and  have 
put  in  for  supplies.  It  is  hoped  that  the  steamer  will  not 
be  long  behind  you ;  indeed,  you  may  find  her  there.  The 
name  of  the  commander  of  the  steamer  is  Butcher.  He 
will  have  a  letter  to  you  with  authority  to  take  what 
ever  quantity  of  coal  and  other  articles  of  your  cargo  he 
may  require,  and  we  particularly  desire  you  to  give  him 
your  best  assistance,  and  afford  him  every  aid  in  your 
power  to  transfer  what  he  needs  from  the  Agrippina  to 
his  own  ship,  and  you  will  then  proceed  to  any  port  he 


246  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

may  direct,  and  land  or  deliver  the  remainder  of  your 
cargo.  In  fact,  you  are  to  consider  all  orders  from  the 
commander  of  the  steamer  as  being  authorized  by  us, 
with  or  without  any  other  letter  of  advice. 

c  If  any  vessel  is  at  anchor  at  Praya  when  you  arrive, 
hoist  your  number,  and  should  she  be  your  consort  she 
will  show  a  white  English  ensign  from  the  after  shroud 
of  the  main  rigging.  If  the  steamer  arrives  after  you, 
she  will,  after  anchoring,  make  this  same  signal  of  the 
white  ensign  in  the  main  rigging,  which  you  will 
answer  with  your  number,  after  which  you  can  com 
municate  freely.  Relying  with  confidence  upon  your 
integrity  and  willingness  to  carry  out  our  wishes  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  voyage  you  have  undertaken,  we  do 
not  think  it  necessary  to  give  you  more  minute  direc 
tions  in  wrriting,  but  may  find  means  to  communicate 
with  you  again  before  your  departure  from  Praya.  Our 
interests  are  so  deeply  involved  in  the  adventure 
entrusted  to  your  management,  that  we  Avill  fully 
appreciate  your  exertions  to  bring  it  to  a  successful 
termination,  and  upon  your  safe  return  to  England,  we 
will  be  happy  to  make  you  a  substantial  acknowledgment 
for  any  extra  exertions  you  may  make  for  the  satisfactory 
accomplishment  of  the  voyage. 

'  We  are,  etc. 
*  Captain  Alexander  McQueen, 
1  Barque  Agrippina' 

The  above  letter  was  '  signed  by  the  registered  owners/ 

'Liverpool,  July  30th,  1862. 
'  SlK,- 

'  You  will  proceed  to  sea  in  the  steamship  Enrico,, 
now  under  your  command,  and  taking  the  channel  by 
the  North  of  Ireland,  will  shape  a  course  for  the  bay  of 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  247 

Praya,  in  the  island  of  Terceira,  one  of  the  Azores.  At 
that  place  you  will  be  joined  by  the  barque  Agrippina, 
Captain  McQueen,  to  whom  you  have  a  letter,  and  who 
will  thenceforth  be  under  your  orders.  As  the  Agrip- 
pina  is  a  sailing  vessel,  and  may  not  be  at  the  place  of 
rendezvous  for  a  fortnight,  it  will  not  be  necessary  for 
you  to  arrive  ahead  of  her,  and  you  will  therefore  econo 
mise  your  fuel  as  much  as  possible,  making  the  passage 
mostly  under  canvas.  You  have  been  informed  of  the 
manner  of  signalling  the  Agrippina^  and  when  she  joins 
you,  if  the  weather  permits,  you  will  at  once  begin  to 
transfer  her  cargo  to  your  own  ship.  The  paymaster 
has  an  invoice  of  her  cargo,  showing  the  contents  of  every 
case  and  bale,  so  that  there  can  be  no  confusion  or  delay. 
All  slops,  clothing,  and  other  articles  in  the  purser's  de 
partment  you  will  please  take  on  board  first,  and  have 
them  placed  in  the  store-rooms,  directing  the  paymaster 
to  issue  such  of  them  as  may  be  required  by  the  men. 

4  Get  the  gun-carriages  out  of  their  cases  and  place 
them  in  their  proper  places,  the  carriage  for  8-inch  gun 
on  the  quarter-deck,  and  the  one  for  the  7 -inch  rifled  - 
gun  immediately  forward  of  the  bridge.  The  carriages 
for  the  broadside-guns  place  opposite  the  side-ports.  The 
cases  containing  the  guns,  being  filled  with  small  fixtures 
and  equipments,  had  better  be  left  as  you  find  them  until 
the  Confederate  States  officer  who  is  to  command  the  ship 
arrives.  The  cases  containing  the  shot  can  be  opened,  and 
the  shot  put  in  the  racks,  each  rack  being  so  fitted  as  to 
receive  its  proper  shot.  The  shells  you  will  place  in  the 
shell-rooms,  each  in  its  proper  box,  the  spherical  shells  in 
the  starboard,  and  the  elongated  shells  in  the  port -room. 
The  pistols  are  in  four  small  cases,  made  so  that  two  of 
them  will  fit  into  each  of  the  arm-chests  intended  for 
the  quarter-deck.  Put  them  in  the  chests  as  soon  as 


248  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

you  get  them  on  board.  Fill  the  bunkers  from  the 
coals  on  board  the  Agrippina^  and  keep  both  vessels 
ready  for  a  start  at  short  notice.  Captain  E.  Semmes, 
of  the  Confederate  States  Navy,  is  the  officer  who  will, 
I  hope,  very  soon  relieve  you.  He  will  bring  you  a 
letter  from  me,  and  thereafter  you  will  consider  that  all 
my  control  or  authority  over  the  ship  is  transferred  to 
him,  My  private  and  official  intercourse  with  you  has 
been  such  as  to  give  me  a  high  estimate  of  your  personal 
and  professional  ability,  and  as  we  have  freely  conversed 
as  to  the  management  of  the  adventure  you  have  un 
dertaken,  I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  give  you  written 
instructions  as  to  the  simple  care  of  the  ship. 

'  You  are  to  consider  yourself  my  confidential  agent, 
and  I  shall  rely  upon  you  as  one  gentleman  may  upon 
another.  If  you  have  an  opportunity  at  any  time,  send 
me  a  line,  and  get  out  of  the  reach  of  the  telegraphic 
stations  as  soon  as  possible.  I  do  not  anticipate  that 
you  will  meet  with  any  interruption  in  making  the 
transfer  of  cargo,  but  an  easterly  gale  may  force  you  to 
get  the  Agrippina  out  of  Praya  Bay,  in  which  case  you 
can  tow  her  under  the  lee  of  the  island  and  lie  by  her 
until  the  weather  permits  you  to  return.  In  such  a 
contingency  leave  a  letter  with  her  Majesty's  Consul, 
directed  to  Captain  J.  W.  Clendenin,  saying  where  you 
have  gone,  and  that  you  will  soon  be  back. ' 

i  It  is  important  that  your  movements  should  not  be 
reported,  and  you  will  please  avoid  speaking  or  signalling 
any  passing  ship. 

4  Wishing  you  a  successful  cruise,  and  hoping  to  see 
you  soon  in  good  health, 

1 1  am,  etc., 

'  (Signed)          JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 
*  Captain  M.  J.  Butcher.' 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  249 

'Liverpool,  July  28^,  1862. 

'  SIR - 

'  You  will  join  the  Confederate  States  steamship 
Alabama  (Enrico)  temporarily  under  the  orders  of 
Captain  M.  J.  Butcher,  and  proceed  in  her  to  sea.  The 
Alabama  may  have  to  cruise  several  days  in  the  British 
Channel,  and  to  touch  at  one  or  two  ports.  During  this 
time  you  are  strictly  enjoined  not  to  mention  that  you 
are  in  any  way  connected  with  the  Confederate  States 
Navy,  but  you  will  simply  act  as  the  purser  of  a  private 
ship. 

'  In  this  capacity  you  will  keep  account  of  all 
money  paid  out,  and  you  will  assist  Captain  Butcher  in 
any  manner  he  may  desire.  You  have  been  provided 
with  an  invoice  of  everything  now  on  board  the  Alabama, 
as  well  as  the  cargo  shipped  on  board  the  barque  Agrip- 
pina,  which  vessel  you  will  meet  at  the  port  to  which 
the  Alabama  is  bound.  The  invoice  of  the  Agrippinrfs 
cargo  gives  the  mark  and  number  of  every  case  and 
bale,  the  contents  of  each,  and  the  part  of  the  vessel  in 
which  it  is  stowed.  You  will  endeavour  to  make  your 
self  fully  acquainted  with  the  invoices,  and  examine  the 
store-rooms,  so  that  you  will  be  able  to  give  efficient 
aid  in  getting  everything  in  its  proper  place  when  the 
transfer  of  stores  is  made. 

'  When  the  Alabama  is  fairly  at  sea  you  will  mix 
freely  with  the  "  warrant  and  petty  officers,"  show  in 
terest  in  their  comfort  and  welfare,  and  endeavour  to 
excite  their  interest  in  the  approaching  cruise  of  the 
ship.  Talk  to  them  of  the  Southern  States,  and  how 
they  are  fighting  against  great  odds  for  only  what  every 
Englishman  enjoys — liberty!  Tell  them  at  the  port  of  des 
tination  a  distinguished  officer  of  the  Confederate  States 
Navy  will  take  command  of  the  ship  for  a  cruise,  in 


250  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

which  they  will  have  the  most  active  service,  and  be 
well  taken  care  of.  I  do  not  mean  that  you  are  to  make 
the  men  set  speeches,  or  be  constantly  talking  to  them, 
but  in  your  position  you  may  frequently  throw  out  to 
leading  men  hints  of  the  above  tenor,  which  will  be 
commented  upon  on  the  berth -deck.  Seamen  are  very 
impressionable,  and  can  be  easily  influenced  by  a  little 
tact  and  management. 

'  When  Captain  Semrnes  joins,  you  will  at  once  report 
to  him,  and  act  thereafter  under  his  instructions.  He 
will  be  a  stranger  to  the  ship  and  crew,  and  will  be  in  a 
position  of  great  responsibility  and  embarrassment. 
You  have  it  in  your  power  to  smooth  away  some  of  his 
difficulties  in  advance,  especially  in  having  all  the  stores 
and  cargo  of  the  ship  in  an  orderly  state,  and  the  men 
settled  and  well-disposed,  and  I  confidently  rely  upon 
your  exertions  to  bring  about  such  a  state  of  things. 
You  will  consider  yourself  as  temporarily  under  the 
orders  of  Captain  Butcher,  in  whom  I  place  great  con 
fidence,  and  by  strict  attention  to  your  duties  and  the 
display  of  zeal  and  judgment  in  their  execution,  you 
will  evince  a  just  appreciation  of  the  trust  reposed  in 
you,  and  will  prove  that  your  appointment  to  so  im 
portant  a  post  has  been  deserved. 

' 1  am,  etc., 

'  (  Signed)         JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 
*  Acting  Assistant-Paymaster  C.  R.  Yonge.' 

The  foregoing  letters,  together  with  the  statement 
which  immediately  precedes,  sufficiently  describe  the 
despatch  of  the  Alabama  and  her  tender.  It  will  be 
perceived  that  the  Alabama  left  the  Mersey  without  any 
portion  of  her  armament,  and  without  any  stores  4  con 
traband  of  war.'  The  official  report  of  the  Surveyor  of 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  251 

the  Customs  to  the  Collector  at  Liverpool,  dated  July 
30th,  1862,  contains  the  following  paragraph: 

'  I  have  only  to  add  that  your  directions  to  keep  a 
strict  watch  on  the  said  vessel  have  been  carried  out, 
and  I  write  in  the  fullest  confidence  that  she  left  this 
port  without  any  part  of  her  armament  on  board.  She 
had  not  as  much  as  a  signal-gun  or  musket. 

1  (Signed)        *E.  MORGAN, 

'  Surveyor/ 

I  got  back  to  Liverpool  from  the  Giants7  Causeway 
on  August  3rd,  and  immediately  posted  the  following 
hasty  despatch  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Confederate  Navy 
by  the  Nassau  closed  mail : 

'Liverpool,  September  3rd,  1862. 

'  SIR,— 

1  For  the  last  fortnight  the  United  States  officials 
in  this  country  have  used  every  possible  means  of  in 
ducing  the  British  authorities  to  seize,  or  at  least  to 
forbid  the  sailing  of  the  Alabama.  Spies  were  em 
ployed  to  watch  the  ship  while  lying  in  a  private 
dockyard,  and  affidavits  were  made  that  men  had  ac 
tually  been  enlisted  by  me  to  serve  in  the  Confederate 
States  Navy. 

'  This  charge,  although  perfectly  unfounded,  for  I  had 
been  very  cautious  not  to  violate  any  English  law,  gave 
me  much  uneasiness,  and  learning  on  Tuesday  last  from 
a  very  reliable  source  that  the  Government  might  not  be 
able  to  resist  much  longer  the  importunities  of  the 
American  Minister,  I  determined  to  get  the  ship  out  of 
British  waters,  and  therefore  went  to  sea  in  her  myself, 
very  unexpectedly,  on  Wednesday  night.  The  United 

VOL.    I.* 


252  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  TEE 

States  ship  Tuscarora  was  known  to  be  on  the  look-out, 
but  favoured  by  thick  weather,  which  enabled  me  to  get 
quickly  clear  of  stations  from  which  our  movements 
could  be  telegraphed,  she  was  dodged,  and  I  have  just 
returned  to  this  place,  having  ]eft  the  Alabama  well  clear 
of  the  Irish  coast,  while  the  Tuscarora  still  remains  on 
the  look-out  off  Queenstown,  as  the  telegraph  reports. 
I  have  but  a  moment  to  mention  this  fact,  as  the  Nassau 
closed  mail  leaves,  or  rather  closes,  in  an  hour.  ...  I 
am  in  receipt  of  a  letter  from  Captain  Semmes,  and  from 
its  contents  hope  to  see  him  here  in  a  day  or  two.  The 
Nassau  mail  is  safe,  even  though  it  passes  through  New 
York,  and  letters  can  be  forwarded  from  Nassau  by 
private  hands  through  the  agents  of  Messrs.  John  Eraser 

and  Co. 

1 1  am,  etc., 

4  (Signed)         JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 

*  Hon.  S.  E.  Mallory, 

*  Secretary  of  the  Navy.' 

Not  long  after  the  above  date  the  Confederate  agencies 
at  Nassau,  Bermuda,  and  Havana  were  so  well  organized 
that  there  was  no  difficulty  in  sending  reports  by  the 
British  mails  via  Halifax  and  New  York  to  either  of 
those  places,  and  the  agents  forwarded  them  to  the  Con 
federate  ports  by  the  best  class  of  blockade-runners.  It 
is  quite  astonishing  how  few  letters  from  the  regular 
official  agents  of  the  Confederate  Government  in  Europe 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The  agents  at  the 
islands  practised  great  caution,  and  put  their  official 
mails  in  the  hands  of  safe  messengers,  who  destroyed 
them  when  capture  seemed  inevitable.  There  was  often, 
of  course,  much  delay,  which  caused  embarrassment,  but 
I  never  learned  that  any  letter  addressed  by  me  to  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  253 

Secretary  of  the  Confederate  Navy  at  Richmond  ever 
found  its  way  to  Washington  instead,  although  lists  of 
captured  correspondence  were  frequently  published  in 
the  New  York  papers. 

I  began  now  to  look  anxiously  for  the  arrival  of 
Captain  Semmes,  and  knowing  that  he  had  left  Nassau 
in  the  steamship  Bahama,  I  arranged  with  the  owners 
of  that  vessel  to  charter  her  for  a  voyage  back  to  Nassau, 
and  the  purpose  was  that  she  should  take  Captain 
Semmes  and  his  officers  to  the  Alabama  at  Terceira. 
Some  extra  stores  and  two  additional  32 -pounder  guns 
were  got  ready  to  be  shipped  by  the  Bahama,  and  Free- 
mantle,  who  was  with  me  in  the  Fingal,  and  a  few  good 
men  were  picked  up  to  go  also,  ostensibly  for  Nassau. 
At  the  last  moment  about  thirty  men  were  induced  to 
take  passage  in  the  Bahama,  the  plea  being  that  they 
were  to  join  a  vessel  at  an  outport. 

The  following  extracts  from  my  two  next  reports  to 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  will  suffice  to  close  the  ac 
count  of  the  outfit  of  the  Alabama,  and  the  beginning 
of  her  career  as  a  Confederate  cruiser. 

•Liverpool,  August  llth,  1862. 
'  SIR,— 

'  I  have  already  informed  you  by  letter,  as  well 
as  by  private  messenger,  that  the  Alabama  is  safely  clear 
of  British  waters,  and  that  another  vessel,  with  her 
battery  and  ordnance  stores,  had  previously  sailed  for  a 
concerted  rendezvous.  I  have  now  the  satisfaction  to 
report  that  Commander  Semmes,  with  his  officers,  has 
arrived  here,  and  will  sail  to-morrow  in  a  steamer 
chartered  for  the  purpose,  to  join  the  Alabama.  It  has 
been  deemed  advisable  that  I  should  go  with  Commander 
Semmes  as  far  as  the  rendezvous,  to  smooth  away  as 


254  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

much  as  possible  his  embarrassments  and  difficulties  in 
assuming  the  command  of  an  entirely  new  ship  with  a 
strange  and  untried  crew.  My  absence  will  not  be 
prolonged  beyond  one  month,  and  I  have  arranged  all 
other  business  so  that  there  will  be  no  delay  or  inter 
ruption  in  the  progress  of  other  work.  As  soon  as  it 
would  be  safe  to  allude  to  the  movements  of  the 
Alabama  in  detail,  you  shall  have  full  accounts.  .  .  . 
Suffice  it  for  the  present  to  say  that  the  United 
States  Consul  ....  has  not  been  able  to  prove  any 
violation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  or  of  her 
Majesty's  Neutrality  Proclamation.  .  .  . 

'  It  will  give  me  the  greatest  satisfaction  to  know  that 
Commander  Semmes  is  fairly  afloat  in  the  Alabama, 
and  confident  of  his  ability  to  do  good  service  in  her,  I 
will  watch  with  pride  her  coming  success,  although  I 
cannot  overcome  the  feeling  of  disappointment  I  expe 
rienced  when  first  informed  that  I  was  not  to  command 
her  myself.  The  papers  necessary  to  show  all  the  plans, 
equipment,  etc.,  of  the  ship  are  too  bulky  to  send  by  the 
means  now  offering,  but  you  shall  have  all  these  points 
as  soon  as  possible.  .  .  . 

i  I  am,  etc., 
'  (Signed)       JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 

'Hon.  S.  RMallory, 

'  Secretary  of  the  Navy.' 

'Liverpool,  September  IQth,  1862. 

'  SIR,— 

i  I  have  the  honour  to  report  my  return  to 
England  after  a  short  cruise  to  the  Western  Islands, 
where  I  had  gone  with  Commander  Semmes  to  see  him 
fairly  afloat  in  the  Alabama.  You  have  been  already 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  255 

informed  that  I  had  taken  the  Alabama  out  of  British 
waters,  and  leaving  her  off  the  north-west  coast  of 
Ireland,  had  returned  to  Liverpool  to  prepare  a  ship  for 
the  conveyance  of  Commander  Semmes  and  his  officers 
as  soon  as  they  arrived.  The  battery  and  ordnance 
stores,  with  a  quantity  of  men's  clothing  and  general 
supplies  for  a  cruising  ship,  with  350  tons  of  coal,  were 
despatched  from  another  port  of  the  kingdom  in  a  sailing 
vessel  bought  for  the  purpose,  and  the  two  vessels 
were  ordered  to  rendezvous  at  Praya,  in  the  island  of 
Terceira. 

'  Captain  Semmes  arrived  from  Nassau  on  the  8th  of 
August,  and  on  the  13th  I  sailed  in  the  steamship 
Bahama  with  him  and  all  his  officers  for  the  previously 
selected  rendezvous. 

4  In  seven  days  the  Bahama  reached  Praya,  and  we 
had  the  satisfaction  to  find  the  Alabama  and  her  consort 
at  anchor  in  the  bay.  It  was  now  Wednesday,  August 
20th,  and  no  time  was  lost  in  commencing  the  transfer 
of  stores  from  the  tender  to  the  Alabama.  Favoured 
by  Providence  with  mild  calm  weather,  we  met  with  no 
interruption,  and  the  work  progressed  so  briskly  that  at 
10  a.m.  on  Friday,  the  22nd,  the  last  gun  of  the  battery 
was  mounted,  the  powder  and  shell  all  stowed,  shot  in 
their  racks,  and,  in  fine,  the  tender  was  discharged. 
The  remainder  of  the  day  until  10  p.m.  was  occupied  in 
coaling,  at  which  time  the  "  main -brace  was  spliced,"  and 
the  hammocks  piped  down,  the  Alabama — so  far,  at  least, 
as  related  to  her  equipment — being  ready  for  action.  On 
Sunday  morning  (the  24th),  the  Alabama  and  Bahama 
steamed  slowly  off  the  land,  and  when  beyond  the 
marine  league  which  was  covered  by  the  jurisdiction  of 
Portugal,  our  own  national  colours  were  hoisted  for  the 
first  time  at  the  Alabama's  peak,  welcomed  by  three 


256  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

cheers  from  the  united  crews  of  both  vessels.  Now 
came  the  business  of  shipping  the  men  formally  for  the 
Confederate  States  service,  making  out  their  allotment 
tickets,  arranging  their  accounts,  etc.  This  could  be 
done  leisurely,  for  we  were  on  the  high  seas,  beyond  the 
reach  of  Foreign  Enlistment  Acts  and  Neutrality 
Proclamations,  the  most  annoying  foes  we  have  to 
contend  with  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic. 

4  By  twelve  o'clock  at  night  all  these  matters  were 
arranged  ;  the  two  steamers  stopped  their  engines,  and 
bidding  Captain  Semmes  a  cordial  adieu,  with  heartfelt 
prayers  for  his  success,  I  stepped  over  the  Alabama  s 
side.  .  .  .  Commander  Semmes  has  written  you  enclosing 
crew-list,  etc.,  and  for  further  information  I  beg  to  refer 
you  to  his  report.  .  .  . 

*I  am,  etc., 

'(Signed)         JAMES  D  BULLOCH. 

'  Hon.  S.  E.  Mallory, 

1  Secretary  of  the  Navy/ 

There  were  some  minor  adventures  attending  the 
equipment  of  the  Alabama  at  Terceira  which  Captain 
Semmes  has  narrated  in  his  very  full  and  interesting 
history  of  his  cruise.  To  repeat  them  here  would  be 
superfluous.  My  official  reports  were  usually  brief  and 
concise,  often  written  in  great  haste,  and  there  was 
neither  time  to  describe  incidents  of  ordinary  interest, 
nor  would  they  have  been  suited  to  appear  in  official 
documents. 

Captain  Butcher  returned  with  me  in  the  Bahama  to 
Liverpool.  We  parted  company  shortly  afterwards  and 
did  not*  meet  again  for  many  years.  I  have  already 
given  my  estimate  of  Captain  Butcher's  qualities,  and  as 
his  name  will  now  disappear  from  this  narrative,  I  take 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  257 

pleasure  in  saying  that  his  conduct  up  to  the  last 
moment  was  confirmatory  of  my  first  impressions. 
He  carried  out  his  instructions  with  zeal  and  intelli 
gence,  and  when  the  Bahama  arrived  at  the  rendezvous, 
we  had  the  satisfaction  to  find  that  he  had  already 
broken  bulk  on  board  the  Agrippina,  and  had  transferred 
a  portion  of  the  stores  and  some  of  the  heavy  weights 
to  the  Alabama,  and  had  thus  lessened  the  subsequent 
labour,  and  shortened  the  time  of  our  detention  at 
Terceira. 

The  whole  story  of  the  building  and  equipment  of  the 
Alabama  has  now  been  told,  perhaps  with  unnecessary 
detail,  but  that  offence  may  be  pardoned,  in  considera 
tion  of  the  misapprehensions  which  have  heretofore 
prevailed,  the  many  mis  statements  which  have  been 
made  with  reference  to  her  origin,  and  the  obligation 
resting  upon  me  to  tell  the  whole  truth,  if  I  ventured 
to  come  forward  as  a  witness  at  all.*  Some  of  the 
statements  respecting  the  departure  of  the  Alabama 
from  Liverpool  require  to  be  especially  controverted  and 
explained.  It  has  been  said  that  she  '  escaped  by  a 
ruse,'  and  that  an  offence  was  committed  by  taking  her 
away  without  registration,  and  without  a  clearance  at 
the  Custom  House.  The  effect  of  registry  in  England 
is  to  entitle  the  ship  to  wear  the  British  flag,  and 
to  assume  the  privileges  of  British  nationality ;  but  the 
law  does  not  positively  require  an  owner  to  register  his 
ship.!  Disabilities  and  disadvantages  are,  however, 
incurred  by  the  failure  to  register,  and  thus  the  law  may 

*  That  the  Alabama  left  Liverpool  wholly  unarmed  is  proved  by 
the  Report  of  the  Surveyor  of  Customs,  See  note,  Chapter  II.,  p.  69. 

t  The  law  in  respect  to  clearance  and  registration  was  altered  in 
1867,  and  the  above  remarks  have  reference  to  the  law  as  it  stood 
in  1861—1865. 

VOL.    I.  17 


258  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

be  said  to  practically  enforce  registration  in  all  cases  of 
British  ships  employed  in  trade  to  and  from  the  United 
Kingdom.  When,  however,  a  vessel  is  built  in  England, 
and  is  sent  abroad  for  sale  or  for  delivery  to  a  previous 
purchaser,  there  is  no  violation  of  law,  and  no  penalty  is 
incurred,  if  she  is  sent  away  without  a  register. 

The  requirement  to  take  out  a  clearance  at  a  British 
port  is  purely  for  Customs  purposes  :  (1)  to  obtain 
statistics  of  the  quantity  and  description  of  merchandise 
entering  and  leaving  the  United  Kingdom;  and  (2)  to 
protect  the  revenue  in  the  following  particular.  Ships 
taking  on  board,  out  of  bond,  such  goods  as  are  liable 
to  import  duty  if  consumed  in  the  country,  are  allowed 
an  exemption  if  the  goods  are  intended  for  use  during 
the  outward  voyage,  or  for  final  export,  and  before 
a  clearance  can  be  effected  the  Customs  authorities 
require  satisfactory  proof  that  the  goods  of  that  class 
stated  to  be  thus  shipped  are  really  kept  on  board 
and  carried  away.  In  the  year  1862,  and  I  believe 
until  18 67,. when  the  law  was  changed,  no  legal  penalty 
was  incurred  by  a  vessel  if  she  left  a  British  for  a 
foreign  port  without  a  clearance,  provided  she  was  in 
ballast,  and  had  no  stores  on  board  except  such  as  were 
exempt  from  duty,  or  had  paid  duty.  I  took  legal 
advice  on  both  the  above  points,  and  was  fully  instructed, 
besides  which,  I  was  furnished  with  specific  examples 
of  ships  that  had  previously  gone  away  direct  from  the 
hands  of  the  builders,  without  registration  or  clearance. 
The  Alabama  was  in  ballast,  and  had  no  goods  or 
stores  on  board  that  were  not  either  free  of  import 
duty  or  had  paid  duty.  She  lay  in  a  public  dock  for  at 
least  a  fortnight.  She  was  brought  out  of  that  dock 
in  open  daylight,  and  lay  a  night  and  part  of  two 
days  in  the  river.  She  then  got  under  weigh  in  a  busy 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  259 

part  of  the  day,  when  the  whole  neighbourhood  was 
awake  and  active,  and  went  to  sea  with  colours  flying. 

There  could  hardly  be  a  movement  less  like  a 
clandestine  i  escape/  and  it  has  been  shown  that  there 
was  no  violation  of  law.  But  it  may  be  and  has  been 
said,  that  the  party  of  guests,  and  the  dressing  with 
flags,  were  intended  to  convey  the  impression  that 
the  departure  was  not  final,  and  that  the  ship  would 
return.  If  the  charge  of  £  escaping  by  a  ruse '  is 
founded  upon  those  lawful  and  innocent  proceedings, 
there  is  no  occasion  for  much  concern  about  it.  I 
have  never  learned  that  the  ethics  of  war  forbid  the 
practice  of  a  ruse  to  deceive  an  enemy. 

Not  a  single  false  statement  was  made  with  the 
purpose  to  mislead  those  having  authority  to  make 
inquiries.  No  trust  was  betrayed,  no  confidence 
violated.  The  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  the  Merchant 
Shipping  Act,  the  Customs  Eegulations,  were  carefully 
examined,  and  in  the  opinion  of  experts  none  of  them 
were  transgressed,  and  no  one  has  ever  been  indicted  or 
made  to  answer  in  a  court  of  law  for  his  conduct  in  any 
matter  concerning  the  building  or  despatch  of  the 
Alabama,  although  the  parties  implicated  were  at  the 
time,  and  continued  to  be,  resident  in  Great  Britain. 

Officers  of  her  Majesty's  Customs  had  been  closely 
watching  the  ship.  They  were  on  board  the  very  morn 
ing  of  her  departure,  and  were  satisfied  that  there  were 
no  arms  or  ammunition  in  the  ship,  and  no  goods  except 
such  as  were  free  or  had  paid  duty.  The  c  so-called ' 
ruse  was  not  intended  to  deceive  them,  but  to  mislead 
the  United  States  consular  spies,  who  I  knew  were 
ready  to  make  any  affidavit  that  might  be  considered 
necessary  to  effect  a  seizure  of  the  ship  for  violation  of 


the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act. 


17—2 


260  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

It  was  furthermore  said  that  the  departure  of  the 
Alabama  from  the  Mersey  was  4  hastened  by  the  illicit 
receipt  of  intelligence  of  the  decision  of  the  British 
Government  to  stop  her.7  In  the  '  Counter  Case  '  pre 
sented  on  the  part  of  the  Government  of  her  Britannic- 
Majesty  to  the  Tribunal  of  Arbitration  at  Geneva,  this 
statement  is  disposed  of  by  pointing  out  that  the  report 
of  the  law  officers  was  not  made  until  the  29th  of  July, 
and  therefore  no  decision  had  been  come  to  when  the 
Alabama  left,  early  on  the  morning  of  that  day  ;  but  the 
defence  is  set  up  that  even  if f  it  had  been  so,  the  British 
Government  could  never  be  held  responsible  for  the 
treachery  of  some  unknown  subordinate,  who  may  have 
become  informed  of  their  decision  or  may  have  anticipated 
that  it  would  be  made.' 

The  statement  referred  to  above  is  rather  in  the 
character  of  an  insinuation  than  a  charge,  because  it 
could  not  have  been  proved  by  any  direct  evidence, 
unless  the  alleged  informer  had  been  driven  by  a  re 
proving  conscience  to  confess  his  treachery.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  cannot  be  proved  to  be  false  by  any  other 
evidence  than  a  direct  and  categorical  denial.  It  is  not 
my  office  to  defend,  or  explain,  or  to  palliate  the  conduct 
of  the  British  Government  in  any  particular,  but  per 
manent  officials,  and  especially  the  subordinates  in  the 
various  departments,  are  in  no  way  responsible  for  a 
policy,  but  only  for  the  manner  in  which  their  specific 
duties  are  performed,  and  I  feel  it  incumbent  upon  me 
to  declare  that  no  officer,  high  or  low,  in  any  department 
of  the  Government,  did  ever  convey  to  me,  or  to  anyone 
who  afterwards  repeated  to  me,  a  word  or  a  hint  which 
led  me  to  anticipate  what  the  action  of  the  Government 
would  be,  or  was  likely  to  be,  in  any  pending  case. 
Although  the  Confederate  Commissioners  were  not 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  261 

officially  recognised,  and  therefore  could  have  no  diplo 
matic  intercourse  with  the  Government,  it  is  well  known 
that  outside  official  circles  they  were  received  with  very 
marked  and  gratifying  cordiality,  and  it  is  probable 
that  through  private  friends  Mr.  Mason  could  and  did 
have  very  favourable  opportunities  of  learning  the 
general,  and  in  some  instances  the  specific,  purposes  of 
the  Government.  Whatever  he  learned  that  had  any 
bearing  upon  our  naval  operations  was  always  repeated 
to  me  without  delay,  and  the  information  thus  received 
often  proved  to  be  correct,  although  it  was  gathered 
merely  from  conversation  with  those  who  were  accus 
tomed  to  observe  the  conduct  of  Ministers  and  to  draw 
their  own  conclusions,  and  not  from  the  statements  of 
any  persons  who  were  in  a  position  to  know  the  actual 
purposes  of  the  Government. 

But  in  the  particular  case  of  the  Alabama  the  signs 
that  something  serious  was  about  to  happen  were  too 
visible  to  escape  notice.  The  numerous  statements  and 
affidavits  sent  to  the  American  Minister  by  the  Consul 
at  Liverpool  were  necessarily  drawn  up  in  legal  form, 
and  required  the  employment  of  solicitors.  I  cannot 
say  whether  there  is,  or  is  not,  a  species  of  magnetic 
sympathy  between  attorneys,  or  whether  they  have  any 
special  devices  for  finding  out  each  other's  ways,  but  I 
do  know  that  my  own  solicitor  managed  to  find  out  the 
particulars  of  some  of  the  affidavits,  and  although  they 
were  inaccurate  in  the  affirmations  which  were  at  all 
specific,  yet  some  of  them  contained  allegations  which 
he  thought  would  at  least  induce  the  Government  to 
detain  the  ship  for  investigation. 

Besides  this,  the  Foreign  Secretary,  pressed  by  the 
United  States  Minister  to  take  some  action,  referred 
the  affidavits  to  the  Commissioners  of  Customs,  and 

VOL.  i.* 


262  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

directed  them  to  inquire  and  report.  For  a  fortnight 
before  the  departure  of  the  Alabama  inquiries  came  in 
showers  from  the  collector,  sometimes  delivered  in 
person  by  the  surveyor  or  his  subordinates,  sometimes 
in  the  form  of  written  memoranda.  The  inquiries  were 
mostly  addressed  to  the  builders  of  the  ship,  and  often 
referred  to  matters  of  which  they  knew  nothing,  and  so 
could  give  no  reply.  My  solicitor  got  possession  of  one 
of  the  lists  of  questions,  and  it  lies  before  me  now  while 
I  am  writing.  Almost  every  inquiry  could  have  been 
answered  by  a  direct  and  positive  denial  of  the  truth  of 
the  allegation ;  but  at  the  same  time  it  was  possible, 
perhaps  probable,  that  the .  Government  would  not  be 
satisfied  with  denials,  however  categorical  and  explicit. 

It  must  be  manifest  from  the  foregoing  resume  that 
there  was  good  reason  for  hastening  the  departure  of  the 
Alabama,  and  I  trust  it  will  be  now  admitted  that  the 
information  which  caused  the  somewhat  precipitate 
movement  came  to  those  concerned  in  it,  not  by  any 
treachery  or  breach  of  trust,  but  in  a  very  simple, 
regular,  and  ordinary  way. 

The  collector  of  the  Port  of  Liverpool  at  that  time 
was  a  Mr.  S.  Price  Edwards.  The  official  documents 
published  in  the  proceedings  before  the  Tribunal  of 
Arbitration  prove,  it  seems  to  me,  that  Mr.  Edwards  did 
his  duty  faithfully — in  fact,  zealously.  On  the  21st  of 
July,  1862,  eight  days  before  the  sailing  of  the  Alabama, 
he  appears  to  have  written  to  his  superiors  in  London 
informing  them  that  the  ship  was  quite  ready  for  sea, 
and  might  sail  at  any  moment,  and  he  asked  to  be 
instructed  by  telegraph  if  the  intention  was  to  detain 
her.* 

*  Extract  from  a  letter  addressed  by  the  Collector  of  Customs, 
Liverpool  (Mr.  Price  Edwards),  to  the  Commissioner  of  Customs, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  263 

When  it  was  known  that  the  Alabama  was  off,  and 
all  chance  of  seizing  her  had  vanished,  great  annoyance 
and  chagrin  was  felt  at  the  United  States  Consulate  and 
among  the  resident  Americans  who  were  in  sympathy 
with  the  Federal  Government.  This  feeling  of  disap 
pointment  was  shown  in  many  ways — among  others,  in 
harsh  and  ungenerous  insinuations  against  the  integrity 
of  the  local  authorities,  especially  against  Mr.  Price 
Edwards  himself,  who  was  even  accused  of  having  been 
paid  for  shutting  his  eyes. 

Many  months  afterwards  I  met  a  gentleman  at  the 
house  of  a  friend,  and  we  engaged  in  conversation  for 
some  time,  neither  knowing  who  the  other  was.  Later 
in  the  evening  we  were  joined  by  our  host,  who  intro 
duced  us.  There  was  a  mutual  expression  of  surprise^ 
for  the  parties  were  Mr.  Price  Edwards  and  the  writer. 
Mr.  Edwards  asked  me  if  I  was  aware  that  he  had  been 
accused  of  taking  a  bribe  from  me  for  letting  the  Alabama 
go.  I  replied  that  I  had  heard  some  indefinite  insinua 
tions  of  the  kind,  but  had  not  given  them  much  heed. 
He  affected  to  be  equally  indifferent,  but  I  learned  from 
other  sources  that  he  had  been  deeply  pained,  and  that 
he  never  wholly  recovered  from  the  feeling  of  mortifica 
tion  produced  by  such  an  unfounded  and  gratuitous 
aspersion  upon  his  official  integrity. 

Subsequently  Mr.  Edwards  fell  into  some  difficulties 
with  the  authorities  at  London  in  no  way  connected 
with  Confederate  affairs,  and  was  removed  from  his 
office.  I  never  knew  the  cause  of  his  removal,  but  I 
met  him  some  time  afterwards.  He  appeared  much 
broken  in  health  and  greatly  depressed  in  spirits,  and 

London,  dated  July  21,  1862  :  *  I  shall  feel  obliged  by  the  Board  being 
pleased  to  instruct  me  by  telegraph  how  I  am  to  act,  as  the  ship 
appears  to  be  ready  for  sea,  and  may  leave  at  any  hour  she  pleases.' 


264  TEE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

not  long  after  I  learned  that  he  had  passed  beyond  the 
reach  of  such  'ills  as  flesh  is  heir  to.'  I  am  glad  to 
have  it  in  my  power  to  free  his  memory  from  the  stain 
which  may  have  clung  to  it  in  respect  to  the  c  escape '  of 
the  Alabama,  although  it  is  hardly  probable  that  any 
surviving  relative  will  know  that  it  has  been  done. 

o 

There  is  just  one  more  disclaimer  that  I  feel  in  some 
sort  impelled  to  pronounce  in  this  connection.  I  have 
said  that  no  public  official,  either  principal  or  subordinate, 
ever  gave  the  faintest  hint  of  the  purposes  of  his  superiors 
in  respect  to  the  seizure  of  Confederate  ships.  I  can 
also  affirm,  without  the  least  mental  reservation,  that  no 
proposition,  or  suggestion,  or  promise  of  reward,  was 
ever  made  to  an  employe  of  the  Government  which 
could  have  tempted  him  to  swerve  in  his  loyalty,  or  to 
turn  one  hair's -breadth  from  the  straight  line  of  his 
duty,  and  I  never  saw  or  heard  of  anyone  who  appeared 
likely  to  be  accessible  to  such  temptations,  had  they 
been  put  in  his  way. 

When  I  parted  from  Captain  Semmes  off  the  island  of 
Terceira,  it  was  arranged  that  I  should  send  out  the 
Acjrippina  to  him  with  a  cargo  of  coals  and  certain  other 
supplies,  and  the  barque  was  ordered  to  Cardiff  to  load. 
This  arrangement  was  carried  out  successfully.  Semmes 
met  his  tender  at  St.  Pierre,  in  the  French  island  of 
Martinique,  from  which  place  he  despatched  her  to  Blan- 
quilla,  a  small  island  off  the  coast  of  Venezuela,  where 
he  took  from  her  a  supply  of  coal,  and  then  sent  her  to 
the  uninhabited  Areas  Cays,  off  Yucatan.  Here  he 
took  the  remainder  of  the  coal  and  stores,  and  sent  the 
barque  to  Liverpool,  proceeding  himself  to  look  after 
General  Banks's  expedition  against  Galveston. 

Semmes'  hope  was  to  catch  the  troop- ships  and 
transports  en  route,  and  to  make  a  dash  in  among 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  265 

them.  He  wrote  me  from  Areas  Islands,  January  4, 
1863:- 

;  I  have  filled  up  with  coal  a  second  time  from  the 
barque,  caulked  the  spar  deck,  overhauled  and  set  up 
rigging,  and  shall  sail  again  to-night  on  another  foray 
against  the  enemy.  My  ship  is  getting  in  good  order, 
and  I  have  nearly  a  full  crew,  having  added  twenty-five 
men  to  the  eighty-five  that  I  brought  with  me  from 
Terceira,  and  they  are  pretty  well  drilled  at  the  guns. 
It  is  not  unlikely  that  before  I  get  out  of  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  I  shall  "  put  up  "  something,  as  this  is  a  sort  of 
"  close  sea  "  of  the  enemy,  swarming  with  his  cruisers. 
After  leaving  the  Gulf  I  shall  carry  out  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy's  suggestion  as  to  my  cruising  ground,  and 
about  which  we  (you  and  I)  have  consulted/ 

In  the  same  letter  Semmes  asked  me  to  send  the 
Agrippina  to  him  again,  first  to  the  island  of  Fernando 
de  Noronha,  with  instructions  to  wait  there  three  days, 
and  if  he  did  not  arrive  to  go  on  to  Bahia.  The  expec 
tation  that  he  would  c  put  up  something '  before  he  got 
out  of  the  Gulf  was  realized.  He  did  not  get  among 
General  Banks' s  transports,  but  he  went  off*  Galveston  to 
look  after  them,  and  found  there  a  powerful  squadron 
under  Acting  Rear- Admiral  H.  H.  Bell,  who  sent  two 
or  three  of  his  ships  to  meet  the  approaching  stranger 
and  bring  her  to  an  account  of  herself. 

Semmes  ran  slowly  off  shore,  and  drew  one  of  his 
pursuers  after  him.  When  he  found  that  the  others  did 
not  follow,  he  waited  until  just  at  nightfall,  when  the 
enemy  closed.  There  was  a  hail  and  a  reply,  then  two 
quickly  succeeding  broadsides,  and  a  sharp  engagement 
of  thirteen  minutes,  a  cessation  of  the  firing  on  one  side, 
and  a  hail  to  report  the  vessel  sinking.  The  hail  was 
not  from  the  Alabama,  but  it  suspended  her  fire,  and 


266  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

her  boats  were  soon  busy  picking  up  the  crew  of  the 
United  States  ship  Hatter  as. 

It  was  a  creditable  performance  for  the  first  effort  of 
a  hastily  improvised  cruiser  with  a  green  crew,  to  sink 
an  opposing  ship  in  thirteen  minutes  in  a  night  engage 
ment,  and  then  to  pick  up  every  man  who  had  not  been 
killed  or  mortally  wounded  in  the  action.  On  the  other 
side,  I  take  pleasure  in  saying  that  Lieutenant-Com 
manding  H.  H.  Blake  showed  commendable  spirit  and 
courage  in  boldly  running  down  upon  a  ship  which  he 
suspected  to  be  the  Alabama,  and  therefore  knew  was 
his  superior  in  armament  and  general  efficiency,  when 
he  had  distanced  his  consorts  and  could  expect  no  sup 
port  from  them. 

The  Hatter  as  was  an  iron  paddle- steamer,  bought  out 
of  the  mercantile  marine.  Her  engines  were  much 
exposed,  and  were  of  the  '  top-lever/  or  '  walking-beam ' 
type.  The  armament  of  the  Hatteras  was  four  32- 
pounders,  two  Parrot  30-pounder  rifles,  one  20-pounder 
rifle,  and  one  12-pounder  howitzer — total,  eight  guns. 
The  armament  of  the  Alabama  was  six  32-pounders, 
one  8 -inch  smooth-bore  gun  (112  cwt.),  and  one 
100-pounder  Blakely  rifled  gun.  The  crew  of  the 
Hatteras  was  108  men,  that  of  the  Alabama  110. 

I  do  not  describe  the  engagement  in  detail,  because 
the  reports  of  both  commanders  are  on  public  record, 
and  every  incident  has  been  minutely  related  in  '  My 
Adventures  Afloat,'  by  Admiral  Semmes.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  the  Alabama  was  the  superior  ship,  and 
barring  an  accident,  or  one  of  those  unexpected  chances 
which  sometimes  occur  in  contests  between  single 
vessels,  and  upset  all  calculations,  she  ought  to  have 
won,  and  the  loss  of  his  ship  was  no  disgrace  to  the 
commander  of  the  Hatteras. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  267 

The  Agrippina  was  not  a  clipper.  She  made  a  long 
passage  from  the  Areas  Islands  to  England,  and  sprang 
her  foremast  in  a  gale  before  getting  into  the  Channel. 
She  was  refitted  and  despatched  as  quickly  as  possible, 
but  this  time  the  arrangements  failed.  Semmes  touched 
at  Fernando  de  Noronha,  and  then  went  on  to  Bahia, 
but  not  finding  the  tender  at  either  place,  he  coaled 
from  the  shore,  and  proceeded  on  his  cruise  to  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  en  route  for  the  China  Sea.  The 
Alabama  left  Bahia  on  the  22nd  of  May,  1863,  and  the 
Agrippina  arrived  there  on  June  1st.  Semmes  was 
a  little  impatient  to  get  away.  He  had  done  much 
damage  to  the  enemy's  commerce  on  the  great  ocean 
highway  off  the  north-east  coast  of  Brazil,  and  began  to 
think  that  the  neighbourhood  could  not  remain  safe 
much  longer.  He  wrote  me  from  Bahia,  May  21st, 
1862  : 

'  I  have  coaled  from  the  shore,  and  as  the  authorities 
are  hurrying  me  off,  I  have  appointed  another  ren 
dezvous  for  the  Agrippina.  If  you  hear  anything  of 
my  violating  the  neutrality  of  Fernando  de  Noronha, 
contradict  it  in  limine,  as  being  an  invention  of  the 
enemy.  We  are  having  capital  success.  That  "little 
bill "  wrhich  the  Yankees  threaten  to  present  to 
our  Uncle  John  Bull,  for  the  depredations  of 
the  Alabama,  is  growing  apace,  and  already  reaches 
$3,100,000.' 

When  the  Agrippina  arrived  at  Bahia,  Captain 
McQueen  found  there  two  United  States  ships,  the 
Mohican  and  the  Onward.  The  United  States  Consul 
had  suspected  another  British  ship  then  in  port  of 
having  stores  on  board  for  the  Alabama,  and  had 
advised  the  commanders  of  the  United  States  ships 
to  capture  her  if  she  should  leave  the  port.  Captain 


268  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

McQueen  soon  learned  that  his  vessel  had  also  attracted 
the  notice  and  suspicions  of  the  United  States  Consul, 
and  he  learned  that  the  Onward  was  especially  on  the 
watch  for  him.  In  this  dilemma  he  consulted  her 
Majesty's  Consul,  who  told  him  that  he  had  not  a 
shadow  of  doubt  that  if  he  went  outside  the  Onward 
would  capture  him,  and  he  would  be  sent  before  a 
United  States  prize-court. 

Captain    McQueen   waited   for   some   time  in  great 
perplexity,  being  most  anxious  to  comply  with  Captain 
Semmes'  instructions,  but  the  Onward  remained  also  on 
the  look-out  for  him,  and  escape  from   her  was   im 
possible.     Finally   he  applied   again   to  her  Majesty's 
Consul,    who   advised  him  to  sell  his  cargo  and  take 
a  freight  for  England,  a  proceeding  which  would  protect 
him   from   capture,    and    would   be    the   best   possible 
arrangement  for  his  owners.     The  Consul  did  not,  of 
course,  know  of  the  Agrippmds  connection  with   the 
Alabama,  whatever  the  general  belief  at  Bahia  may  have 
been,  and  his  advice  was  given  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
his   duty   as   the    guardian   of  British    interests,    the 
Agrippina  being  a  duly  registered  British  ship.  Captain 
McQueen  acted  upon  it,  and  to  satisfy  the  owner  that  all 
was   right,   he   brought   home   a   consular    certificate, 
which  alleged  that    '  Bahia   had   been   for   some   time 
virtually  blockaded  by  the  United  States  ships  Mohican 
and  Onward. ,' 

The  Agrippina 's  homeward  freight  amounted  to  £437 
15s.  3d.  She  was  too  well  known  to  be  used  for 
the  Confederate  service  again,  and  was  sold,  after  some 
delay,  for  a  purchaser  did  not  readily  offer.  Her  original 
cost  was  £1,400,  and  she  fetched  at  auction  £860.  The 
service  she  had  rendered  was  more  than  compensation 
for  the  loss,  but  it  was  evident  that  the  expense  of 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  269 

providing  a  permanent  tender  for  each  cruising  snip 
was  more  than  the  Confederate  Treasury  could  bear,  and 
besides  this,  I  perceived  that  the  probabilities  of  bringing 
the  two  together  at  distant  and  varying  points,  where 
they  could  communicate  and  make  the  transfer  of  stores 
safely,  did  not  justify  the  labour  and  expenditure.  The 
Alabama  was  therefore  left  to  look  out  for  herself, 
and  I  felt  no  great  concern,  because  I  was  confident 
of  her  qualities  and  fitness  for  the  work  she  had 
in  hand.  I  knew  that  she  could  supply  herself  with 
provisions  and  various  other  wants  from  prizes,  and  the 
'  cruising  fund '  was  sufficient  to  meet  the  requirements 
of  fuel.  Her  commander  writes  of  her  thus  : 

*  I  was  much  gratified  to  find  that  my  new  ship  proved 
to  be  a  fine  sailer  under  canvas.  This  quality  was  of 
inestimable  advantage  to  me,  as  it  enabled  me  to  do 
most  of  my  work  under  sail.  She  carried  but  an 
eighteen  days'  supply  of  food,  and  if  I  had  been  obliged, 
because  of  her  dull  sailing  qualities,  to  chase  everything 
under  steam,  the  reader  can  see  how  I  should  have  been 
hampered  in  my  movements.  I  should  have  been  half 
my  time  running  into  port  for  fuel.  This  would  have 
disclosed  my  whereabouts  so  frequently  to  the  enemy, 
that  I  should  have  been  constantly  in  danger  of  capture, 
whereas  I  could  now  stretch  into  far-distant  seas,  and 
chase,  capture,  and  destroy,  perfectly  independent  of 
steam.  I  adopted  the  plan,  therefore,  of  working  under 
sail  in  the  very  beginning  of  the  cruise,  and  practised  it 
unto  the  end.  With  the  exception  of  half-a-dozen  prizes, 
all  my  captures  were  made  with  my  screw  hoisted  and 
my  ship  under  sail/ 

The  foregoing  extract  from  '  My  Adventures  Afloat,' 
by  Admiral  Semmes,  is  confirmatory  of  what  I  have 
said  in  an  early  chapter  respecting  the  suitable  type  for 


270  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  TEE 

a  Confederate  cruiser  ;  and  the  opinion  I  held  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  was  maintained  to  the  end,  and 
deterred  me  from  buying  any  of  the  ordinary  war -ships 
with  non-lifting  screws,  or  any  of  the  wooden  ships 
with  insufficient  sail  power,  which  private  parties  de 
sirous  to  make  commissions  were  constantly  pressing 
upon  me. 

The  Alabama,  it  will  be  perceived,  was  commissioned 
on  the  high  seas,  and  she  never  entered  a  Confederate 
port.  This  was  always  a  sore  point  with  Mr.  Seward, 
the  United  States  Secretary  of  State.  He  never  ceased 
to  call  her  a  pirate,  nor  to  press  the  British  Government 
to  seize  her,  even  after  she  had  been  commissioned  as  a 
man-of-war  under  the  Confederate  flag.  The  tone  of 
his  despatches  on  the  subject  was  not  couched  in  such 
language  as  is  commonly  used  by  statesmen  accustomed 
to  diplomatic  usage.  His  petulant  complaints  often 
gave  offence,  and  brought  upon  him  rebukes  and  retorts 
which  must  have  been  wounding  to  the  national  feeling 
in  the  United  States  if  they  were  ever  printed  in  the 
Congressional  documents. 

The  European  Powers  having  acknowledged  the 
existence  of  a  de  facto  Government  at  Eichmond,  that 
acknowledgment  carried  with  it  the  concession  of  all 
belligerent  rights.  By  the  determination  to  acknowledge 
the  Confederate  States  as  belligerents,  England,  among 
other  Powers,  bound  herself  to  extend  the  same  privi 
leges  to  Confederate  cruisers  as  to  those  of  the  United 
States  ;  and  it  was  not  only  discourteous,  but  it  was 
highly  impolitic  in  Mr.  Seward  to  taunt  foreign  Govern 
ments  with  precipitancy  in  the  recognition,  and  then  of 
harbouring  c  piratical  cruisers.' 

I  suppose  there  can  be  no  principle  of  international 
law  plainer  than  this,  namely,  when  a  ship  is  once  com- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  271 

missioned  by  a  recognised  de  facto  Government,  no  other 
Power  can  inquire  into  her  origin  or  antecedents. 

The  process  of  commissioning  a  ship  is  for  the  duly 
appointed  captain,  with  his  staff  of  officers,  to  take  charge 
of  her,  read  his  commission,  and  hoist  his  pennant  and 
the  national  colours.  When  these  formalities  have  been 
complied  with,  no  foreign  Power  can  question  the 
character  of  the  ship,  or  enter  upon  any  inquiry  as  to  the 
place  where  she  was  commissioned.  The  British  autho 
rities  could  ask  the  commander  of  a  Confederate  cruiser 
for  a  sight  of  his  commission,  and  if  that  was  in  order, 
no  further  inquiry  was  admissible. 

No  European  or  other  neutral  Power  questioned  the 
foregoing  premises  during  the  late  Civil  War,  and  it  is 
not  therefore  necessary  to  mention  any  precedents  from 
their  history  of  vessels  commissioned  abroad  or  on  the 
high  seas. 

Cooper,  in  his  '  Naval  History  of  the  United  States/ 
supplies  many  examples  of  vessels  which  were  bought, 
armed,  equipped,  manned,  and  almost  exclusively 
officered  abroad  and  by  foreigners,  and  which  were  then 
commissioned  by  the  American  Government  and  sent  to 
cruise  against  English  commerce,  and  to  foray  upon  the 
British  coasts,  without  previously  entering  an  American 
port.  As  one  case  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  prece 
dent,  I  will  just  mention  that  of  a  fine  fast  English 
cutter  bought  at  Dover  by  an  agent  of  the  American 
Commissioners  in  France.  She  was  taken  across  the 
channel  to  Dunkirk,  where  her  name  was  changed  to  the 
Surprise.  She  was  fully  equipped,  officered,  and  manned. 
The  Commissioners  filled  up  a  blank  commission  signed 
by  John  Hancock,  President  of  Congress,  and  handed  it 
to  one  Captain  Gustavus  Conyngham,  who  went  to  sea 
from.  Dunkirk  on  the  1st  of  May,  1777,  and  on  the  4th 


272  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

captured  the  English  packet  Prince  of  Orange.  Captain 
Conyngham  took  his  prize  into  Dunkirk,  the  neutral 
port  from  which  he  had  sailed  only  a  few  days  before. 
The  English  Minister  remonstrated,  and  the  French 
Government  seized  the  Surprise,  imprisoned  Captain 
Conyngham,  and  took  away  his  commission  ;  but  the 
American  Commissioners  at  Paris  found  means  to  obtain 
his  release.  They  bought  and  fitted  out  another  cutter 
at  Dunkirk,  which  was  called  the  Revenge,  and  Captain 
Conyngham  was  recommissioned  to  her.  The  Revenge 
sailed  from  Dunkirk  on  July  18,  1777,  and  captured 
many  British  vessels.  Some  she  destroyed  ;  the  most 
valuable  she  sent  into  Spanish  ports.  Fenimore  Cooper 
says  that  the  Surprise  and  Revenge  were  spoken  of  in 
the  accounts  of  the  day  as  privateers,  but  that  they  were, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  bought  and  equipped  by  agents  of 
the  Diplomatic  Commissioners  of  the  United  States. 

Commodore  Paul  Jones  fitted  out  his  ship,  the  Eon- 
homme  Richard,  in  a  French  port.  His  crew,  picked  up 
chiefly  at  Nantes,  are  thus  described  by  Cooper:  'A 
few  Americans  were  found  to  fill  the  stations  of  sea- 
officers  on  the  quarter-deck  and  forward,  but  the 
remainder  of  the  people  were  a  mixture  of  Irish,  Scotch, 
Portuguese,  Norwegians,  Germans,  Spaniards,  Swedes, 
Italians,  and  Malays,'  etc.  The  Commissioners  stationed 
in  France  at  that  time,  and  who  conducted  the  naval 
operations  of  the  American  Congress  abroad,  were 
Benjamin  Franklin,  Silas  Deane,  and  John  Adams, 
eminent  men,  who  would  have  indignantly  repudiated 
the  charge  of  piracy  against  their  improvised  cruisers, 
and  yet  no  agent  of  the  Confederate  Government  ever 
took  such  liberties  with  neutral  rights,  or  with  the  laws 
of  nations,  as  they  did. 

In  regard  to  the  right  to  commission  a  ship  on  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  273 

high  seas,  I  will  refer  to  but  one  case,  recorded  also  in 
Cooper's  '  Naval  History  of  the  United  States.'  Com 
modore  David  Porter  made  a  famous  cruise  among  the 
English  whaling  fleet  in  the  Pacific  during  the  war  of 
1812-15,  in  command  of  the  United  States  ship  Essex. 
One  of  his  prizes  being  armed  and  well  suited  for  cruising, 
he  manned  her,  partly  from  his  own  ship,  put  his  first- 
lieutenant,  John  Downes,  in  command,  and  com 
missioned  her  as  a  United  States  ship-of-war,  naming 
her  the  Essex  Junior. 

In  view  of  these  and  other  well-known  examples 
recorded  in  the  naval  histories  of  England  as  well  as  the 
United  States,  Mr.  Seward's  continued  harping  upon  the 
'  foreign  origin '  of  the  Alabama  seemed  puerile  to  the 
representatives  of  the  various  Powers  to  whom  he 
addressed  remonstrances  on  the  subject.  However,  the 
Florida,  although  she  went  into  a  Confederate  port,  and 
was  officered,  manned,  and  recommissioned  there,  was 
also  called  by  the  generic  name  of  '  pirate  '  in  all  the 
official  correspondence  of  the  United  States  during  the 
war  ;  and  so  it.  appears  that,  in  Mr.  Seward's  opinion, 
deeds  done  by  the  de  facto  Government  of  the  revolted 
colonies  in  1777,  or  by  the  more  formally  recognised 
Government  at  Washington  in  1812-15,  were  just  and 
lawful  acts  of  war,  but  that  similar  acts  done  by  authority 
of  the  de  facto  Government  of  the  Confederate  States  in 
1862  were  '  criminal '  and  '  nefarious.'  The  Surprise, 
fitted  out,  armed,  and  manned  at  Dunkirk,  might  with 
propriety  capture  a  British  vessel  four  days  after  she 
had  left  the  neutral  port ;  the  Essex  Junior,  a  captured 
prize,  might  be  lawfully  commissioned  by  a  United 
States  officer,  at  some  savage  island  in  the  Pacific,  and 
then  sent  to  prey  upon  British  whalers  ;  but  the 
Alabama,  carrying  the  commission  of  a  de  facto  Govern- 

VOL.  i.  18 


274  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

ment,  recognised  as  a  belligerent  Power  by  every 
civilized  nation,  was  a  '  piratical  rover '  unworthy  of 
shelter  or  assistance,  but  fit  only  to  be  pursued  and 
destroyed  as  a  common  enemy  and  a  common  pest. 

Let  us  hope,  if  we  can,  that  there  will  be  no  more 
wars,  foreign  or  domestic  ;  but  Mr.  Seward  has  done 
much  by  the  pretensions  he  set  up  during  the  great 
contest  of  1861-65  to  embarrass  the  United  States 
whenever  they  may  be  again  placed  in  the  position  of  a 
neutral  or  belligerent. 

The  Alabama  left  Liverpool  on  the  29th  of  July, 
1862.  She  was  commissioned  off  the  island  of  Terceira 
on  the  24th  of  August,  and  she  kept  the  sea  almost 
incessantly  for  two  years.  During  that  period  she  was 
rarely  in  harbour,  and  never  long  enough  to  effect  a 
thorough  and  satisfactory  overhaul  of  rigging,  hull,  or 
engines.  She  was  kept  while  cruising  chiefly  under  sail, 
with  screw  up  ;  but  she  was  purposely  taken  to  the 
great  thoroughfares  of  American  marine  traffic,  to  those 
well-known  points  towards  which  the  trade  of  the 
world  converges,  and  where  it  was  reasonable  to  expect 
United  States  ships  would  be  sent  to  keep  guard. 
Hence  she  was  in  constant  expectation  of  having  to  run 
or  to  fight.  Any  morning's  light  might  find  her  close 
to  an  enemy's  ship,  and  prudence  required  both  a  sharp 
look-out  and  constant  readiness.  Her  engines  got  rest, 
but  her  boilers  none.  The  fires  were  never  allowed  to 
go  wholly  out,  but  were  banked  ;  and  the  water  was  kept 
in  such  condition  that  steam  might  be  quickly  got. 
The  chief  engineer  has  told  me  that  he  rarely  had  an 
opportunity  to  cool  the  boilers  and  clean  flues  and 
pipes. 

A  great  portion  of  her  cruising  was  in  the  tropics, 
although  she  faced  every  vicissitude  of  climate.  The 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  275 

icy  fogs  of  the  Newfoundland  Bank,  the  steaming 
moisture  of  the  equatorial  belt,  the  burning  sun  of 
Malacca  and  the  China  Sea — all  these  in  turn,  and  in 
quick  succession,  served  to  test  her  endurance.  The 
wear  and  tear  of  such  a  cruise,  such  a  lengthened  period 
of  restless  activity,  with  no  means  to  supply  deficiencies 
or  to  repair  injuries,  except  what  might  be  found  in 
captured  vessels,  told  upon  the  little  craft  at  last,  and 
early  in  1864  Semmes  began  to  think  of  her  require 
ments,  and  coming  back  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope 
into  the  Atlantic,  he  worked  leisurely  up  through  the 
*  paths  of  commerce/  capturing  a  prize  now  and  then, 
but  finding  few,  for  by  that  time  the  American 
mercantile  flag  had  well  nigh  disappeared. 

The  effect  produced  upon  the  commerce  and  the 
shipping  interests  of  the  United  States  by  two  or  three 
Confederate  cruisers  was  a  very  striking  peculiarity  of 
the  late  war.  While  the  Alabama  was  in  the  China  Sea 
many  American  ships  took  shelter  in  the  harbour  of 
Singapore  and  other  ports,  and  were  partly  dismantled 
and  laid  up  at  a  time  when  trade  was  good,  and  there 
was  an  active  demand  for  tonnage  to  all  parts  of  the 
world.  Semmes  found  on  board  a  prize  captured  in  the 
Straits  of  Malacca  a  copy  of  the  Singapore  Times,  dated 
9th  December,  1863,  containing  a  list  of  seventeen 
American  ships,  with  an  aggregate  tonnage  of  about 
12,000  tons,  which  were  laid  up  at  that  port  alone. 

The  Eight  Hon.  Milner  Gibson,  President  of  the 
Board  of  Trade,  made  a  speech  at  Ashton-under-Lyne, 
January  20th,  1864,  in  which  he  commented  upon  the 
transference  of  the  carrying  trade  from  American  to 
British  ships.  He  stated  that  during  the  year  (1863-4) 
the  number  of  British  ships  clearing  had  increased  to 
something  like  14,000,000  tons,  as  against  7,000,000 

18—2 


276  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

tons  of  all  foreign  tonnage  inclusive,  and  he  gave  the 
actual  decrease  in  the  employment  of  American  shipping 
in  the  trade  between  England  and  the  United  States  as 
something  like  forty -six  or  forty -seven  per  cent. 

Mr.  Milner  Gibson  called  particular  attention  to  the 
foregoing  results  as  an  example  of  what  could  be  done 
by  two  or  three  swift  steamers,  and  commented  upon 
the  injury  inflicted  upon  the  commerce  of  the  United 
States  by  the  Confederate  cruisers,  as  a  warning  to  other 
Maritime  Powers  of  what  might  happen  to  them.  But 
I  have  always  thought  that  the  United  States  Navy 
Department  showed  either  great  apathy  or  was  singularly 
blind  to  the  real  danger  to  the  commerce  of  the  United 
States,  and  strangely  negligent  in  using  the  means  to 
protect  it.  The  points  of  attack  were  so  apparent  that 
it  seems  hardly  credible  that  they  were  never  oc 
cupied. 

The  whole  traffic  between  the  northern  ports  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Pacific,  as  well  as  with  Brazil  and 
the  states  of  the  La  Plata,  passes  through  a  belt  of  no 
great  width,  which  intersects  the  equator  at  about  the 
30th  meridian  of  west  longitude.  American  outward- 
bound  ships  shape  their  course  so  as  to  leave  the  north 
east  Trades  near  the  above-named  meridian,  then  work 
their  way  through  the  equatorial  c  doldrums,'  and  meet 
ing  the  south-east  Trade-winds,  they  are  forced,  after 
crossing  the  line,  generally  somewhat  further  west, 
thus  passing  in  sight,  or  very  nearly  in  sight,  of  the 
island  of  Fernando  de  Noronha.  Homeward-bound 
American  ships  from  the  East  Indies  leave  the  south 
east  Trades  at  very  nearly  the  same  point,  and  those  from 
round  the  Horn  and  the  La  Plata  or  Brazil  pass  some- 
ftimes  rather  more  to  the  westward,  between  Fernando 
de  Noronha  and  that  portion  of  the  South  American 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  277 

coast  which  has  its  extreme  eastern  projection  between 
Pernambuco  and  Cape  St.  Koque. 

If  the  United  States  had  stationed  a  few  ships  to 
cruise  in  couplets  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  above- 
named  i  forks  of  the  road/  as  they  have  been  called  by 
Maury,  and  a  few  more,  say,  in  the  Straits  of  Malacca,  and 
on  the  principal  and  well-known  cruising  ground  of  their 
whaling-fleet,  two  or  three  Confederate  cruisers  could 
not  have  remained  for  weeks  in  the  track  of  passing 
ships,  capturing  and  destroying  them  without  hindrance. 

Neither  the  Alabama,  Florida,  nor  Sumter  was  driven 
from  her  work  in  any  particular  latitude  ;  they  shifted 
their  cruising  grounds  only  when  it  seemed  advisable 
to  seek  fresh  victims  elsewhere  ;  and  the  Shenandoak 
went  round  the  world,  sought  out  the  great  American 
whaling-fleet  in  the  North  Pacific,  and  destroyed  thirty- 
eight  vessels  without  so  much  as  seeing  a  United  States 
ship-of-war. 

It  is  not  probable  that  any  other  Maritime  Power 
will  leave  its  commerce  at  the  mercy  of  light  cruisers 
of  the  Alabama  type  in  a  future  war.  In  fact,  a 
fair  amount  of  British  trade  could  be  carried  on  in 
steamers  capable  of  protecting  themselves  or  of  escaping 
by  their  great  speed,  because  the  majority  of  the  modern 
steamers  of  the  British  mercantile  marine  could  carry  as 
heavy  guns  as  the  cruisers  that  would  be  sent  after 
them,  and  they  have  very  high  speed. 

On  the  llth  of  June,  1864,  the  Alabama  arrived  at 
Cherbourg.  The  purpose  was  to  give  her  a  thorough 
refit,  at  least  so  far  as  the  French  authorities  would 
permit..  Captain  Semmes  soon  learned  that  the  United 
States  ship  Kearsarge,  Captain  John  A.  Winslow,  was  at 
Flushing.  On  the  14th  she  came  round  to  Cherbourg, 
and  Captain  Winslow  made  a  request  of  the  local 


278  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

authorities  that  a  number  of  prisoners  landed  from  the 
Alabama  should  be  permitted  to  join  his  ship.  This  re 
quest  was  refused,  and  the  Kearsarge,  without  anchoring, 
went  outside  and  took  up  a  position  off  the  breakwater. 
It  was  not  probable  that  she  would  leave  the  near 
neighbourhood  until  the  Alabama  came  out,  and  it  was 
necessary  therefore  for  Captain  Semmes  to  consider 
whether  he  would  complete  his  repairs,  and  then  attempt 
to  avoid  an  encounter  by  going  out  on  a  dark  night,  or 
whether  he  should  go  out  openly  and  engage  her. 

The  Kearsarge  had  some  advantage  in  tonnage,  and  in 
weight  and  size  of  scantling,  and  she  was  probably  in 
better  condition  generally.  The  effect  of  the  Alabama's 
long  and  active  cruise  has  been  mentioned  above.  Captain 
Semmes,  writing  about  two  months  before  his  arrival 
at  Cherbourg,  likens  her  to  '  the  weary  foxhound,  limp 
ing  back  after  a  long  chase,  footsore,  and  longing  for 
quiet  and  repose.'  The  Kearsarge,  on  the  contrary,  was 
out  in  pursuit,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  she 
was  fit  for  any  work  suited  to  her  class. 

The  Alabama  carried  six  32 -pounder  guns  in  broad 
side,  one  8-inch  smooth  bore  of  112  cwt.,  and  one  7-inch 
100-pounder  rifled  gun  (Blakely  pattern)  on  pivots. 
The  Kearsarge  mounted  four  32 -pounders  in  broadside, 
two  11 -inch  Dahlgren  guns  pivoted  on  deck,  and  one 
28-pounder  rifled  gun,  pivoted  on  the  top-gallant  fore 
castle.  She  had  also  a  12 -pounder  howitzer,  which  was 
used  near  the  close  of  the  action.  The  Alabama  was 
pierced  for  eight  32 -pounders,  but  was  two  short.  How 
ever,  by  shifting  one  to  the  fighting  side  she  could,  and 
in  fact  did,  use  six  guns  in  the  engagement  against  the 
five  which  the  Kearsarge  fought. 

In  spite  of  the  Alabama's  extra  32 -pounder  in  broad 
side,  I  think  every  professional  man  would  say  without 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  279 

hesitation  that  the  battery  of  the  Kearsarge  was  the 
most  effective.  She  not  only  threw  more  metal  in 
broadside,  but  the  larger  calibre  of  her  two  chief  pivot- 
guns  gave  her  a  great  advantage  against  a  wooden  ship. 
I  have  not  hesitated  to  point  out,  fairly  as  I  think,  the 
particulars  in  which  I  consider  the  Kearsarge  to  have 
been  superior  in  condition  and  armament  to  the 
Alabama.  The  conditions  under  which  the  engagement 
was  fought  did  not  admit  of  any  advantage  being 
gained  on  either  side  by  skilful  handling,  neither  ship 
having  sufficient  superiority  in  speed  to  enable  her 
to  take  a  raking  position.  The  result  of  the  action  was 
determined  by  the  superior  accuracy  of  the  firing  from 
the  Kearsarge.  The  damage  she  inflicted  upon  the 
Alabama  was  more  than  sufficient  to  have  destroyed 
her,  and  inasmuch  as  the  Kearsarge  received  no  mortal 
wound,  and  came  out  of  the  engagement  with  no 
material  injury,  it  is  only  a  fair  admission  to  say  that 
the  result  would  probably  not  have  been  different  under 
the  existing  circumstances,  even  if  the  Alabama  had 
been  a  larger  ship,  and  more  powerfully  armed. 

The  crew  of  the  Alabama  were  in  good  discipline,  and 
were  well  drilled  in  the  manual  of  the  guns,  but  the 
impossibility  of  replenishing  the  ordnance  stores  pre 
vented  target  practice,  and  the  battery  had  never  been 
used  with  shot  except  in  the  short  engagement  with  the 
HatteraSj  which  was  fought  at  very  close  quarters,  and 
a  few  rounds  on  one  occasion  fired  at  a  prize,  after 
the  crew  were  removed.  The  men,  therefore,  had  not 
been  trained  to  judge  of  distances,  and  were  wholly 
without  the  skill,  precision  and  coolness  which  corne 
only  with  practice  and  the  habit  of  firing  at  a  visible 
object  and  noting  the  effect. 

Captain  Semmes  took  a  comprehensive   view  of  the 


280  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

relative  force  and  condition  of  the  two  ships,  and  did 
not  think  the  disparity  so  great  as  to  render  success 
hopeless.  He  thought  of  the  cases  in  which  a  chance 
shot  reaching  a  vital  spot  had  disabled  ships  in  previous 
engagements,  or  had  at  least  balanced  the  initial 
disparity,  and  felt  therefore  justified  in  trying  con 
clusions  with  his  enemy,  who  it  was  quite  apparent  did 
not  intend  to  grant  him  a  free  passage  out  to  sea. 

Captain  Semmes  notified  Captain  Winslow,  through 
the  United  States  Consul,  that  he  would  go  out  and 
fight  him  as  soon  as  he  had  finished  coaling,  and  it 
will  not  be  doubted  that  both  ships  made  the  best 
possible  preparations  for  the  engagement.  On  the 
morning  of  the  19th  of  June,  1864,  at  about  9.30,  the 
Alabama  got  under  weigh,  and  steamed  out  of  Cher 
bourg,  passing  to  the  westward  of  the  breakwater.  The 
Kearsarge  took  note  of  her  movement,  and  knowing  that 
there  was  no  purpose  to  avoid  an  engagement,  and 
desirous  to  prevent  any  encroachment  upon  the  neutral 
rights  of  France,  Captain  Winslow  turned  his  ship's  head 
off*  shore,  and  steamed  to  a  distance  of  about  seven 
miles,  followed  by  the  Alabama.  When  it  was  quite 
certain  that  both  vessels  were  well  beyond  the  '  line  of 
jurisdiction,'  the  Kearsarge  turned  her  head  in  shore 
and  steered  towards  the  Alabama.  The  two  ships 
approached  rapidly,  both  were  cleared  for  action,  each 
with  her  battery  pivoted  to  starboard. 

When  they  were  about  one  mile  apart,  the  Alabama 
sheered  to  port,  showed  her  starboard  battery,  and 
almost  immediately  opened  fire,  the  shot  mostly  going 
high.  The  Kearsarge  stood  on  until  she  had  received 
three  'broadsides'  from  the  Alabama*  the  shot  still 
going  high,  and  doing  no  damage  except  to  the  rigging. 
*  Captain  Winslow's  official  report. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  281 

At  about  a  thousand  yards'  distance,  Winslow  began  to 
be  apprehensive  of  getting  a  raking  shot,  and  he  then 
sheered  to  port,  bringing  his  own  starboard  broadside  to 
bear,  and  opened  fire. 

The  action  now  became  active  on  both  sides.  Semmes, 
conscious  of  the  inferiority  of  his  crew  in  gunnery,  had 
carefully  considered  the  advantage  he  would  gain  by 
fighting  at  close  quarters,  and  his  purpose  was  to  get 
within  short  range  as  soon  as  possible.  "Winslow, 
ignorant  of  this  intention  on  the  part  of  his  adversary, 
pushed  on  at  full  speed  to  get  in- shore  of  the  Alabama, 
hoping  thus  to  prevent  any  attempt  to  return  into 
Cherbourg  if  he  should  succeed  in  disabling  her.  As 
soon  as  the  two  ships  passed  each  other,  the  Kearsarge 
put  her  helm  to  port,  with  the  object  to  pass  under  the 
stern  of  the  Alabama  and  rake  her.  To  counteract  this 
movement  and  to  keep  her  own  broadside  bearing,  the 
Alabama  s  helm  was  ported  also,  and  the  two  ships, 
keeping  their  helms  to  port,  and  steaming  at  full  speed, 
fell  into  a  circular  course,  and  continued  the  action 
heading  in  opposite  directions,  in  positions  generally 
parallel  to  each  other,  while  steaming  round  a  common 
centre. 

In  about  one  hour  and  ten  minutes  after  the  Alabama 
fired  her  first  gun,  she  was  found  to  be  in  a  sinking  con 
dition.  The  11 -inch  shells  of  the  Kearsarge  had  made 
several  openings  in  her  sides  which  it  wras  impossible  to 
stop,  and  at  every  roll  in  the  very  moderate  swell  large 
quantities  of  water  rushed  into  her. 

Semmes  made  an  effort  to  reach  the  French  coast  by 
assisting  the  engines  with  the  fore-and-aft  sails,  but  the 
ship  filled  so  rapidly  that  the  fires  were  soon  put  out. 
Meanwhile  the  Kearsarge  steamed  ahead,  and  keeping  her 
helm  to  port,  she  passed  under  the  Alabama  s  stern,  and 


282  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

ranging  along  her  port-beam,  finally  got  into  a  raking 
position  across  her  bow  ;  but  by  this  time  the  Alabama 
was  so  manifestly  sinking  that  the  fire  of  both  ships  had 
ceased. 

When  Semmes  discovered  that  his  ship  had  got  her 
death  wound,  and  that  she  was  hopelessly  settling  under 
him,  he  ordered  the  colours  to  be  struck.  There  is 
some  discrepancy  in  the  reports  of  the  two  commanders 
as  to  the  cessation  of  the  firing.  Captain  Semmes  says 
that  the  Kearsarge  fired  into  him  after  his  flag  was  down. 
On  the  other  hand,  Captain  Win  slow  states  that  having 
ceased  firing,  he  received  two  shots  from  the  Alabama  s 
port  battery,  which  drew  a  return  from  him.  Neither 
captain,  however,  charges  the  other  with  a  wilful  default. 
Semmes  states  the  fact  in  his  report,  but  in  the  comments 
upon  the  action  in  his  narrative  of  the  cruise,  he  acquits 
Captain  Winslow  of  any  intentional  violation  of  the 
rules  of  humane  warfare,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  alleged  exchange  of  shots  after  the  surrender  arose 
from  a  mistake  which  is  not  without  precedent  in  pre 
vious  sea  fights. 

There  was  barely  time  to  get  the  Alabama's  wounded 
men  into  the  boats  and  despatch  them  to  the  Kearsarge, 
when  the  ship  went  down,  and  the  officers  and  crew 
were  swimming  for  their  lives.  The  Kearsarge  did  not 
immediately  send  assistance.  It  appears  from  Captain 
Winslow's  report  that  the  boats  were  disabled,  but  he 
managed,  after  some  delay,  to  get  two  afloat,  and  they 
picked  up  a  few  men. 

Captain  Semmes  and  the  greater  portion  of  his  officers 
and  crew  were  rescued  by  two  French  fishing  vessels 
and  the  English  steam-yacht  Deerhound,  owned  by  Mr. 
John  Lancaster.  The  French  fishermen  proceeded  into 
Cherbourg,  and  the  Deerlwund  to  Southampton,  and  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  283 

rescued  officers  and  men  were  landed  at  those  two  ports 
respectively. 

The  Alabama  was  so  badly  cut  up  in  her  hull  that  it 
is  doubtful  if  she  could  have  been  again  refitted  for 
cruising,  even  if  she  could  have  been  kept  afloat  long 
enough  to  reach  Cherbourg.  An  officer  told  me  the  day 
after  the  engagement  that  he  thought  a  barrel  might 
have  been  passed  through  the  hole  made  by  an  11 -inch 
shell  at  the  gangway,  and  near  the  water-line.  He  said 
one  of  the  men,  while  sponging  his  gun,  saw  the  hole, 
and  called  his  attention  to  it.  He  looked  out  of  the 
port,  and  when  he  saw  the  aperture  and  the  rush  of 
water  at  every  roll,  he  felt  that  the  Alabama's  last 
moments  were  close  at  hand.  It  is  not  possible  to  tell 
how  many  times  the  Alabama  was  hit,  but  it  is  quite 
certain  that  she  received  many  shot  in  her  hull,  more 
than  one  of  which  contributed  to  her  sinking. 

The  Kearsarge  fired  173  shot  and  shell,  apportioned 
as  follows  :  From  11 -inch  guns,  55  shell  ;  from  32- 
pounders,  18  shell  and  42  solid  shot  ;  from  2 8 -pounder 
rifled  gun,  48  shell  ;  from  12 -pound  howitzer,  9  shrap 
nel  and  1  canister.  She  was  struck  twenty-eight  times 
by  shot  and  shell  in  various  places.  One  shell  exploded 
in  her  funnel,  but  except  damage  to  some  of  her  boats, 
she  was  but  little  injured,  and  strange  to  say,  she  had 
only  three  men  wounded,  none  killed.  The  Alabama 
had  twenty-one  wounded,  and  nine  killed,  and  it  is 
believed  that  ten  were  drowned. 

I  have  read  with  care  the  reports  of  the  two  com 
manders.  They  are  creditable  to  the  writers,  and  give 
a  fair,  unpretentious  account  of  the  action,  varying  in 
no  essential  particular.  I  have  not  described  the  action 
with  minute  detail,  because  the  official  reports  are  on 
record,  and  Captain  Semnies  has  published  a  full  ac- 


284  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

count  of  all  the  incidents  appertaining  to  the  engagement, 
and  the  events  which  preceded  and  followed  it.  I  feel 
confident  that  I  have  given  an  impartial  summary,  and 
I  think  it  may  fairly  be  stated  that  the  Kearsarge  was  in 
better  condition  anil  was  more  efficiently  armed  than  the 
Alabama ;  but  that  she  used  her  superior  strength  with 
commensurate  skill  and  effectiveness,  and  gained  the 
action  by  the  excellence  of  her  gunnery. 

In  mentioning  the  points  it  was  proper  for  Semmes  to 
consider  before  determining  whether  he  would  be 
justified  in  engaging  the  Kearsarge,  I  have  said  that  he 
took  into  account  the  possible  occurrence  of  one  of  those 
fortuitous  chances  which  often  produce  very  unexpected 
results.  It  appears  from  the  details  annexed  to  Captain 
Winslow's  report  that  a  shell  from  the  Alabama  s  7 -inch 
rifled  gun  lodged  in  the  stern-post  of  the  Kearsarge,  but 
did  not  explode.  A  ship's  stern-post  receives  the '  wood- 
ends  '  of  the  planks  which  form  the  counter,  and  a  vessel 
could  scarcely  receive  a  shell  in  a  more  vital  point,  if  the 
shell  exploded.  I  have  been  informed  by  an  officer, 
who  told  me  that  he  got  the  fact  from  the  first-lieutenant 
of  the  Kearsarge,  that  this  shell  struck  the  stern-post 
about  fifteen  minutes  after  the  beginning  of  the  engage 
ment.  If,  therefore,  it  had  not  failed  to  explode,  the 
stern  of  the  Kearsarge  would  have  been  shattered,  the 
wood-ends  opened,  and  she  would  have  foundered  instead 
of  the  Alabama.  But  without  reference  to  time,  if  the 
shell  had  done  its  work,  the  result  would  have  been  to 
entirely  change  the  issue  of  the  action. 

In  all  the  remarks  I  have  heretofore  made  with  re 
ference  to  the  relative  strength  and  condition  of  the  two 
ships,  I  have  compared  them  exclusively  as  two  wooden 
screw-steamers,  but  it  appears  from  Captain  Winslow's 
report  that,  his  ship  being  rather  light,  he  had  protected 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  285 

her  midship  section  by  stowing"  the  sheet  chain- cables 
outside.  The  chains  were,  it  appears,  arranged  perpen 
dicularly  from  the  water's  edge,  so  as  to  cover  the  engine 
space,  and  they  were  concealed  by  a  thin  plank  covering. 
In  fact,  the  Kearsarge  over  her  most  vital  parts  was 
armour-plated,  and  this  is  an  important  consideration  in 
discussing  the  principles  of  naval  warfare  suggested  by 
this  spirited  engagement  between  two  single  ships  pro 
pelled  by  steam. 

Captain  Semmes,  in  his  report,  says  that  the  officers 
whom  he  sent  to  the  Kearsarge  with  the  wounded,  in 
formed  him  that  the  covering  boards  had  been  ripped  off 
in  many  directions,  and  in  some  places  the  chains  had 
been  broken  and  forced  partly  into  the  ship's  side  by  the 
Alabama  s  shot  and  shells.  It  is  manifest  that  if  those 
projectiles  had  found  their  way  into  that  protected  section 
of  the  Kearsarge,  the  engagement  might  have  had  a 
different  result. 

Captain  Semmes  also  states,  in  the  history  of  his 
cruise,  that  the  Alabama's  powder  was  defective,  which 
he  attributed  to  the  long  time  it  had  been  on  board,  and 
the  exposure  to  so  many  varying  climates.  It  seems  to 
me  that  there  is  some  reason  to  accept  the  opinion  that 
the  powder  was  defective,  because  the  details  accompany 
ing  Captain  Winslow's  report  mention  that  the  Kearsarge 
was  struck  twenty-eight  times  in  various  places  about 
the  hull,  but  no  damage  is  stated  except  the  shattering 
of  two  boats.  When  the  firing  became  active,  the  ships 
were  about  a  thousand  yards  apart,  and  the  distance  was 
gradually  reduced  to  four  hundred  yards.  At  this 
latter  distance  I  think  that  the  100 -pound  elongated 
shot  and  shells  from  the  Alabama  s  Blakely  rifled  gun 
would  have  carried  the  chain  through  the  side  of  the 
Kearsarge  if  they  had  struck  with  the  velocity  due  to  the 


286  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

pOAver  of  the  weapon.  The  powder  on  board  the 
Alabama  was  manufactured  and  put  up  into  cartridges 
especially  for  her  by  Messrs  Curtiss  and  Harvey.  I 
do  not  mind  mentioning  their  names,  because  they  took 
the  order  as  an  ordinary  business  transaction,  and  without 
the  slightest  knowledge  of  the  purpose  for  which  the 
ammunition  was  wanted.  The  quality  at  the  beginning 
of  the  cruise  was  perfect.  Captain  Semmes  has  told  me 
that  in  the  night  engagement  with  the  Hatteras  her  sides 
were  all  ablaze  with  the  vivid  light  of  the  Alabama  s  ex 
ploding  shells,  and  the  sharp,  quick,  vigorous  reports 
gave  proof  of  the  purity  and  strength  of  the  charges. 

In  reference  to  the  action  with  the  Kearsarge,  Captain 
Semmes  says  :  '  Perceiving  that  our  shells,  though 
apparently  exploding  against  the  enemy's  sides,  were 
doing  him  but  little  damage,  I  returned  to  solid-shot 
firing  ;'  and  several  naval  experts  who  witnessed  the 
engagement  from  the  hills  near  Cherbourg  have  told  me 
that  they  were  struck  with  the  difference  in  the  appear 
ance  of  the  flame  and  smoke  produced  by  the  explosions 
of  the  shells  from  the  two  ships.  Those  from  the  Kear- 
sarge  emitted  a  quick  bright  flash,  and  the  smoke  went 
quickly  away  in  a  fine  blue  vapour,  while  those  from  the 
Alabama  exhaled  a  dull  flame  and  a  mass  of  sluggish 

oO 

grey  smoke.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  the  effect  of  climate 
and  the  long  stowage  on  board  had  helped  to  deteriorate 
the  Alabama's  powder,  but  I  think  the  deterioration  was 
hastened  and  increased  by  a  local  cause,  and  by  a 
practice  the  ill  effects  of  which  were  not  suspected  at 
the  time. 

The  internal  arrangements  of  the  Alabama  were 
designed  to  secure  the  largest  possible  space  for  essential 
stores  ;  and  as  she  had  means  of  condensing,  it  was  not 
thought  necessary  to  provide  tanks  for  more  than  two  to 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  287 

three  weeks'  supply  of  water.  The  magazine  was  placed 
so  that  the  top  would  be  two  feet  and  a  half  below  the 
water-line,  and  the  water-tanks,  which  were  of  iron, 
were  fitted  on  each  side  and  in  front  of  it,  and  were 
carried  up  to  the  berth  deck-beams,  thus  forming  an 
additional  protection.  After  the  loss  of  the  Alabama,  I 
learned  from  the  chief  engineer  that  it  was  often  the 
habit  to  condense  in  excess  of  the  quantity  which  the 
cooling-tank  held  ;  and  that  the  boiling  water,  almost  in 
the  condition  of  steam,  was  often  passed  directly  into 
the  two  iron  tanks  on  each  side  of  the  magazine,  and 
in  contact  with  it.  I  think  this  practice  contributed 
largely  to  the  deterioration  of  the  powder,  and  I  have 
thought  it  worth  mentioning  as  an  element  in  the  case. 

Taking  a  comprehensive  and  impartial  view  of  all 
the  circumstances,  I  think  it  will  be  admitted  that  the 
probabilities  of  success  were  in  favour  of  the  Kearsarge. 
Captain  Winslow  was  quite  right  in  doing  whatever  he 
could  to  increase  the  defensive  power  of  his  ship,  and  he 
was  not  bound  to  inform  his  adversary  that  he  had 
encased  her  most  vulnerable  parts  with  chain- cables. 
It  has  never  been  considered  an  unworthy  ruse  for  a 
commander,  whether  afloat  or  ashore,  to  disguise  his 
strength  and  to  entice  a  weaker  opponent  within  his 
reach.  The  Kearsarge  was  well  fought.  Captain  Winslow 
reported  the  result  in  a  clear,  plain  statement,  neither 
concealing  nor  exaggerating  any  circumstance  that 
would  tend  to  enhance  his  own  merit,  or  to  depreciate 
his  adversary,  if  it  were  differently  told.  Anyone 
who  reads  his  report  and  the  accompanying  documents, 
and  who  is  aware  of  the  effect  of  her  fire  upon  the 
Alabama,  will  admit  that  the  Kearsarge  was  in  a  state  of 
discipline  and  efficiency  creditable  to  all  on  board,  and 
to  the  United  States  naval  service. 


288  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  Alabama 
could  not  have  won,  except  by  the  occurrence  of  a 
fortuitous  chance,  such  as  the  explosion  of  the  shell 
which  lodged  in  her  enemy's  stern-post.  Captain 
Semmes  says  that  every  man  and  officer  behaved  well, 
and  at  the  trying  moment  there  was  neither  panic  nor 
confusion.  Captain  Winslow  says  in  his  report  that 
1  the  firing  of  the  Alabama  was  at  the  first  rapid  and 
wild ;  towards  the  close  it  became  better,'  which  proves 
that  her  crew  were  steady  and  cool,  and  that  they 
only  lacked  practice  to  make  them  effective  gunners. 

The  fact  that  the  Kearsarge  was  in  some  degree  '  a 
protected  ship,'  and  that  the  Alabama  was  somewhat 
inferior  in  force  and  general  condition,  besides  having 
defective  powder,  are  circumstances  which  sufficiently 
account  for  the  result  of  the  engagement.  Nevertheless, 
the  principle,  admitted  in  theory,  that  good  guns,  well 
handled,  are  essential  to  success  in  naval  warfare,  found 
a  confirmation  in  the  damage  inflicted  by  the  Kearsarge 
upon  her  adversary,  and  the  precision  of  her  fire  might 
have  given  her  the  victory  even  over  a  much  larger 
ship,  less  efficient  than  herself  in  the  above  respects. 

I  hope  there  is  nothing  in  the  foregoing  remarks 
which  will  appear  like  a  purpose  to  lessen  the  credit 
due  to  Captain  Winslow  for  the  excellent  performance 
of  his  ship,  or  to  press  into  undue  prominence  the 
defects  and  inferiority  of  the  Alabama. 

I  have  not  felt  at  all  impelled  to  dwell  upon  Semmes' 
especial  merits,  or  to  take  the  occasion  of  this  particular 
incident  of  his  naval  career  to  eulogise  him.  His  defeat 
did  not  change  the  estimate  I  had  formed  of  his  capacity. 
If  he  had  gained  the  victory  it  would  not  have  added 
to  my  appreciation  of  his  abilities.  As  a  mere  sea- 
officer  under  the  ordinary  requirements  of  the  naval 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  289 

profession,  he  was  not  especially  distinguished.  He 
had  neither  the  physique  nor  the  dashing  manner  which 
combine  to  make  a  showy  brilliant  deck  officer,  and 
in  the  gift  of  handling  a  ship  in  fancy  evolutions  he  had 
no  special  excellence.  But  in  broad  comprehensive 
knowledge  of  all  the  subjects  embraced  in  a  thorough 
naval  education,  in  tact,  judgment,  acquaintance  with 
diplomatic  usage,  and  the  requirements  of  international 
law  and  comity — in  the  capacity  to  generalize  and 
to  form  plans,  and  in  the  latent  nerve  and  mental 
vigour  necessary  to  impress  his  views  upon  those  under 
him,  and  thus  to  carry  them  out  effectively,  he  had 
few  if  any  equals  in  that  service  in  which  he  passed  the 
greater  portion  of  his  life,  and  which  he  left  in  obedience 
to  a  principle  which  was  paramount  with  him,  as  it  was 
in  the  minds  of  many  others  of  unblemished  character 
and  unsullied  honour,  and  who  yet  were  classed  together 
with  him  under  the  generic  appellations  of  '  pirate/ 
'  rebel '  and  traitor,'  in  the  political  phraseology  which 
grew  up  and  w^as  disseminated  from  the  State  Depart 
ment  at  Washington. 

Semmes  managed  the  cruises  of  the  Sumter  and 
Alabama  with  admirable  skill  and  judgment.  He 
not  only  inflicted  great  injury  upon  the  enemy,  but 
he  did  much  to  enlighten  the  authorities  at  the  neutral 
ports  necessity  forced  him  to  visit  upon  the  true  nature 
of  the  war,  and  to  remove  the  impression  that  Con 
federate  cruisers  were  buccaneers,  seeking  only  plunder, 
and  willing  to  grasp  it  regardless  of  the  rights  of 
neutrals  or  the  restraints  of  international  courtesy.  He 
was  often  compelled  to  correspond  with  officials  of  high 
position  in  civil  service,  as  well  as  in  military  and 
naval  rank.  He  had  often  to  act,  not  only  as  the 
commander  of  a  national  ship,  but  as  the  diplomatic 

VOL.  i.  19 


290  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

and  consular  agent  of  his  country  as  well.  In  all  of 
these  trying  positions  he  acquitted  himself  admirably. 
The  local  authorities  perceived  that  he  understood  his 
belligerent  rights,  but  also  knew  how  to  advance  his 
claims  with  firmness  and  precision,  without  departing  a 
hair's-breadth  from  the  line  of  official  courtesy  and 
respect.  He  soon  won  the  confidence  of  those  with 
whom  he  came  in  contact,  and  his  ships  were  generally 
received  and  treated  in  neutral  ports  with  a  kindly 
consideration  which  was  gratifying  to  himself  and 
beneficial  to  the  cause  he  represented.  In  fact,  he 
was  capable  of  much  more  than  sailing  or  fighting 
a  single  ship.  He  had  the  faculties  and  the  acquire 
ments  which  fit  a  man  for  high  command,  and  if 
circumstances  had  ever  placed  him  at  the  head  of 
a  fleet,  I  feel  sure  that  he  would  have  achieved  im 
portant  and  notable  results. 

When  the  Alabama  settled  down  to  her  final  resting 
place  at  the  bottom  of  the  English  Channel,  and  the 
Kearsarge  steamed  away  with  flying  colours  to  announce 
her  victory,  it  would  seem  that  the  pride  of  the  victors 
might  have  been  satisfied,  and  their  anger  appeased, 
after  a  little  pardonable  jubilation.  But  as  the  origin 
of  the  famous  Confederate  cruiser  gave  rise  to  much 
controversy,  so  likewise  did  the  circumstances  of  her 
death  furnish  a  topic  for  discussion,  carried  on  with 
harsh  and  bitter  petulance  by  Mr.  Seward,  and  answered 
with  singular  forbearance,  but  with  a  touch  of  sarcasm 
and  reproof,  by  Earl  Russell.  Captain  Semmes  and  his 
officers,  having  landed  from  the  Deer  hound  at  South 
ampton,  were  free  to  go  where  they  liked  ;  but  Mr. 
Adams,  the  United  States  Minister,  soon  sent  in  a 
complaint  to  her  Majesty's  Government  and  claimed 
them  as  prisoners -of- war. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  291 

Lord  Eussell  was  evidently  more  surprised  than 
vexed  by  this  preposterous  demand.  In  the  official 
reply  he  says  : — 

'  It  appears  to  me  that  the  owner  of  the  DeerKound, 
of  the  Eoyal  Yacht  Squadron,  performed  only  a  common 
duty  of  humanity  in  saving  from  the  waves  the  captain 
and  several  of  the  crew  of  the  Alabama.  They  would 
otherwise,  in  all  probability,  have  been  drowned,  and 
thus  would  never  have  been  in  the  situation  of  prisoner s- 
of-war.  It  does  not  appear  to  me  to  be  any  part 
of  the  duty  of  a  neutral  to  assist  in  making  prisoners- 
of-war  for  one  of  the  belligerents/ 

The  answer  to  the  above  was  written  by  Mr.  Seward 
himself,  in  a  despatch  addressed  to  Mr.  Adams — 
probably  he  thought  Mr.  Adams  would  be  too  mild.  I 
shall  only  quote  one  paragraph,  which  sufficiently 
exhibits  its  general  tone.* 

'  The  Earl  argues  that  if  those  persons  had  not  been 
so  taken  from  the  sea,  they  would  in  all  probability 
have  been  drowned,  and  they  would  never  have  been  in 
the  situation  of  prisoners -of- war.  ...  I  have  to 
observe  upon  these  remarks  of  Earl  Russell  that  it  was 
the  right  of  the  Kearsarge  that  the  pirates  should  drown, 
unless  saved  by  humane  exertions  of  the  officers  and 
crew  of  that  vessel,  or  by  their  own  efforts,  without  the 
aid  of  the  Deerhound! 

From  Mr.  Seward's  point  of  view  they  were  pirates — 
Jiostes  humani  generis.  If,  therefore,  they  had  been  saved 
by  the  '  humane  exertions  of  the  Kearsarge J  it  would 
have  been  to  meet  the  fate  of  hanging  instead  of  drown 
ing — an  alternative  that  would  not  have  tempted  them 
to  make  much  effort  to  get  out  of  the  water. 

*  See  *  United  States  Appendix,'  vol.  iii.,  pp.  263,  273,  and 
'British  Case,' p.  116. 

19—2 


292  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

The  answer  of  the  British  Government  to  Mr.  Seward's 
demand  was  '  that  there  is  no  obligation  by  international 
law  which  can  bind  the  Government  of  a  neutral  State 
to  deliver  up  to  a  belligerent  prisoners-of-war  who  may 
have  escaped  from  such  belligerent,  and  may  have  taken 
refuge  within  the  territory  of  such  neutral/  He  adds 
that  they  had  been  guilty  of  no  offence  against  the  laws 
of  England,  and  had  committed  no  act  which  would 
bring  them  within  the  provisions  of  a  treaty  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  for  the  mutual 
surrender  of  offenders,  and  states  the  following  conclu 
sion  : — '  Her  Majesty's  Government  are,  therefore,  en 
tirely  without  any  legal  means  by  which,  even  if  they 
wished  to  do  so,  they  could  comply  with  your  above- 
mentioned  demand.' 

The  grounds  of  Lord  Kussell's  refusal  were  unques 
tionable,  and  his  reasoning  was  unanswerable.  Mr. 
Seward  must  or  should  have  known  that  the  reply  to 
his  demand  could  not  have  been  different  from  what  it 
proved  to  be,  and  his  motive  in  seeking  the  humiliation 
of  a  refusal  is  inexplicable.  But  Mr.  Seward  had  fully 
impressed  his  views  and  his  spirit  upon  many  of  his 
subordinates  who  represented  the  United  States  abroad 
at  that  time,  and  especially  upon  Mr.  Thomas  H.  Dudley, 
the  Consul  at  Liverpool,  who  manifested  a  bitterness  of 
temper,  and  practised  a  sharpness  and  asperity  in  lan 
guage  and  correspondence,  and  a  recklessness  in  his 
statements,  which  would  have  been  appalling,  but  for  the 
conviction  that  public  sentiment  in  Europe  would  revolt 
against  such  pretentious  extravagance. 

After  the  departure  of  the  Alabama  from  Liverpool, 
many  communications  were  addressed  by  Mr.  Adams  to 
the  British  Government  dwelling  upon  her  so-called 
escape,  and  the  despatch  of  her  armament  from  England, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  293 

In  one  communication  he  enclosed  a  letter  from  Mr. 
Thomas  H.  Dudley,  dated  January  11,  1864,  in  which 
that  gentleman  with  the  bitter  temper  and  indiscreet 
pen  enumerated  the  circumstances  affecting  the  Alabama, 
which,  he  affirmed,  proved  her  to  be  a  i  British  ship/ 
and  her  acts  '  piratical/  The  above  letter  was  referred 
to  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown,  who  were  asked  to 
advise  whether  any  proceedings  could  be  taken  with 
reference  to  the  supposed  breaches  of  neutrality  alleged 
by  Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Dudley.  The  law  officers 
reported  that  i  no  proceedings  can  at  present  be  taken/ 
but  they  could  not  let  Mr.  Dudley's  uncivil  assertions 
pass  without  comment,  and  they  closed  their  report  with 
the  following  remarks  : — i  So  far  as  relates  to  Mr. 
Dudley's  argument  (not  now  for  the  first  time  advanced) 
that  the  Alabama  is  an  English  piratical  craft,  it  might 
have  been  enough  to  say  that  Mr.  Dudley,  while  he 
enumerates  everything  which  is  immaterial,  omits 
everything  that  is  material,  to  constitute  that  character.7 
The  law  officers  then  demonstrate  that  the  Alabama 
is  a  public  ship-of-war  of  the  Confederate  States,* 
'and  has  been  ever  since  she  hoisted  the  Confederate 
flag  and  received  her  armament  at  Terceira/  and  they 
close  their  report,  or  rather  their  i  opinion/  in  these 
words  : — '  It  is  to  be  regretted  that,  in  any  of  the  discus 
sions  on  this  subject,  so  manifest  an  abuse  of  language 
as  the  application  of  the  term  "  English  piratical  craft" 
to  the  Alabama  should  still  be  permitted  to  continue/ 

The  law  officers  who  gave  the  above  c  opinion '  were 
Sir  Eoundell  Palmer,  now  Lord  Selborne,  who  was 
generally  supposed  to  be  partial  to  the  Federal  cause, 
and  Sir  Robert  Collier,  who  had  been  consulted  by  the 

:>  For  opinion  of  the  law  officers  quoted  above  see  'British  Case/ 
p.  117. 


294  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

solicitors  of  the  United  States  Consul  in  reference  to  the 
seizure  of  the  Alabama  before  he  received  the  appoint 
ment  of  Solicit  or -General. 

Northern  men  often  complained  of  the  sympathy  ex 
hibited  in  some  parts  of  Europe,  and  especially  in 
England,  for  the  Confederate  cause.  I  have  reason  to 
believe  that  at  least  five  out  of  every  seven  in  the  middle 
and  upper  classes  in  England  were  favourable  to  the 
South,  and  I  confidently  believe  that  the  majority  were 
moved  to  favour  that  side  by  the  haughty  and  offensive 
tone  assumed  by  many  of  the  representatives  of  the 
United  States. 

At  the  time  of  the  rescue  of  the  Alabama  s  drowning 
men  by  the  Deerhound,  many  harsh  things  were  said  of 
her  owner,  Mr.  •John  Lancaster,  in  the  diplomatic  cor 
respondence  of  the  United  States,  and  high  officials  of 
that  Government  recklessly  affirmed  that  the  Deerhound 
was  in  collusion  with  the  Alabama,  and  that  Mr.  Lan 
caster  had  taken  his  yacht  out  to  watch  the  engagement 
under  a  covert  understanding  with  Captain  Semmes. 

It  is  not  probable  that  any  American  historian  will 
give  further  currency  to  those  statements.  Mr.  Lan 
caster  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  her  Majesty's  Govern 
ment,  and  to  all  who  read  his  published  letter,  that  there 
was  not  the  slightest  foundation  in  fact  for  the  assertions 
of  the  United  States  officials  in  respect  to  his  conduct, 
and  he  publicly  offered  to  submit  the  whole  of  his  pro 
ceedings  to  the  yachtsmen  of  England  for  their  opinion. 
I  would  have  made  no  mention  of  the  foregoing  incident 
at  all,  except  for  the  fact  that  it  remains  on  record  in  the 
printed  papers  in  reference  to  the  Confederate  naval 
operations,  and  it  appeared  necessary,  therefore,  to  men 
tion  the  satisfactory  and  conclusive  proof  that  the  accu 
sations  were  not  true. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  295 


CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Confederate  cruisers  and  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act. — The 
protest  of  the  United  States  against  the  '  laxity '  of  the  British 
Government. — The  answer  of  the  British  Government. — The  Con 
federate  States  admitted  to  be  belligerents  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  and  acknowledged  as  such  by  the  European 
Powers. — Debate  in  the  House  of  Commons. — European  recruits 
for  the  United  States  Army  in  England. — Review  of  the  situation 
of  the  belligerents  in  regard  to  neutral  States. — The  American 
and  the  English  Foreign  Enlistment  Acts. — The  Alexandra  Case. — 
The  Crown  witnesses. — Conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  this  case. — 
After-history  of  the  Alexandra. — Other  vessels  searched  at  the 
instigation  of  the  United  States  Consul. — United  States  purchases 
in  England.  —  The  Board  of  Trade  Returns.  —  Messrs.  Baring 
Brothers  and  Co.  and  the  United  States. — Condition  of  the  Con 
federates  during  the  War. 

A  HISTORY  of  the  efforts  made  by  the  Confederate 
Government  to  organize  a  naval  force  abroad  would  be 
very  incomplete  if  the  narrative  was  limited  to  a  mere 
statement  of  the  number  and  names  of  the  vessels  which 
were  bought  or  built  in  Europe  and  a  description  of  the 
arrangements  which  were  made  to  effect  their  departure 
from  the  neutral  ports  and  to  equip  them  as  fighting 
ships.  It  is  well  known  that  the  few  Confederate  cruisers 
which  may  be  said  to  have  been  of  '  foreign  origin  ' 
created  much  greater  disturbance,  and  excited  far  more 
public  interest,  than  their  operations  would  have  aroused 


296  .    THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

if  they  had  simply  come  out  of  the  ports  of  one  belli 
gerent,  in  the  ordinary  way,  and  had  inflicted  a  given 
amount  of  damage  upon  the  other.  They  were  the  source 
of  very  serious  complaints  and  much  diplomatic  cor 
respondence  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  and  pages  of  '  Hansard '  are  filled  with  the 
reports  of  debates  in  reference  to  them  in  both  Houses 
of  the  British  Parliament.  They  were  the  means  of  first 
drawing  serious  attention  to  the  Foreign  Enlistment 
Act,  and  caused  the  law  officers  of  her  Majesty's 
Government  much  trouble  in  expounding  the  meaning 
of  that  somewhat  ambiguous  statute.  They  gave 
occasion  for  a  suit  which  resulted  in  a  judicial  exposi 
tion  of  the  Act,  and  a  judgment  which  has  never  been 
reversed,  but  which  was  so  unsatisfactory  to  the  United 
States,  who  were  the  real  plaintiffs,  and  also  to  her 
Majesty's  Government,  who  seemed  desirous  to  satisfy 
them,  that  a  Koyal  Commission,  composed  of  learned 
judges  and  jurists  and  distinguished  statesmen  to  the 
number  of  thirteen,  was  appointed  to  inquire  into  the 
character,  working,  and  effect  of  the  laws  of  Great 
Britain  available  for  the  enforcement  of  neutrality  ;  and 
finally,  as  everyone  knows,  they  gave  rise  to  so  much 
controversy  between  her  Britannic  Majesty's  Govern 
ment  and  that  of  the  United  States,  in  reference  to 
international  rights  and  duties,  that  an  agreement  could 
only  be  effected  by  means  of  a  special  treaty  and  a  great 
international  arbitration.  The  diplomatic  correspondence 
has  been  long  since  published,  and  is  accessible  to  all 
who  are  interested  in  the  subject. 

The  United  States  affirmed  that  the  Confederate 
Government  had  established  a  bureau  of  their  Navy 
Department  in  England.  They  charged  the  Confederate 
agents  with  wilfully  and  persistently  violating  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  297 

municipal  laws  of  Great  Britain,  and  denounced  their 
acts  as  being  '  criminal '  and  '  nefarious.7  They  com 
plained  that  her  Majesty's  Government  was  both  lax 
and  slow  in  putting  the  law  in  operation,  and  that  the 
subordinate  officers  of  the  Crown  were  wilfully  passive 
in  executing  the  orders  of  their  superiors.  The  answers 
of  the  British  Government  to  the  complaints  of  the 
United  States  are  fully  set  out  in  the  correspondence 
and  in  the  proceedings  before  the  Tribunal  of  Arbi 
tration  at  Geneva.  "The  merest  synopsis  of  them  would 
require  more  space  than  would  be  admissible  in  this 
narrative. 

The  gravamen  of  the  charges  was  that  the  British 
Government  did  not  put  the  municipal  law  in  operation 
with  sufficient  promptness  and  energy  to  prevent  the 
acts  complained  of,  and  did  not  enforce  the  punitive 
clauses  with  the  rigour  which  the  nature  of  the  alleged 
offences  and  friendly  consideration  for  the  United  States 
justified  the  latter  Government  in  expecting.  The  sub 
stance  of  the  answer  was  that  the  Government  of  Great 
Britain  was  one  of  limited  and  legally  defined  powers, 
and  that  its  authority  could,  therefore,  be  exercised  only 
in  subordination  to  law  ;  that  when  there  was  interfer 
ence  by  the  Government  with  the  rights  of  persons  or 
property,  redress  might  be  immediately  sought  and 
recovered,  provided  the  Government  could  not  maintain 
its  action,  in  a  court  of  law.  The  Government  could  not, 
therefore,  seize  vessels  alleged  to  belong  to  the  Con 
federate  States,  or  arrest  persons  accused  of  violating 
the  law,  unless  there  was  sufficient  prima  facie  evidence 
to  render  a  conviction  probable  ;  and  neither  the 
evidence  obtained  by  the  Government  through  their 
own  officers,  or  tendered  by  the  United  States  Minister 
and  Consuls,  was  considered  sufficient  by  the  law  officers 
of  the  Crown  to  justify  either  seizure  or  prosecution. 


298  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

One  ship  was  seized,  and  the  United  States  officials 
exerted  themselves  to  the  utmost  to  provide  evidence, 
but  the  prosecution  failed,  and  her  Majesty's  Govern 
ment  had  to  pay  damages.  It  was  furthermore  contended 
that  acts  prohibited  by  municipal  law  or  by  the  orders 
and  proclamations  of  the  Executive  Government  were 
not  necessarily  prohibited  by  the  law  of  nations,  and 
there  was  no  obligation  to  use  executive  power  harshly, 
or  in  a  manner  at  variance  with  the  spirit  of  the  national 
institutions,  with  no  other  purpose  than  to  protect  one 
belligerent  against  the  other.  In  one  of  Earl  Russell's 
despatches  to  Lord  Lyons,  the  British  Minister  at  Wash 
ington,  he  says  that  a  phrase  used  by  Mr.  Seward  in 
describing  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain  '  was  rather  a 
figure  of  rhetoric  than  a  true  description  of  facts ;'  'that 
the  Cabinet  were  of  opinion  that  the  law  was  sufficient, 
but  that  legal  evidence  could  not  always  be  procured.'* 
.  .  .  '  That  the  British  Government  had  done  everything 
in  its  power  to  execute  the  law  ;'  and  that,  in  his  belief, 
'  if  all  the  assistance  given  to  the  Federals  by  British 
subjects  and  British  munitions  of  war  were  weighed 
against  similar  aid  given  to  the  Confederates,  the  balance 
would  be  greatly  in  favour  of  the  Federals.'  f  Lord 
Eussell  added,  however,  that  Mr.  Adams,  the  American 
Minister,  totally  denied  the  foregoing  proposition.  In 
this  denial  of  Mr.  Adams,  we  have  the  clue  to  the  feeling 
which  aroused  the  temper  of  the  United  States,  and 
wrhich  caused  Mr.  Seward  to  put  forward  so  many  un 
reasonable  complaints,  and  to  use  such  strong  and  often 
abusive  language  in  referring  to  the  acts  of  the  Con 
federate  Government  and  their  agents. 

One  of  the  most  important  lessons  to  be  learned  in 

*  Earl  Eussell  to  Lord  Lyons,  March  27,  1863. 

t  Parliamentary  Document,  'North  America,'  No.  1,  1864,  p.  2. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  299 

ordinary  life  in  the  management  of  every -day  affairs,  is 
that  which  teaches  men  to  acknowledge  and  to  submit 
with  dignity  and  patience  to  the  consequences  of  an 
1  accomplished  fact,'  even  though  the  result  may  have 
disappointed  their  hopes  and  baulked  their  expectations. 
The  statesman  whose  temper  will  not  suffer  him  to  admit 
that  which  is  incontrovertible,  whose  faculties  cannot 
discern  the  difference  between  his  own  will  and  the  in 
evitable  fulfilment  of  events,  who  persistently  and  with 
ever  increasing  warmth  urges  his  own  opinions  and 
policy  against  the  adverse  convictions  of  those  who  have 
already  scrutinized  the  question  and  pronounced  their 
judgment,  can  hardly  expect  to  control  or  direct  public 
sentiment  successfully,  or  to  make  the  cause  in  which 
he  is  engaged  acceptable  to  those  not  immediately  con 
nected  with  him  by  some  common  interest.  The  Cabinet 
of  Mr.  Abraham  Lincoln  during  the  period  of  the  Civil 
War  contained  a  number  of  able,  energetic  men,  but 
they  never  could  bring  their  minds  to  acknowledge  that 
they  were  engaged  in  war  with  a  de  facto  Government, 
and  they  never  could  treat  with  complaisance  the  repre 
sentatives  of  those  foreign  Powers  who  ventured  to  act 
upon  the  principle  that  the  contest  between  the  States 
was  a  revolution  and  not  an  insurrection. 

But  the  logic  of  facts  proved  too  strong  for  them. 
One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  Government  at  Washington 
for  the  suppression  of  the  so-called  rebellion  was  to 
proclaim  a  blockade  of  all  the  Southern  ports.  In  the 
Proclamation,  dated  April  19,  1861,  President  Lincoln 
stated  that  the  blockade  would  be  '  set  on  foot'  '  in  pur 
suance  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  law 
of  nations  in  such  cases  provided/  The  foreign  Ministers 
resident  at  Washington  immediately  requested  infor 
mation  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  blockade  was  to 


300  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

be  enforced.  To  the  British  Envoy  Mr.  Seward  gave 
the  assurance  that  it  would  be  conducted  strictly  accord 
ing  to  the  rules  of  public  law,  and  with  as  much 
liberality  towards  neutrals  as  any  belligerent  could 
practise.  In  reply  to  the  Minister  of  Spain  he  wrote 
thus :  '  The  blockade  will  be  strictly  enforced  upon  the 
principles  recognised  by  the  law  of  nations.'* 

The  proclamation  of  blockade  was  limited  at  first 
to  seven  specified  States,  but  by  the  end  of  May  it 
was  extended  to  all  the  principal  ports  of  the  Gulf  and 
Atlantic  States,  including  Virginia.  The  Federal 
cruisers  soon  began  to  make  prizes  of  neutral  ships 
for  alleged  breach  of  blockade,  and  they  were  condemned 
with  very  short  shrift  by  the  United  States  prize-courts. 
Appeals  were  taken  to  the  Supreme  Court,  and  Mr. 
Justice  Grier,  giving  the  judgment  of  the  court  in 
a  test  case,  said  : 

'  To  legitimatize  the  capture  of  a  neutral  vessel  or 
property  on  the  high  seas,  a  war  must  exist  de  facto, 
and  the  neutral  must  have  a  knowledge  or  notice  of  the 
intention  of  one  of  the  parties  belligerent  to  use  this 
mode  of  coercion  against  a  port,  city,  or  territory  in 
possession  of  the  other.  .  .  .  The  proclamation  of  the 
blockade  is  itself  official  and  conclusive  evidence  to  the 
court  that  a  state  of  war  existed  which  demanded  and 
authorized  a  recourse  to  such  a  measure  under  the 
circumstances  peculiar  to  the  case.  The  correspondence 
of  Lord  Lyons  with  the  Secretary  of  State  admits  the 
fact  and  concludes  the  question.' 

The  Great  Maritime  Powers  acted  upon  the  foregoing 

statements  of  Mr.   Seward   and   the  judgment   of  the 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.     They  admitted 

the  legality  of  the  blockade,   and  as  a  necessary  and 

*  See  'British  Case,'  part  ii.,  p.  5. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  301 

legitimate  consequence  they  acknowledged  the  Con 
federate  States  as  belligerents,  and  threw  open  their 
ports  to  both  parties  on  the  same  conditions  and 
under  precisely  similar  restrictions. 

Here,  then,  was  an  accomplished  fact — tide  facto  war. 
Europe  refused  to  look  upon  the  efforts  of  eleven  great 
commonwealths,  whose  entire  population,  to  the  number 
of  at  least  six  millions  of  people,  had  united  in  asserting 
their  right  to  retire  from  a  voluntary  union,  as  a  mere 
insurrectionary  opposition  to  an  obnoxious  Government. 
The  common- sense,  as  well  as  the  philanthropy  of 
all  nations,  rejected  the  proposition  to  treat  President 
Davis,  Lee,  and  Stonewall  Jackson  as  common  brawlers 
or  rebels,  and  the  people  of  England  especially  could 
not  be  persuaded  to  denounce  Josiah  Tattnall,  who 
towed  the  British  boats  into  the  Peiho,  as  a  pirate,  nor 
could  they  cast  that  stigma  upon  the  naval  service 
to  which  he  belonged. 

The  acknowledgment  of  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  as  a  belligerent  met  with  such  unanimous  con 
currence  among  foreign  States,  that  it  would  have 
been  only  an  act  of  common  courtesy,  and  of  judicious 
policy,  to  accept  the  judgment.  But  Mr.  Seward  could 
not  bring  himself  to  a  dignified  acquiescence  in  the 
common  verdict.  He  indulged  in  repeated  and  petulant 
complaints,  and  urged  with  vehement  earnestness  that 
all  the  world  should  be  subservient  to  his  will,  and 
should  re-fashion  the  code  of  public  law  to  suit  his 
policy.  It  was  a  case  of  one  sagacious  juror  against 
eleven  stubborn  men  who  took  a  different  view  of 
the  criminal.  What  Mr.  Seward  wanted  was  that 
Europe  should  permit  the  United  States  to  remain 
in  the  enjoyment  of  every  privilege  guaranteed  by 
treaties  of  peace,  free  and  unrestricted  access  to  the 


302  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

ports,  the  right  to  buy  arms  and  transport  them  unmo 
lested  across  the  sea,  to  engage  men  and  forward  them 
to  the  battlefields  in  Virginia  without  question,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  that  the  whole  world  should  tolerate 
a  total  suppression  of  trade  with  eleven  great  provinces, 
and  suffer  the  United  States  to  seize  ships  on  the 
high  seas  and  hale  them  before  prize-courts,  unless 
they  were  protected  by  the  certificate  of  an  American 
Consul.*  He  wished  to  practise  all  the  rights  which  a 
state  of  wyar  confers  upon  a  belligerent,  but  begged  to  be 
excused  from  performing  the  duties  which  attach  in 
equal  degree  to  that  condition. 

The  answer  of  the  Great  Maritime  Powers  was  plain 
and  to  the  point.  Substantially  it  was  this  :  i  You  may 
be  whatever  you  like — in  a  state  of  peace  or  in  a 
state  of  war.  If  the  political  agitation  which  disturbs 
your  country  is  a  mere  insurrection  which  you  will 
suppress  in  "ninety  days,"  the  result  will  be  quite 
agreeable  to  us ;  but  meanwhile  we  must  claim  the  right 
to  go  into  the  Southern  ports,  and  get  the  staples  our 
people  want,  and  give  in  exchange  the  products  of 
our  industry,  which  their  people  want.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  you  cannot  maintain  us  in  our  privileges  of  trade 
with  the  South — if  you  cannot  exercise  jurisdiction 
there,  and  can  only  enter  the  country  with  great  armies, 
which  we  perceive  are  often  defeated  ;  if  to  restore  your 
authority  it  is  necessary  to  resort  to  measures  which  are 
only  admissible  when  exercised  as  a  belligerent  right, 
then  by  your  own  showing  there  is  a  state  of  war, 
to  which  there  are  of  necessity  two  parties,  each  of 
whom  must,  by  the  common  law  of  nations,  have  equal 
rights  and  duties,  and  we  must  protect  our  status  as 
neutrals  by  seeing  that  neither  party  takes  more  than 
*  See  Debate:  Hansard,  vol.  clxx.,  1863  (2),  pp.  581,  582. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  303 

he   is   entitled   to   receive,  or  exacts  more  than  he  is 
justified  in  demanding.' 

It  will  thus  he  seen  that  the  outside  world  did  not 
originate  the  event  or  create  the  fact.  Eighteen  or  more 
great  States,  acknowledging  a  central  Government  at 
Washington,  were  engaged  in  war  with  eleven  other 
great  States  adhering  to  a  common  authority  at  Kich- 
mond.  This  was  the  actual  condition  of  affairs.  All 
the  special  pleading  of  the  politicians  at  Washington,  all 
the  finesse  of  diplomatic  reasoning,  could  not  alter  the 
facts.  Foreign  Powers  perceived  the  actual  state  of 
affairs,  and  the  Proclamations  of  Neutrality,  and  the 
regulations  specifying  the  conditions  upon  which  their 
ports  might  be  used,  were  framed  in  accordance  with  the 
fact  that  there  was  a  state  of  war  between  two  separate 
Powers,  and  although  one  could  glory  in  the  full-fledged 
title  of  *  a  Government  de  jure,1  and  the  other  was 
shackled  with  the  more  restrictive  appellation  of  '  a 
Government  de  facto,'  yet  in  regard  to  belligerent  rights 
and  duties  they  were  placed  on  precisely  the  same  footing 
by  the  common  consent  and  common  action  of  the  whole 
civilized  world. 

In  discussing  the  acts  of  the  Confederate  Government, 
and  the  efforts  made  by  them  to  obtain  military  sup 
plies  and  a  few  cruising  ships  in  Europe,  it  is  only  fair 
to  call  attention  to  the  real  position  of  the  two  belli 
gerents  in  reference  to  the  neutral  Powers. 

It  has  been  often  asserted  in  the  diplomatic  corre 
spondence  of  the  United  States  that  the  agents  of  the 
Confederate  Government  abused  the  hospitality  and  in 
fringed  the  municipal  laws  of  the  neutral  States,  espe 
cially  of  Great  Britain.  '  Criminal  evasion/  '  nefarious 
transactions,'  and  other  cognate  expressions,  were  among 
the  milder  forms  in  which  their  conduct  was  denounced 


304  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

by  the  United  States  Secretary  of  State  and  his  consular 
representatives.  Those  charges  and  those  epithets  have 
been  preserved  in  the  pages  of  '  Blue  Books,'  and  remain 
on  record  among  the  proceedings  of  the  Tribunal  of 
Arbitration  at  Geneva  ;  and  there  are  many  people  in 
England  even  now  who  think  that  there  must  have  been 
some  clever  evasion  of  the  law,  some  illicit  '  tip  '  from  a 
sub-official,  which  made  the  so-called  ;  escape '  of  the 
Alabama  and  her  consorts  possible. 

If  the  charges  and  the  epithets  had  merely  been  cast  at 
an  individual  agent  they  wrould  be  of  little  importance, 
and  it  would  hardly  be  worth  while  to  intrude  an  ex 
planation  or  a  defence  into  a  narrative  of  this  kind, 
because  an  agent  must  be  prepared  to  bear  the  conse 
quences  of  the  policy  he  undertakes  to  carry  out,  and  if 
his  principals  have  exacted  from  him  the  performance  of 
any  acts  which  may,  when  stripped  of  rhetorical  flourish, 
be  justly  branded  as  '  criminal '  or  ;  nefarious/  he  must 
be  content,  if  he  has  consented  to  retain  his  office,  to 
assume  the  responsibility  and  to  endure  the  ignominy. 
But  I  have  shown  in  a  previous  chapter  that  it  was  the 
principle  as  well  as  the  policy  of  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  to  practise  a  scrupulous  and  rigid  deference  to  the 
rights  of  neutrals  and  the  municipal  laws  of  those  coun 
tries  from  which  they  hoped  to  draw  supplies.  My  own 
instructions  were  clear  and  explicit  on  this  point,  and  I 
am  in  the  position  to  know  that  all  orders  issued  by  the 
Confederate  Government  to  agents  and  commanders  of 
cruising  ships  were  of  the  same  tenor.  If,  therefore, 
the  law  of  England  was  violated,  or  evaded  in  a  criminal 
degree,  the  fault  must  be  laid  to  the  inadvertence  or  the 
negligence  or  the  wilfulness  of  the  agent,  and  not  to 
the  policy  of  those  in  whose  behalf  he  was  acting. 

Seldom  is  a  man  competent  to  take  up  a  complicated 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  305 

Act  of  the  British  Parliament,  or  of  any  other  Legislative 
Assembly,  and  define  its  scope  and  the  limit  of  its  sense 
and  bearing  upon  his  own  conduct,  especially  when  the 
Act  contains  many  clauses  combining  prohibitory,  pre 
ventive,  and  punitive  enactments.  What  he  is  bound 
to  do,  however,  is  to  take  due  precautions,  by  consulting 
experts  whose  office  it  is  to  examine  and  give  opinions 
on  points  of  law,  who  are  familiar  with  legal  phraseology, 
and  are  acquainted  with  the  precedents  and  the  previous 
judgments  of  the  Courts  in  cases  which  may  have  arisen 
under  the  statute,  so  that  he  may  escape  danger  of  pro 
secution,  and  be  free  from  the  offence  of  misusing  the  hos 
pitality  of  the  country  which  has  offered  him  shelter  and 
protection.  Those  precautions  were  taken  before  a  ship 
was  bought  or  built  in  England  for  the  Confederate 
Government,  and  the  opinion  of  the  learned  barristers 
whose  advice  was  asked  has  been  already  given  in  a 
previous  chapter.*  The  only  doubt  that  could  be  felt 
in  regard  to  the  advice  was  that  it  was  founded  solely 
upon  the  opinion  of  the  eminent  lawyers  who  gave  it, 
and  could  not  be  confirmed  by  any  precedent  or  previous 
judgment,  because  up  to  the  year  1863  no  ship  had  been 
seized  and  brought  to  the  test  of  a  trial  under  the  Act. 

The  Governments  at  Washington  and  at  Richmond 
stood  at  that  time  on  a  precise  equality  before  the  general 
laws  of  nations,  and  the  municipal  law  of  each  neutral 
state.  I  mean,  of  course,  with  reference  to  their  re 
spective  rights  and  duties  as  belligerents.  Whatever  was 
obligatory  upon  the  one  was  equally  binding  upon  the 
other.  Whatever  the  agent  of  one  could  do  without 
offence,  the  other  could  do  also.  The  Foreign  Enlist 
ment  Act  defined  the  limits  to  which  each  could  go.  It 
laid  down  the  precepts  which  each  were  alike  bound  to 

*  See  chap,  ii.,  pp.  66—69. 
VOL.    I.  20 


306  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

obey,  and  defined  the  consequences  of  disobedience  to 
both  without  partiality  or  discrimination.  If  an  agent 
of  the  United  States  could  perform  any  service  for  his 
Government  in  England  without  infringing  the  laAV  or 
laying  himself  open  to  the  charge  of  '  criminal  evasion/ 
an  agent  of  the  Confederate  States  might  do  the  same  or 
an  equivalent  act  with  corresponding  innocence  and  pro 
priety. 

A.  member  of  Parliament — the  late  Mr.  John  Laird- 
stated  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  the  Navy  Depart 
ment  of  the  United  States  opened  negotiations  with 
the  firm  from  which  he  retired  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Civil  War  for  building  a  special  class  of  ships.  The 
correspondence,  or  at  least  sufficient  to  establish  the 
fact,  was  read  publicly  before  the  whole  House,  and  the 
member  referred  to  stated  that  while  he  felt  bound  to 
suppress  the  names  of  the  persons  through  whom  the 
negotiations  had  been  proposed,  he  would,  if  it  was 
thought  advisable,  hand  the  whole  correspondence,  '  with 
the  original  letters,'  confidentially  to  the  Speaker  of  the 
House,  or  to  the  Prime  Minister,  in  order  that  the  public 
should  have  the  assurance  that  he  was  not  overstating 
the  facts.  One  of  the  extracts  read  to  the  House  was  as 
follows  : — c  I  have  this  morning  a  note  from  the  As 
sistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in  which  he  says,  "  I 
hope  your  friends  will  tender  for  the  two  iron-plated 
steamers." 

It  is  proper  for  me  to  mention  that  in  a  subsequent- 
debate,  about  four  months  afterwards,  Mr.  Richard 
Cobden  stated  that  he  had  received  a  letter  from  his 
friend,  Mr.  Charles  Sumner,  of  the  United  States  Senate, 
informing  him  that  the  Secretary  of  the  United  States 
Navy  denied  that  any  order  had  '  been  sent  from  the 
American  Navy  Department  to  any  shipbuilder  in  this 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  307 

country'  (England).  Mr.  Laird  did  not  assert  that  an 
order  had  been  sent,  but  that  proposals  had  been  made 
and  negotiations  opened  on  the  subject,  and  that  the 
firm  to  which  he  belonged  at  the  time  were  asked  if  they 
would  undertake  to  build  as  desired,  '  how  soon,  and  for 
how  much.'  In  reply  to  Mr.  Cobden,  he  said  that  '  he 
was  quite  prepared,  if  necessary,  to  prove  every  word  he 
had  said  in  a  former  debate  was  perfectly  true  ;  and  as 
the  question  was  one  which  affected  her  Majesty's 
Government,  he  was  ready  to  put  his  proofs  (namely, 
the  original  letters)  in  the  hands  of  the  noble  lord  at  the 
head  of  the  Government.' 

The  debates  referred  to  may  be  found  in  Hansard, 
vol.  clxx.  Session  1863  (2),  and  vol.  clxxii.  Session 
1863  (4).  In  the  course  of  the  latter  debate  the  Prime 
Minister  (Lord  Palmerston)  said  : — '  I  cannot,  in  the 
abstract,  concur  with  my  honourable  friend'  (Mr.  Cobden) 
'  in  thinking  that  there  is  any  distinction  in  principle 
between  muskets,  gunpowder,  bullets,  and  cannon  on 
the  one  side,  and  ships  on  the  other.'  .  .  .  '  Therefore 
I  hold,  that  on  the  mere  ground  of  international  law 
belligerents  have  no  right  to  complain  if  merchants — I 
do  not  say  the  Government,  for  that  would  be  inter 
ference — as  a  mercantile  transaction  supply  one  of  the 
belligerents  not  only  with  arms  and  cannon,  but  also 
with  ships  destined  for  warlike  purposes.' 

The  negotiations  referred  to  by  Mr.  Laird  were  aban 
doned  for  reasons  not  necessary  to  mention  in  detail. 
The  firm  could  not  undertake  the  work  on  the  condi 
tions  as  to  time  of  completion,  etc.,  and  I  do  not  know 
whether  the  United  States  made  overtures  to  other  ship 
builders  or  not.  The  naval  resources  of  the  United 
States  were  so  immeasurably  superior  to  those  of  the 
Confederate  States,  both  in  the  supply  of  materials  and 

20—2 


308  THE  SECEET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

the  mechanical  means  for  utilizing  them,  that  the  Navy 
Department  at  Washington  did  not  probably  feel  any 
anxiety  on  the  score  of  ships.  The  chief  supplies  which 
the  United  States  drew  from  Europe  were  arms,  accou 
trements,  ammunition,  and  men.  I  say  men,  because  it 
is  well  known  that  large  numbers  of  emigrants  were 
induced  to  go  to  the  United  States  during  the  war  under 
implied  promises  or  allegations  that  they  would  find 
remunerative  work,  and  the  work  supplied  them  after 
arrival  was  that  of  bearing  arms  in  the  United  States 
Army  and  helping  to  subjugate  the  South. 

It  would  be  easy  for  me  to  name  persons  of  un 
questioned  respectability  in  England,  especially  in 
Liverpool,  who  were  well  aware  that  bands  of  so-called 
emigrants  were  constantly  passing  through  Liverpool 
and  other  English  coast  towns,  en  route  for  the  United 
States,  often  in  charge  of  men  who  were  known  to  be 
agents  of  that  Government.  The  diplomatic  corres 
pondence  demonstrates  incontestably  that  a  system  of 
'  evasive  enlistment '  for  the  United  States  army  was 
practised  in  Europe  during  the  Civil  War,  and  Con 
federate  officers  would  have  no  difficulty  in  proving, 
if  there  was  any  need,  that  whole  battalions  of  Federal 
soldiers  were  captured  during  the  campaigns  in 
Virginia,  composed  of  men  who  had  not  been  six 
months  in  the  country,  and  who  could  not  speak  a 
word  of  English. 

There  Avere  two  cases  in  which  public  inquiry  was 
made  as  to  the  character  of  the  passengers  by  American 
ships  about  to  leave  Liverpool  for  New  York.  In  one 
of  the  cases  the  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  clandestine 
enlistment  was  so  strong,  that  the  men  were  forced 
to  land.  I  could  name  the  solicitors  who  were  the 
chief  actors  in  the  above  mentioned  cases.  They  are 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  309 

one  of  the  leading  firms  in  Liverpool.  I  am  not 
repeating  merely  the  current  belief  or  suspicion  that 
prevailed  at  the  time,  nor  am  I  affirming  the  existence 
of  a  practice  the  proof  of  which  rests  upon  such  vague 
evidence  as  is  often  tendered  in  the  phrase  '  it  is  quite 
notorious.7  Perhaps  the  subject  is  of  sufficient  import 
ance  to  justify,  if  not  to  require  me  to  give  a  particular 
example. 

One  day  in  the  very  height  of  the  war,  a  gentleman 
called  at  my  office  and  told  me  that  he  had  reason 
to  feel  satisfied  that  a  large  number  of  men  would 
arrive  in  Liverpool  that  afternoon,  who  were  really 
recruits  for  the  United  States  army  ;  that  they  were  in 
charge  of  a  person  who  he  thought  was  a  commissioned 
officer  in  the  United  States  Service ;  that  they  were  to 
embark  on  board  the  American  ship  Great  Western, 
then  lying  in  the  river,  and  he  thought  I  ought  to  take 
some  steps  to  bring  the  matter  before  the  proper 
authorities.  I  replied  that  my  duties  could  only  be 
satisfactorily  and  successfully  performed  by  a  prudent 
reserve,  and  by  maintaining  a  retiring  and  unobtrusive 
attitude.  If  I  ventured  into  the  arena  of  legal  strife 
with  the  American  Consul,  or  with  persons  supposed  to 
be  engaged  in  unlawful  proceedings,  I  should  necessarily 
be  forced  out  of  my  retirement,  which  I  thought  would 
be  more  injurious  to  the  interests  of  the  Confederacy 
than  the  addition  of  a  few  hundred  men  to  the  armies  of 
the  United  States. 

My  informant,  although  an  Englishman,  was  a  warm 
partizan  of  the  south.  He  admitted  the  soundness  of 
my  reasons  for  not  interfering,  but  was  not  satisfied  to 
leave  the  affair  to  take  its  course  without  some  opposi 
tion.  He  went  to  a  few  others  who  were  known  to  be 
'  Southern  sympathizers,'  and  they  placed  the  evidence 


310  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

in  the  hands  of  a  local  solicitor,  who  communicated  it  to 
the  Customs  authorities.  The  alleged  facts  were 
fonvarded  to  London,  and  a  junior  solicitor  of  the 
Customs  was  sent  to  investigate  the  case.  I  believe  the 
ship  was  detained  one  or  two  days,  or  at  least  her 
clearance  was  held  back.  The  solicitor  of  the  Customs 
who  made  the  investigation  reported  that  the  evidence 
of  a  violation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  was  not 
sufficient  to  justify  the  arrest  of  any  of  the  parties,  and 
the  ship  and  her  passengers  were  allowed  to  proceed. 
The  gentleman  who  gave  me  the  information  went 
on  board  with  the  solicitor  he  had  consulted,  and 
he  told  me  that  the  men,  many  of  whom  were  Irishmen, 
seemed  to  know  that  he  and  those  with  him  were  trying 
to  stop  them ;  but  feeling  safe  from  interference,  they 
chaffed  and  indulged  in  a  good  deal  of  rough  humour, 
and  he  furthermore  told  me  that  he  saw  a  person  on 
board  who  was  a  cabin  passenger,  and  appeared  to 
have  charge  of  the  men,  and  that  he  wore  a  military 
dress,  which  some  of  the  men  told  him  was  the 
uniform  of  a  lieutenant  in  the  United  States  army. 

Now,  the  foregoing  incident  would  prove  nothing  if 
there  were  no  sequel  to  it,  but  in  the  winter  of  1871  I 
went  to  New  York  on  a  visit.  I  was  stopping  at  the 
house  of  a  gentleman — a  New  Yorker,  of  high  social 
position.  He  had  neither  a  military  education  nor 
what  may  be  called  the  military  instincts,  and  being  a 
man  of  great  practical  sense,  with  a  sound  perception  of 
the  fitness  of  things,  he  did  not  seek  a  commission 
in  the  army,  and  he  was  far  too  valuable  a  man  to 
be  wasted  in  the  office  of  carrying  a  rifle  in  the  ranks. 
But  his  temperament  was  too  ardent,  and  his  convictions 
too  strong,  to  admit  of  his  remaining  inactive  in  the 
struggle,  which  he  perceived  was  likely  to  be  long  and 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  311 

arduous.  There  could  not  have  been  a  man  more 
loyal  to  the  United  States,  more  willing  to  make  greater 
personal  sacrifices  for  the  success  of  the  Federal  cause. 
I  believe  he  did  as  much  as  any  one  to  keep  up  the 
spirit  of  the  men  in  the  field,  and  to  animate  the  hopes 
of  the  desponding  who  Avere  not  in  the  field ;  and 
his  services  were  as  important  and  as  conducive  to  the 
final  success  of  the  Federal  Government  as  those  of  any 
man  at  the  North  who  was  not  in  high  command,  or  in 
some  equally  important  civil  executive  office.  I  could 
say  much  of  his  personal  qualities,  which  made  him 
lovable  by  those  who  knew  him  well,  but  this  is  no  place 
for  a  tribute  of  that  kind. 

The  gentleman  to  whom  I  refer  was  firmly  impressed 
with  the  feeling  that  the  neutrality  of  England  was  more 
favourable  to  the  South  than  to  the  North,  but  one  of 
his  characteristics  was  to  take  fair  and  reasonable  views 
of  other  men's  motives,  and  to  express  his  own  opinions 
with  moderation  and  courtes}r.  One  day  we  were  dis 
cussing  the  action  of  Great  Britain,  the  effect  of  the 
Proclamation  of  Neutrality,  and  the  manner  in  which 
the  municipal  law  was  applied  in  restraining  the 
operations  of  the  Confederate  agents.  He  took  the 
ground  that  they  were  allowed  too  great  latitude,  and 
that  the  British  Government  showed  an  unfriendly 
feeling  towards  the  United  States  in  permitting  the 
Alabama  and  other  ships  to  leave  England.  I,  of  course, 
took  an  opposite  position,  and  we  argued  the  point  in  a 
temperate  and  friendly  spirit.  I  contended  that  her 
Majesty's  Government  could  not  have  stopped  the 
Alabama  without  acting  arbitrarily,  and  going  beyond 
the  limits  of  a  fair,  impartial  neutrality,  and  to  demon 
strate  that  the  preventive  clauses  of  the  Foreign  Enlist 
ment  Act  were  not  applied  very  strictly  against  the 


312  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

United  States,  I  cited  the  incident  of  the  ship   Great 
Western,  which  I  have  mentioned  above. 

My  friend  smiled.  He  could  be  as  reticent  as  anyone 
when  there  was  necessity  for  reserve,  but  he  was  too 
honest  to  shrink  from  admitting  a  fact,  or  to  hedge 
himself  behind  a  prevarication  in  a  friendly  argument. 
He  left  me,  and  went  into  another  room.  In  a  few 
moments  he  returned,  bringing  a  small  package  of  papers, 
filed  and  backed  in  voucher  form,  and  then  told  me  that 
he  had  been,  during  a  portion  of  the  war,  a  member  of  a 
committee  whose  office  it  was  to  look  after  men  who  had 
been  brought  over  from  Europe  without  any  definite 
purpose  on  their  own  part,  and  who  might  therefore  be 
available  as  recruits  for  the  army  ;  that  he  had  nothing 
whatever  to  do  with  engaging  the  men  abroad,  and  never 
inquired  what  inducements  were  held  out  to  them  to 
come  over,  but  when  they  were  safe  across  and  were  of 
willing  minds,  the  committee  paid  the  expenses,  etc. 
*  These  papers,'  he  said,  £  are  the  documents  and  vouchers 
relating  to  that  voyage  of  the  Great  Western  you  have 
just  mentioned.  And  the  information  upon  which  your 
Liverpool  friend  acted  was  probably  correct.' 

We  were  both  amused  by  this  accidental  discovery 
of  our  common  connection  with  a  transaction  eight 
years  after  the  event,  and  I  was  well  satisfied  to  have 
such  a  complete  demonstration  of  the  facility  with 
which  the  United  States  could  and  did  recruit  their 
armies,  without  infringing  the  British  Foreign  Enlist 
ment  Act,  because  it  confirmed  me  in  the  opinion  I  had 
previously  maintained,  that  the  Act  was  not  intended 
to  protect  one  belligerent  from  another,  but  to  prevent 
prejudice  to  Great  Britain  herself  by  acts  done  within 
the  kingdom  which  would  endanger  its  peace  and  wel 
fare.  Her  Majesty's  Government  brought  the  subject 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EVEOPE.  313 

of  the  alleged  enlistments  to  the  notice  of  the  American 
Minister,  and  appeared  to  be  satisfied  with  the  declaration 
that  there  had  been  none.  The  Confederate  Government 
had  no  recognised,  diplomatic  agent  to  whom  inquiries 
could  be  addressed,  and  who  could  make  explanation, 
and  after  the  departure  of  two  or  three  ships  the  com 
plaints  and  remonstrances  of  the  United  States  Minister 
induced  her  Majesty's  Foreign  Secretary  on  more  than 
one  occasion  to  seize  and  detain  vessels  in  which  the 
Confederate  Government  had  no  interest  whatever,  or, 
as  the  Attorney -General  expressed  it,  to  'strain  the  law.7 
I  assert  nothing  more  than  the  fact  that  the  United 
States,  by  means  of  authorized  agents,  did  induce  many 
men  to  go  from  Europe  to  America  during  the  war,  the 
intent  being  to  enlist  them  into  the  army  after  their 
arrival.  I  do  not  affirm  that  there  was  an  actual  enlist 
ment  in  any  part  of  Europe,  and  the  disclaimer  of  the 
United  States  Minister  was  no  doubt  justified.  The  pro 
cess  was  carried  out  thus :  Able-bodied  men  were  per 
suaded  or  stimulated  by  judicious  representations  to  emi 
grate  to  the  United  States,  and  they  were  kindly  looked 
after  and  cared  for  on  the  journey  to  the  ports  and  on  the 
voyage  across  the  Atlantic  by  friendly  intermediaries. 
There  was  nothing  illegal  in  this.  Kifles,  accoutre 
ments,  and  ammunition  were  bought  at  Birmingham  and 
elsewhere,  and  were  shipped  through  the  great  houses 
of  Baring,  and  Brown,  Shipley  and  Co.,  to  the  United 
States,  in  the  ordinary  way  of  business.  There  was 
nothing  illegal  in  that.  When  the  men  and  the  arms 
arrived  in  New  York,  or  Boston,  or  Philadelphia,  they 
were  brought  together  by  a  happy  accident  ;  the  emi 
grants  were  persuaded  that  it  was  a  very  fine  thing  to 
be  soldiers,  they  were  dressed  in  the  traditional  '  blue/ 
the  equipment  was  completed,  and  they  were  marched 


314  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

off  to  Virginia,  to  be  shot  down  at  Seven  Pines  and 
Chancellor  sville,  or  to  perish  by  fever  in  the  swamps 
of  the  Ghickahominy. 

The  Confederate  Government  did  not  require  men  so 
much  as  arms.  They  were  never  able  to  equip  the 
fighting  population  of  the  country.  They  wanted,  how 
ever,  besides  arms,  ships  suitable  to  cruise  and  to  destroy 
the  enemy's  mercantile  marine  ;  and  the  manner  of 
accomplishing  their  purpose  may  be  briefly  described  as 
follows  : 

A  ship  suited  in  structure  and  general  arrangements 
to  carry  the  weight  of  a  battery  on  deck,  to  berth  a 
sufficient  crew,  and  to  keep  the  sea  for  a  long  time,  was 
bought  or  built  in  England.  She  was  then  despatched 
to  an  outport  without  a  weapon  or  an  ounce  of  powder 
on  board,  and  with  a  crew  just  sufficient  to  navigate  her 
in  safety.  According  to  the  best  advice  available,  there 
was  nothing  illegal  in  that  transaction.  Guns,  cut 
lasses,  revolvers,  ammunition,  and  stores  of  all  necessary 
kinds,  wrere  bought  in  London.  Birmingham.  Sheffield 

7  o  O  ' 

and  elsewhere,  and  were  shipped  in  due  form,  by  a  vessel 
loading  in  the  ordinary  way,  for  the  West  Indies,  or 
other  suitable  market  for  such  supplies.  There  can  be 
no  doubt  that  this  part  of  the  transaction  was  perfectly 
legal.  The  two  vessels — one  fit  to  bear  arms,  but 
having  none  ;  the  other  full  of  arms,  but  unable  to  use 
them — shaped  their  respective  courses  so  as  to  gradually 
converge  until,  at  some  point  far  removed  from  British 
jurisdiction,  they  found  themselves  in  a  fortunate  con 
junction.  The  equipment  of  the  ship  fit  to  bear  arms 
was  then  completed  ;  passengers  or  seamen  from  the 
two  vessels,  and  perhaps  from  a  third,  were  persuaded 
that  they  might  have  a  jolly  cruise,  and  they  donned 
the  familiar  and  jaunty  serge  frock  of  the  man -of- war's- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  315 

man,  and  went  to  i  battle  the  watch '  and  to  take  their 
chances  under  the  Confederate  flag. 

I  think  the  foregoing  sketches  clearly  and  fairly 
demonstrate  the  attitude  of  the  two  belligerents  in 
the  late  Civil  War  in  respect  to  the  British  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act,  and  I  should  be  much  surprised  to  hear 
anyone  not  biased  by  prejudice,  or  pledged  in  advance 
to  a  particular  assertion,  say  that  there  is  a  shade  or  a 
shadow  of  difference  between  them,  whether  viewed  as  a 
matter  of  principle  or  as  a  question  of  evading  the  law. 

Now  that  seventeen  years  have  passed  since  the  end 
of  the  war,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  passions  which  were 
then  aroused  have  sufficiently  subsided  on  both  sides  to 
make  it  possible  for  each  to  take  a  fair  and  equitable 
retrospect  of  what  the  other  did.  I  have  met  many 
Northern  men  who  were  loyal  to  their  Government, 
who  sacrificed  their  business  and  risked  their  lives  in  its 
support,  and  who  never  did  fall  into  the  frenzied  state 
of  bitterness  which  many  of  the  political  party  leaders 
manifested,  and  who  never  had  any  sympathy  with  the 
violent  and  abusive  language  used  by  Mr.  Seward  and 
some  of  his  consular  agents. 

In  the  British  counter-case  presented  to  the  Tribunal 
of  Arbitration  at  Geneva  (p.  57),  I  find  the  follow 
ing  paragraph,  which  serves  as  an  illustration  of  the 
extreme  pretensions  set  up  by  the  United  States,  and 
the  effect  produced  by  the  ill-advised  complaints  and 
demands  of  their  representatives.  c  Pressed  by  the 
difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  their  own  operations 
in  Europe  and  those  of  the  Confederate  States  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  make  it  appear  that  the  British  Govern 
ment  was  bound  to  give  free  scope  to  the  former  and 
repress  the  latter,  the  United  States  appear  to  imagine 
that  they  found  such  a  distinction  in  two  circumstances. 


316  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

One  of  these  is,  that  the  needs  of  the  Confederacy  were, 
as  they  allege,  more  urgent  than  those  of  the  Union  : 
the  former  could  only  obtain  their  military  supplies  from 
abroad  ;  the  latter  could  manufacture  some  of  theirs  at 
home.*  The  other  is,  that  the  United  States,  having  the 
command  of  the  sea,  could  transport  the  goods  pur 
chased  by  them  freely  and  openly,  or  (as  it  is  expressed) 
"  in  the  ordinary  course  of  commerce  ;"  whilst  the  Con 
federates  were  obliged  to  "  originate  a  commerce  for  the 
purpose "  —that  is,  to  get  their  goods  transported  by 
way  of  Nassau  and  Bermuda,  which  are  commonly 
places  of  no  great  trade — and  further,  to  make  use  of 
those  concealments  by  which  the  traffic  in  contraband  of 
war,  when  not  protected  by  a  powerful  navy,  usually 
tries  to  elude  the  vigilance  of  the  enemy's  cruisers.  Are 
we,  then,  to  understand  that,  according  to  the  views  put 
forward  in  the  case  of  the  United  States,  the  "  strict  and 
impartial  neutrality  towards  both  belligerent s/T  which  it 
is  the  duty  of  a  neutral  Government  to  maintain,  obliges 
it  to  find  out  which  of  the  two  stands  in  the  greater 
need  of  supplies,  and  consists  in  lending  aid,  by 
measures  of  repression,  to  the  belligerent  whose  force  is 
the  greater  and  his  wants  the  less  pressing  of  the  two, 
and  thus  assisting  him  to  crush  more  speedily  the 
resistance  of  his  weaker  enemy  ?  Her  Majesty's  Govern 
ment  is  unable  to  assent  to  this  novel  opinion,  advan 
tageous  as  it  would  doubtless  prove  to  States  wrhich,  like 
Great  Britain,  possess  a  powerful  navy.' 

The  last  sentence  in  the  foregoing  quotation  is  perti 
nent  to  a  comment  I  have  previously  made  upon  the 
pretensions  set  up  and  exacted  by  the  United  States 
during  the  war.  They  advanced  and  were  permitted  to 
enforce  belligerent  rights  which  wrere  strongly  resisted 
*  'Case  of  the  United  States,'  pp.  310—312. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  317 

when  applied  to  themselves  in  former  years,  and  thus 
established  precedents  which  will  occasion  much  trouble 
and  perplexity  to  some  future  Government  at  Washing 
ton,  if  the  United  States  should  be  neutral  in  a  war 
between  two  countries  having  powerful  navies.  It  is 
well  known  that  the  great  autocratic  and  monarchical 
Powers  of  Europe  had  shown  a  willingness  for  years 
before  the  American  Civil  War  to  relax  the  extreme 
application  of  the  belligerent  rights  heretofore  claimed 
by  them,  and  relentlessly  enforced  whenever  their  in 
terests  required.  England,  once  so  persistent  and  arro 
gant  in  practising  the  '  right  of  search/  has,  during 
many  past  years,  taken  a  leading  part  in  the  effort  to 
modify  the  harsh  restraints  upon  neutral  commerce, 
which  she  herself  was  formerly  so  ready  to  inflict,  and 
to  abolish  or  prohibit  the  destruction  of  private  property 
on  the  high  seas.  The  Great  Powers  who  joined  in  the 
Declaration  of  Paris  in  the  year  1856,  agreed  to  several 
very  important  rules  which  greatly  relaxed  the  oppres 
sive  restraints  on  neutral  commerce  in  times  of  war. 
The  most  beneficent  provisions  of  that  famous  Declara 
tion  were  those  which  practically  affirmed  the  doctrine 
that  '  free  ships  made  free  goods/  and  which  furthermore 
exempted  neutral  goods  from  condemnation  as  prize,  if 
found  in  an  enemy's  ship.  It  is  remarkable  that  the 
United  States,  professing  the  freest  and  most  liberal 
institutions,  and  up  to  1861  vehemently  urging  and 
insisting  upon  the  fullest  immunity  for  their  flag,  should 
have  so  suddenly  made  a  retrograde  movement  in  the 
liberal  policy  of  their  past  history,  while  even  the  auto 
cratic  States  of  Europe  were  discarding  their  dictatorial 
traditions,  and  were  advancing  in  the  path  of  greater 
freedom  to  commerce,  and  less  interference  with  the 
rights  and  privileges  of  neutrals. 


-318  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

In  the  year  1863  Messrs.  Pile,  Spence  and  Co.,  of  the 
City  of  London,  advertised  a  line  of  steamers  to  run 
regularly  between  England  and  Matamoras,  in  Mexico. 
The  first  vessel  despatched  on  the  line  was  the  screw 
steamer  Gipsy  Queen,  which  performed  her  voyage  and 
returned  in  safety.  The  second  vessel  was  the  Peterhoff, 
also  a  screw  steamer.  The  Peterhoff  left  London  with 
proper  clearances  from  the  Custom  House,  but  for 
greater  precaution  took  a  certificate  of  clearance  from 
the  Mexican  Consul.  In  the  due  progress  of  her  voyage 
she  arrived  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  island  of  St. 
Thomas,  where  she  was  stopped  by  a  United  States  ship- 
of-war  and  boarded.  Her  papers  were  examined  and 
endorsed  with  a  statement  that  they  were  in  order,  and 
she  was  then  permitted  to  proceed  on  her  voyage.  In 
accordance  with  the  original  intention  of  her  owners, 
she  went  into  St.  Thomas,  replenished  her  coal,  and 
sailed  again  for  Matamoras.  Just  as  she  was  leaving  the 
harbour  of  St.  Thomas  the  United  States  ship  Vanderbilt 
was  coming  in,  and  Admiral  Wilkes,  the  senior  American 
naval  officer  present,  ordered  the  commander  of  the 
Vanderbilt  to  pursue  her.  He  did  so  ;  he  captured  her 
and  brought  her  back  to  St.  Thomas,  whence  she  was 
afterwards  taken  to  Key  West  to  be  adjudicated  upon 
by  a  prize-court. 

The  above  facts  are  condensed  from  a  debate  on  the 
subject  in  the  British  House  of  Commons,  March  27, 
1863  (Hansard,  vol.  clxx.,  Session  1863  (2),  p.  71,  etc.). 
In  the  same  volume  (p.  575,  etc.),  will  be  found  another 
long  and  spirited  debate  on  the  '  Conduct  of  Admiral 
Wilkes J  and  '  American  Cruisers  and  British  Merchant 
men.'  Those  debates  go  further  than  anything  I  have 
written  to  demonstrate  not  only  the  harsh  and  rigorous 
manner  in  which  the  United  States  enforced  their  belli- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  319 

gerent  rights  during  the  Civil  War,  but  the  surprise 
which  was  aroused  in  England  by  the  sudden  and  com 
plete  abandonment  and  reversal  of  their  previous  prin 
ciples  in  respect  to  the  i  right  of  search.7  The  purpose 
of  the  United  States  was  to  hermetically  seal  up  the 
Southern  ports,  to  deprive  the  South  of  every  possible 
means  of  obtaining  supplies  from,  abroad,  whether  by 
direct  trade  or  through  ports  contiguous  tb  it  either  by 
sea  or  by  land ;  and  to  accomplish  that  purpose  appeared 
to  be  of  greater  importance  to  the  Government  at  Wash 
ington  than  to  maintain  a  character  for  consistency  in 
the  interpretation  of  International  Law. 

At  the  present  day  the  American  shipping  trade  has 
fallen  to  a  very  low  point,  but  all  who  are  acquainted 
with  the  resources  of  the  country,  the  activity  and  com 
mercial  intelligence  of  the  people,  and  the  mechanical 
skill  they  have  exhibited  in  the  past,  will  expect  to  see 
their  trade  revive  and  American  ships  again  taking  their 
due  part  in  the  marine  traffic  of  the  world  whenever  the 
country  can  persuade  its  rulers  to  remodel  the  naviga 
tion  laws.  But  when  the  United  States  resume  their 
due  place  among  the  Maritime  Powers,  they  will  require 
a  powerful  and  ubiquitous  navy  to  protect  their  com 
merce  against  the  encroachments  of  some  future  belli 
gerents,  who  may,  and  probably  will  be,  inclined  to 
follow  the  precedents  of  1861 — 65. 

The  statements  in  the  foregoing  pages  having  refer 
ence  to  the  operations  of  the  United  States  in  England, 
and  the  comparison  of  their  conduct  with  that  of 
the  Confederate  States  in  respect  to  alleged  violations  or 
evasions  of  the  municipal  law,  and  of  neutral  rights,  are 
not  made  as  a  reproach  to  the  former,  nor  are  they 
set  forth  as  grounds  upon  which  to  found  an  argument, 
or  to  build  up  a  defence.  Whatever  was  done  by  a 


320  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Confederate  agent  in  Europe,  can  be  made  to  appear 
neither  better  nor  worse,  by  proving  that  some  one  else 
has  committed  or  avoided  the  same  errors,  and  I  heartily 
renounce  all  faith  in,  and  all  tolerance  for,  the  weak  and 
puerile  plea  of  '  Et  tu  guoque.'  But  the  facts  which 
I  have  mentioned  are  parts  of  the  current  history  of 
those  troublous  times  when  the  American  Union  was 
suffering  its  great  national  convulsion,  and  the  general 
historian  of  the  future  will  require  information  on 
all  such  points,  in  order  that  he  may  have  the  data  for  a 
fair  impartial  judgment. 

I  have  stated  that  before  a  keel  was  laid,  or  a  ship  was 
bought  in  England  for  the  Confederate  Government, 
advice  was  taken  as  to  the  legality  of  the  proceedings, 
and  that  everything  was  done  thereafter  in  strict  con 
formity  with  the  advice  obtained.  I  can  affirm,  without 
the  least  mental  reservation,  that  no  deception  whatever 
was  practised  upon  the  Customs  authorities  in  respect  to 
the  registry  or  clearance  of  the  Alabama,  for  as  the  law 
then  stood,  neither  registry  nor  clearance  was  required, 
and  with  reference  to  the  other  ships  built  or  bought  by 
me,  I  can  state  with  equal  confidence  that  every  require 
ment  of  the  law  was  complied  with,  whether  affecting 
the  registration,  clearance,  or  shipping  of  the  crews. 

But  to  determine  whether  the  agents  of  the  Con 
federate  Government  infringed  or  evaded  the  municipal 
law  of  England,  something  more  will  be  required  by 
those  who  are  interested  in  the  questions  than  the 
mere  opinion  of  lawyers,  however  eminent,  or  the 
assurance  of  an  implicated  party,  however  conscientiously 
he  may  affirm  his  innocence  of  an  evil  intent.  The 
course  of  events  has  furnished  the  only  authoritative 
rule  which  can  be  applied  to  the  elucidation  of  any 
doubtful  or  ambiguous  point  of  law — that  is,  a  trial 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  321 

before  a  duly  constituted  court,  and  a  judicial  exposition 
and  decision. 

In  the  well  known  case,  '  The  Attorney  General  v. 
Sillem  and  others,'  commonly  called  '  The  Alexandra 
Case/  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  was  discussed  at 
great  length  by  several  of  the  most  distinguished  lawyers 
of  the  English  bar,  by  Sir  William  Atherton,  her 
Majesty's  Attorney -General,  Sir  Roundell  Palmer,  her 
Majesty's  Solicitor- General,  and  Sir  Eobert  Philli- 
more,  the  Queen's  Advocate,  on  one  side,  and  Sir  Hugh 
Cairns,  J.  B.  Karslake,  Esq.,  Q.C.,  George  Mellish, 
Esq.,  Q.C.,  and  James  Kemplay,  Esq.,  on  the  other. 
The  judgment  rendered  in  the  above  case  has  never 
been  reversed,  and  the  interpretation  of  the  Act  as  laid 
down  by  the  learned  judge  on  that  occasion  fixes 
its  meaning  and  settles  the  question  of  the  culpability 
of  the  Confederate  agents.  The  ;  Alexandra  Case,'  was 
what  lawyers  call  a  prosecution  in  rem,  and  the  Crown 
contended  for  a  forfeiture  of  the  ship  for  or  upon  an 
alleged  violation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  chiefly 
with  reference  to  the  seventh  section.  It  will  probably 
help  the  reader  to  understand  the  case,  and  to  duly 
estimate  the  effect  of  the  judgment,  if  I  give  a  brief 
history  of  the  circumstances  under  which  the  Act  was 
passed,  and  a  short  explanation  of  the  principles  of 
neutrality  involved  in  it. 

The  United  States  have  an  Act  very  similar  to  that  of 
Great  Britain,  both  as  regards  the  object  of  the  statutes, 
and  the  causes  which  appeared  to  render  them  necessary. 
In  the  year  1778,  the  American  Colonies,  then  engaged 
in  their  War  of  Independence  with  Great  Britain,  made 
a  treaty  (in  fact,  there  were  two)  with  the  Government 
of  Louis  XVI.,  by  which  very  large,  important  and 
exclusive  privileges  were  granted  to  the  respective  parties 

VOL.  i.  21 


322  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

with  reference  to  the  use  of  each  other's  ports  for 
the  condemnation  and  sale  of  prizes,  and  for  the  visit, 
shelter,  and  equipment  of  their  ships -of- war.  Very 
shortly  after  the  execution  of  Louis  XVL,  the  French 
National  Convention  plunged  into  a  war  with  England 
and  Holland. 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  cruelty  and  arrogance  of 
the  men  who  assumed  the  control  of  the  French  Govern 
ment  in  those  days  of  terror,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
they  did  not  lack  audacity  and  vigour.  They  appeared 
at  once  to  look  to  the  United  States  as  a  convenient 
point  d'appui  for  their  naval  operations,  and  jumped  to 
the  conclusion  that  under  the  aforementioned  treaties  of 
1778  they  would  be  permitted  to  arm  and  commission 
privateers  in  the  American  ports,  to  bring  into  them  their 
prizes,  and  to  have  the  prizes  condemned  by  the  French 
Consuls.  The  French  Republic  declared  war  against 
England  on  February  1st,  1793,  and  one  of  the  first  acts 
of  the  Government  was  to  send  a  Minister  to  the  United 
States,  to  inflame  the  people  against  Great  Britain,  and 
to  claim  and  use  the  rights  and  privileges  conceded  by 
the  treaties  of  1778.  M.  Genet,  the  person  selected  for 
the  mission,  was  certainly  not  wanting  in  the  qualities  of 
self- assurance,  energy  and  presumption.  He  arrived  at 
Charleston  on  the  8th  of  April,  1793,  and  began  forth 
with  to  organize  a  system  of  privateering.  He  also 
issued  instructions  authorizing  the  French  Consuls  to 
hold  courts  of  Vice -Admiralty  for  condemning  the 
prizes  which  the  cruisers  of  France  might  capture  and 
bring  into  the  ports  of  the  United  States.  Having 
thus  put  these  naval  operations  in  train,  he  set  out  for 
Philadelphia,  and  during  his  journey  he  resorted  to 
every  possible  means  of  inciting  the  people  of  the  country 
to  acts  of  enmity  against  England. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUEOPE.  323 

Washington,  who  was  then  President,  and  whose  wise 
judicial  mind  would  have  revolted  against  this  pre 
sumptuous  conduct,  even  if  good  faith  to  England  had 
not  influenced  him,  did  not  wait  for  a  remonstrance  from 
the  British  Minister,  but  issued  a  proclamation  of 
neutrality  on  the  22nd  of  April,  1793.  There  was  some 
opposition  to  Washington's  prompt  and  decisive  action, 
for  in  his  Cabinet  were  several  members  who  were 
favourable  to  the  French  cause,  but  his  strength  of 
character  and  firmness  of  will  enabled  him  to  put  his 
own  views  in  practice,  and  to  maintain  an  attitude  of 
strict  neutrality.  M.  Genet  appears  to  have  carried 
matters  on  with  a  very  high  hand,  and  he  tried  the 
temper  and  the  forbearance  of  the  President  greatly. 
He  not  only  persisted  in  violating  the  neutral  territory, 
but  he  entered  into  various  offensive  political  intrigues, 
and  made  himself  so  obnoxious  that  his  recall  was 
demanded,  and  the  United  States  Minister  in  Paris  was 
instructed  to  say  to  the  French  Government  that  if  M. 
Genet  persevered  in  his  proceedings  the  United  States 
Government  would  be  forced  to  suspend  his  functions 
before  a  successor  could  arrive.  The  result  of  those 
troublesome  proceedings  was  to  bring  the  majority  of 
the  Cabinet  into  complete  agreement  with  the  President, 
and  they  gave  rise  to  the  first  Act  for  the  Preservation 
of  Neutrality,  or  what  may  be  called  the  first  American 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  which  was  passed  by  Congress 
early  in  1794,  re-enacted  March  2,  1797,  and  made  final 
April  24,  1800. 

The  Act  thus  made  perpetual  in  1800  did  not,  how 
ever,  prove  strong  enough  for  the  purpose.  The  revolt 
of  the  Spanish  Colonies  in  South  America  gave  much 
trouble  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  Agents 
from  those  colonies  came  to  New  York,  Baltimore,  and 

21—2 


324  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

other  ports,  and  bought  and  equipped  vessels  to  cruise 
against  Spanish  commerce,  and  American  citizens  fitted 
out  vessels  which  were  officered  and  manned  exclusively 
by  Americans,  and  after  being  thus  fully  equipped  for 
immediate  hostilities  they  were  commissioned  by  the 
several  revolted  colonies.  Those  proceedings  involved 
the  United  States  in  constant  complaints  from  Spain, 
and  in  diplomatic  remonstrance  and  correspondence 
with  her  representatives,  and  finally,  to  meet  the  fresh 
necessities,  a  further  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  was  passed, 
April,  1818,  which  was  the  American  Act  in  force  during 
the  late  Civil  War. 

The  contests  between  Spain  and  her  American  colonies 
beginning  in  1810,  attracted  much  notice  in  England, 
and  were  from  the  first  regarded  with  warm  interest  by 
the  people  of  Great  Britain.  The  old  spirit  of  maritime 
adventure,  and  the  passion  for  enterprises  to  the  Spanish 
Main  and  the  '  El  Dorados7  on  the  west  coast,  which 
aroused  the  temper  and  inspired  the  actions  of  Drake, 
Cavendish,  Hawkins,  and  their  contemporaries — those 
splendid  buccaneers,  whose  deeds  have  added  piquancy 
and  glory  to  the  reign  of  the  Virgin  Queen — had  not 
yet  been  completely  superseded  by  the  more  peaceful 
instincts  of  the  nineteenth  century,  nor  wholly  and 
effectively  shackled  by  the  growing  stringency  of  a 
recognised  International  Code. 

It  appears  that  in  1814  Spain  was  able  to  persuade 
England  that  she  ought  to  do  something  to  check,  if  not 
to  prevent,  the  participation  of  British  subjects  in  the 
war  she  was  then  waging  with  her  recalcitrant  subjects 
in  the  'Golden  South  America,'  and  in  August,  1814,  a 
supplementary  treaty  was  made  between  the  two  Powers, 
which  declared  in  Article  III.  that  '  His  Britannic 
Majesty  being  anxious  that  the  troubles  and  disturbances 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  325 

which  unfortunately  prevail  in  the  dominions  of  his 
Catholic  Majesty  in  America  should  cease,  and  the 
subjects  of  those  provinces  should  return  to  their 
obedience  to  their  lawful  sovereign,  engages  to  take  the 
most  effectual  measures  for  preventing  his  subjects  from 
furnishing  arms,  ammunition,  or  any  other  article,  to  the 
revolted  in  America.' 

The  treaty  did  not,  however,  meet  the  purposes  which 
inspired  it,  because  we  find  that  in  1818  the  interest  in 
the  strife  had  again  been  greatly  aroused  throughout 
Great  Britain,  partly  in  consequence  of  the  instinctive 
attachment  of  the  people  to  the  cause  of  freedom,  and 
partly  in  consequence  of  the  extravagant  expectations 
which  interested  parties  had  excited  by  highly  coloured 
statements  of  the  wealth  of  the  Spanish  American 
colonies,  and  the  vast  field  that  their  independence 
would  open  up  to  British  commerce  and  enterprise. 
But  in  addition  to  the  foregoing  causes,  much  irritation 
had  been  produced  throughout  Great  Britain  by  the 
reactionary  policy  of  Ferdinand  VII.,  the  prohibitory 
duties  he  had  imposed  upon  British  commerce,  and  the 
resentful  feelings  which  were  provoked  by  the  alleged 
ingratitude  he  had  shown  to  many  British  officers  who 
had  served  him  in  Spain. 

There  was  at  the  time  a  strong  party  even  in  Parlia 
ment  who  were  in  favour  of  supporting  the  claims  of 
the  colonies  and  giving  them  help  to  win  their  inde 
pendence.  There  was  an  old  statute  of  James  I.,  which 
specified  the  conditions  upon  which  British  subjects 
might  enter  into  the  service  of  a  foreign  prince  ;  and 
there  were  further  Acts,  in  the  reign  of  George  II. , 
forbidding  enlistment  or  the  procuring  others  to  enlist  in 
a  foreign  service  '  without  licence  under  the  King's  sign- 
manual.'  By  Statute  29  George  II.  c.  17,  it  was 


326  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

enacted  c  that  to  serve  under  the  French  King1  as  a 
military  officer  shall  be  felony  without  benefit  of  clergy  ; 
and  to  enter  the  Scotch  Brigade  in  the  Dutch  service 
without  first  taking  the  oaths  of  allegiance  and  abjura 
tion,  shall  be  a  forfeiture  of  £500.'* 

The  foregoing  may  be  taken  as  the  substance  of 
'British  neutrality  law'  in  1818,  when  Spain  was 
striving .  to  suppress  the  revolt  of  her  American 
colonies. f  But  neither  the  treaty  of  1814  nor  the  pro 
hibitory  Acts  of  Parliament  were  sufficient  to  prevent 
aid  being  sent  to  the  insurgents,  both  in  men  and 
materials  of  war.  There  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
any  attempt  at  disguise.  Great  numbers  of  Peninsular 
veterans,  officers  and  men,  went  to  the  revolted  pro 
vinces,  and  gave  them  the  benefit  of  their  experience 
and  the  prestige  of  their  military  fame.  An  adventurer 
of  some  note,  who  assumed  the  title  of  general,  and  was 
known  as  Sir  Gregor  McGregor,  collected  an  expedition 
in  the  ports  of  Great  Britain,  with  which  he  sailed  in 
British  vessels  and  under  the  British  flag.  He  attacked 
and  took  Porto  Bello,  in  South  America,  then  in  the 
undisturbed  possession  of  a  Spanish  force.  This  violent 
act  of  aggression  led  to  strong  remonstrances  on  the 
part  of  the  Spanish  Government,  and  the  British 
Ministry,  on  the  10th  of  June,  1819,  introduced  a  Bill 
for  the  Amendment  of  the  Neutrality  Laws,  which  was 
passed  on  the  21st  by  a  majority  of  sixty-one.  The 
Act  was  strongly  opposed,  the  Opposition  being  led  by 
Sir  James  Macintosh,  who  denounced  it  as  a  '  left- 

*  Phillimore's  'International  Law,'  vol.  iii.,  ed.  1857,  p.  212. 

t  For  the  dates  and  facts  in  respect  to  the  origin  of  the  British  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act,  see  Appendix  to  Keport  of  the  Neutrality  Laws  Com 
missioners,  issued  for  the  information  of  the  House  of  Commons, 
1868,  from  which  the  account  herein  is  abridged  in  the  leading  points. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  327 

handed  neutrality,  aimed  at  the  struggling  independence 
of  South  America.'  In  the  year  1823,  Lord  Althorp 
moved  for  the  repeal  of  the  Act,  but  the  motion  was 
defeated,  and  the  statute,  as  passed  on  the  21st  June, 
1819,  remained  the  l  Neutrality  Law  '  of  Great  Britain  up 
to  and  during  the  American  Civil  War.  It  is  known, 
and  was  generally  alluded  to,  as  the  '  Foreign  Enlistment 
Act/  and  it  is  the  Act  which  is  applicable  to  all  cases  of 
alleged  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain  by 
either  belligerent  in  the  American  Civil  War. 

O 

The  passing  of  the  Act  of  1819  seems  to  have  put 
an  end  to  the  despatch  of  expeditions  from  Great  Britain 
against  Spain,  for  a  time,  at  least ;  but  it  was  neces 
sary  to  put  it  in  force  on  several  occasions  to  prevent  or 
to  arrest  expeditions  fitted  out  to  operate  against  other 
countries  with  which  England  was  at  peace.  In  1835 
an  Order  in  Council  was  passed  exempting  British 
subjects  who  might  engage  in  the  service  of  Queen 
Isabella  of  Spain  from  the  penalties  of  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act.  Under  the  terms  of  this  exemption, 
a  British  legion  was  formed,  which  went  to  Spain  under 
the  command  of  Sir  De  Lacy  Evans,  and  served  there 
during  the  war  against  the  Carlists.  In  1862  an  Order 
in  Council  was  again  issued  suspending  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act  so  as  to  allow  Captain  Sherard  Osborne, 
R.N.,  to  fit  out  ships  and  engage  British  subjects  to 
enter  the  service  of  the  Emperor  of  China. 

In  the  Appendix  to  the  Report  of  the  Neutrality  Law 
Commissioners  in  the  year  1867,  it  is  said  that  'in  all, 
or  nearly  all,  the  cases  up  to  the  time  of  the  American 
Civil  War,  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  had  been  invoked 
to  prevent  the  enlistment  and  despatch  of  recruits  and 
soldiers  rather  than  the  equipment  of  vessels/  There 
are  only  three  cases  mentioned  of  interference  with,  or 


328  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

seizure  of  vessels,  and  in  each  of  them  the  ships  were  so 
completely  equipped  and  manned  that  they  might  have 
engaged  in  hostilities  as  soon  as  they  were  clear  of  the 
British  port,  or  else  they  had  emigrants  or  volunteers 
on  board  which  it  was  proved  were  intended  for  the 
service  of  a  belligerent,  and  no  case  is  mentioned  of  any 
vessel  being  brought  to  trial. 

In  order  to  comprehend  the  application  of  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act  to  the  cases  of  Confederate  ships  built 
or  bought  in  England,  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind 
the  circumstances  which  produced  the  amendment  of  the 
Neutrality  Laws  in  1819,  and  the  evil  it  was  intended  to 
guard  against,  and  to  remedy,  by  the  Act  of  Parliament. 

Mr.  Canning,  in  his  speech  in  support  of  the  Bill, 
gave  a  graphic  description  of  an  expedition  prepared  in 
a  British  port  for  hostile  attack  upon  some  foreign 
Power,  and  he  said  that  if  a  foreigner  visiting  England 
at  the  time  should  see  the  ships  with  their  armament 
and  crews  on  board,  and  the  transports  with  the  troops, 
he  would  naturally  ask  with  what  country  England  was 
at  war.  When  he  was  told  that  the  country  was  not  at 
war,  but  was  in  peace  and  amity  with  the  whole  world, 
he  would  doubtless  be  greatly  surprised. 

The  Attorney-General  of  that  day,  in  introducing  the 
Bill  into  Parliament,  said  :  '  It  was  extremely  important 
for  the  preservation  of  neutrality  that  the  subjects  of 
this  country  should  be  prevented  from  fitting  out  any 
equipments,  not  only  in  the  ports  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland,  but  also  in  other  parts  of  the  British  dominions? 
to  be  employed  in  foreign  service/  He  explained  that 
by  fitting  out  'armed  vessels,  or  by  supplying  the 
vessels  of  other  countries  with  warlike  stores,  as  effec 
tual  assistance  might  be  rendered  to  a  foreign  Power  as 
by  enlistment  in  their  own  service,'  and  he  added  '  that 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  329 

in  the  second  provision  of  the  Bill,  two  objects  were 
intended  to  be  embued — to  prevent  the  fitting  out  of 
armed  vessels,  and  also  to  prevent  the  fitting  out  or 
supplying  other  ships  with  warlike  stores  in  any  of  his 
Majesty's  ports,  not  that  such  vessels  might  not  receive 
in  any  port  in  the  British  dominions,  but  the  object  of 
the  enactment  was  to  prevent  them  from  shipping  war 
like  stores,  such  as  guns  and  other  things — other  things 
obviously  and  manifestly  intended  for  no  other  purpose 
than  war.' 

It  is  usual  for  Legislative  Acts  to  be  headed  or  pre 
ceded  by  an  explanatory  .clause,  or  preamble,  as  it  is 
called,  which  states  the  object  of  the  Act  and  the  evil  to 
be  remedied  by  it.  The  preamble  to  the  English  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act  is  as  follows  :  '  Whereas  the  enlistment 
or  engagement  of  his  Majesty's  subjects  to  serve  in  war 
in  foreign  service  without  his  Majesty's  license,  and  the 
fitting-out,  equipping,  and  arming  of  vessels  by  his 
Majesty's  subjects  for  warlike  operations  in  or  against 
the  dominions  or  territories  of  any  foreign  Prince, 
State,  Potentate,  or  persons  exercising  or  assuming  to 
exercise  the  powers  of  Government  in  or  over  any 
foreign  country,  etc.,  may  be  prejudicial  to  and  tend  to 
endanger  the  peace  and  welfare  of  this  kingdom,  etc.'  It 
would  appear  from  the  foregoing  explanations,  and  the 
preamble  of  the  Act,  that  the  object  was  to  provide 
against  the  fitting  out  of  warlike  expeditions  in  the  ports 
of  Great  Britain  which  might  be  in  condition  to  engage 
in  acts  of  hostility  as  soon  as  they  left  the  neutral  port, 
and  to  prohibit  British  subjects  from  practically  engaging 
in  war  on  their  own  account,  by  taking  part  in  the  pre 
paration  of  warlike  expeditions  in  Great  Britain,  or  the 
arming  of  ships  for  war  within  the  United  Kingdom. 
This  was  the  view  taken  by  the  learned  barristers  whose 


330  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

opinions  were  asked  before  the  contracts  for  the  Florida 
and  Alabama  were  made.  They  advised  that  it  was  not 
illegal  for  a  builder  to  build,  or  a  purchaser  to  buy,  a 
ship  of  any  description  whatever,  provided  she  was  not 
armed  for  war  and  no  men  were  enlisted  or  engaged  to 
go  in  her  for  the  service  of  a  foreign  State. 

The  ground  is  now  clear  for  the  report  of  the  test 
case  which  has  been  mentioned  above — a  case  which 
resulted  in  a  judicial  exposition  of  the  law,  and  an 
authoritative  verdict  upon  the  acts  of  the  Confederate 
Government  in  respect  to  the  building  or  purchase  of 
ships  in  England. 

About  the  7th  of  March,  1863,  a  small  wooden  screw- 
steamer  was  launched  from  the  building-yard  of  Messrs. 
W.  C.  Miller  and  Son,  at  Liverpool.  The  material 
of  which  the  ship  was  built,  her  general  arrangements, 
and  the  fact  that  she  was  launched  from  the  same  yard 
in  which  the  Florida  was  built,  soon  attracted  the  notice 
of  Mr.  Dudley's  spies,  and  they  began  to  manufacture 
affidavits  for  the  information  of  the  American  Minister. 
On  the  28th  of  March,  Mr.  Dudley  made  a  formal 
'  affirmation '  (being,  as  he  stated,  averse  to  taking 
an  oath)  that  he  had  reason  to  believe  that  the  above 
mentioned  vessel,  which  had  been  named  Alexandra, 
was  intended  for  the  Confederate  States.  The  '  affirma 
tion  '  began  with  the  preamble  or  introductory  prelude 
which  was  commonly  adopted  by  the  American  Consuls 
of  the  period,  namely,  that  the  Government  and  people 
of  the  United  States  were  engaged  in  a  war  with 
*  certain  persons  who  have  rebelled  against  such  Govern 
ment,  and  pretended  to  set  up  and  assume  to  exercise  the 
powers  of  Government,  styling  themselves  the  Con 
federate  States  of  America  ;'  then  was  added  a  synopsis 
of  the  grounds  of  Mr.  Dudley's  faith  in  that  to  which 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  331 

he  affirmed,  and  a  declaration  of  his  belief  in  the  truth 
of  the  affidavits  of  certain  other  persons,  whose  state 
ments  were  duly  sworn  to  at  the  same  time. 

The  foregoing  '  affirmation '  and  '  affidavits  '  were 
forwarded  to  the  United  States  Minister  in  London,  and 
on  the  30th  Mr.  Adams  addressed  a  letter  to  Lord 
Russell  on  the  subject,  and  an  active  correspondence 
appears  to  have  been  carried  on  between  that  gentleman, 
the  British  Foreign  Office,  the  Customs  authorities,  the 
Mayor  and  Head-Constable  of  Liverpool,  the  Treasury, 
and  the  Home  Office.  The  correspondence  fills  twenty- 
four  pages  of  the  appendix  to  the  '  British  Case.'  A 
synopsis  of  it  would  hardly  interest  the  reader.  It  is 
sufficient  to  say  that  the  upshot  of  it  all  was  the 
seizure  of  the  Alexandra,  and  a  suit  in  her  Majesty's 
Court  of  Exchequer  for  her  forfeiture  to  the  Crown. 

The  little  vessel  which  had  occasioned  all  this  commo 
tion  had  been  launched  on  the  day  the  Princess  of 
Wales  entered  London,  previous  to  her  marriage,  and 
had  been  christened  Alexandra,  in  commemoration  of 
that  interesting  event.  She  was  taken  into  the  Toxteth 
Dock  to  complete  her  outfit,  and  to  have  her  engines 
placed,  and  there  the  work  went  peacefully  on,  her 
builders  and  owners  having  some  consciousness  that  the 
United  States  Minister  was  uneasy  about  her,  but 
not  dreaming  that  they  were  doing  anything  illegal,  and 
therefore  attempting  no  concealment  or  disguise. 

On  the  5th  of  April,  1863,  the  Surveyor  of  Customs 
at  Liverpool  seized  her,  and  all  work  upon  her  was 
suspended.  The  trial  was  not  begun  until  the  22nd  of 
June,  and  as  the  decision  was  important,  besides  furnish 
ing  the  first  and  the  last  judicial  exposition  of  the 
Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  I  feel  that  a  synopsis  of  the 
proceedings  would  not  be  inappropriate,  and  I  will  now 


332  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

t 

give  an  abridgment  of  the  report  which  my  solicitor  got 
for  me  at  the  time. 

The  c  information  "  in  the  case  was  dated  May  25th, 
1863,  and  stated  that  a  certain  officer  of  her  Majesty's 
Customs  had  seized  and  arrested,  to  the  use  of  her 
Majesty,  as  forfeited,  a  certain  ship  or  vessel  called  the 
Alexandra,  together  with  the  furniture,  tackle,  and 
apparel  belonging  to  and  on  board  the  said  ship  or 
vessel.  Then  followed  counts  to  the  number  of  ninety- 
eight,  charging  the  offences  by  reason  of  which  the 
ship  had  become  forfeited  to  the  Crown.  The  97th  and 
98th  counts  were  abandoned  by  the  Crown.  The  re 
maining  ninety -six  counts  consisted  of  the  first  eight 
counts  repeated  twelve  times,  merely  varying  the 
offence  charged.  Thus,  the  first  eight  counts  charge 
that  the  defendants  did  equip  the  vessel,  the  next  eight 
counts  that  they  did  furnish  the  vessel,  the  next  eight 
that  they  did^  out,  then  they  did  attempt  or  endeavour 
to  equip,  and  so  on,  exhausting  the  various  offences 
enumerated  in  the  seventh  section  of  the  statute,  with 
the  exception  of  arming  the  vessel,  which  was  not 
charged  at  all.  The  first  eight  counts  therefore  repre 
sented  the  rest,  and  were  in  substance  as  follows.  The 
first  count  charged  that  '  certain '  persons  within  the 
United  Kingdom,  without  having  any  leave  or  license 
of  her  Majesty  for  that  purpose  first  had  and  obtained, 
did  equip  the  said  ship  or  vessel,  with  intent  and 
in  order  that  such  ship  or  vessel  should  be  employed  in 
the  service  of  certain  foreign  States,  styling  themselves 
the  Confederate  States  of  America,  with  intent  to  cruise 
and  commit  hostilities  against  a  certain  foreign  State, 
with  which  her  Majesty  was  not  then  at  war,  to  wit,  the 
Republic  of  the  United  States  of  America,  contrary  to 
the  form  of  the  statute  in  that  case  made  and  provided, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  333 

whereby  and  by  force  of  the  statute  in  that  case  made 
and  provided,  the  said  ship  or  vessel,  together  with  the 
said  tackle,  apparel,  and  furniture,  became  and  was 
forfeited.  The  second  count  differed  from  the  first  only 
in  charging  that  hostilities  were  to  be  committed  against 
the  citizens  of  the  foreign  State.  The  third  count 
omitted  the  words  '  that  such  ship  or  vessel  should 
be  employed  in  the  service/  etc.,  and  merely  charged 
that  the  defendants  did  equip  the  vessel  with  intent  to 
cruise  and  commit  hostilities  against  a  certain  foreign 
State,  etc.  The  fourth  count  resembled  the  third, 
merely  varying  the  description  of  the  belligerent  party 
against  whom  hostilities  were  to  be  committed.  The 
fifth,  sixth,  seventh  and  eighth  counts  resembled  the 
first  and  second  counts,  and  merely  varied  the  descrip 
tion  of  the  belligerent  parties  who  were  affected  by  the 
conduct  of  the  defendants.  The  intent,  therefore,  was 
stated  in  two  different  ways,  to  meet  the  ambiguous 
language  of  the  seventh  section,  wherein  the  clause 
'  with  the  intent  or  in  order  that  such  ship,'  and  the 
clause  'with  the  intent  to  cruise/  may  be  regarded 
either  as  alternative  or  cumulative  propositions.  The 
defendants  pleaded  that  the  vessel  was  not  forfeited  for 
the  supposed  causes  in  the  information  mentioned. 

At  the  trial,  which  took  place  on  the  22nd  June,  1863, 
and  following  days,  before  the  Lord  Chief  Baron  of  the 
Exchequer  (Sir  Frederick  Pollock,  Kt.),  the  evidence  for 
the  Crown  was  directed  to  prove,  first,  that  the  vessel 
was  built  for  the  purpose  of  a  warlike  equipment  ; 
second,  that  she  was  intended  at  some  stage  or  other 
of  her  construction  for  the  service  of  the  Confederate 
States.  It  may  be  assumed  that  the  Crown  succeeded 
in  proving  that  the  vessel  was  built  for  the  purpose  of  a 
warlike  equipment,  or  at  any  rate  that  she  was  suited  to 


334  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

receive  a  warlike  equipment,  but  on  the  second  point  the 
witnesses  were  so  discredited  on  cross-examination,  that 
neither  judge  nor  jury  appeared  to  give  much,  if  any, 
credence  to  their  evidence,  and  the  counsel  for  the  defend 
ants  did  not  call  any  witnesses.  The  judge,  in  charging 
the  jury,  after  explaining  the  information,  and  citing 
Kent  and  Storey,  proceeded  thus  : 

1  These  are  authorities'  (Kent  and  Storey)  ' which  show 
that  where  two  belligerents  are  carrying  on  war,  the 
subjects  of  a  neutral  Power  may  supply  to  either, 
without  any  breach  of  international  law,  and  certainly 
without  any  breach  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act.  all 
the  munitions  of  war,  gunpowder,  every  description  of 
firearms,  cannon,  every  kind  of  weapon — in  short,  what 
ever  can  be  used  in  war  for  the  destruction  of  human 
beings.  Why  should  ships  be  an  exception  ?  In  my 
opinion,  in  point  of  law  they  are  not/  His  lordship 
then,  having  adverted  to  the  statute  and  read  the  seventh 
section,  said  :  4  The  question  that  I  shall  propose  to  you  7 
(the  jury)  i  is  this — whether  you  think  that  this  vessel 
was  merely  in  the  course  of  building  for  the  purpose  of 
being  delivered  in  pursuance  of  a  contract,  which  I  own  I 
think  was  perfectly  lawful,  or  whether  there  was  any 
intention  that  in  the  port  of  Liverpool,  or  any  other 
English  port  (and  there  is  certainly  no  evidence  of  any 
other),  the  vessel  should  be  equipped,  fitted  out,  and  fur 
nished  or  armed  for  the  purpose  of  aggression.  Why 
should  ships  alone  be  themselves  contraband  ?  .  .  .  . 
What  the  statute  meant  to  provide  for  was,  I  think,  by 
no  means  the  protection  of  the  belligerent  Powers,  other 
wise  they  would  have  said,  "You  shall  not  sell  gun 
powder,  you  shall  not  sell  guns."  The  object  of  the 
statute  was  this — we  will  not  have  our  ports  in  this 
country  subject  to  possibly  hostile  movements.  You 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  335 

shall  not  be  fitting  up  at  one  dock  a  vessel  equipped  and 
ready,  not  being  completely  armed,  but  ready  to  go  to 
sea,  and  at  another  dock  close  by  be  fitting  up  another 
vessel,  and  equipping  her  in  the  same  way,  which  might 
come  into  hostile  communication  immediately,  possibly 
before  they  left  the  port.  Now  and  then  this  has  hap 
pened,  and  that  has  been  the  occasion  of  this  statute. 
The  offence  against  which  this  information  is  directed 
is  the  "  equipping,  furnishing,  fitting  out,  or  arming." 
From  Webster's  dictionary  it  appears  that  to  "equip  "  is 
to  "furnish  with  arms."  In  the  case  of  a  ship  especially, 
it  is  to  "  furnish  and  complete  with  arms" — that  is  what 
is  meant  by  "equipping."  "Furnish"  is  given  in  every 
dictionary  as  the  same  thing  as  "  equip."  To  "  fit  out  " 
is  to  "  furnish  and  supply,"  as  to  fit  out  a  privateer,  and 
I  own  that  my  opinion  is  that  u  equip,"  "  furnish,"  "  fit 
out,"  or  "  arm,"  all  mean  precisely  the  same  thing.  .  .  . 
The  question  is — Was  there  any  intention  that  in  the 
port  of  Liverpool,  or  in  any  other  port,  the  vessel  should 
be,  in  the  language  of  the  Act  of  Parliament,  either 
"  equipped,  furnished,  fitted  out,  or  armed,"  with  the 
intention  of  taking  part  in  any  contest  ?  If  you  think 
that  the  object  was  to  equip,  furnish,  fit  out,  or  arm  that 
vessel  at  Liverpool,  then  that  is  a  sufficient  matter.  But 
if  you  think  the  object  really  was  to  build  a  ship  in 
obedience  to  an  order,  and  in  compliance  with  a  contract, 
leaving  it  to  those  who  bought  it  to  make  what  use  they 
thought  fit  of  it,  then  it  appears  to  me  that  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act  has  not  been  in  any  degree  broken.' 

The  jury  found  a  verdict  for  the  defendants.  The 
counsel  for  the  Crown  tendered  a  Bill  of  Exceptions  to 
the  direction  of  the  judge,  in  order  that  all  the  points  of 
law  involved  might  be  argued  and  decided  in  the  Ex 
chequer  Chamber  (the  Court  of  Appeal).  The  Bill  of 


336  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Exceptions  was  subsequently  abandoned,  and  in  Novem 
ber,  1863,  the  Attorney -General  moved  a  'rule'  in  the 
Court  of  Exchequer  to  set  aside  the  verdict  found,  and 
for  a  new  trial.  In  the  same  month  cause  was  shown 
against  and  for  this  l  rule  '  before  the  Lord  Chief  Baron 
and  the  Barons  Bramwell,  Channel,  and  Pigott.  The 
question  was  very  fully  argued,  and  the  four  judges 
read  very  long  opinions,  two,  namely,  the  Lord  Chief 
Baron  and  Baron  Bramwell,  giving  judgment  for  the 
claimants  of  the  ship,  and  two,  namely,  Barons  Channel 
and  Pigott,  for  the  Crown.  Inasmuch  as  the  four  judges 
were  divided,  Baron  Pigott,  according  to  practice,  with 
drew  his  judgment  in  order  that  the  Crown  might  ap 
peal.  The  Crown  subsequently  appealed  to  the  Court 
of  Exchequer  Chamber,  but  the  appeal  was  dismissed 
on  a  preliminary  objection  of  a  technical  nature.  The 
appeal  was  then  carried  to  the  House  of  Lords,  but  was 
also  dismissed  on  the  same  grounds.  The  judgment  for 
the  claimants  of  the  ship  therefore  remained  undisturbed, 
and  the  questions  raised  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
seventh  section  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  have 
never  received  any  other  solution  than  that  which  is  set 
out  in  the  charge  of  the  Lord  Chief  Baron  to  the  jury, 
which  it  will  be  perceived  exactly  agrees  with  the 
opinions  given  by  the  learned  barristers  who  were  con 
sulted  before  any  effort  to  build  ships  in  England  was 
made  at  all. 

The  United  States  authorities  appear  to  have  been 
satisfied  with  the  action  taken  by  her  Majesty's  Govern 
ment  in  the  matter  of  the  Alexandra.  On  the  6th  of 
April,  the  day  after  the  seizure,  Mr.  Adams  wrote  to 
Earl  Russell :  4  It  is  a  source  of  great  satisfaction  to  me 
to  recognise  the  readiness  which  her  Majesty's  Govern 
ment  has  thus  manifested  to  make  the  investigations 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  337 

desired,  as  well  as  to  receive  the  assurances  of  its  deter 
mination  to  maintain  a  close  observation  of  future  move 
ments  of  an  unusual  character  that  justifies  suspicions  of 
an  evil  intent.7*  Mr.  Seward,  writing  to  Mr.  Adams 
after  the  verdict,  says  :  *  You  are  authorised  and  ex 
pected  to  assure  Earl  Russell  that  this  Government  is 
entirely  satisfied  that  her  Majesty's  Government  have 
conducted  the  proceedings  in  the  case  with  perfect  good 
faith  and  honour,  and  that  they  are  well  disposed  to 
prevent  the  fitting-out  of  armed  vessels  in  British  ports 
to  depredate  upon  American  commerce,  and  to  make  war 
upon  the  United  States.  This  Government  is  satisfied 
that  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown  have  performed  their 
duties  in  regard  to  the  case  of  the  Alexandra  with  a 
sincere  conviction  of  the  adequacy  of  the  law  of  Great 
Britain,  and  a  sincere  desire  to  give  it  effect. 'f 

It  must  have  been  refreshing  to  Earl  Russell  to  re 
ceive  a  commendatory  notice  from  Mr.  Seward,  for  the 
general  tone  of  the  communications  from  Washington 
could  not  have  been  agreeable  reading  at  the  British 
Foreign  Office.  The  satisfaction  of  Mr.  Seward  and  of 
Mr.  Adams  was  confined  to  the  approval  of  Lord  Rus 
sell's  readiness  to  seize  the  ship,  and  the  zeal  displayed 
by  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown  in  the  prosecution  of 
the  suit,  but  they  could  not  have  been  gratified  by  the 
result  of  the  suit,  although  it  was  her  Majesty's  Treasury 
which  had  to  bear  the  consequences  of  the  failure  to 
effect  a  forfeiture.  The  builders  of  the  Alexandra, 
Messrs.  Fawcett,  Preston  and  Co.,  made  a  claim  for 
damages,  and  after  much  delay  and  negotiation  their 

*  'British  Appendix,'  vol.  ii.,  p.  171,  and  see  also  'British  Case,' 
p.  40. 

t  '  United  States  Documents,'  vol.  ii.,  p.  291,  quoted  in  '  British 
Case,'  pp.  40,  41. 

VOL.    I.  22 


338  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

solicitors  agreed  to  receive  £3,700,  'on  the  understand 
ing  that  the  amount  shall  be  paid  without  delay/  and 
that  amount  was  paid  to  them  by  order  of  the  Treasury. 

It  is  necessary  to  say  something  in  reference  to  the 
witnesses  brought  forward  by  Mr.  Thomas  H.  Dudley, 
the  United  States  Consul,  in  support  of  the  '  information ' 
in  the  '  Alexandra  Case/  in  order  that  the  evidence 
which  her  Majesty's  Government  was  urged  to  act  upon 
in  this  and  other  cases  may  be  fully  understood,  and  a 
correct  judgment  may  be  formed  in  respect  to  the  action 
of  that  Government  in  applying  the  Foreign  Enlistment 
Act  to  the  operations  of  the  Confederate  agents  during 
the  war. 

I  have  said  in  a  previous  chapter  that  the  affidavits 
upon  which  the  United  States  Minister  based  his  com 
plaints  and  accusations  were  for  the  most  part  either 
wholly  false  or  they  contained  gross  exaggerations.  A 
man  may  be  deeply  impressed  with  the  expectation  that 
a  certain  event  is  about  to  happen  ;  the  expectation  may 
be  fully  realized,  and  yet  the  information  upon  which 
his  convictions  were  formed  may  have  been  false  in  all 
specific  particulars.  The  Florida  and  Alabama,  as  is 
now  well  known,  became  Confederate  cruisers,  and  Mr. 
Dudley's  predictions  in  regard  to  their  ultimate  purpose 
have  been  fulfilled  ;  but  the  statements  made  in  the 
affidavits  of  Da  Costa,  Passmore,  and  others,  which 
appear  in  the  proceedings  before  the  Geneva  arbitrators, 
are  false  ;  and  if  either  of  the  ships  named  had  been 
seized  by  the  Government,  their  falsehood  would  have 
been  proved,  not  only  by  rebutting  testimony,  but  by 
cross-examination  of  the  witnesses  themselves.  This  is 
precisely  what  happened  in  the  '  Alexandra  Case.'  The 
Crown  proved  by  its  own  witnesses,  who  were  experts, 
that  the  ship  was  so  constructed  as  to  be  well  suited  to 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  339 

the  purposes  of  a  cruiser,  but  not  for  purposes  of  com 
merce.  When,  however,  the  prosecution  attempted  to 
prove  specific  facts  in  regard  to  the  intent  to  equip,  etc., 
the  evidence  failed,  and  failed  because  it  was  untrue,  and 
therefore  entirely  broke  down  in  cross-examination. 
Counsel  for  the  defence  were  so  satisfied  that  the 
witnesses  had  discredited  themselves  to  the  jury,  that 
they  called  no  witnesses  to  deny  their  statements.  Men 
who  are  employed  as  spies,  or  who  are  paid  to  give 
evidence  in  regard  to  matters  upon  which  they  can  have 
no  personal  knowledge  except  what  they  may  have 
acquired  by  dishonest  and  unworthy  means,  are  easily 
exposed  by  skilful  cross-examination  in  the  witness- 
box  ;  and  anyone  who  was  present  at  the  trial  of  the 
Alexandra,  or  cares  to  read  the  report  of  the  proceedings, 
will  feel  a  contemptuous  pity  for  Mr.  Dudley's  three 
witnesses — John  Da  Costa,  George-  Temple  Chapman, 
and  Clarence  Randolph  Yonge.  Sir  Hugh  Cairns  (now 
Earl  Cairns),  in  his  address  to  the  jury,  summed  up 
and  commented  upon  the  evidence  of  the  above-named 
'  worthies  '  as  follows  : 

'  I  cannot  help  pausing  to  remind  you  of  the  kind  of 
evidence  that  Da  Costa  gave.  He  came  forward,  and 
what  did  he  tell  us  he  was  ?  He  said  he  was  a 
shipping-agent  and  a  steamboat-owner  ;  that  is  his  own 
account,  in  the  first  instance,  of  his  character.  I  am 
sorry  to  destroy  that  illusion  ;  but  it  turns  out,  on 
cross-examination,  that  he  is  a  crimp  and  a  partner  in 
a  tug.  He  says  he  is  a  shipping- agent  and  a  steamboat- 
owner.  How  easily  great  titles  may  descend  to  some 
thing  smaller  !  He  is  a  crimp  and  a  partner  in  a  tug. 
He  is  brought  forward  by  the  Crown — I  beg  pardon, 
not  by  the  Crown  ;  he  is  one  of  the  witnesses  of  Mr. 
Dudley,  the  Liverpool  Consul.  .  .  .  My  learned  friend  for 

22—2 


340  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

the  Crown  could  not  moderate  him.  He  had  one  thing 
to  say,  and  he  was  always  saying  it,  and  whatever  he 
was  asked  it  always  came  out.  "  There  is  a  gunboat " — 
that  is  what  he  came  to  tell,  and  he  would  say  nothing 
else — the  "  Phantom  "  and  "  gunboat  ;"  all  I  know  is 
"that  was  a  gunboat."  He  would  give  no  answer 
without  mixing  up  with  it  that  which  he  thought  he 
came  here  to  prove.' 

After  pointing  out  the  irrelevancy  as  well  as  im 
probability  of  Da  Costa's  statements,  Sir  Hugh  Cairns 
proceeded: — 

'  I  have  still  to  deal  with  the  two  illustrious  witnesses 

who  remain — the  two  spies.     I  will  take  first  Mr.  George 

Temple  Chapman.  .  .  .  George  Temple  Chapman's  story 

is   this :    He  went   to  the  counting-house   of    Messrs. 

Eraser,  Trenholm  and  Co.,  and  has  an  interview  with 

Mr.  Prioleau  ;  he  represents  himself  to  be  a  Secessionist, 

and  a  warm  supporter  of  the  Southern  States.     He  goes 

with  that  lie  on  his  lips  to  have  a  conversation  with  Mr. 

Prioleau.      Now,  what  was  the  object  of  telling  that  lie 

on  the  1st  of  April  (while  the  seizure  is  being  prepared 

for)  ?     Mr.  George  Temple  Chapman  was  sent  to  the 

office  of  Messrs.  Eraser,  Trenholm  and  Co.,  to  have  an 

interview   with    Mr.  Prioleau,  and  to  beguile  him  by 

a  false  statement  into  making  admissions  to  him.     1 

suppose  you  will  see  that  Mr.  George  Temple  Chapman 

was  sent  by  the  American  Consul  as  a  spy,  in  order  to 

obtain  some  admission  about  the  Alexandra.     Well,  what 

came  of  it  ?  ...     Does  he  say  that  he  was  able  to 

extract  one  single  sentence  from  that  firm,  or  to  obtain 

from  Mr.  Prioleau,  who  was  confiding  in  him,  believing 

in  him  as  a  compatriot, — does  he  say  that  he  obtained 

one   single   piece   of   information   with   respect  to  the 

Alexandra?  .  .  .  Nothing  of    the  kind.       The    whole 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  341 

thing  is  a  failure  which  recoils  on  the  Crown.  .  .  .  The 
witness  who  comes  forward  and  tells  this  story,  cannot 
put  his  finger  upon  a  single  fact  that  could  bear  upon 
the  case  of  the  Alexandra.1 

I  was  at  the  office  of  Messrs.  Eraser,  Trenholm  and 
Co.  when  Mr.  Chapman  called,  and  after  his  interview 
with  Mr.  Prioleau,  he  asked  to  see  me.  He  introduced 
himself  as  an  ex-officer  of  the  United  States  Navy,  and 
told  me  that  although  a  Northern  man,  his  sympathies 
were,  and  had  been,  wholly  with  the  South,  and  for  that 
reason  he  had  been  obliged  to  leave  Boston.  I  instinc 
tively  distrusted  him,  but  he  had  the  external  appearance 
of  a  gentleman,  and  I  received  his  visit  with  as  much 
courtesy  as  I  could  command  for  the  occasion.  He 
showed  me  a  letter  which  he  said  he  had  got  from  the 
'mulatto  wife  of  Clarence  R.  Yonge/  mentioned  elsewhere, 
and  he  thought  I  might  like  to  have  it.  The  letter 
purported  to  be  a  copy  of  an  official  letter  written  by 
me  many  months  before,  and  he  said  Mr.  Yonge  had 
kept  this  copy,  and  might  make  improper  use  of  it. 
The  contents  of  the  letter  were  of  no  importance,  and  I 
handed  it  back  to  him,  merely  saying  that  it  did  not 
concern  me.  On  the  trial  it  came  out  that  his  object 
was  to  obtain  some  admission  from  me,  but  he  failed, 
and  his  evidence  in  respect  to  our  interview  was  false. 

After  fully  exposing  the  character  of  Chapman,  and 
the  worthlessness  of  his  evidence,  Sir  Hugh  Cairns 
proceeded  to  deal  with  the  third  of  the  trio,  thus: — 

i  Well,  but,  gentlemen  of  the  jury,  I  come  to  the 
greatest  witness  of  all  in  this  case,  the  witness  who  was 
reserved  by  the  Crown  to  the  last,  and  was  brought 
forward  certainly  with  some  pomp  and  ceremony.  I 
mean  Mr.  Clarence  Randolph  Yonge.  How  am  I  to 
describe  this  specimen  of  humanity? — the  man  who 


342  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

began  his  career  by  abandoning  his  wife  and  child  in  his 
native  country  . . .  who  became  Captain  Bulloch's  private 
secretary,  had  access  to  his  papers,  was  the  companion 
of  those  who  were  engaged  in  the  Confederate  cause, 

O     O  7 

persuaded  them  that  he  shared  in  the  feeling  of 
patriotism  which  actuated  them  ;  who  came  over  to 
England,  who  still  assumed  the  same  character — who, 
received  by  Messrs.  Fraser,  Trenholm  and  Co.,  became 
possessed  of  every  secret  with  regard  to  the  proceedings 
of  those  who  were  engaged  in  w^ar  on  the  part  of  the 
Southern  States  ;  who  accepted  a  commission  from  his 
native  country  in  her  service,  became  an  officer  enrolled 
in  her  navy,  owning  allegiance  to  her,  received  her  pay, 
distributed  her  money;  who  then  became  a  deserter, 
slipping  overboard  on  leaving  the  ship  of  which 
he  was  an  officer,  in  order  that  he  might  by  a  lying 
pretence  of  a  marriage  effect  the  ruin  and  plunder  the  A 
property  of  a  widow,  who  had  the  misfortune  to  entertain 
him  in  her  country  and  to  be  possessed  of  some  property 
of  her  own  ;  who  succeeded  in  possessing  himself  of  that 
property  ;  who  brought  her  over  to  Liverpool,  and  who 
then  turned  her  adrift,  penniless,  on  the  streets  ;  who 
then  hurried  up  to  London  in  order  to  pour  into  the 
ear  of  Mr.  Adams,  the  American  Minister,  his  tale  of 
treachery,  betraying  every  one  of  his  familiar  friends, 
and  every  one  of  his  brother  officers,  and  the  cause  of 
the  country  to  which  he  had  promised  allegiance  ;  who 
stood  there  in  the  witness-box  before  you,  who  denied 
no  crime  and  blushed  at  no  villainy,  until,  indeed,  it  was 
suggested  that  the  victim  of  his  villainy  had  been  a 
mulatto  woman,  and  not  his  wife,  and  then  all  his  feeling 
of  '  self-respect  recoiled,  and  he  indignantly  denied  the 
charge.  This,  gentlemen,  is  the  man  who  is  brought 
forward  at  the  end  as  the  climax  of  the  case  on  the  part 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  343 

of  the  Crown  ;  but  I  beg  pardon,  he  is  not  the  witness 
of  the  Crown — he  is  the  witness  of  Mr.  Adams,  the 
United  States  Minister.  It  is  Mr.  Adams  who  forwarded 
him  to  the  Crown  to  be  put  into  the  witness-box  before 
a  jury  of  English  gentlemen,  to  repeat  the  tale  which 
that  unmitigated  villain  told  in  our  ears.  Gentlemen,  I 
know  the  honourable  and  straightforward  character  of 
my  honourable  and  learned  friend,  the  Attorney -General, 
and  I  felt  how  he  mast  have  loathed  and  recoiled  from 
his  task  when,  reading  from  the  brief  of  the  American 
Minister,  he  put  questions  to  this  witness,  question  after 
question,  which  elicited  the  tale  which  we  heard  from  Mr. 
Clarence  Randolph  Yonge.  .  .  .  But  what  was  it  that 
Mr.  Randolph  Yonge  told  us,  after  all  ?  He  gave  us  a 
great  deal  of  information  about  the  Alabama,  he  told  us 
how  the  money  was  procured  to  pay  the  officers  on  board 
the  Alabama,  he  told  us  where  the  Alabama  went  to,  etc.' 
Counsel  then  pointed  out  the  folly  as  well  as  the  fatality 
of  bringing  forward  such  a  witness,  and  added,  '  I  do 
not  merely  mean  to  say  that  this  evidence  would  cover 
with  shame  any  case  that  was  ever  brought  before  a  jury, 
though  that  is  perfectly  true.  .  .  .  But  consider  this.  .  .  . 
We  have  now  got  laid  before  us,  by  one  of  the  agents, 
as  it  was  said,  of  the  Confederate  Government,  everything 
they  contemplated  last  April  at  the  time  when  they  were 
engaged  in  the  fitting  out  and  sending  away  the  Alabama. 
.  .  .  He  has  disclosed  the  secrets  of  the  Cabinet  Councils 
in  Liverpool,  and  not  one  single  secret  of  those  Cabinet 
Councils  has  reference  to  the  ship  you  are  now  trying/* 

*  When  I  went  to  Savannah  in  the  Fingal,  in  November,  1862, 
Mr.  Clarence  E.  Yonge  was  an  assistant,  or  clerk,  in  the  paymaster's 
office  at  that  naval  station.  He  had  served  as  acting-paymaster  on 
board  of  one  or  two  of  the  vessels  of  Flag-officer  Josiah  Tatnall's 
squadron,  and  was  reported  to  be  fully  competent  to  perform  the 
VOL.  I.* 


344  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

The  trial  of  the  Alexandra  afforded  the  opportunity  to 
discover  and  expose  the  character  of  the  witnesses 
which  the  United  States  Consul  offered  to  produce  in 
support  of  his  allegations,  and  looking  over  the  affidavits 
published  among  the  documents  laid  before  the  Tribunal 
of  Arbitration  at  Geneva,  and  in  the  diplomatic  corre 
spondence,  I  find  they  are  nearly  all  of  the  same  stamp  as 
those  of  Mr.  John  Da  Costa,  namely,  utterly  inaccurate 
as  regards  the  specific  statements.  But  although  the 
witnesses  in  the  ' Alexandra  Case '  were  so  thoroughly 
discredited  that  the  jury  could  not  have  believed  their 
testimony,  yet  the  verdict  of  the  jury  was  really  given 
for  the  defendants  in  consequence  of  the  directions 
of  the  Lord  Chief  Baron  on  the  points  of  law,  which 
may  be  summed  up  in  the  following  sentence  :  '  But 
if  you  think  the  object  really  was  to  build  a  ship  in 
obedience  to  an  order  and  in  compliance  with  a  contract, 
leaving  it  to  those  who  bought  it  to  make  what  use  they 
thought  fit  of  it,  then  it  appears  to  me  that  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act  has  not  been  in  any  degree  broken/ 

If  it  had  not  been  for  the  trial  of  the  Alexandra,  the 

duties  of  a  naval  paymaster.  Just  before  leaving  the  Confederate 
States  to  return  to  Europe  in  January,  1862,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  directed  me  to  take  Mr.  Yonge  out  as  my  private  secretary, 
and  to  give  him  an  appointment  as  acting-assistant-paymaster  for 
the  Alabama  when  she  was  ready  for  sea.  When  Captain  Semmes 
joined  the  Alabama,  I  told  him  that  Yonge  was  an  unsteady  and  un 
reliable  young  man,  whose  judgment  and  discretion  were  not  to  be 
trusted,  but  I  had  no  suspicion  in  regard  to  his  integrity  in  money 
matters,  and,  of  course,  could  not  have  dreamed  that  he  was  capable 
of  treachery  and  treason.  He  was  dismissed  from  the  Alabama  in 
disgrace,  but  Captain  Semmes  did  not  report  the  fact  to  me  at  the 
time.  He  came  to  Liverpool,  but  never  came  near  me ;  he  went 
instead  to  Mr.  Dudley,  the  United  States  Consul,  to  whom  he  sold 
himself,  with  the  results  specified  in  the  speech  of  Sir  Hugh  Cairns, 
the  facts  having  been  drawn  from  him  in  the  course  of  his  evidence. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  345 

judicial  exposition  of  the  law,  and  the  verdict  of  a  jury, 
there  would  have  been  no  sufficient  and  unanswerable 
reply  to  the  reiterated  assertions  of  the  United  States 
Consul  and  of  Mr.  Seward,  that  the  acts  of  the  Con 
federate  Government  in  attempting  to  procure  ships  in 
England  were  '  criminal '  and  *  nefarious/  But  we 
have  cumulative  evidence  in  almost  every  form  in  which 
independent  and  authoritative  opinion  can  be  pronounced, 
in  regard  both  to  the  spirit  and  the  letter  of  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act,  and  I  will  now  give  a  synopsis  of  that 
evidence,  in  order  that  the  reader  may  have  the  data 
upon  which  to  found  his  own  judgment. 

First, — there  is  the  legal  opinion  of  the  two  learned 
barristers  who  were  consulted  before  the  contract 
for  the  Alabama  was  made,  and  which  has  already  been 
mentioned.* 

Second, — Lord  Palmerston,  the  Prime  Minister  of 
England,  during  the  Civil  War,  when  all  these  'Ala 
bama  questions '  were  occupying  the  public  mind,  in  a 
speech  in  the  House  of  Commons,  July  23rd,  1863, f 
said :  4 1  cannot,  in  the  abstract,  concur  with  my  honour 
able1  friend '  (Mr.  Richard  Cobden)  '  in  thinking  that 
there  is  any  distinction  in  principle  between  muskets, 
gunpowder,  bullets  and  cannon  on  the  one  side,  and 
ships  on  the  other.  These  are  things  by  which  war  is 
carried  on,  and  you  are  equally  assisting  belligerents  by 
supplying  them  with  muskets,  cannon,  and  ammunition, 
as  you  are  by  supplying  them  with  ships  that  are 
to  operate  in  war.'  After  citing  cases  from  United 
States  history,  he  further  said  :  '  Therefore  I  hold,  that 
on  the  mere  ground  of  international  law  belligerents 
have  no  right  to  complain  if  merchants — I  do  not  say 

*  See  chap.  ii.  pp.  66,  67. 

t  See  Hansard,  vol.  clxxii,  Session  1863  (4),  pp.  1269,  1270. 


346  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

the  Government,  for  that  would  be  interference — as 
a  mercantile  transaction,  supply  one  of  the  belligerents, 
not  only  with  arms  and  cannon,  but  also  with  ships 
destined  for  warlike  purposes.' 

Third, — Earl  Eussell,  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Adams,  argues  the 
question  upon  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  and  cites  to 
the  American  Minister  two  cases — the  Independencia  and 
the  Alfred,  which  were  decided  in  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court,  and  then,  appealing  to  the  American 
Minister  upon  the  authorities  of  his  own  country,  he 
says  :  '  It  seems  clear  on  the  principles  enumerated  in 
these  authorities  that,  except  on  the  ground  of  any 
proved  violation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  which 
those  cases  decided  had  not  been  violated,  in  those  cases 
her  Majesty's  Government  cannot  interfere  with  com 
mercial  dealings  between  British  subjects  and  the 
so-styled  Confederate  States,  whether  the  object  of  those 
dealings  be  money,  or  contraband  goods,  or  even  ships 
adapted  for  warlike  purposes.'* 

Fourth, — her  Majesty's  Solicitor-General,  Sir  Koundell 
Palmer — now  Lord  Selborne  and  Lord  Chancellor  of 
England — in  a  speech  made  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
during  a  debate  on  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  March 
27th,  1863,  said :  i  It  would  be  a  great  mistake  to 
suppose  that  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  was  meant  to 
prohibit  all  commercial  dealings  in  ships-of-war  with 
belligerent  countries.  It  is  not  intended  to  do  so.  Two 
things  must  be  proved  in  every  case  to  render  the 
transaction  illegal :  that  there  has  been  what  the  law 
regards  as  the  fitting- out,  arming,  or  equipment  of 
a  ship-of-war ;  and  with  the  intent  that  the  ship  should 

*  Quoted  or  read  to  the  court  by  Sir  Hugh  Cairns  in  the 
Alexandra  trial,  p.  173. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  347 

be  employed  in  the  service  of  a  foreign  belligerent.'* 
The  Solicitor-General  then  recites  two  cases  in  which 
decisions  have  been  rendered  by  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  upon  the  corresponding  American 
statute,  to  demonstrate  to  the  House  '  what  may  law 
fully  be  done  on  the  showing  of  the  Americans  them 
selves  ;'  and  he  then  adds  :  '  The  circumstances  of  the 
case  tried  before  Justice  Story  were  so  far  exactly  the 
same  as  those  which  occurred  in  the  case  of  the 
Alabama,  and,  in  the  absence  of  any  further  evidence, 
the  seizure  of  that  ship  would  have  been  altogether 
unwarrantable  by  law.  She  might  have  been  legitimately 
built  by  a  foreign  Government,  and  though  a  ship-of- 
war,  she  might  have  formed  a  legitimate  article  of 
merchandise,  even  if  meant  for  the  Confederate  States/ 

I  might  cite  many  familiar  cases  from  the  history 
of  the  United  States,  and  from  the  judgments  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  that  country,  in  opposition  to  the 
views  put  forward  by  Mr.  Seward  in  respect  to  the 
Confederate  ships  ;  but  the  charge  was  that  English 
municipal  law  was  violated  and  '  criminally  evaded,'  and 
that  British  hospitality  was  abused  in  a  manner  which 
was  'nefarious,'  and  therefore  it  is  not  necessary  to 
appeal  to  any  other  tribunals  than  those  of  the  country 
in  which  the  alleged  offences  were  committed.  That 
appeal  has  been  made,  and  the  verdict  rendered  is  that 
the  Confederates  have  done  no  violence  either  to  British 
law  or  to  British  hospitality.  We  have  the  judgment 
of  the  Prime  Minister  of  England  that  there  is  no  dis 
tinction  in  principle  between  supplying  belligerents  with 
arms  and  ammunition,  or  ;  with  ships  that  are  to  operate 
in  war,7  and  that  a  British  merchant  may  sell  either 
guns  or  ships  to  a  belligerent  without  infringing  either 
*  Hansard,  vol.  clxx.,  Session,  1863  (2),  pp.  47—52. 


348  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

local  or  international  duties.  We  have  the  declaration 
of  Earl  Russell,  the  Minister  especially  charged  with  the 
diplomatic  relations  of  the  kingdom,  that  the  Confederate 
States  had  the  right  to  procure  i  money  or  contraband 
goods,  or  even  ships  adapted  for  warlike  purposes*  in 
England,  provided  only  they  did  not  violate  the  express 
conditions  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act.  We  have 
the  Solicitor- General,  one  of  the  highest  legal  advisers  of 
the  Crown,  stating  with  all  the  authority  of  his  office, 
and  with  all  the  prestige  of  his  position  as  a  Member  of 
Parliament,  that  it  would  be  a  great  mistake  to  suppose 
that  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  was  meant  to  prohibit 
commercial  dealings  in  ships-of-war  with  belligerent 
countries,  and  assuming  that  the  Alabama  was  not 
4  equipped  '  in  England,  she  was  a  legitimate  article  of 
merchandise,  even  if  meant  for  the  Confederate  States. 
Finally,  we  have  had  the  trial  of  a  test-case,  and  the 
verdict  of  a  special  jury,  under  the  direction  of  one  of 
the  highest  judges  in  the  kingdom,  and  the  decision  was 
that  an  English  shipbuilder  may  build  any  kind  of  ship, 
to  a  commercial  order,  or  merely  in  compliance  with  a 
contract,  and  the  purchaser  may  take  her  away  and  do 
what  he  likes  with  her  afterwards,  without  any  violation 
of  English  law. 

It  is  manifest,  therefore,  that  in  the  opinion  of  the 
highest  personages  in  England,  of  those  who  during 
the  w^hole  period  of  the  Civil  War  were  responsible  for 
the  Government  of  the  country,  who  had  the  exclusive 
authority  to  interpret  the  law  and  to  administer  it,  who 
from  their  exalted  position,  their  experience,  and  their 
knowledge  of  public  affairs,  were  eminently  fitted  to  pro 
nounce  judgment  upon  what  was  due  to  her  Majesty's 
Government,  both  in  reference  to  acts  of  obedience 
and  acts  of  courtesy — in  the  opinion  of  such  men,  ex- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  349 

pressing  their  views  under  circumstances  of  the  gravest 
official  responsibility — the  Confederate  Government,  by 
buying  or  building  ships  in  England,  did  nothing 
contrary  to  commercial  usage,  international  comity, 
or  municipal  law.  If  the  charges  of  c  criminality '  and 
1  nefarious  evasions  of  law '  had  been  merely  cast  at  me 
as  an  individual,  or  against  any  other  agent  of  the  Con 
federate  Government,  I  would  not  have  made  the  fore 
going  elaborate  explanation,  but  I  have  learned  the 
application  of  the  legal  phrase,  '  qui  facit  per  alium  facit 
per  se.'  I  have  always  felt  that  the  object  was  to  dis 
credit  the  Government  of  the  Confederate  States,  as  well 
as  to  defeat  their  purposes,  and  every  feeling  of  loyalty 
has  impelled  me  to  give  all  who  care  to  form  an  impar 
tial  judgment  the  facts  and  circumstances  which  should 
be  taken  into  account.  The  epithets  have  already  passed 
into  history.  They  can  never  be  erased  from  the  public 
documents  which  they  deface.  Some  future  American 
Secretary  of  State — perhaps  now  that  the  country  is  re 
united  it  may  be  an  ex-Confederate  or  his  descendant — 
may  look  over  the  files  of  his  Department  and  wonder 
at  the  heat  and  passion  of  his  predecessor  ;  but  I  will 
venture  to  say  that  no  member  of  the  late  Confederate 
Government,  and  not  one  of  their  representatives  abroad, 
ever  has  felt  a  pang  of  conscience  on  the  subject,  or  has 
ever  had  his  peace  of  mind  disquieted  by  the  thought 
that  he  was  doing,  or  had  done,  in  respect  to  the  matters 
at  issue,  anything  of  which  a  loyal  man  should  be 
ashamed — loyal,  I  mean,  in  the  broad  sense  of  duty  to 
others  as  well  as  to  himself. 

At  some  future  day,  when  the  actors  have  passed 
away,  a  true  and  impartial  history  of  the  great  Civil 
War  and  its  causes  will  be  written,  for  it  was  too  notable 
an  event  to  remain  as  a  mere  item  in  the  course  of  God's 


350  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

providence.  Then  the  truth,  and  the  whole  truth, 
will  appear,  and  the  world  will  be  surprised  to  learn 
how  much  the  South  has  been  misrepresented,  the 
motives  and  doctrines  of  her  public  men  distorted,  and 
even  the  private  life  and  social  habits  of  her  people 
caricatured  for  political  purposes.  Those  who  were 
inimical  to  the  South,  or  were,  at  least,  instigated  by 
motives  of  political  necessity  to  misstate  facts  or  to 
suppress  a  part  of  the  truth,  have  had  the  oppor 
tunity  to  publish  their  statements  and  to  impress  them, 
upon  the  public  mind  of  the  present  generation,  with 
hardly  an  effort  of  retort  or  correction  on  behalf  of  the 
Southern  people. 

But  the  history  of  the  past  cannot  be  wholly  for 
gotten.  It  must  be  and  is  known  that  in  the  pure  days 
of  the  Republic,  before  the  tyrannous  '  caucus  '  and  the 
iniquitous  '  machine '  had  usurped  the  control  and 
direction  of  the  public  will — when  men  were  judged 
upon  their  merits,  and  political  parties  were  separated 
by  honest  diversity  of  opinion,  and  not  by  sectional 
lines — the  South,  though  greatly  inferior  in  voting 
power,  furnished  four  out  of  five  consecutive  Presidents. 
She  has  given  such  men  as  Clay,  Calhoun,  Crittenden, 
Crawford,  and  Forsyth  to  the  civil  service  since  the 
great  struggle  for  independence,  and  the  greatest  of  the 
Chief- Justices  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  a  Southerner. 
She  has  contributed  many  gallant  and  able  men  to  the 
army  and  navy.  The  '  Father  of  his  Country  '  was  a 
Virginian  planter,  and  even  Farragut,  who  made  his 
reputation  in  helping  to  defeat  the  South,  and  has  been 
called  the  c  Nelson  of  the  American  Navy/  was  by  birth, 
by  early  training,  by  marriage,  by  all  the  domestic  and 
social  associations  of  his  life,  a  Southern  man,  possessing 
in  a  marked  degree  the  peculiarities,  and  even  what  may 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUEOPE.  351 

be  called  the  provincialisms,  of  that  part  of  the  United 
States. 

I  have  mentioned  but  a  small  number  of  the 
Southerners  who  helped  to  elevate  the  national  fame 
before  dissension  and  distrust  had  alienated  the  two 
sections,  and  I  feel  sure  that  the  day  will  come  when 
justice  will  be  done  to  the  Southern  leaders  of  1861-65, 
and  that  an  impartial  posterity  will  by  its  verdict  free 
their  names  from  the  calumnies  which  have  been  spoken 
against  them,  and  will  pronounce  a  retributive  censure 
upon  their  traducers.  After  the  trial  of  the  Alexandra, 
and  the  clear,  emphatic  opinion  expressed  by  the  highest 
authorities  of  the  kingdom  in  regard  to  the  sale  and 
purchase  of  ships  in  England  on  behalf  of  a  belligerent, 
it  might  have  been  supposed  that  the  Confederate 
Government  would  have  been  permitted  to  supply  its 
necessities,  at  least,  under  restrictions  no  greater  than 
those  imposed  upon  the  United  States.  But  such  was 
not  the  case.  Whether  Mr.  Seward's  warm  com 
mendation  of  the  '  good  faith  and  honour '  of  her 
Majesty's  Government,  and  the  zeal  of  the  law  officers 
of  the  Crown  in  the  prosecution  of  the  Alexandra,  won 
Earl  Russell  to  the  Federal  cause,  or  whether  he  yielded 
to  the  importunities  of  Mr.  Adams  in  the  spirit  of  the 
judge  '  in  a  certain  city  '  of  whom  we  read  in  Scripture, 
that  unfortunate  ship  was  pursued  with  relentless  perse 
cution  until  the  end  of  the  war.  She  was  held  under 
seizure  by  the  Government  until  April,  1864.*  When 
released,  her  name  Avas  changed  to  Mary,  her  fittings 
on  deck  and  below  were  altered  and  made  suitable  to  a 
vessel  of  commerce,  and  in  July  she  sailed  from  Liver 
pool  for  Bermuda,  and  thence  to  Halifax.  Mr.  Seward 
at  once  addressed  a  communication  to  the  British  Charge 
*  See  « British  Case,'  p.  41. 


352  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

d' Affaires  at  Washington,  and  the  letter  was  forwarded 
to  the  Lieutenant -Governor  of  Nova  Scotia.  That 
functionary  replied  that  he  could  not  *  interfere  with  any 
vessel,  British  owned,  in  a  British  harbour,  on  mere 
suspicion  ;'  nevertheless,  he  promised  to  institute  inquiry 
and  to  have  a  strict  watch  kept  on  her.  The  Mary,  finding 
no  rest  for  the  sole  of  her  foot,  or  rather  for  her  keel,  at 
Halifax,  returned  in  December  to  Bermuda,  and  thence 
proceeded  to  Nassau,  where,  on  the  13th  of  December, 
1864,  she  was  seized  by  order  of  the  Governor,  and 
proceedings  were  instituted  against  her  in  the  Vice- 
Admiralty  Court  of  the  colony.  The  cause  was  heard 
on  the  22nd  and  23rd  of  May,  1865  ;  and  on  the  30th 
of  May  the  Court  decided  that  there  was  no  '  reasonably 
sufficient '  evidence  of  illegal  intent  to  support  a  sentence 
of  forfeiture,  and  the  vessel  was  accordingly  released. 
The  war  had  by  that  time  ceased,  and  the  little  craft 
was  freed  from  further  persecution. 

Before  turning  to  another  subject,  I  will  just  mention 
that,  in  spite  of  Da  Costa' s  sworn  statements  to  the  con 
trary,  I  never  saw  the  Alexandra  until  after  she  was  seized, 
I  never  had  the  slightest  control  over  her,  and  never  gave 
an  instruction  in  reference  to  her.  She  was  built  under 
a  contract  with  Mr.  Charles  K.  Prioleau,  of  Liverpool,  at 
his  own  private  cost  and  risk  exclusively.  He  told  me, 
while  she  was  building,  that  his  purpose  was  to  send 
her  as  an  unarmed  ship  to  run  the  blockade  into  Charles 
ton,  if  possible,  and  after  her  arrival  there  he  meant  to 
present  her  to  the  Confederate  Government.  This  trans 
action  would  have  been  perfectly  regular  and  unobjec 
tionable,  according  to  the  decision  in  the  trial  before  the 
Lord  Chief  Baron  of  the  Exchequer,  and  the  views  of 
the  eminent  statesmen  whose  opinions  I  have  given 
above  ;  but  it  was  violently  interfered  with  and  pre- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  353 

vented  by  authorities  deriving  their  power  from  those 
Ministers  who  had  declared  that  there  was  no  difference 
in  principle  between  selling  a  gun  or  a  ship  to  a  belli 
gerent,  and  no  violation  of  neutrality  in  permitting  it  to 
be  done  ;  and  I  assume  that  if  a  British  merchant  may 
sell  a  ship,  there  can  be  no  iniquity  in  his  giving  one 
away.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  too,  that  there  was 
no  evidence  that  the  Alexandra,  or  Mary,  was  intended 
to  be  given  to  the  Confederate  States.  After  her  release 
she  was  loaded  and  cleared  for  Halifax  as  any  other 
British  ship. 

Under  date  of  September  1st,  1863,  I  wrote  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  at  Richmond  on  this  subject,  as 
follows  : — 

'  The  favourable  decision  in  the  "  Alexandra  Case  " 
has  not  made  our  operations  in  Europe  less  difficult. 
Federal  spies  have  rather  increased  than  otherwise,  and 
I  am  convinced  that  nothing  more  should  be  attempted 
in  England.  While  the  shipment  of  arms  and  every 
description  of  warlike  implement  for  the  North  is  freely 
allowed,  while  armour  plates  are  being  rolled  in  this 
country  for  United  States  ships,  and  recruiting  is  noto 
riously  going  on  in  Ireland  for  the  Federal  army,  a 
vessel  cannot  clear  for  an  island,  even  though  it  be  a 
British  island,  contiguous  to  the  Confederate  States, 
without  inquiry,  interruption,  and  delay  ;  and  a  ship 
building  anywhere  in  private  yards  with  the  external 
appearance  of  a  man-of-war,  is  not  only  watched  by 
Yankee  spies,  but  by  British  officials,  and  is  made  the 
subject  of  newspaper  discussions,  letters  and  protests 
from  lawyers,  and  even  petitions  from  the  "  Emancipa 
tion  Society."  The  South  derives  some  advantage  from 
her  recognised  status  as  a  belligerent,  but  the  neutrality 
of  Great  Britain  discriminates  too  palpably  in  favour  of 

VOL.  i.  23 


354  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE  . 

the  North  to  deceive  anyone  as  to  the  fears,  if  not  the 
sympathies,  of  the  present  Ministry.' 

In  the  Appendix  to  the  British  Case,  Geneva  Arbi 
tration,  vol.  ii.,  there  is  a  list  of  twelve  vessels  which 
were  made  the  subject  of  correspondence  between  the 
United  States  Minister  and  her  Majesty's  Government, 
and  all  of  them,  upon  the  simple  allegations  of  the  United 
States  Consuls  at  Liverpool  and  elsewhere,  were  inter 
rupted  in  their  loading,  and  interfered  with,  more  or  less, 
by  the  Customs  authorities.  Some  of  them  were  loading 
in  part  with  contraband  of  war,  and  a  portion  of  the 
shipments  were  on  behalf  of  the  Confederate  Government. 
In  none  of  those  ships  did  the  Confederate  States  have 
any  interest  whatever,  except  as  shippers  by  them  to 
Bermuda,  the  Bahamas,  and  Havana.  One  of  them, 
the  Phantom,  became  a  blockade-runner,  but  she  sailed 
from  Liverpool  in  a  perfectly  legitimate  way. 

Some  of  the  cases  demonstrate  very  strongly  the 
recklessness  of  the  United  States  Consuls  in  their  allega 
tions,  and  the  readiness  with  which  Earl  Kussell  acted 
upon  them.  On  March  24th,  1863,  Thomas  H.  Dudley, 
the  United  States  Consul  at  Liverpool,  wrote  Mr.  Adams 
that  '  this  vessel '  (the  Southerner}  '  came  here  yesterday 
either  to  load  or  to  fit  out  as  a  privateer.  There  is  no 
doubt  about  this  vessel.  I  suppose  it  will  be  impossible 
for  me  to  obtain  legal  evidence  against  these  two 
vessels,*  and  nothing  short  of  this  will  satisfy  the 
Government/f  Mr.  Dudley  never  permitted  himself  to 
doubt,  and  generally  indulged  in  a  sneer  at  the  British 
Government;  but,  notwithstanding  his  positive  assertion, 
Mr.  Adams,  in  forwarding  the  statement  to  Earl  Russell 
on  the  26th,  was  obliged  to  inform  his  lordship  that 

*  Phantom  and  Southerner. 

f  'British  Case,'  Appendix,  vol.  ii.,  p.  167. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  355 

Mr.  Dudley  was  mistaken,  and  that  the  ship  referred  to 
had  not  yet  reached  Liverpool.*  The  Southerner  was  a 
large  screw-steamer,  built  at  Stockton-on-Tees  for  a 
passenger  and  freight  trade.  She  was  provided  with  all 
fittings  necessary  to  handle  her  cargoes,  and  her  saloons 
were  arranged  in  every  respect  as  a  first-class  passenger 
ship.  No  one  fairly  inspecting  her  could  have  supposed 
that  she  would  have  been  fitted  up  in  that  style  if  the 
intention  was  to  convert  her  into  a  '  privateer/  and  her 
size  and  draft  of  water  manifestly  unsuited  her  for  even 
blockade-running.  Yet  the  British  Foreign  Office 
acted  upon  Mr.  Dudley's  allegations,  and  twenty-four 
pages  of  the  '  Appendix  '  (pp.  185 — 209)  are  occupied 
with  a  correspondence  in  respect  to  her  between  Mr. 
Adams,  Earl  Kussell,  the  Treasury  and  Customs  officials, 
the  Town  Clerk,  the  Mayor,  and  Head- Constable  of 
Liverpool.  Finally  she  was  surveyed  by  Mr.  T.  Hobbs, 
Admiralty  overseer,  assisted  by  Mr.  W.  Byrne,  Assist 
ant  Surveyor  of  Customs  at  Liverpool,  and  Mr.  Hobbs 
reported  to  the  Controller  of  the  Navy  on  June  23rd, 
1863,  as  follows  :f 

'  She  is  fitted  with  top -gallant  forecastle  and  poop- 
deck,  with  deck-houses  continuous  fore  and  aft  with  the 
same,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  Inman  line  of  screw- 
boats,  now  sailing  between  this  port  and  New  York. 
She  is  fitted  aft  under  the  poop-deck  with  accommodation 
for  about  sixty-six  saloon  passengers,  etc.  ...  I  find 
that  her  topsides  are  of  iron-plates,  three-eighths  of  an 
inch  thick,  and  in  no  way  fitted  or  secured,  as  I 
consider,  necessary  for  the  working  of  guns.  ...  I 
cannot  find  anything  with  regard  to  construction  or 

*  She  arrived  a  few  days  after. 

t  '  British  Case,'  Appendix,  vol.  ii.,  p.  206. 

23—2 


356  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

fittings  that  would  lead  me  to  suppose  that  she  was 
intended  for  belligerent  purposes.7 

In  consequence  of  the  above  report,  the  Head- 
Constable  of  Liverpool  advised  the  Mayor  that  the 
officer  especially  appointed  to  watch  the  ship  should  be 
relieved,  and  on  the  3rd  of  July  Earl  Eussell  reported 
the  facts  to  Mr.  Adams,  and  the  ship  was  permitted  to 
go  about  her  business.  It  appears  that  she  went  on  a 
voyage  up  the  Mediterranean,  in  the  course  of  which  she 
touched  at  Algiers,  from  which  port  another  American 
Consul,  by  the  name  of  Edward  L.  Kingsbury,  wrote 
to  Mr.  Dayton,  the  United  States  Minister  at  Paris, 
on  October  2nd,  1863  : 

'  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that,  while  absent 
from  my  post  by  special  permission,  I  received  informa 
tion  that  "  the  suspected  pirate  steam- ship  Southerner  " 
was  at  Malta,  en  route  from  Alexandria  to  Algiers.'* 

Mr.  Kingsbury  then  gives  a  full  description  of  the 
ship,  her  cargo,  passengers,  etc.,  which  particulars 
he  got  from  i  a  perfectly  competent  and  reliable  gentle 
man  of  my  acquaintance  at  this  place/  and  adds  :  '  I  am 
also  informed  that  the  British  and  United  States  flags 
are  painted  upon  the  partitions  of  the  companion  way, 
etc.,  the  ship  having  been  built,  it  is  said,  to  run 
between  Liverpool  and  Charleston.' 

The  Phantom  was  detained  and  watched  and  written 
about  in  the  same  way.  I  have  said  that  she  became  a 
blockade-runner,  but  she  was  wholly  private  property. 
The  Confederate  States  never  had  any  interest  in  her 
whatever.  Mr.  Thomas  H.  Dudley  got  a  man  by  the 
name  of  Robert  Thomas  to  swear  that  he  knew  me, 
and  had  seen  me  frequently  giving  directions  about  the 
Phantom,  and  especially  on  one  occasion  inspecting  and 
*  '  British  Case,'  Appendix,  vol.  ii.,  p.  209. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  357 

giving  orders  about  the  screw,  during  a  trial  which 
occupied  twenty  minutes.*  As  a  fact,  I  never  was 
on  board  the  Phantom,  nor  even  alongside  of  her,  in  my 
life,  and  never  heard  of  Mr.  Robert  Thomas  until  I  saw 
his  name  at  the  bottom  of  the  above  affidavit,  -and 
I  solemnly  declare  his  statements  to  be  false  in  every 
particular,  so  far  as  they  relate  to  me.  Mr.  Dudley's 
affidavits  always  had  a  wonderful  particularity  in  the 
details.  He  seemed  to  have  been  determined,  as  he  had 
to  pay  for  them,  to  get  his  money's  worth. 

Another  one  of  the  suspected  craft  was  an  old  ricketty 
fifty-gun  ship  called  the  Amphion^  which  had  been  sold 
out  of  one  of  her  Majesty's  dockyards  '  as  old  material,' 
and  yet  the  United  States  Consul  at  London  succeeded 
in  putting  her  purchasers  to  considerable  trouble  and 
expense  with  the  Admiralty  about  her.  One  vessel — 
the  Hector — turned  out  to  be  building  for  the  British 
Admiralty  ;  nevertheless,  when  she  was  launched  Mr. 
Adams  contrived  to  get  up  a  correspondence  with  the 
Foreign  Office  and  the  Admiralty  on  the  subject,  f 

It  would  be  easy  for  me  to  give  many  more  cases 
of  interference  with  the  loading  and  despatch  of  vessels 
from  British  ports  during  the  war  in  deference  to  the 
suspicions  of  the  United  States  Minister.  Whenever  an 
American  Consul  thought  the  Confederate  Government 
had  an  interest  in  the  cargo,  or  he  felt  the  desire 
to  show  his  animosity  to  a  supposed  friend  or  sym 
pathizer  with  the  South,  he  could  always  find  some  one 
to  make  the  stereotyped  affidavit,  and  the  inquiry, 
interference  and  delay  would  almost  invariably  follow. 
There  is  no  exaggeration  in  saying  that  there  was  much 
difficulty  and  trouble  in  making  shipments  by  vessels  of 

*  *  British  Case,'  Appendix,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  171,  172. 
t  'British  Case,'  Appendix,  vol.  ii.,  p.  143,  etc. 


358  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

any  description  to  Halifax,  Bermuda,  the  Bahamas, 
Havana  or  Matamoras  during  the  war,  and  the  restric 
tions  and  necessary  concealments  added  much  to  the 
labour  and  expense  of  forwarding  supplies  to  the  Con 
federate  States.  And  yet  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  trade,  by  the  repeated  declaration  of  her  Majesty's 
Ministers,  was  perfectly  legitimate,  and  they  professed 
to  enforce  their  neutrality  with  impartial  fairness,  or, 
rather,  indifference  to  the  interests  of  either  belli 
gerent. 

I  have  stated,  in  the  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Confederate  Navy  quoted  above,  that  the  neutrality  of 
England  was  practised  in  a  way  to  give  great  advan 
tages  to  the  United  States.  While  the  restrictions 
placed  upon  all  shipments  which  were  made  in  vessels 
not  loading  for  one  of  the  northern  ports  amounted 
almost  to  a  prohibition,  I  never  heard  of  a  single  inter 
ruption  to  the  trade  in  contraband  with  the  United 
States,  nor  do  I  know  of  a  single  instance  in  which 
a  vessel  bound  to  that  country  was  delayed  a  moment, 
or  asked  what  was  the  destination  of  her  cargo,  or  made 
to  show  whether  the  purpose  was  to  arm  her  as  a 
national  cruiser,  or  privateer,  after  her  departure. 

The  United  States  Minister  at  London  gave  certificates 
to  British  vessels  loaded  with  arms  and  other  contraband 
articles  for  Mexico  during  the  French  invasion  of  that 
country,  when  he  had  satisfactory  proof  that  the  arms 
were  intended  for  the  Mexican  Government,  but  he 
refused  certificates  to  others  who  applied  to  him  without 
such  proof.  The  former  were  protected  from  capture 
by  United  States  ships,  but  the  latter  were  in  several 
cases  captured  on  the  high  seas,  and  carried  before  the 
American  prize-courts  (vide  the  case  of  the  Peterhoff^ 
mentioned  above). 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  359 

In  Hansard,  vol.  clxx.,  Session  1863  (2),  p.  576,  etc., 
there  is  a  report  of  a  debate  in  the  House  of  Commons 
on  the  above  subject  (there  were  several  debates).  Mr. 
Roebuck,  commenting  upon  one  of  the  permits  given  by 
Mr.  Adams  says  :  '  That  permit  is  granted.  Why  ? 
Because  that  ship  carried  out  arms  to  the  Mexicans,  to 
be  used  against  our  ally,  France.'  In  another  case  he 
says :  i  The  permit  was  refused ;  and  now  I  must  say 
that  Mr.  Adams,  the  American  Minister,  is  the  Minister 
for  Commerce  in  England.' 

In  the  same  debate  another  member,  Mr.  Peacocke,  gave 
a  very  graphic  and  circumstantial  account  of  the  manner 
in  which  the  giving  of  the  permits  came  about.  He 
said  :  i  The  Mexican  Government  ordered  supplies  of 
arms  in  the  United  States.  The  Government  of  the 
United  States,  however,  arrested  the  vessel  which  was 
to  carry  these  arms.  The  Mexican  Government,  as 
well  it  might,  remonstrated  ;  whereupon  Mr.  Seward 
informed  the  Mexican  Minister  that  he  did  not  wish  to 
deprive  him  of  a  supply  of  arms  to  carry  on  the  war 
against  France,  but  the  United  States  wanted  those 
arms  themselves.  "  If,  however,"  added  Mr.  Seward, 
"you  will  send  over  to  England  and  get  arms,  we 
will  give  you  every  facility  in  our  power."  Mr. 
Peacocke  then  explained  that  the  Mexican  officer 
charged  with  the  purchase  of  the  arms  came  over  to 
England,  provided  with  a  letter  to  Mr.  Adams,  request 
ing  that  Minister  to  give  him  every  assistance  in  his 
power,  in  order  to  obtain  arms  to  help  the  Mexicans  in 
their  war  with  France.  '  It  was  under  these  circum 
stances,'  adds  Mr.  Peacocke,  '  and  not  from  any 
individual  action  taken  on  his  own  responsibility,  that 
Mr.  Adams  furnished  the  pass.'  This,  it  must  be 
admitted,  was  permitting  a  very  unusual  power  to  the 


360  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

United  States  Minister,  and  the  exercise  of  a  very  com 
prehensive  belligerent  right. 

But  in  demonstration  of  the  favour  and  privileges 
granted  to  the  United  States,  as  compared  with  the 
watchful  restrictions  imposed  upon  the  Confederate 
agents,  it  is  not  necessary  for  me  to  go  beyond  the 
unlimited  freedom  to  get  and  to  ship  whatever  they 
wanted  for  their  own  use  which  the  United  States 
enjoyed  during  the  whole  war.  I  will  confine  my  state 
ment  to  the  official  returns,  as  printed  in  the  British 
Counter-case,  p.  54,  etc.  It  appears  that  in  May,  1862, 
Mr.  Adams,  in  compliance  with  instructions  from  Mr. 
Seward,  pressed  on  Lord  Russell,  in  conversation,  the 
expediency  of  revoking  the  recognition  of  the  belligerent 
status  of  the  Confederate  Government,  and  mentioned, 
in  connection  with  this  subject,  the  irritation  produced 
in  the  United  States  by  the  reports  of  supplies  furnished 
by  private  persons  in  England  to  the  Confederates.  Lord 
Russell,  in  his  reply,  said  '  that  large  supplies  of  similar 
materials  had  been  obtained  in  England  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States,  which  had  been  freely  transported  and 
used  against  the  "  insurgents."  '*  Mr.  Adams  admitted 
that  at  one  time  a  quantity  of  arms  and  military  stores 
had  been  purchased  in  England  '  as  a  purely  commercial 
transaction,'  for  the  use  of  the  Federal  army  ;  but  said 
that  he  had  early  objected  to  the  practice,  for  the  reason 
that  it  prevented  him  from  pressing  his  remonstrances 
against  a  very  different  class  of  operations  carried  on  by 
friends  and  sympathizers  with  the  '  rebels '  in  England, 
and  it  had  been  discontinued.  Mr.  Adams  added  that 
'  we '  (the  United  States)  '  had,  indeed,  purchased  largely 

*  Mr.  Adams  to  Mr.  Seward,  reporting  the  conversation  with  Lord 
Russell ;  the  word  'insurgents  '  is  Mr.  Adams's,  not  Lord  Russell's, 
who  never  speaks  of  the  Confederates  in  that  character. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  361 

in  Austria,  but  that  Government  had  never  given  any 
countenance  to  the  insurgents.'  Mr.  Adams,  courteous 
as  he  generally  was,  could  not,  it  appears,  refrain  from 
having  his  fling  at  Lord  Russell  on  this  occasion.  He 
would  have  no  more  arms  bought  in  England  '  as  a 
purely  commercial  transaction/  because  so  many  people 
sympathized  with  the  '  rebels  '  in  that  free  country  ;  he 
would  go  to  autocratic  Austria,  where  there  was  no 
sympathy  with  i  insurgents.' 

But  Mr.  Adams  was  mistaken  in  the  statement  that 
purchases  in  England  for  the  United  States  army  had 
been  discontinued.  Messrs.  Naylor,  Vickers  and  Co.,  of 
New  York,  Liverpool,  and  London,  bought  and  shipped 
large  quantities  of  small  arms  to  the  United  States. 
They  were  supplied  from  Birmingham  alone  with 
156,000  rifles  between  June,  1862,  and  July,  1863. 
They  acted  very  extensively  as  agents  for  the  United 
States  Government.  The  Assistant  Secretary  of  War  at 
Washington,  in  a  letter,  addressed  to  them  on  the  20th 
of  October,  1862,  sanctioned  an  arrangement  for  the 
supply  of  100,000  rifles,  and  the  acceptance  of  this  order 
was  duly  notified  to  the  Secretary  of  War  by  a  letter 
from  Birmingham,  dated  November  4th,  1862.  The 
arms  were  sent  to  Liverpool  for  shipment.  In  December, 
1863,  ffty  68-pounder  guns  were  proved  at  the  Royal 
Arsenal  at  Woolwich,  at  the  request  of  Messrs.  T.  and  C. 
Hood,  and  after  proof  they  were  taken  away  by  Messrs. 
Naylor,  Tickers  and  Co.  and  shipped  to  New  York. 
There  were  other  large  purchases  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States. 

The  general  results  of  these  operations  may  be  traced 
in  the  official  returns  of  exports  from  Great  Britain 
to  the  northern  ports  of  the  United  States,  published  by 
the  Board  of  Trade.  These  show  that,  whereas  the 


362  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

average  yearly  export  of  small  arms  to  those  ports  for  the 
years  1858,  1859,  1860,  were  18,329;  it  rose  in  1861  to 
44,904,  in  1862  to  343,304,  and  amounted  in  1863  to 
124,928.  These  are  the  recorded  shipments  of  small 
arms ;  but  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  other 
shipments,  to  a  considerable  extent,  were  made  under 
the  denomination  of  hardware.  Of  percussion  caps, 
the  average  export  in  the  years  1858,  1859,  and  1860 
was  55,620,000;  in  1863  it  rose  to  171,427,000, 
and  in  1864  was  102,587,000.  Of  cannon  and  other 
ordnance  the  exports  in  the  year  1862  alone  were 
valued  at  £82,920,  while  the  aggregate  value  of 
the  exports  for  the  other  nine  years,  from  1858  to 
1861,  and  from  1863  to  1867,  was  but  £3,336.  The 
exports  of  saltpetre  for  the  years  1858  to  1861  had 
averaged  248  tons  yearly.  The  purchases  for  the 
United  States  Government  raised  the  amount  to  3,189 
tons  for  the  year  1862  alone.  The  amount  of  lead 
shipped,  which  had  averaged  2,810  tons  yearly,  rose  in 
1862  and  1864  to  13,148  and  11,786  tons  respectively. 
I  might  give  further  statistics  in  reference  to  military 
clothing  and  other  supplies,  but  the  foregoing  is 
sufficient  to  show  the  enormous  quantity  of  articles 
contraband  of  war  which  were  bought  by  the  United 
States  in  England  during  the  war,  and  then  shipped, 
chiefly  from  Liverpool,  without  let  or  hindrance,  inter 
ference,  vexatious  inquiry,  or  delay,  on  the  part  of  any 
local  authority,  and  I  wish  particularly  to  call  attention 
to  the  fifty  6 8 -pounders  proved  at  the  Koyal  Arsenal  at 
Woolwich  and  then  shipped  to  New  York. 

The  State  Department  at  Washington,  and  the 
Consuls  who  received  their  inspiration  from  its  chief, 
indulged  often  in  what  Lord  Eussell  called  'figures 
of  rhetoric '  when  addressing  her  Majesty's  Government 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  363 

on  subjects  appertaining  to  the  war.  The  compilers 
of  the  '  Case'  presented  to  the  Tribunal  of  Arbitration  at 
Geneva  on  behalf  of  the  United  States,  appear  to  have 
drunk  deeply  from  the  same  fountain.  It  is  stated  by 
them,  as  a  complaint,  that  England  was  '  the  arsenal, 
the  navy-yard,  and  the  treasury  of  the  insurgents.' 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Confederate  Government 
bought  supplies  of  all  kinds  in  England,  and  that 
money  was  provided  to  pay  for  them,  and  persons  were 
employed  to  purchase,  forward,  and  ship  them  ;  but  the 
quantity  of  articles  bought  and  money  expended  must 
have  been,  I  was  almost  going  to  say  insignificant — at 
any  rate  it  was  small — in  comparison  with  the  opera 
tions  of  the  United  States. 

I  have  read  nearly  the  whole  '  Case  of  the  United 
States,'  and  do  not  find  it  asserted  that  the  rifles, 
cannon,  saltpetre,  etc.,  mentioned  above,  found  their  way 
to  New  York  without  any  purchasing  or  financial 
agents  to  transact  the  business.  It  is  probable  that 
many  agents  were  employed  in  such  large  transactions, 
and  therefore  branches  of  the  War,  Navy,  and  Treasury 
Departments  of  the  United  States  were  to  be  found  in 
England,  in  the  same  sense  that  those  departments 
of  the  Confederate  Government  were  represented  there. 
However,  w^e  are  not  left  in  doubt  on  this  point.  From 
the  documents  laid  before  the  Tribunal  of  Arbitration,  we 
learn  that  the  United  States  engaged  large  warehouses 
at  Birmingham  for  the  reception  of  arms  when  com 
pleted,  after  which  they  were  shipped  through  the 
agency  of  Messrs.  Barings  and  Messrs.  Brown,  Shipley 
and  Co.,*  and  we  have  already  seen  that  they  had 
guns  proved  at  Woolwich.  There  also  appears  in 
the  British  Appendix,  vol.  vi.,  p.  154,  a  letter  from 
*  'British  Counter-Case/ p.  53. 


364  TEE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

the  Secretary  of  War  at  Washington  to  one  of  his 
agents — a  Mr.  Schuyler — in  which  he  says  :  t  You 
will  please  express  my  acknowledgments  to  Messrs. 
Baring  Brothers  and  Co.  for  their  prompt  and  patriotic 
action  in  facilitating  your  operations.  The  terms 
offered  by  Messrs.  Baring  Brothers  and  Co.,  namely 
one  per  cent,  commission,  and  five  per  cent,  interest  per 
annum,  as  agreed  upon  by  them  with  the  Navy  Depart 
ment,  are  approved.' 

Messrs.  Baring  Brothers  and  Co.  are  a  very  eminent 
banking  firm,  as  all  the  world  knows.  Their  financial 
arrangements  with  the  War  and  Navy  Departments  of 
the  United  States  were  no  doubt  in  strict  conformity 
with  neutral  duties — at  least,  that  may  be  inferred  from, 
the  statements  of  Earl  Russell,  for  in  a  letter  to 
Mr.  Adams  already  quoted  above,  he  said :  'Her 
Majesty's  Government  cannot  interfere  with  commercial 
dealings  between  British  subjects  and  the  so-styled 
Confederate  States,  whether  the  object  of  those  dealings 
be  money,  or  contraband  goods,  or  even  ships  adapted 
for  warlike  purposes.'  The  Confederate  agents  have 
advanced  this  declaration  of  her  Majesty's  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  as  'a  complete  justification  for 
all  their  dealings  with  British  subjects,  and  they  do  not 
deny  that  it  can  and  should  be  applied  to  the  agencies 
of  the  United  States  with  equal  pertinence  and  compre 
hensiveness.  But  there  is  a  special  difference  between 
the  financial  operations  of  the  two  belligerents  in 
England  in  this  particular,  that  while  the  Confederate 
Government  dealt  with  private  merchants  and  tradesmen 
exclusively,  who  were  not  bound  by  any  specific  under 
taking  to  investigate  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the 
neutrality  laws,  but  might  fairly  and  conscientiously 
deal  in  money,  contraband  goods,  or  ships  '  as  purely 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  365 

mercantile  transactions/  the  United  States  had  their 
Treasury  Department  in  England  at  the  office  of 
bankers  whose  leading  partner  was  a  member  of  Parlia 
ment,  who  was  bound  by  his  oath,  as  well  as  by 
the  ordinary  precepts  of  loyalty,  to  follow  with  scrupu 
lous  nicety  the  spirit  as  well  as  the  letter  of  the  law,  and 
to  set  an  example  of  strict  and  impartial  compliance  with 
her  Majesty's  Proclamation  of  Neutrality. 

Mr.  T.  Baring's  name  appears  in  Hansard*  as  a  warm 
advocate  of  the  North  in  the  debates  on  the  Alabama 
question,  and  he  urged  the  Government  to  give  the 
United  States  some  assurance  that  they  would  prevent 
the  Confederates  obtaining  ships  in  England,  which  he 
said  might  be  the  cause  of  a  war  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  aggrieved  Republic  across  the  water.  Now,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  invariably  denounced 
the  shipbuilders,  the  tradesmen,  the  financiers,  who  in 
the  ordinary  and  legitimate  course  of  their  business  had 
commercial  dealings  with  the  Confederate  Government. 
They  charged  them  with  disloyalty,  with  violating  the 
neutrality  of  their  country,  and  endangering  its  peace, 
and  often  added  epithets  and  insinuations  which  were 
personal  and  offensive.  Did  Mr.  Seward  and  his  Secre 
tary  of  War  really  think  that  the  house  of  Baring 
Brothers,  with  its  Parliamentary  member,  could  lend 
them  money  to  buy  guns,  and  rifles,  and  saltpetre — 
could  forward  the  goods  for  them  and  perform  such 
other  services  in  l  facilitating  the  operations '  of  their 
agents  as  to  earn  the  highest  commendation  they  could 
bestow,  and  yet  be  wholly  free  from  a  like  criminality 
with  those  who  were  only  doing  the  same  things  in  kind, 
but  hardly  in  degree,  for  the  Confederates^?  I  suppose 
the  use  of  the  word  ^  patriotic y  in  the  commendatory 
*  See  especially  vol.  clxx.,  1863  (2),  p.  59. 


366  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

letter  of  the  United  States  Secretary  of  War  in  reference 
to  Messrs.  Baring  must  have  been  a  slip  of  the  pen.  It 
is  one  of  those  infelicitous  and  inappropriate  expressions 
which  sometimes  creep  into  hastily  written  documents, 
or  escape  from  an  over-fluent  orator.  A  member  of  the 
British  House  of  Commons  is  quite  free  to  advocate  any 
cause  which  appeals  to  his  sympathies,  and  whose  prin 
ciples  coincide  with  his  convictions  ;  but  when  the  great 
commercial  firm  to  which  he  belongs  embarks  in  a  large 
financial  operation  with  a  foreign  belligerent,  however 
ably,  faithfully,  and  energetically  he  may  serve  the 
interests  of  his  clients,  we  must  look  for  some  other 
word  to  describe  his  conduct  than  that  expression  which 
can  only  be  fitly  used  in  reference  to  services  rendered 
from  amor  patrice. 

I  most  earnestly  and  emphatically  disclaim  the 
slightest  wish  or  purpose  to  reflect  in  any  way  upon  the 
house  of  Messrs.  Baring  Brothers,  or  to  intimate  that 
the  member  of  the  firm  who  sat  in  the  House  of  Com 
mons  committed  any  fault.  I  have  mentioned  their 
name,  and  commented  upon  their  transactions  with  the 
United  States,  historically.  The  facts  are  recorded  in 
the  diplomatic  correspondence,  and  in  the  proceedings 
in  the  Geneva  Arbitration,  and  I  have  used  them,  together 
with  other  statements  mentioned  above,  to  illustrate  the 
relative  attitudes  of  the  two  belligerents  in  respect  to 
the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain,  and  to  demonstrate  that 
if  England  was  the  '  arsenal  and  treasury '  of  the  Con 
federate  Government,  as  has  been  alleged,  the  same  may 
be  said  in  a  stricter  as  well  as  in  a  still  more  compre 
hensive  sense  with  reference  to  the  United  States,  whose 
War  Offices  were  so  completely  and  definitely  established 
that  they  had  warehouses  for  the  storing  of  arms  and 
the  use  of  public  arsenals  for  proving  guns,  and  whose 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  367 

Treasury  may  be  said  to  have  been  represented  in  the 
British  House  of  Commons. 

In  a  debate  on  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  March  27th, 
1863,  Lord  Palmerston,*  commenting  upon  the  allega 
tion  that  the  Government  had  failed  to  detain  vessels 
supposed  to  be  intended  for  the  Confederate  States  upon 
reasonable  suspicion,  said,  '  Is  it  not  fair  for  us  to  say 
that  so  far  as  suspicions  go,  we  have  been  informed — 
perhaps  erroneously — that  not  only  have  arms  been 
despatched  to  the  Northern  ports  of  the  United  States, 
but  that  efforts  have  been  made,  in  Ireland  especially,  to 
enlist  persons  to  serve  in  the  Federal  army  and  navy? 
Unquestionably  a  great  many  cases  have  occurred  in 
North  America  in  which  British  subjects  have  been 
seized  and  attempts  made  to  compel  them  to  serve 
against  their  will  in  the  Civil  War.' 

I  have  already  mentioned  two  cases  in  which  the  sus 
picions  caused  interference  with  two  vessels  alleged  to 
be  taking  recruits  from  Liverpool  for  the  United  States 
army,  but  I  have  not  been  able  to  discover  a  single 
instance  of  interference  with  a  vessel  loading  with  arms 
and  other  war  supplies  for  the  United  States,  and  I  can 
find  no  record  of  a  single  ship  being  detained  an  hour  to 
give  account  of  her  cargo,  or  her  destination,  if  she  was 
clearing  out  for  a  Northern  port,  and  was  duly  certified 
by  the  local  United  States  Consul.  It  was  very  different 
with  ships  of  any  description  loading  for  a  British  colony, 
for  Cuba  or  for  Mexico.  The  mere  allegation  of  an 
American  Consul  that  he  had  reason  to  believe  that  she 
was  intended  for  a  Confederate  cruiser  was  sufficient  to 
cause  immediate  investigation,  often  complete  stoppage 
of  the  work  during  the  inquiry,  and  in  many  instances  a 
complete  prevention  of  the  voyage.  Sometimes  the  com- 
*  Hansard,  vol.  clxx.,  1863  (2),  p.  93. 


368  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

plaints  of  the  United  States  were  couched  in  such  exag 
gerated  terms,*  and  they  put  forward  such  astounding 
claims  against  Great  Britain  for  the  depredations  of 
Confederate  cruisers,  that  Lord  Kussell  ventured  upon  a 
retort,  as,  for  example,  October  26th,  1863,f  he  tells 
Mr.  Adams  that  if  her  Majesty's  Government  were  to 
apply  the  principle  of  interfering  with  the  trade  of  ship 
building  as  broadly  as  the  United  States  wished,  a  source 
of  honest  livelihood  to  great  numbers  of  British  subjects 
would  be  seriously  embarrassed  and  impeded  ;  and  he 
then  remarks  :  '  I  may  add  that  it  appears  strange  that, 
notwithstanding  the  large  and  powerful  naval  force 
possessed  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  no 
efficient  measures  have  been  taken  by  that  Government 
to  capture  the  Alabama.'1 

I  do  not  propose  to  discuss  the  conduct  of  her  Majesty's 
Government  towards  the  Confederate  States  during  the 
Civil  War  with  reference  either  to  international  law  or 
comity.  The  result  of  the  war  has  been  to  obliterate 
the  political  status  of  those  States  as  a  separate  and  de 
facto  Power,  and  no  one  is  now  competent  to  argue  such 
questions  on  their  behalf  with  any  practical  purpose. 
Nevertheless,  it  will  always  remain  a  subject  of  interest 
to  the  five  or  six  million  people  of  the  Southern  States 
and  their  posterity,  and  it  will  always  be  an  embarrassing 
problem  for  them  to  determine  the  reasons  why  the 
British  Ministry  of  1861 — 65  acted  towards  the  Con 
federate  States  in  a  manner  so  inconsistent  with  their 
own  interpretation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  con 
firmed  as  that  interpretation  was  by  the  unreversed 

*  See  letter  of  Mr.  Adams  to  Earl  Russell,  dated  October  23rd, 
1863,  '  North  America,'  No.  1,  1864,  Parliamentary  Blue  Book, 
p.  26. 

t  Reply  to  Mr.  Adams's  letter  above,  p.  42,  No.  19. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  369 

judgment  of  a  court  of  law.  c  There  is  no  difference  in 
principle  between  supplying  a  belligerent  with  muskets, 
cannon,  and  ammunition,  or  with  ships  that  are  to 
operate  in  war/  '  Her  Majesty's  Government  cannot 
interfere  with  commercial  dealings  between  British  sub 
jects  and  the  so-styled  Confederate  States,  whether  the 
object  of  those  dealings  be  money,  or  contraband  goods, 
or  even  ships  adapted  for  warlike  purposes/  '  The 
Alabama  might  have  been  legitimately  built  by  a  foreign 
Government,  and  though  a  ship-of-war,  she  might  have 
formed  a  legitimate  article  of  merchandise,  even  if  meant 
for  the  Confederate  States.'  '  An  English  shipbuilder 
may  build  any  kind  of  ship  to  a  commercial  order,  or 
merely  in  compliance  with  a  contract ;  and  the  purchaser 
niav  make  what  use  of  her  afterwards  he  sees  fit.'  These 

•/ 

are  the  official  declarations  of  the  two  principal  members 
of  the  Ministry  which  governed  England  during  the 
American  Civil  War,  of  the  Solicit  or -General  under  the 
same  Government,  and  the  unre versed  judgment  of  the 
Lord  Chief  Baron  of  the  Exchequer. 

I  think  anyone  who  fairly  and  impartially  examines 
the  facts  connected  with  the  seizure  of  ships  alleged  to 
have  been  bought  or  built  for  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment,  and  the  repeated  detention  of  vessels,  and  inter 
ference  with  their  loading,  when  it  was  supposed  that 
their  cargoes  were  ultimately  intended  for  a  Southern 
port,  will  admit  that  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  was 
not  administered  in  accordance  with  the  above  declara 
tions  and  judgment,  so  far  as  the  Confederate  States  were 
concerned  ;  and  that  the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain  was 
practised  in  such  a  manner  as  greatly  to  embarrass  and 
hinder  the  efforts  of  that  belligerent  who  most  needed 
what  she  could  supply,  and  which  the  said  belligerent 
was  desirous  to  buy  in  a  fair  way  of  trade. 

VOL.  i.  24 


370  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

When  the  American  colonies  rebelled  against  the 
British  Crown,  they  obtained  substantial  aid  from 
France,  before  the  Government  of  Louis  XVI.  became  a 
party  to  the  war.  When  the  Spanish  American  pro 
vinces  revolted  from  Spain,  England  and  the  United 
States  did  not  preserve  a  very  rigorous  neutrality,  but 
permitted  the  struggling  colonists  to  get  much  help  in 
men  and  ships.  When  Greece  was  labouring  for  her 
freedom,  almost  the  whole  Christian  world  sent  her 
succour  of  some  sort.  When  Queen  Isabella  was  battling 
for  her  crown  against  Don  Carlos,  the  English  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act  was  suspended  to  permit  a  British 
general,  with  a  British  legion,  to  fight  in  her  behalf. 
When  the  conflicting  claims  of  Dona  Maria  and  Don 

o 

Miguel  had  kindled  the  fires  of  Civil  War  in  Portugal, 
a  British  admiral  was  permitted  to  command  the  naval 
forces  of  one  of  the  parties  and  to  retain  his  commission 
in  the  British  navy.  When  Pope  Pio  Nono  was  fighting 
for  his  temporalities,  he  had  his  Irish  battalion  and  his 
foreign  legion,  recruited  without  much  difficulty  among 
the  Catholic  States.  When  the  Italian  people  were 
expelling  King  Bomba  and  the  reigning  dukes,  the 
chief  combatants  on  the  popular  side  were  Garibaldi's 
volunteers,  including  many  foreigners  and  *  Garibaldi's 
Englishman '  among  them.  When  Servia  was  striving 
to  free  herself  from  the  suzerainty  of  Turkey,  a 
Kussian  general  commanded  her  active  army  in  the 
field,  and  volunteers  from  neutral  Russia  filled  her 
ranks.  Even  in  the  Franco -Prussian  War  of  1870, 
Garibaldi,  the  restless  Revolutionist,  broke  up  his 
hermitage  at  Caprera,  and  brought  a  band  of  men  in  the 
traditional  red  shirt  to  fight  for  France. 

The  list  is  not  exhausted.  Memory  furnishes  me 
with  no  record  of  a  struggle  for  freedom,  or  between 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  371 

two  great  contending  factions  of  the  same  people,  or  of 
a  weaker  state  striving  to  maintain  itself  against  the 
aggression  of  a  stronger,  in  which  the  merits  of  the 
contest,  the  gallantry  of  the  weaker  side,  or  the  common 
human  instincts  which  have  impelled  men  in  all  past 
time  to  help  those  who  appeared  to  need  help,  did  not 
bring  the  required  succour  in  some  practical  form.  The 
South  alone,  so  far  as  I  know,  was  left  to  fight  her 
arduous  and  prolonged  battle  with  no  foreign  aid,  and 
with  but  a  grudging  allowance  of  the  necessities  she  was 
able  to  pay  for.  A  few  gallant,  sympathetic  men  like 
Prince  Polignac  and  Heros  von  Borke  brought  their 
stout  hearts  to  her  aid  ;  but  the  men  who  followed 
Lee  and  Beauregard,  Stonewall  Jackson,  Longstreet, 
and  other  Confederate  chiefs,  were  the  sons  of  the 
soil,  and  a  few  English  and  Irish,  and  still  fewer 
Germans,  who  from  long  residence  had  come  to  love 
the  country  and  its  people  and  were  practically 
Southerners. 

I  cannot  call  to  mind — I  believe  there  never  has  been 
— a  great  war,  fought  against  such  odds,  not  in  men 
alone,  but  in  every  element  of  military  power,  in  which 
the  weaker  side  has  persevered  so  long  and  endured  so 
patiently,  and  then  after  defeat  has  murmured  so  little 
and  set  so  manfully  to  work  to  retrieve  its  losses. 

I  wish  to  draw  no  comparisons  between  the  combat 
ants,  and  I  know  too  much  of  both  North  and  South  to 
doubt  that  there  are  thousands  of  brave,  earnest,  true, 
and  loyal  men  in  each  and  every  section  of  the  Union. 
Many  thousands  of  gallant  men  went  from  every 
Northern  State  to  the  battlefields  of  the  South,  and 
sacrificed  their  lives,  honestly  believing  that  the  national 
life  was  bound  up  in  the  Union  of  the  States,  and  that 
they  must  fight  to  maintain  that  Union.  There  were 

24—2 


372  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

hundreds  of  men  in  the  armies  of  the  United  States, 
subalterns  and  field-officers  of  regiments,  brigade  and 
division  commanders,  who  filled  their  offices  not  only 
with  admirable  courage,  but  with  all  the  dash,  judg 
ment,  and  tactical  skill  that  their  positions  required  ;  but 
taking  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  war  at  this  distance 
of  time,  with  temper  cool  and  judgment  free  from  bias,  I 
am  of  the  opinion  that  the  United  States  did  not  find 
the  man — he  might  have  been  there — I  only  say  that 
they  did  not  find  the  man  for  a  chief- commander,  who 
displayed  more  than  average  ability  as  a  military 
strategist. 

Sadowa  was  won,  and  the  Austro-Prussian  War  was 
ended  in  a  campaign  of  about  seven  weeks,  by  the 
superior  skill  of  the  Prussian  Chief- of- Staff.  France  was 
crushed,  two  of  her  great  armies  capitulated,  one  in  the 
field,  one  from  the  shelter  of  a  strongly  fortified  position. 
The  whole  of  her  eastern  and  northern  provinces  were 
overrun,  and  her  capital  was  occupied  by  a  German 
corps  d'armee,  after  little  more  than  a  year's  fighting. 
No  one  believes  that  the  Austrians  are  wanting  in 
courage,  or  in  high  military  qualities  ;  and  French 
troops  have  marched  as  victors  over  nearly  the  whole  of 
Continental  Europe.  Facts  now  known  have  proved 
that  Prussia  in  1866  was  better  prepared  for  active 
war  than  Austria,  and  the  German  armies  were  doubtless 
more  efficiently  organized  in  1870  than  those  of  France. 
But  looking  at  the  relative  military  strength  of  these 
three  Powers,  their  population,  wealth,  wrar  material  in 
possession,  and  ability  to  keep  up  the  supply,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  the  difference,  if  any,  was  not  sufficient 
to  account  in  any  way  for  the  quickness  and  thorough 
ness  of  the  results,  and  we  must  look  to  the  genius  of 
Yon  Moltke  for  the  explanation. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  373 

The  South  was  almost  wholly  destitute  of  war 
material,  and  could  supply  herself  only  by  driblets,  and 
at  very  great  cost.  Almost  from  the  start  she  was 
isolated  by  blockade  from  communication  with  the 
countries  from  which  she  might  have  drawn  supplies. 
She  had  no  natural  lines  of  defence,  but  was  open  to 
invasion  along  a  frontier  of  many  hundreds  of  miles. 
Rivers,  sounds,  and  inlets,  which  she  had  no  naval  force 
to  defend,  afforded  access  to  her  very  heart.  Her  means 
of  inland  communication  were  hardly  more  than  equal 
to  the  requirements  of  ordinary  passenger  and  goods 
traffic,  and  proved  wholly  insufficient  for  war  transport. 
The  difficulty  of  arming  the  troops  in  the  field  was  so 
great  that  they  never  were  supplied  with  a  uniform 
weapon,  and  powder  was  so  scarce  and  difficult  to 
obtain,  that  it  was  found  necessary  to  form  artificial 
nitre  beds  for  its  manufacture,  and  some  of  them  were 
not  '  ripe  '  for  use  at  the  end  of  the  war.  The  difficulty 
of  transportation  was  so  great  that  it  was  impossible  to 
get  supplies  to  the  front,  and  the  troops  in  the  field 
were  often  on  poor  and  insufficient  rations.  The 
medical  staff  was  so  deficient  in  all  kinds  of  necessaries 
for  the  comfort  and  treatment  of  the  sick  and  wounded, 
that  many  men  died  from  sheer  want  of  them,  and 
thousands  were  unshod  and  without  greatcoats,  even  in 
winter.  When  all  these  drawbacks  and  deficiencies  are  con 
sidered,  there  still  remains  the  important  item  of  numbers, 
and  I  think  it  is  only  a  fair  estimate  to  say  that  the 
actual  fighting  population  of  the  South,  that  is  to  say, 
the  number  of  males  capable  of  bearing  arms,  was  not 
more  than  one-fifth  of  those  of  the  same  class  in  the 
States  which  adhered  to  the  Union.  Thus  over-matched, 
the  South  resisted  for  four  years,  and  some  of  the  most 
desperate  combats  of --the  war  were  fought  during  the 


374  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

advance  upon  Richmond,  and  along  the  lines  between 
the  James  River  and  Petersburg,  during  the  last  months 
of  the  struggle,  when  she  was  well-nigh  exhausted — 
when,  as  General  Grant  is  reported  to  have  said,  she  had 
'  robbed  the  cradle  and  the  grave '  to  supply  her  armies 
in  the  field. 

It  appears  to  me  that  the  South  could  not  have  held 
out  so  long  if  the  opposing  power  had  been  wielded 
with  a  superior  military  skill.  But  I  have  no  wish  to 
pursue  this  topic  further.  The  military  historian  of  the 
future  will  duly  consider  all  these  facts,  and  the  generals 
who  figured  in  the  great  Civil  War  will  be  placed  in 
their  relative  positions,  without  reference  to  the  adulations 
which  partial  friendship,  or  partizan  bias,  may  have 
heaped  upon  them  in  the  years  just  passed. 

The  Southern  people  know  that  many  persons  in 
England  sympathized  with  them,  and  that  their  cause 
w-as  not  without  able  and  eloquent  advocates  in  both 
Houses  of  the  British  Parliament.  It  was  very  generally 
thought  that  at  least  two  members  of  the  Cabinet  were 
also  very  favourably  inclined  towards  the  South,  but  that 
prudential  and  other  reasons,  and  the  belief  that  the 
rupture  was  final,  induced  the  Cabinet,  as  a  whole,  to  de 
cline  committing  the  Government  to  an  open  recognition 
of  the  Confederate  States. 

The  action  of  the  Ministers,  I  think,  demonstrated 
qlearly  that  they  were  agitated  by  unsettled  views  ;  they 
vacillated  and  did  not  act  up  to  their  own  declarations  ; 
they  did  and  said  things  which  deceived  both  sides — 
which  excited  hopes  at  the  South,  and  caused  irritation 
at  the  North  ;  and  this  wavering  policy  ended  at  last  in 
the  payment  of  £3,000,000  to  the  United  States,  for 
alleged  offences  which  Lord  Russell  had  often  repudiated, 
and  for  not  restraining  the  Confederates  from  doing  in 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  375 

England  what  he  more  than  once  declared  he  neither 
could  nor  would  prevent.  Perhaps  now  that  the  war  is 
over,  the  States  reunited,  and  the  people  of  the  two 
sections  are  drawing  near  to  each  other  in  sympathy,  and 
in  the  bonds  of  common  interests,  it  is  well  that  the 
South  has  no  debt  of  gratitude  to  pay,  and  that  the 
North  is  finding  out  that  she  has  no  real  grudge  to 
nurse  against  England.  These  great  political  convul 
sions  follow  the  inscrutable  laws  of  Providence,  and 
when  the  main  issues  and  the  grand  results  are  con 
trolled  by  a  Power  we  cannot  resist,  and  dare  not 
question,  it  is  hardly  worth  while  to  perplex  our  minds, 
and  to  vex  our  souls  by  snarling  at  each  other  over  the 
paltry  details. 

It  is  necessary,  perhaps,  to  state  that  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act  referred  to  in  this  narrative  is  the  Act 
of  1818,  and  all  the  remarks  upon  the  neutrality  laws  of 
Great  Britain,  and  the  registry  and  clearance  of  vessels, 
have  reference  to  the  condition  of  the  law  during  the 
years  1861-65,  when  the  alleged  offences  of  the  Con 
federates  were  committed.  Since  then  (1867)  the  law 
in  respect  to  the  clearance  of  vessels  has  been  changed, 
and  in  consequence  of  the  report  of  the  Neutrality  Com 
mission,  a  new  and  very  stringent  '  Foreign  Enlist 
ment  Act '  was  passed  in  1870.  The  statute  as  it  now 
stands  will  prove  very  vexatious  to  the  ship-building 
trade  whenever  England  is  again  a  neutral  during  a  great 
war.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  ship -building  trade  will 
then  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  Consuls  of  the  contending 
parties. 


376  THE  SECEET  SERVICE  OF  THE 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Review  of  the  Situation  in  November,  1861. — Changed  purposes  of 
the  Confederate  Government  in  regard  to  their  naval  operations. — 
Armour-clad  vessels  required. — Two  contracted  for  with  Messrs. 
Laird  Brothers. — Correspondence  concerning  them. — Their  transfer 
to  Messrs.  Bravay,  and  their  ultimate  purchase  by  Government  and 
enrolment  in  her  Majesty's  navy  as  the  Scorpion  and  the  Wivern. — 
Action  of  her  Majesty's  Government  and  that  of  the  United 
States  in  reference  to  these  vessels. — Inconsistency  of  the  declara 
tions  and  actions  of  the  British  Government. 

AN  explanation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  and  the 
manner  in  which  it  was  made  applicable  to  the  operations 
of  the  Confederate  agents  in  England  appeared  to  be  a 
necessary  part  of  the  history  of  those  operations ;  and 
the  account  of  the  '  Alexandra  Case/  which  furnished  a 
practical  exposition  of  the  statute,  has  again  carried 
the  narrative  far  in  advance  of  the  due  course  of  events. 
The  chief  purpose  of  the  Confederate  Government  in 
sending  me  to  Europe  was  at  first  to  get  ships  afloat 
capable  of  keeping  the  sea  as  long  as  possible,  and  other 
wise  fitted  to  cruise  and  destroy  the  enemy's  commerce  ; 
and  my  original  instructions  were  to  put  six  suitable 
vessels  in  commission  with  all  reasonable  despatch. 
Insufficiency  of  money,  and  the  pressing  wants  of  the 
Navy  Department  in  other  respects,  compelled  me  to 
limit  the  number  to  the  two  whose  despatch  from 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.          .   377 

England  has  already  been  described  ;  and  it  soon  became 
manifest  that  they  were  enough  to  drive  the  American 
commercial  flag  away  from  the  principal  routes  of  trade. 
But  the  designs  of  the  Government  assumed  a  broader 
range  after  my  departure  from  Montgomery,  and  the 
reality  and  magnitude  of  the  war  in  which  the  country 
was  involved  had  become  apparent. 

By  the  time  of  my  return  to  the  Confederacy  in  the 
Fingal  (November,  1861),  the  battles  of  Bull  Eun  and 
Leesburgh  had  been  fought ;  there  had  been  some  active 
campaigning  in  Western  Virginia  ;  Port  Royal  and  the 
chief  inlets  of  the  great  North  Carolina  Sounds  had  been 
occupied  by  the  United  States  forces  ;  and  a  blockade  of 
the  southern  coast  from  the  Chesapeake  to  the  Mississippi, 
and  even  beyond  as  far  west  on  the  gulf- shore  as  Sabine 
Pass,  had  been  proclaimed.  The  coast  was  too  long  for 
the  number  of  ships  then  on  the  United  States  navy-list 
to  guard  effectively  ;  but  Europe,  and  indeed  all  the 
neutral  states,  were  satisfied  with  the  assurance  that  a 
sufficient  force  would  soon  be  placed  off  the  ports  and 
chief  inlets  to  justify  the  distinction  between  a  genuine 
and  a  proper  blockade,  and  they  had  acknowledged  the 
state  of  war  and  the  legitimate  consequences  appertaining 
to  that  condition. 

The  Confederate  Government  had  also  removed  to 
.Richmond,  the  several  Executive  Departments  had  been 
more  completely  organized,  and  there  was  a  general 
conviction  among  the  higher  and  more  experienced 
officials  that  the  contest  would  be  fierce,  and  probably 
long.  Winter  weather  had  set  in.  Active  campaigning 
had  ceased  along  the  northern  frontier  of  Virginia. 
The  two  combatants  were  warily  watching  each  other, 
and  each  was  preparing  to  renew  hostilities  on  a  large 
scale.  The  United  States  were  organizing  a  great  army 


378  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

on  the  Potomac,  for  an  effective,  and  they  hoped  a 
crushing,  advance  upon  Richmond  in  the  early  spring 
of  1862.  The  Confederate  Government  was  straining 
every  nerve  to  equip  the  forces  necessary  to  repel 
the  threatened  invasion,  and  to  occupy  the  many  weak 
points  along  the  extended  line  of  land  frontier  and  sea 
coast. 

Although  the  enemy's  naval  strength  had  enabled 
him  to  occupy  with  but  little  resistance  a  number 
of  important  points,  such  as  Port  Royal,  Roanoke 
Inlet,  etc.,  and  to  place  there,  under  cover  of  his  ships, 
military  forces  which  proved  to  be  a  constant  and 
embarrassing  menace,  yet  on  the  whole  the  balance 
of  success  up  to  that  time  was  in  favour  of  the  Con 
federates.  The  advance  upon  Richmond  by  way  of 
Bull  Run  had  certainly  been  the  largest  and  most 
important  operation  of  the  war  at  the  close  of  1861,  and 
the  invading  army  had  been  so  thoroughly  beaten  at 
that  now  historic  creek,  that  the  remnant  fled  into 
Washington  without  organization  or  cohesiveness,  a 
mere  flying  rabble.  General  McDowell's  army  at  Bull 
Run  was  a  larger  and  more  efficient  force  in  every 
respect  than  the  hastily  gathered  and  ill-armed 
volunteers  under  Beauregard  and  Johnstone,  and  I 
believe  it  is  generally  admitted  that  his  dispositions  were 
judicious,  and  that  his  plan  of  advance  and  attack  was 
skilfully  and  energetically  executed,  so  far  as  his  own 
efforts  and  those  of  his  staff  were  concerned.  Accord 
ing  to  all  sound  rules  of  calculation,  he  ought  to 
have  won  the  battle  in  spite  of  the  unquestioned  gallantry 
and  stubborn  hardihood  of  the  Southern  troops.  The 
sudden  panic  which  seized  the  Federal  army,  and  which 
drove  whole  brigades  into  confusion,  and  then  precipi 
tated  them  into  a  headlong  rout  of  unparalleled  confusion 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  379 

and  dismay,  is  simply  a  fact  in  the  history  of  the  war 
which  I  shall  not  attempt  to  explain.  I  saw  the  effect 
in  the  feeling  of  hopeful  confidence  which  the  event  had 
inspired  among  the  Southern  people,  and  yet  it  was 
manifest  that  the  higher  authorities  at  Richmond  were 
not  possessed  by  any  vain  expectation  that  another 
Federal  army  would  run  away,  or  that  the  Confederate 
States  would  win  their  independence,  except  by  hard 
fighting  and  patient  endurance. 

The  War  Department  was  steadily  and  systematically 
collecting  material,  and  massing  troops.  The  Navy 
Department  was  striving  to  build  and  equip  vessels  at 
several  coast  places,  and  on  some  inland  waters,  for 
harbour  and  river  defence,  and  had  begun  to  entertain 
hopes  of  doing  something  more  abroad  than  to  com 
mission  ships  to  cruise  against  the  enemy's  commerce. 
The  Treasury  Department  was  hard  at  work  upon  the 
finances,  devising  means  of  converting  the  great  staples 
which  remained  in  the  country  into  money,  or  discussing 
how  they  might  be  used  as  the  basis  of  credit  in  Europe 
to  meet  the  wants  of  the  two  fighting  departments  of 
the  Government. 

I  have  already  (Chapter  III.)  given  some  account 
of  the  views  and  purposes  of  the  Navy  Department 
at  the  time  above  referred  to,  and  of  the  especial 
duties  assigned  me.  In  the  subsequent  course  of  the 
narrative  the  change  in  respect  to  my  own  services  and 
employment  has  been  necessarily  mentioned,  and  now 
I  must  further  relate  a  still  more  important  advance 
in  the  purposes  of  the  Confederate  Government  with 
respect  to  naval  operations  against  the  enemy. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  on  my  arrival  at  Savannah 
with  the  Fingal  in  November,  1861,  I  was  immediately 
ordered  to  Richmond  for  consultation  with  the  Navy 


380  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Department.  Among  the  many  matters  discussed  was 
the  subject  of  ironclad  vessels,  and  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  (Hon.  S.  R.  Mallory)  was  much  impressed  with 
the  importance  of  getting  vessels  of  that  description  to 
match  the  enemy's  '  Monitors,'  and  to  open  and  protect 
the  blockaded  ports.  He  told  me  that  he  had  sent 
Lieutenant  James  H.  North  to  England  to  inquire  into 
the  construction  of  such  vessels,  but  had  not  yet  heard 
from  him. 

Mr.  Mallory's  earnest  desire  was  to  find  the  money 
to  build,  and  to  decide  upon  the  best  type  of  armoured 
vessels  for  operations  on  the  coast.  It  was  impossible 
to  build  them  in  the  Confederate  States — neither  the 
materials  nor  the  mechanics  were  there  ;  and  besides, 
even  if  iron  and  skilled  artizans  had  been  within  reach, 
there  was  not  a  mill  in  the  country  to  roll  the  plates, 
nor  furnaces  and  machinery  to  forge  them,  nor  shops  to 
make  the  engines. 

I  gave  all  the  information  I  then  had  on  the  subject, 
and  Mr.  Mallory  directed  me  to  make  further  and  more 
especial  inquiries  as  soon  as  I  got  back  to  England,  but 
nothing  definite  was  decided  when  I  left  Richmond. 
Just  before  leaving  Savannah  en  route  for  Wilmington, 
to  run  the  blockade  of  that  port,  I  received  specific 
instructions  on  the  subject  in  a  letter  from  the  Navy 
Department,  of  which  the  following  is  a  copy: — 


'  Navy  Department, 

'Kichmond,  January  Itth,  1862. 
'  SIR — 

' 1  desire  more  particularly  to  direct  your  atten 
tion  to  the  subject  of  constructing  iron  or  steel  clad 
ships  in  France  or  England  than  was  done  in  my  letter 
of  the  llth  inst.  Lieutenant  North  has  had  this  matter 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  381 

in  charge,  but  has  not  yet  been  able  to  do  anything 
with  it.  I  earnestly  desire  to  have  an  armoured  steam- 
sloop  of  moderate  size,  say  of  about  2,000  tons,  and  to 
carry  eight  or  ten  heavy  guns,  built  in  England  upon 
the  most  approved  plan  and  in  the  shortest  time,  and 
the  evident  change  of  feeling  and  opinion  in  England  in 
relation  to  our  country  induces  me  to  believe  that  we 
may  now  contract  for  the  construction  and  delivery  of 
such  a  vessel/ 

Then  follow  some  general  comments  upon  the  Gloire, 
Warrior,  and  Black  Prince  : 

4  Many  plans  of  such  a  vessel  have  been  submitted, 
and  herewith  I  send  you  the  drawings,  without  specifi 
cations  of  the  one  devised  by  Naval- Constructor  Porter 

and  Chief- Engineer  Williamson I  submit  this 

plan  for  your  information  only ;  but  so  anxious  am  I  to 
have  an  ironclad  ship  built,  that  should  you  and  Lieu 
tenant  North,  with  whom  I  associate  you  in  this  matter, 
be  able  to  contract,  or  to  make  the  preparatory  arrange 
ments  to  contract,  for  an  armoured,  either  steel  or  iron 
clad,  ship,  you  will  proceed  with  despatch  to  prescribe 
the  character  of  the  vessel,  and  I  will  place  the  funds  in 

England  at  once 

'  I  am,  etc., 

'  S.  R.  MALLORY. 

'  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
'  Captain  James  D.  Bulloch, 
*  Savannah,  Georgia.' 

Anyone  who  cares  to  refer  to  the  leading  newspaper 
articles,  and  who  remembers  the  general  tone  of  public 
sentiment  in  England  at  about  the  date  of  the  above 
letter,  will,  I  think,  admit  that  there  was  a  very  apparent 
tendency  of  opinion  towards  a  feeling  of  sympathy 


382  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

with  the  Confederate  cause,  and  that  the  Government  at 
Eichmond  had  reason  at  that  time  to  expect,  if  not 
formal  recognition,  at  least  that  degree  of  passive  en 
couragement  which  would  enable  their  agents  to  obtain 
all  necessary  supplies  without  further  restraint  than  was 
sufficient  to  maintain  a  fair  impartial  neutrality. 

I  arrived  in  Liverpool  on  the  10th  of  March,  and 
began  at  once  to  examine  into  the  question  of  ironclads, 
which  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  had  so  much  at  heart. 
On  the  21st  of  March  I  advised  him  that  I  was  in  full 
treaty  with  competent  builders,  and  hoped  to  be  able  to 
send  a  detailed  report,  with  plans,  etc.,  in  a  very  short 
time.  I  soon  perceived,  however,  by  the  strict  watch 
upon  the  Florida,  which  I  was  then  trying  to  despatch 
from  Liverpool,  and  from  the  espionage  upon  the 
Alabama,  and  other  signs,  that  the  Foreign  Enlistment 
Act  would  be  most  rigorously  enforced  in  respect  to  all 
undertakings  on  behalf  of  the  Confederate  Government, 
and  in  a  despatch  dated  April  llth,  1862, 1  reported  my 
fears  on  the  subject,  and  ventured  to  ask  whether  it 
would  not  be  well  to  concentrate  all  the  resources  of  the 
Navy  Department  for  the  defence  of  the  home  ports,  and 
I  then  added  : — 

'  I  find  that  several  parties  would  contract  for  any 
description  of  ship,  but,  as  I  have  before  remarked,  an 
ironclad  sea-going  ship  must  be  large,  and  would  require 
at  least  a  year  to  complete  after  the  order  was  received 
on  this  side.  I  would  therefore  respectfully  suggest  that 
wooden  vessels  be  laid  down  at  once  at  the  various  ports 
in  the  Confederacy,  where  timber  is  abundant,  then,  by 
sending  over  scale  drawings,  or  working  plans,  of  their 
decks  and  sides,  the  iron  plates,  rivets,  bolts,  etc.,  could 
be  made  here,  marked,  and  shipped  to  arrive  as  soon  as 
the  vessels  would  be  readv  to  receive  them/ 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  383 

Later  in  the  war,  vessels  were  built  in  the  Confederate 
States — at  least  they  were  begun — and  engines  were  sent 
from  England  for  them  ;  but  rny  suggestion  did  not 
promptly  reach  the  Navy  Department,  and  at  the  begin 
ning  the  Government  was  impressed  with  the  feeling 
that  the  arrogant  tone  of  Mr.  Seward's  despatches  to  the 
United  States  Ministers  abroad,  and  the  excessive  harsh 
ness  with  which  the  right  of  search  and  of  capture  was 
practised  by  the  United  States  cruisers  upon  neutral 
vessels,  would  either  create  active  opposition,  and  per 
haps  interference  with  the  blockade,  or  would  so  irritate 
the  Maritime  Powers  that  they  would  not  be  over- strict 
in  pressing  their  neutrality  laws.  Hence  it  was  thought 
advisable  to  begin  a  few  ironclad  vessels  at  once. 

At  any  rate,  it  was  my  duty  to  carry  out  the  views  of 
the  Executive  Government,  and  I  pushed  on  with  all 
possible  arrangements,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  act  promptly 
as  soon  as  definite  instructions  were  received.  Com 
munication  by  letter  with  the  Confederate  States  was 
generally  slow,  as  our  mails  had  to  go  to  Bermuda  and 
Nassau,  and  thence  wait  the  departure  of  a  blockade- 
runner  which  the  Government  agent  would  be  willing 
to  trust.  Sometimes,  however,  we  sent  cypher 
despatches  through  Baltimore,  and  got  very  quick 
replies  ;  but  this  could  only  be  done  under  great  reserve, 
and  for  very  special  purposes.  On  the  10th  of  June, 
1862,  I  received  a  long  despatch  from  the  Navy  Depart 
ment,  treating  of  general  matters.  It  was  dated  April 
30th,  and  so  had  been  forty-one  days  coming.  That 
letter  contained  specific  instructions  to  begin  at  least 
two  iron-clad  vessels,  and  I  replied  by  the  first  return 
ing  mail  for  Bermuda,  via  Halifax. 

The  following  extract  from  my  despatch  relates  to  the 
above-mentioned  instructions  : 


384  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

;  Finding,  on  niy  arrival  in  England  in  March,  1862, 
that  Lieutenant  North  had,  as  he  informed  me,  specific 
orders  to  buy  or  build  a  frigate,  and  that  he  had  already 
made  arrangements  to  contract  for  such  a  vessel  as  soon 
as  the  necessary  funds  arrived,  I  devoted  myself  primarily 
to  the  especial  duties  assigned  me ;  but  as  vessels  (iron 
clad)  capable  of  acting  efficiently  either  in  the  attack 
or  defence  of  our  coast  must  necessarily  be  of  light 
draught,  I  put  myself  in  communication  with  eminent 
iron- shipbuilders,  whose  position  enabled  them  to  obtain 
the  official  reports  of  all  experiments,  with  the  view  of 
determining  the  minimum  draft  compatible  writh  sea 
worthiness.  It  resulted,  from  a  close  calculation  of 
weights  and  form  of  model,  that  by  using  turrets  instead 
of  broadside  batteries,  whereby  the  sides  would  be 
relieved  from  much  strain  and  the  heavy  weights  be 
thrown  over  the  centre,  a  vessel  might  be  built  of  about 
the  following  dimensions  :  length,  230  feet  ;  beam, 
extreme,  42  feet ;  draft,  with  crew  and  stores  for  three 
months,  15  feet;  engines,  350-horse-power  nominal; 
speed,  10^  knots  ;  tonnage,  1,850. 

'  I  immediately  directed  the  plans  and  scale-drawings 
of  such  a  ship  to  be  made,  and  reported  to  you  by  letter 
that  I  would  forward  them  as  soon  as  they  were  ready 
and  an  opportunity  offered.  While  this  was  going  on— 
I  think  about  the  middle  of  May — Lieutenant  North 
received  a  remittance  of  $150,000,  unaccompanied  by 
any  letter  of  advice,  as  I  was  informed ;  and  supposing 
it  to  be  for  the  uses  mentioned  in  his  original  in 
structions,  he  prepared  at  once  to  close  up  a  contract  for 
an  armoured  frigate,  and  notified  me  of  the  fact. 

4 1  advised  him  that  a  ship  of  less  size,  cost,  and  draft 
could  be  built ;  but  he  deemed  his  orders  specific  and 
peremptory  as  to  class  of  ship,  and  contracted  for  a 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  385 

frigate  of  3,200  tons  accordingly.  About  the  10th  of 
June  I  received  your  letter  of  April  30th,  in  which  you 
say  :  "  I  write  to  Commander  Semmes  to  take  command 
of  the  largest  of  the  two  vessels  built  by  you,  and  I 
write  also  to  Lieutenant  North  to  take  command  of  the 
other  vessel ;"  and  you  direct  me  to  furnish  those  officers 
with  funds  for  cruising  expenses.  As  to  myself  you  say  : 
"  I  hasten  to  urge  upon  you  the  necessity  of  having 
at  least  two  armoured  vessels  built  and  equipped  at 
the  earliest  possible  moment."  "  Act  upon  your  own 
judgment,  to  save  time.  British  inquiry  and  experi 
ments,  and  your  own  knowledge  of  the  bars  and  waters 
of  our  country,  will  enable  you  to  act  advisedly." 

'  To  render  these  instructions  possible  of  fulfilment, 
you  inform  me  that  one  million  of  dollars  has  already 
been  placed  to  my  credit  with  Messrs.  Fraser,  Trenholm 
and  Co.,  and  that  you  hope  to  increase  the  amount  to 
two  millions  very  soon. 

4  Fortunately,  I  was  in  a  position  to  act  promptly 
upon  those  instructions.  The  drawings  and  plans 
ordered  were  nearly  finished,  and  on  the  day  after  the 
receipt  of  your  letter  I  requested  the  parties  who  had 
been  assisting  me  all  along  to  make  a  tender  for  the 
contract,  having  previously  provided  myself  with  esti 
mates  from  other  builders  who  competed  for  Admiralty 
contracts.  In  a  few  days  the  price  was  agreed  upon, 
and  I  gave  a  verbal  order  for  two  vessels,  so  that  no 
time  should  be  lost  in  contracting  for  the  large  quantity 
of  armour  plates  required.  By  giving  the  order  for 
both  vessels  to  the  same  builders  I  got  a  reduction  of 
£1,250  on  the  cost  of  each,  and  by  adopting  the  same 
size  and  model  of  ship,  and  a  like  form  of  engines,  they 
can  both  be  completed  in  very  nearly  the  same  time. 
Besides  this,  experience  has  taught  me  that  it  is  far 

VOL.  i.  25 


386  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

safer  to  keep  our  business  as  little  extended  as  possible, 
as  otherwise  the  chance  of  our  transactions  being  ferreted 
out  by  the  Federal  spies,  who  abound  even  in  this 
country,  is  greatly  increased. 

'  For  full  description  of  these  vessels,  I  beg  to  refer 
you  to  the  drawings.  ...  A  clause  in  the  contract 
gives  me  the  right  to  modify  or  alter  them  in  certain 
particulars,  as  experience,  during  the  progress  of  the 
work,  may  suggest/ 

Here  follows  a  minute  description  of  the  peculiar 
construction  and  rig  of  the  ships. 

6  The  first  of  these  ships  will  be  ready  for  sea  in 
March,  1863,  and  the  second  in  May.  Cost  of  each, 
fully  equipped,  except  magazines  and  battery,  £93,750.' 

I  added  that  the  contracting  parties  had  shown  great 
confidence  in  me  by  taking  this  large  contract  upon  my 
assurance  that  the  money  would  be  forthcoming,  and  I 
hoped  that  the  remittances  would  be  forwarded  so  as  to 
ensure  prompt  payment  of  the  several  instalments  as 
they  fell  due.  The  builders  with  whom  I  contracted 
for  the  above  ships  were  Messrs.  Laird  Brothers,  of 
Birkenhead,  and  the  whole  of  the  arrangements  were 
made  in  the  same  way  as  those  for  the  building  of  the 
Alabama.  They  treated  with  me  as  a  private  individual, 
and  the  contract  was  a  purely  '  commercial  transaction/ 
the  agreement  being  that  they  should  build  and  deliver 
the  two  vessels  to  me  in  the  port  of  Liverpool,  finished 
according  to  the  stipulated  specifications,  but  furnished 
only  with  such  fittings  and  outfit  as  were  required  for 
an  ordinary  sea-voyage.  In  order  to  avoid  every  pos 
sible  appearance  of  an  intent  to  arm  them  within  British 
jurisdiction,  it  was  arranged  that  no  magazines  were  to 
be  placed  in  either  ship,  nor  any  special  places  for 
stowing  shells  and  ordnance  stores. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  387 

I  have  stated  very  confidently  that  at  the  time  of 
contracting  for  the  Alabama  the  Messrs.  Laird  knew 
nothing  of  my  connection  with  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment,  but  at  the  date  when  the  contracts  for  the  two 
armoured  vessels  were  concluded,  the  Florida  had  already 
left  Liverpool  and  the  Alabama  was  nearly  ready  to 
start.  My  name  had  been  often  mentioned  in  the 
United  States  Consul's  affidavits  as  an  agent  of  the 
Confederate  Navy  Department,  and  they  (the  Messrs. 
Laird)  had  no  doubt  been  informed  of  those  affidavits, 
and  knew  therefore  as  much,  but  no  more,  than  anyone 
else  whose  attention  had  been  attracted  to  the  two 
handsome-looking  and  handy  vessels  which  were  alleged 
to  be  the  property  of  one  of  the  belligerents  across  the 
sea. 

I  wish  to  make  no  mystery  of  these  proceedings,  nor 
to  set  up  a  pretence  that  the  Messrs.  Laird  did  not 
believe  that  the  two  formidable  vessels  they  were  about 
to  build  would  ultimately  find  their  way  to  a  Confederate 
port ;  all  that  I  affirm  is  that  they  never  heard  from  me 
that  I  was  not  building  the  vessels  for  my  own  personal 
account,  and  throughout  the  whole  of  the  transactions 
nothing  was  said  by  them  as  to  the  intent.  They 
undertook  '  to  build  the  two  ships  in  obedience  to 
an  order,  and  in  compliance  with  a  contract,  leaving 
it  to  those  who  bought  them  to  make  what  use  they 
thought  fit  of  them/  a  transaction  which,  it  must  be 
remembered,  was  subsequently  pronounced  by  the  Lord 
Chief  Baron  of  the  Exchequer  to  be  perfectly  legiti 
mate. 

Before  closing  the  contracts  with  the  Messrs.  Laird, 
I  had  of  course  considered  and  discussed  with  my 
solicitor  whether  armour-plating  a  ship  could  be  con 
sidered  '  equipment '  within  the  meaning  of  the  Foreign 

25—2 


388  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Enlistment  Act.  He  went  carefully  over  the  opinions 
given  by  counsel  with  reference  to  the  Alabama,  and 
said  that  the  statute  did  not  forbid  the  building1  of  any 
description  of  ship,  that  the  prohibitory  clauses  referred 
to  the  arming  or  furnishing  a  vessel  with  ammunition 
and  ordnance  stores  for  warlike  purposes.  I  afterwards 
learned  that  Messrs.  Laird  took  counsel's  opinion  also 
before  undertaking  to  build  the  ships,  and  they  were 
informed  that  there  was  nothing  illegal  in  the  proposed 
transaction.  It  will  be  perceived  that  every  possible 
effort  was  made  to  get  at  the  meaning  and  application 
of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  so  that  there  might  be 
no  intentional  or  heedless  violation  of  the  municipal 
law,  and  no  reckless  indifference  to  the  Queen's  neu 
trality. 

The  judgment  of  the  court  in  the  case  of  the 
Alexandra  was  not  rendered  until  April,  1863,  and  the 
explicit  declarations  of  Lord  Palmerston,  Earl  Russell, 
and  the  Solicitor-General  (Sir  Roundell  Palmer)  were 
not  made  until  March,  1863  ;  but  it  was  shown  in  the 
preceding  chapter  that  those  declarations  and  that 
judgment  confirmed  the  opinion  previously  given  by 
counsel,  namely,  that  it  was  perfectly  legal  for  a  British 
subject  to  build  a  ship  of  any  description  as  a  purely 
mercantile  transaction,  and  deliver  her  unarmed  to  a 
purchaser,  even  though  the  ship  was  t  destined  for  war 
like  purposes ;'  or  '  even  if  meant  for  the  Confederate 
States  '  as  the  Solicitor-General  expressed  it. 

By  the  middle  of  July,  1862,  the  work  on  both  ships 
had  fairly  begun,  and  there  were  reasonable  grounds  for 
hope  that  they  would  be  permitted  to  leave  Liverpool, 
when  completed,  in  an  unarmed  state.  They  were 
known  in  the  yard  while  building  as  '  294 '  and  '  295,' 
but  those  numbers  did  not  attract  the  notice,  nor 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  389 

suggest  the  mystery  attributed  to  the  figures  '  290,'  by 
which  the  Alabama  was  at  first  known.  The  circum 
stances  connected  with  the  building  of  these  two  vessels, 
and  the  very  peculiar  arrangement  by  which  they  were 
taken  into  the  Koyal  Navy  as  her  Majesty's  ships 
Scorpion  and  Wivern,  are  important  and  interesting  as 
historical  reminiscences,  and  to  avoid  the  possibility  of 
overdrawing  them  or  of  giving  a  fresh  colouring  to 
a  single  incident,  I  shall,  at  the  cost  of  sacrificing  some 
regularity  and  smoothness  in  the  narrative,  merely  give 
extracts  from  my  official  reports  to  the  Confederate 
Navy  Department  on  the  subject,  in  the  precise  order  of 
date,  with  such  other  correspondence  as  may  appear 
necessary  to  a  full  and  clear  illustration  of  the  whole 
matter. 

In  a  despatch  dated  'Liverpool,  August  llth,  1862,' 
I  reported  as  follows  : — 

'  The  armour-clad  ships  are  getting  on  finely,  and 
I  have  great  hopes  that  I  shall  be  allowed  to  use 
the  revolving  turrets.  ...  If  the  war  continues  until 
spring,  these  vessels  may  yet  have  important  and  con 
clusive  work  in  the  question  of  the  blockade.  The 
difficulty  of  getting  them  fairly  to  sea  will  be  very  great, 
however,  and  I  confess  that  thus  far  I  do  not  see 
the  means  to  be  adopted.' 

September  10 th,  1862,  I  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  thus : — 

*  I  trust  you  have  learned  by  this  time  what  I  am 
doing  in  iron,  and  have  received  my  plans,  etc.  The 
work  is  going  on  to  my  entire  satisfaction,  and  if  funds 
do  not  fail,  you  shall  have  two  formidable  ships  ready 
in  the  early  spring.  .  .  .  At  the  proper  time  I  will 
suggest  the  means  of  getting  officers  out  for  these 
ships.  For  the  present  I  think  they  had  better  not 


390  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

be  sent  here.  The  presence  of  a  number  of  naval 
officers  in  England  could  not  fail  to  excite  comment, 
and  their  movements  would  be  closely  watched.  I 
do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  embarrassment  has  already 
been  occasioned  by  the  number  of  persons  from  the 
South  who  represent  themselves  to  be  agents  of  the 
Confederate  States  Government.  There  are  men  so 
constituted  as  not  to  be  able  to  conceal  their  connection 
with  any  affairs  which  may  by  chance  add  to  their 
importance,  and  such  persons  are  soon  found  out  and 
drawn  into  confessions  and  statements  by  gossiping 
acquaintances,  to  the  serious  detriment  of  the  service 
upon  which  they  are  engaged. 

'  The  proper  armament  for  the  turret -ships  is  engaging 
my  serious  thoughts.  Experiments  are  in  progress 
at  Shoeburyness  to  determine  this  very  point,  and 
I  will  watch  the  results  until  the  time  requisite  for  the 
construction  of  the  guns  compels  me  to  make  a  choice. 
...  I  have  resolved  to  construct  the  turrets  to 
revolve,  and  run  the  risk  of  being  interfered  with,  and 
there  will  be  two  guns  of  the  heaviest  calibre  practicable 
for  actual  service  in  each  turret,  mounted  parallel  to 
each  other,  and  four  and  a  half  feet  from  centre  to 
centre.  The  ports  will  be  oval,  large  enough  vertically 
to  give  twelve  degrees  of  elevation  and  five  degrees  of 
depression,  with  just  width  enough  to  clear  the  chase  ol 
the  guns,  so  that  an  object  can  be  seen  over  the  side 
sights. 

i  I  have  the  working  drawings  of  Captain  Cowper 
Coles'  turret,  and  will  send  them  by  first  safe  oppor 
tunity.  You  are  aware  of  the  difficulty  of  sending 
letters,  and  the  consequent  necessity  of  being  as  brief  as 
possible.  I  cannot,  therefore,  reason  upon  points  of 
interest,  but  must  request  you  to  be  satisfied  with 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  391 

simple  statements.  I  am  making  a  collection  of  all  the 
official  reports  of  expriments  upon  matters  connected 
with  ships  and  their  armaments,  and  have  the  evidence 
given  before  the  "  Defence  Committee"  and  the  "  Plate 
Committee "  of  the  House  of  Commons.  These  are 
in  pamphlets,  are  too  valuable  to  be  lost,  and  could  not 
be  replaced,  so  I  must  await  a  safe  opportunity  to  send 
them.' 

4  Liverpool,  September  2M. —  ...  I  have  nothing  to 
add  except  that  the  ships  are  progressing  as  rapidly  as 
could  be  expected,  and  that  I  am  more  pleased  with 
them  every  day.  The  ships  being  of  entirely  new 
design,  I  see  reasons  to  modify  the  plans  from  time  to 
time,  but  only  in  immaterial  points  not  involving 
important  alterations.  ...  I  confidently  expect  to 
afford  you  great  satisfaction  in  the  character  of  these 
ships.  I  think  they  will  be  as  near  an  approach  to 
cruising  ships  as  can  be  devised,  when  the  powers  of 
defence  and  offence  are  considered  in  conjunction  with 
their  light  draft  of  water,  fifteen  feet  extreme.' 

'  Liverpool,  November  7th,  1862. —  .  .  .  Armour-clad 
Ships. — An  unusual  amount  of  bad  weather  has  some 
what  interfered  with  a  certain  portion  of  the  work  upon 
the  ships  of  this  description  ;  but  the  builders  are  as 
anxious  as  I  am  to  have  them  ready  in  the  stipulated 
time,  and  have  covered  them  with  comfortable  sheds,  and 
have  even  introduced  gas,  so  as  to  insure  additional  hours 
for  work  during  the  short  foggy  days  of  this  climate.  I 
have  decided  upon  the  means  of  getting  the  first  of  these 
ships  clear  of  British  jurisdiction  in  a  manner  not  to  in 
fringe  her  Majesty's  proclamation ;  but  the  attempt  will 
be  attended  with  difficulty,  and  will  require  to  be  con 
ducted  with  such  caution  and  secrecy  that  I  fear  to 
mention  the  plan  even  in  this  way.  .  .  .  In  each 


392  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

attempt  to  get  a  ship  out  a  different  plan  must  be  pur 
sued.  As  the  first  of  these  ships  will  be  ready  in  April, 
it  is  time  to  arrange  for  getting  the  officers  detailed  and 
in  a  position  to  join  her. 

*  I  am  still  firmly  of  the  opinion  that  to  send  a  staff  of 
officers  to  this  country  would  excite  comment  and  sus 
picion,  and  would  probably  end  in  failure  to  accomplish 
the  end  in  view.  I  have  reason  to  be  sure  that  if  I  had 
not  sent  the  Alabama  and  her  armament  away  before  the 
arrival  of  Captain  Semmes  and  his  officers,  she  would 
have  been  stopped.  I  beg  leave,  therefore,  to  throw  out 
the  following  suggestion  for  your  consideration.  Select 
the  officers  for  each  ship,  also  a  few  leading  men  and 
marines — non-commissioned  officers  who  are  natives  of 
the  South,  or  bond-fide  citizens  of  the  Confederacy — to 
give  nationality  to  the  crew  and  to  ensure  the  actual 
possession  of  the  ship  until  the  men  shipped  at  large  are 
got  into  a  good  state  of  discipline. 

'  Send  the  first  detachment  out  in  a  steamer  especially 
provided  for  the  purpose,  so  as  to  be  under  the  control 
of  the  senior  officer,  and  direct  them  to  proceed  at  once 
to  the  island  of  Madeira.  Upon  arrival  at  Madeira,  the 
senior  officer  should  be  instructed  to  notify  me  by  the 
English,  as  well  as  by  the  Portuguese,  mail,  to  coal  his 
ship,  have  everything  ready  to  sail  at  short  notice,  and  if 
he  finds  his  presence  excites  comment,  to  go  out  on  a 
short  cruise,  leaving  a  letter  with  her  Majesty's  Consul, 
addressed  to  Captain  W.  Arkwright,  British  ship  Car- 

natic The    steamer   employed  for   this  service 

should  be  sailed  under  the  British  flag,  or,  better  still, 
the  French  flag,  if  a  French  owner  can  be  found  for  her, 
and  she  should  be  managed  in  every  way  as  a  merchant 
vessel,  the  officers  and  their  staff  being  simply  passengers. 
The  Julia  Usher,  a  small  steamer  belonging  to  Messrs. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  393 

Eraser,  Trenholm  and  Co.,  will  very  shortly  sail  for  a 
Southern  port.  If  she  gets  in  you  might  employ  her  for 
the  service — or  the  Giraffe,  if  she  can  be  supplied  with 
coal,  would  be  a  still  better  ship,  from  her  great  speed. 
It  would  be  well  to  combine  movements,  so  that  the 
officers  should  not  arrive  much  ahead  of  the  ship  they 
are  to  join,  and  with  the  state  of  the  blockade  under 
your  own  eye,  you  can  arrange  their  departure  from  the 
Confederate  port,  so  as  to  reach  Madeira  about  the  10th 
of  April.  ...  As  Captain  Semmes  will  soon  have  a 
thoroughly  organized  crew,  I  respectfully  suggest  that 
one  of  these  ships  be  put  at  his  disposal.  The  officers 
sent  out  could  be  transferred  to  the  Alabama.  I  am  sure 
Captain  Semmes  would  be  pleased  with  such  an  arrange 
ment,  and  I  have  written  him  that  it  was  my  intention 
to  bring  the  matter  to  your  consideration.  There  may 
be  difficulty  in.  communicating  with  Captain  Semmes, 
but  I  shall  soon  know,  as  he  will  probably  be  at  the  first 
rendezvous  agreed  upon  in  a  fortnight.  I  have  already 
sent  out  a  cargo  of  coal  to  meet  him  at  Port  Eoyal,  Mar 
tinique.  .  .  . 

'  I  will  not  add  anything  on  the  subject  of  my  being 
detailed  for  the  command  of  one  of  the  ships,  but  beg  to 
refer  to  a  previous  letter  in  which  I  have  set  forth  my 
feelings  and  hopes.  My  ambition  is  to  get  afloat,  but 
after  what  you  say  in  your  letter  of  July  12th,  I  feel 
bound  to  submit  with  becoming  grace  to  any  assign 
ment  of  duty  for  myself  you  may  think  the  interests  of 
the  public  service  may  require.  You  will  pardon,  I 
trust,  the  personal  character  of  these  remarks.  They 
are  induced  by  that  professional  pride  you  are  well  aware 
an  officer  should  always  possess.' 

'  Liverpool ,  November  21st,  1862. —  ....  The  work 
upon  the  armoured  ships  progresses  favourably.' 


394  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

6  Liverpool,  December  18th,  1862. — I  am  gratified  to 
learn  that  you  approve  of  the  designs  for  the  two  armour- 
clad  ships.  ...  As  their  life  must  necessarily  begin 
with  a  sea -voyage  of  over  three  thousand  miles,  it  was 
absolutely  necessary  to  secure  good  sea-going  qualities 
and  fair  speed,  which  I  think  could  not  have  been 
accomplished  on  less  draft  and  dimensions.  I  designed 
these  ships  for  something  more  than  harbour  or  even 
coast  defence,  and  I  confidently  believe,  if  ready  for  sea 
now,  they  could  sweep  away  the  entire  blockading  fleet 
of  the  enemy/ 

'Liverpool,  January  23rc/,  1863. —  ....  I  was  pre 
pared  for  all  ordinary  opposition,  and  no  mere  physical 
obstruction  could  have  prevented  our  ships  getting  out, 
partially  equipped  at  least.  There  has  arisen  a  political 
question  which  is  very  embarrassing.  The  Ministry 
have  ordered  the  Collectors  of  Customs  to  examine  and 
report  frequently  upon  all  vessels  building  in  their  dis 
tricts,  and  armoured  ships  cannot  escape  notice.  Our 
transactions  have  become  well  known — Southern  papers 
received  lately  publish  them,  and  a  letter  in  the  Times 
from  the  South  clearly  indicates  that  armoured  ships  are 
expected  from  this  side  to  break  the  blockade.  I  have 
been  aware  that  indiscreet  persons  who  should  have 
known  better  have  written  to  private  persons  at  the 
South  on  such  matters,  and  I  am  not  surprised  at  the 
result.  Lord  Eussell  says  in  effect  that  the  "  290  " 
evaded  the  law,  and  rather  intimates  that  it  shall  not  be 
done  again.  I  am  convinced  that  the  present  British 
Ministry  will  do  almost  anything  the  United  States 
Government  asks,  and  you  are  well  aware  that  an 
"  Order  in  Council "  will  override  the  ordinary  rules  of 
law.  Parliament  meets  February  5th,  and  I  am  reliably 
informed  that  the  question  of  furnishing  supplies  to  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  395 

belligerents  will  come  up.  I  am  consulting  the  best 
legal  authority,  but  confess  that  the  hope  of  getting  the 
ships  out  seems  more  than  doubtful — indeed,  hopeless, 
unless  there  should  be  a  change  in  the  political  character 
of  the  Ministry.  I  will  of  course  go  on  as  if  no  obstacle 
existed,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  avail  myself  of  chance 
circumstances/ 

''February  Zrd,  1863  (cypher  despatch,  via  Balti 
more). —  ....  I  have  been  delayed  in  giving  orders 
for  ordnance  stores,  etc.,  for  iron  ships,  by  want  of  money ; 
but  financial  agent  authorizes  me  to  order  them,  and 
says  in  any  event  he  can  and  will  manage  to  supply  the 
necessary  funds  when  the  payments  are  required. 
Unforeseen  causes  have  kept  back  work  on  iron  ships. 
Have  tried  very  hard  to  hasten  the  completion,  but 
insurmountable  difficulties  have  occurred.  No  armoured 
ships  for  Admiralty  have  ever  been  completed  in  time 
specified  ;  whole  character  of  work  new,  and  builders 
cannot  make  close  calculations  ;  great  labour  and 
unexpected  time  required  to  bend  armour-plates  ;  and 
the  most  important  part  of  the  work,  the  riveting,  is 
far  more  tedious  than  anticipated.  .  .  .  Think  British 
Government  will  prevent  iron  ships  leaving,  and  am 
much  perplexed  ;  object  of  armoured  ships  too  evident 
for  disguise.' 

On  the  9th  of  March,  1863,  I  received  a  despatch 
from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  '  Richmond, 
January,  1863.'  In  reference  to  sending  out  officers  for 
the  armoured  vessels,  the  Secretary  wrote  thus : — 

4 1  concur  with  the  views  you  express  upon  the 
inexpediency  of  sending  naval  officers  to  England.  The 
plan  suggested  in  your  despatch  of  November  7th,  1862  ' 
(see  p.  392)  '  is  so  difficult  of  accomplishment  that  I  will 
at  once  submit  to  your  judgment  another,  and  request 


396  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

you  to  give  me  your  views  as  promptly  as  practicable. 
It  would  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  us  to  obtain 
the  services  of  a  suitable  steamer  ;  and  failing  in  this, 
we  should  be  compelled  to  charter  an  English  sailing 
vessel  at  Nassau  for  the  purpose.  I  suggest  to  you,  there 
fore,  that  you  at  once  put  yourself  confidentially  in 
communication  with  Mr.  Slidell,  and  learn  from  him 
whether  you  cannot  fit  out  the  vessels  at  a  French  port, 
in  which  event  the  officers  could  go  to  France,  incog., 
via  England,  in  the  ordinary  way,  and  escape  observa 
tion.  I  do  not  suppose  that  the  French  Government 
would  give  any  formal  assent  to  this  proposition, 
but  I  do  suppose  that  not  only  no  obstacle  would  be 
offered,  but  that  facilities  would  be  extended.  ...  I  am 
not  at  liberty  to  state  the  reasons  of  this  opinion,  but 
they  are  sufficiently  strong  to  induce  me  to  press  the 
subject  upon  your  attention.  If  you  could  run  over  to 
Paris  and  see  Mr.  Slidell  it  would  be  the  best,  perhaps 
the  only  course  to  pursue.  I  do  not  desire,  by  any 
suggestion  here  made,  to  change  any  plan  that  you  may 
deem  best  for  getting  the  ships  to  sea.  I  do  not  know 
your  entire  plan,  and  offer  my  suggestions  for  your  con 
sideration,  content  to  leave  the  matter  to  your  uncon 
trolled  discretion.  I  trust  you  will  be  able  to  advise  me 
of  your  determination  in  time  to  avoid  any  delay  in  my 
co-operation/ 

On  the  very  day  of  the  receipt  of  the  above  despatch 
I  was  able  to  send,  via  Baltimore,  a  reply  in  cypher, 
dated  '  Liverpool,  March  9.' — '  Completion  of  armoured 
ships  having  been  delayed,  change  of  plan  can  be  made. 
You  can  send  officers  to  France  as  soon  as  possible. 
Will  go  to  consult  with  our  commissioner  in  France 
(Mr.  Slidell)  in  a  few  days,'  etc. 

I  must  call  particular  attention  to  the  cautious  inti- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  397 

mation  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  that  the  Govern 
ment  at  Richmond  had  good  reasons  to  suppose  that 
facilities  would  be  extended  to  us  in  France.  The 
grounds  upon  which  such  expectations  were  based  will 
appear  very  clearly  in  the  subsequent  arrangements  with 
reference  to  the  two  English  ironclads,  and  in  the  ac 
count  of  the  efforts  to  build  and  fit  out  ships  in  France. 
On  the  llth  of  May,  1863,  I  received  two  despatches 
from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  cypher.  The  first, 
dated  '  Richmond,  March  19th,  1863,'  contained  the 
following : — 

'  Your  despatch  of  February  3rd,  1863  '  (see  p.  395), 
'  reached  me  yesterday.  I  share  your  apprehensions  as 
to  our  ships.  The  importance  to  our  cause  of  getting 
them  to  sea  at  an  early  day  renders  the  subject  one  of 
great  anxiety.  I  am  in  possession  of  information  which 
prompts  me  to  suggest  to  you  the  following  proposition, 
should  you  find  that  the  [British]  Government  designs  to 
prevent  their  departure.  Do  not  risk  correspondence, 
but  proceed  to  Paris  and  consult  Mr.  Slidell,  after  con 
ferring  fully  with  Mr.  Mason,  and  arrange,  in  the  manner 
which  your  judgment  shall  approve  after  such  consulta 
tion,  for  the  transfer  of  the  vessels  to  French  owner, 

and  their  equipment  in   a  French  port.     M. *,  a 

Member  of  the  Corps  Legislatif,  and  who  is  said  to 
have  the  confidence  of  the  Emperor,  is  indicated  as  a 
party  willing  to  receive  the  transfer  and  complete  the 
outfit,'  etc. 

The  second  despatch  was  dated  '  Richmond,  March 
27th,  1863, '  and  merely  enclosed  copy  of  a  letter  from 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  cypher  to  Mr.  Slidell,  our 
commissioner  to  France.  The  letter  to  Mr.  Slidell  was 

*  The  name  is  suppressed  because  the  person  was  not  the  one 
with  whom  the  arrangement  was  subsequently  made. 


398  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

in  the  Navy  Department  cypher,  and  I  was  directed  to 
translate  its  contents  and  then  to  act  upon  them  in  con 
junction  with  Mr.  Slidell.  The  following  is  a  copy  of 
the  letter,  which  I  transcribe  in  full,  as  it  bears  upon 
other  operations  in  France  which  will  be  narrated  in  a 
subsequent  chapter : — 

tKichmond,  March  With,  1863. 

4  The  Secretary  of  State  having  laid  before  me  certain 
portions  of  your  despatch  of  January  llth,  No.  23,  I 
am  induced  to  invoke  your  aid  in  such  manner  as  you 
may  deem  most  advisable  in  the  attainment  of  two 
objects  of  the  first  importance  to  the  interest  of  our 
country.  You  have  doubtless  noticed  certain  indica 
tions  in  England  of  a  disposition  to  prevent  the  depar 
ture  of  the  ships  built  there  for  our  service.  The 
officer  in  England  in  charge  of  this  duty,  a  close  ob 
server  of  public  sentiment  there,  expresses  much  anxiety 
upon  this  subject,  in  which  I  fully  share.  Under  these 
circumstances,  Commander  Bulloch  is  instructed  to 
confer  fully  with  Mr.  Mason  and  yourself  as  to  the 

practicability  of  transferring  those  ships  to  M. ,  or 

other  French  citizen,  with  the  view  of  removing  them 
from  England  as  early  as  possible,  and  fitting  them  out 
in  France.  If  this  can  be  accomplished,  they  might  be 
probably  loaded  with  supplies  for  the  French  army  in 
Mexico,  cleared  for  Vera  Cruz,  and  sold  to  us  at 
Terceira  or  elsewhere.  Our  early  possession  of  those 
ships  in  a  condition  for  service  is  an  object  of  such  para 
mount  importance  to  our  country,  that  no  effort,  no 
sacrifice,  must  be  spared  to  accomplish  it.  Whatever 

may  be  the  terms  which  M. may  prescribe  as  the 

conditions  of  thus  placing  them  at  our  command  will 
be  promptly  met,  and  apart  from  all  pecuniary  consi- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  399 

deration  involved  in  the  enterprise,  its  success  would 
entitle  him  to  the  gratitude  of  the  country. 

'  To  the  good  judgment  of  Commander  Bulloch  I 
must  necessarily  leave  all  details,  earnestly  asking  your 
assistance  to  open  and  conduct  this  measure  to  a  favour 
able  conclusion. 

'  The  second  subject  referred  to  is  the  construction  of 
new  ships  for  our  country  in  France.  The  size  and  gene 
ral  character  of  the  ships  would  be  best  determined  by 
Commander  Bulloch,  after  consultation  with  the  builders, 
and  due  consideration  of  the  means  of  construction, 
the  time  involved,  etc.  The  character  of  our  rivers  and 
harbours,  however,  necessarily  demands  light  draught. 
Payment  for  contracts  would  be  made  in  interest-bear 
ing  bonds,  or  in  cotton  delivered  here  upon  demand  at 
prices  controlled  by  its  current  value  in  this  market. 

1 1  am,  etc., 
c  (Signed)         S.  K.  MALLORY.' 

'  Hon.  John  Slidell, 
'Paris.' 

Before  the  receipt  of  the  foregoing  despatch,  Mr. 
Slidell  had  communicated  to  me  his  belief  that  we 
should  be  allowed  much  more  latitude  in  our  naval 
operations  in  France  than  in  England,  and  I  had  already 
been  in  conference  with  him  on  the  subject.  My  next 
despatch  to  the  Navy  Department  of  importance  in 
reference  to  the  ironclads  was  under  date  of  *  Liverpool, 
June  30th,  1863'  :- 

'  First  in  importance  as  well  as  interest  are  the  iron 
clads  already  under  construction.  These  should  have 
been  ready  for  sea  between  March  and  June,  according 
to  the  original  terms  of  contract.  I  have  already 
reported  that  mechanical  difficulties  of  construction,  not 


400  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

within  the  reach  of  foresight,  had  delayed  the  progress 
of  these  vessels,  but  the  action  of  the  British  Govern 
ment  in  reference  to  our  operations  in  Great  Britain, 
culminating  in  the  seizure  of  the  Alexandra  and  her 
trial  in  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  has  still  further  delayed 
their  completion.  As  long  ago  as  the  latter  part  of 
March,  I  went  to  Paris  to  consult  with  Hon.  John 
Siidell  with  reference  to  a  possible  sale  of  these  ships  to 
a  French  subject.  Through  M.  Arman,  a  distinguished 
naval  architect  of  Bordeaux,  Mr.  Siidell  and  I  were 
introduced  to  the  Messrs.  Bravay  and  Co.,  of  Paris, 
with  whom  a  satisfactory  arrangement  has  been  made. 
Messrs.  Bravay  and  Co.  have  bought  the  ships  from 
me  for  a  nominal  sum,*  and  the  contract  with  the 
builders  has  been  transferred  to  them,  or  rather,  the 
builders  have  made  a  new  contract  agreeing  to  complete 
the  ships  for  the  Messrs.  Bravay  and  Co.  precisely  as 
they  were  to  have  been  finished  for  me. 

'  This  exchange  of  property  required  to  be  managed 
with  great  caution,  because  it  was  well  known  that  the 
true  ownership  of  the  vessels  was  suspected,  and  that 
any  attempt  to  equip  them  for  sea,  or  even  to  launch 
them,  would  result  in  their  seizure  and  indefinite  deten 
tion  by  means  of  the  interminable  proceedings  of  the 
Court  of  Exchequer.  In  order  that  the  transaction 
might  bear  the  scrutiny  of  an  English  court,  I  thought 
it  advisable  to  take  the  advice  of  counsel  on  the  points 
of  English  law.  His  opinion  was  that  the  mere  building 
of  a  ship  in  England,  for  whatever  purpose,  was  not 
contrary  to  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act;  that  the 

*  The  precise  facts  are,  that  Messrs.  Bravay  bought  the  ships  for  a 
specified  amount,  and  they  engaged  to  re-sell  them  beyond  British 
jurisdiction  for  an  amount  which  should  include  a  commission  to 
them. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  401 

seizure  of  the  Alexandra  and  the  stoppage  of  several 
other  ships  for  inquiry  in  consequence  of  affidavits 
lodged  by  the  United  States  Consuls  were  illegal  and 
arbitrary  acts,  but  that  the  ironclads  were  liable  to  the 
same  proceedings,  and  if  they  should  be  seized  we  could 
not  expect  to  release  them  from  the  Court  of  Exchequer 
during  the  war,  if  at  all. 

'  It  was  known  that  ....  Clarence  R.  Yonge  had 
already  stated  to  the  United  States  Minister  in  London 
his  belief  that  the  ironclads  referred  to  were  intended 
for  the  Confederate  Government;  that  the  United 
States  Consular  spies  were  already  watching  their 
daily  progress,  and  that  the  British  Foreign  Office 
would  act  promptly  whenever  it  suited  Mr.  Adams' 
purpose  to  demand  their  seizure.  It  was  therefore 
necessary  to  disconnect  myself  with  the  ships  as  quickly 
as  possible.  I  was  advised  by  counsel  that  under 
any  circumstances  there  would  doubtless  be  a  legal 
inquiry  into  the  title  to  the  property,  and  that  all  the 
papers  and  letters  relating  to  the  sale  must  be  such 
as  would  bear  judicial  scrutiny  and  tend  to  prove  the 
bond  jide  character  of  the  transfer.  As  the  builders 
would  naturally  be  the  principal  witnesses,  it  was 
absolutely  necessary  to  prevent  them  from  suspecting 
that  there  was  any  collusion  between  the  nominal 
purchasers  and  myself.  With  this  view  I  first  wrote  a 
formal  letter  to  the  Messrs.  Laird,  stating  that  the 
interference  of  the  British  Government  in  all  attempts  to 
build  ships  suspected  of  being  for  the  Confederate 
States  was  such  as  to  make  it  certain  that  they  would 
not  be  allowed  to  complete  the  ironclads  for  me ;  that  I 
was  not  willing  to  run  the  risk  of  their  seizure,  which 
would  either  result  in  entire  confiscation  or  my  being 
kept  out  of  the  use  of  the  large  sum  of  money  already 

VOL.  i.  26 


402  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

expended  for  an  indefinite  time,  and  requesting  them  to 
sell  the  ships  for  such  sum  as  would  ensure  me  a 
reasonable  profit,  and  to  release  me  from  all  further 
obligations  under  the  contract. 

'  Fortunately,  just  at  this  time  the  Russian  Govern 
ment  made  an  offer  for  the  ships,  and  I  hastened  to 
Paris  to  regulate  the  correspondence  on  the  part  of  the 
French  purchasers,  to  suit  the  advice  of  my  English 
solicitor.  As  you  will  readily  perceive,  the  affair  re 
quired  a  good  deal  of  management,  and  occupied  far 
more  time  than  if  the  transaction  had  been  a  real  one. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into  further  details.  Suffice  it 
to  say  that  our  two  ironclads  are  now  the  property  of 
Messrs.  Bravay  and  Co.,  of  Paris,  agents  for  the  Pasha 
of  Egypt.  The  papers  are  all  in  proper  legal  form,  the 
Messrs.  Laird  are  convinced  that  the  sale  is  bond  fide, 
and  I  have  expressed  the  most  cordial  regrets  that  there 
should  have  been  a  necessity  for  such  a  proceeding. 

£  To  keep  up  this  illusion  I  can  no  longer  appear 
on  board  the  ships,  or  even  in  the  yard  of  Messrs. 
Laird,  but  can  only  direct  their  further  completion  from 
behind  the  desk  of  the  Messrs.  Bravay  and  Co.  These 
necessary  proceedings  have  created  additional  delay  in 
finishing  the  ships,  but  the  work  shall  now  be  pushed  on 
as  rapidly  as  possible/ 

Then  follows  a  specific  report  of  the  condition  of  the 
ships. 

'  The  engines  of  both  ships  have  been  ready  for 
several  months.  One  ship  is  entirely  plated,  and  could 
have  been  in  the  water  six  weeks  ago  if  it  had  not  been 
for  the  political  necessity  of  keeping  her  back.  ...  I 
cannot  hope  that  these  two  ships  will  be  ready  to  take 
the  sea  before  October.  I  can  only  assure  you  that 
every  effort  will  be  made  to  hasten  their  completion.  I 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  403 

will  keep  the  Messrs.  Bravay  under   a  constant  pres 
sure.7 

In  an  historical  narrative  of  this  kind  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  writer  to  take  care  that  no  persons  who  were  con 
nected  with  the  transactions,  and  whose  names  and  credit 
as  men  of  business  are  in  any  way  implicated,  shall  be 
left  in  a  doubtful  position,  by  reason  of  a  looseness  in 
the  general  statements,  or  a  want  of  particularity  in  the 
details.  I  have  stated  in  the  letter  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  quoted  above  (June  30th,  1863),  that  it  was 
necessary  to  manage  the  arrangements  with  Messrs. 
Bravay  so  that  the  Messrs.  Laird  should  not  suspect  that 
the  sale  of  the  ships  was  not  bond  fide  and  final.  Every 
step  in  the  business  was  taken,  in  conjunction  with  my 
solicitor,  in  the  ordinary  somewhat  circumlocutory  way, 
which  appears  to  be  unavoidable  in  the  legal  transfer  of 
property,  and  I  believe  that  if  the  Messrs.  Laird  ever 
read  this  book,  they  will  receive  the  first  intimation  of 
the  true  character  of  the  transaction  from  the  disclosures 
on  the  subject  here  made.  The  Messrs.  Laird  acted  as 
agents  for  the  sale  of  the  ships,  and  I  simply  arranged 
with  Messrs.  Bravay  that  they  should  apply  for  tenders 
for  two  ships  in  the  ordinary  way  of  business.  The 
Lairds  would  naturally  have  preferred  building  new 
ships  in  response  to  this  proposition,  but  they  acted  with 
their  accustomed  good  faith,  and  promptly  reported  to 
me  the  offer  they  had  received  as  a  probable  opportunity 
to  sell  the  two  ironclads. 

When  in  the  course  of  the  arrangements  they  applied 
to  me  for  definite  and  specific  authority  to  sell  the  ships 
which  they  could  produce  to  Messrs.  Bravay,  they  wrote 
thus  :  '  It  will  be  necessary  that  we  should  have  clear 
instructions,  either  direct  to  Birkenhead  or  through  your 
solicitor,  of  the  price  at  which  we  are  to  negotiate  the 

26—2 


404  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

sale/  After  giving  their  own  views  of  the  price  which 
might  be  fairly  asked,  they  add :  '  As  the  inquiry 
came  to  us  in  the  ordinary  course  of  our  business  for 
building  vessels,  and  not  with  any  special  reference  to 
vessels  we  might  have  in  course  of  construction,  we  hope 
that  you  will  agree  with  us  that  these  prices  should 
include  a  commission  of  two  and  a  half  per  cent,  on  the 
transaction  to  us,  as  we  not  only  lose  the  opportunity  of 
tendering  to  our  correspondent  for  new  vessels,  but  shall 
have  considerable  trouble  in  making  the  transfer  and 
arranging  money  matters  and  other  details/ 

In  reply  to  the  foregoing  I  wrote  to  the  Messrs.  Laird 
that,  having  made  inquiry  through  my  bankers,  I  was 
satisfied  in  regard  to  the  financial  position  of  Messrs. 
Bravay,  and  had  learned  that  they  had  executed  large 
commissions  for  the  Egyptian  Government,  and  had  at 
the  time  an  open  order  for  two  ironclad  vessels  from  the 
Pasha.  I  therefore  felt  assured  that  they  were  able  to 
carry  out  the  proposed  transaction,  and  it  might  there 
fore  be  closed  on  the  terms  proposed  ;  and  I  added  : 

'  Your  claim  for  a  commission  upon  the  amount  of  the 
sale  is,  under  the  circumstances,  quite  usual  and  justifi 
able,  and  if  two  and  a  half  per  cent,  is  the  established 
commission  in  such  cases,  I  readily  agree  to  it.  .... 
Hoping  that  in  better  times  we  may  be  able  to  renew 
our  business  associations,  which  have  been  as  satisfactory 
to  me  as  our  social  intercourse  has  been  agreeable,  and 
assuring  you  of  my  personal  esteem  and  regard, 

i  I  am,  etc., 
1  (Signed)         JAMES  D.  BULLOCH.' 

During  the  negotiations  an  offer  was  made  for  the 
purchase  of  the  ships  on  behalf  of  the  Eussian  Govern- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  405 

merit,  and  Messrs.  Laird,  looking  to  the  official  and 
therefore  reliable  source  from  which  the  inquiry  came, 
and  the  financial  security  of  such  a  transaction,  were 
inclined  to  entertain  it.  To  refuse  the  offer  upon 
grounds  which  would  seem  reasonable  to  them  was  at 
first  a  little  embarrassing,  but  I  wrote  my  solicitor,  who 
of  course  knew  of  the  arrangement  with  Messrs.  Bravay, 
that  the  excessively  friendly  relations  which  appeared  to 
exist  between  Russia  and  the  United  States  made  me 
suspicious  of  any  proposition  coming  from  St.  Peters 
burg.  It  was  possible,  I  said,  that  the  Russian 
Admiral  might  be  acting  on  behalf  of  the  United  States 
Navy  Department,  and  the  ships  might  get  under  the 
wrong  flag,  and  I  suggested  that  this  was  a  sufficient 
reason  for  declining  the  proposition. 

It  is  useless  to  give  further  details.  The  sale  to 
Messrs.  Bravay.  and  the  transfer  of  the  property,  was 
effected  by  my  solicitor  and  the  Messrs.  Laird  in  con 
formity  with  strict  commercial  and  legal  usage  and 
requirement.  The  chief  object  was  to  keep  the  Messrs. 
Laird  free  from  any  knowledge  of  the  secret  understand 
ing  with  Messrs.  Bravay,  so  that  they  might  be  able  to 
answer  all  inquiries,  either  from  the  Foreign  Office  or 
the  Customs  authorities,  without  embarrassment  or 
hesitation.  This  purpose  was  effected,  as  will  appear  to 
anyone  who  cares  to  read  the  official  correspondence  on 
the  subject,  which  fills  one  hundred  and  forty-five  pages 
of  the  Appendix  to  the  '  British  Case/  Vol.  II. 

The  arrangement  with  Messrs.  Bravay,  regarded  as  a 
mere  business  transaction,  was  based  upon  a  letter  from 
M.  Franqois  Bravay,  the  senior  partner,  dated  '  Alex 
andria,  Egypt,  28th  December,  1862,'  to  his  brother, 
M.  Adrien  Bravay,  who  was  the  resident  managing 
partner  of  the  firm  in  Paris,  and  the  reply  to  that  letter, 


406  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

dated  ;  Paris,  loth  January,  1863.'  In  the  above- 
mentioned  letter  from  M.  Francois  Bravay,  he  writes 
generally  about  his  business  relations  with  the  Viceroy? 
but  the  first  paragraph  of  the  letter  is  the  only  one 
which  need  be  quoted  here. 

'I  write  you  a  few  lines'  (he  says)  '  to  inform  you 
that  the  Viceroy  positively  wishes  me  to  complete  some 
commissions  for  him,  in  spite  of  the  resolve  I  have 
manifested  to  him  not  to  execute  them.  He  has  ordered 
me  to  have  built  for  him  in  France  two  armoured 
frigates,  after  the  best  and  most  perfect  designs.  He 
stipulates  above  everything  that  it  shall  not  be  made 
known  that  they  are  for  the  Egyptian  Government,  for 
he  has  political  reasons  for  that.  Make  arrangements  to 
get  designs  and  the  contracts  in  the  best  form.' 

The  reply  acknowledges  the  receipt  of  the  above 
letter,  and  in  reference  to  the  particular  subject  says : — 
*  Your  letter  transmits  to  us  the  commission  which  his 
Highness  the  Viceroy  has  given,  to  have  built  in  France 
two  armoured  frigates,  after  the  latest  models.  We  will 
at  once  take  the  necessary  steps  for  the  execution  of  that 
order,  in  obtaining  from  the  French  Government  the 
same  facilities  for  its  execution  that  have  been  already 
granted  us  in  reference  to  the  guns  that  we  have  had 
constructed  for  his  Highness,'  etc. 

These  and  other  letters,  which  were  shown  to  Mr. 
Slidell  and  to  me,  sufficiently  demonstrated  that  the 
Messrs.  Bravay  had  extensive  business  relations  with  the 
Viceroy  of  Egypt,  and  that  they  were  therefore  in  a  posi 
tion  to  justify  the  purchase  of  such  vessels  as  the  two  at 
Birkenhead.  It  was  necessary  to  have  the  status  of  the 
Messrs.  Bravay  fully  established  in  the  above  respects, 
for  manifest  reasons  of  a  purely  business  character, 
because  the  Messrs.  Laird  would  not  have  paid  atten- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  407 

tion  to  an  offer  coming  from  irresponsible  parties.  But 
Mr.  Slidell  had  received  private  and  confidential  infor 
mation  that  the  Imperial  Government  would  not  inter 
fere  with  any  subsequent  arrangement  Messrs.  Bravay 
might  make  for  the  delivery  of  the  ships  to  the  Con 
federate  Government,  after  they  had  been  despatched 
from  England,  and,  moreover,  it  was  intimated  to  him 
that  if  her  Majesty's  Government  objected  to  a  private 
firm  taking  the  ships  away  without  a  guarantee  that 
they  were  not  intended  for  a  belligerent,  the  Imperial 
Government  would  state  on  behalf  of  Messrs.  Bravay 
that  they  were  satisfied  with  the  explanations  of  that 
firm,  and  would  request  permission  for  the  departure  of 
the  ships  as  the  property  of  French  subjects.  This 
hint,  conveyed  to  Mr.  Slidell  through  a  very  direct  and 
satisfactory  source,  was  the  foundation  of  the  whole 
agreement  with  the  Messrs.  Bravay. 

The  order  of  the  Viceroy  for  the  two  armoured  vessels 
was  dated  before  we  had  met  either  of  the  Messrs. 
Bravay,  or  had  thought  of  an  arrangement  of  the  kind 
for  getting  the  ships  out  of  British  jurisdiction.  It  was 
made  use  of  only  as  a  plausible  reason  why  a  private 
firm  should  want  vessels  of  such  formidable  structure 
and  armament,  and  was  not  manufactured  for  the  occa 
sion.  Subsequently  it  will  appear  that  the  Grand  Vizier 
of  Egypt  denied  that  an  order  for  ironclad  vessels  had 
been  given  to  Messrs.  Bravay.  Perhaps  there  were 
political  reasons  for  the  denial,  just  as  there  were  for 
keeping  the  order  secret.  Or  perhaps  the  order,  being 
rather  in  the  character  of  a  request,  or  what  may  be 
called  a  £  permissive  commission,'  the  Grand  Vizier 
might  have  found  it  convenient,  at  the  particular  time 
when  the  inquipies  were  made,  to  deny  any  knowledge 
of  it. 


408  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

The  arrangement  by  which  it  was  hoped  that  the 
departure  of  the  two  ships  from  Liverpool  would  be 
assured  having  now  been  fully  explained,  it  only  remains 
to  describe  the  progress  and  result  of  the  undertaking, 
which  can  best  be  done  by  a  transcript  of  such  portions 
of  my  official  despatches  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  as 
relate  to  the  subject. 

i  Paris,  July  8#A,  1863. — I  have  the  honour  to  send 
you  with  this  letter  a  complete  set  of  drawings  of  our 
two  ironclad  vessels,  which  in  future  reports  I  will 
allude  to  as  Nos.  294  and  295.  I  also  send  the  detailed 
specifications  upon  which  the  ships  are  being  completed.' 
After  a  full  and  most  specific  explanation  of  the  draw 
ings,  the  despatch  continues  :  '  I  reserve  my  remarks 
upon  the  special  service  upon  which  it  would  be  advisable 
to  employ  these  ships  for  a  separate  despatch.' 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  had  previously  alluded  to 
the  desirability  of  using  the  ironclads  for  re-opening 
the  Mississippi  and  regaining  possession  of  New  Orleans, 
and  had  invited  me  to  comment  upon  that  proposition. 
The  work  on  the  vessels  had  up  to  this  time  progressed 
without  interference,  although  we  had  been  well  aware 
that  they  were  closely  watched.  After  the  arrangement 
with  the  Messrs.  Bravay,  which  was  completed  on  the 
17th  of  June,  1863,  it  was  of  course  my  duty  to  proceed 
with  all  contingent  plans  as  if  expecting  that  the  ships 
would  be  permitted  to  sail,  and  I  reported  on  the  subject 
of  their  employment  as  follows  : — 

1  Paris,  July  9th,  1863. 

<  SIR  — 

'  The  several  despatches  I  will  now  have  the 
honour  to  send  you  are  of  such  a  nature,  and  treat  upon 
subjects  a  knowledge  of  which  by  the  enemy  would 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  409 

be  so  ruinous  to  our  interests,  that  I  have  thought  it 
advisable  to  send  them  by  a  special  messenger,  and  have 
selected  Lieutenant  W.  C.  Whittle,  Confederate  States 
Navy,  for  this  important  service.  It  is  possible  that 
Lieutenant  Whittle  may  be  forced  to  destroy  the 
despatches,  and  yet  may  be  able  to  reach  you  in  person ; 
I  have  therefore  fully  instructed  him  as  to  their  contents, 
and  have  given  him  full  verbal  explanations  of  the  draw 
ings  of  the  ships  and  turrets.  .  .  . 

'  No  very  great  difficulty  was  experienced  in  getting 
crews  for  the  Florida  and  Alabama,  and  I  think  any 
vessels  fitted  out  to  cruise  against  commerce,  thereby 
holding  out  to  the  men  not  only  the  captivating  excite 
ment  of  adventure,  but  the  possible  expectation  of 
prize-money,  might  almost  at  any  time  pick  up  a  goodly 
number  of  passable  seamen.  But  the  ironclads  are 
too  manifestly  for  other  purposes  to  deceive  any  mere 
adventurer.  Their  grim  aspect  and  formidable  equipment 
clearly  show  that  they  are  intended  for  the  real  danger  and 
shock  of  battle,  and  I  do  not  think  reliable  crews  could 
be  obtained  from  among  the  floating  population  of 
European  seaports.  The  ships  are  so  rigged  as  to  require 
but  few  able  seamen.  The  actual  force  of  the  crews  need 
be  only  artillerists,  but  these  must  be  men  willing  to 
fight  for  the  sake  of  their  country  alone,  and  must  be 
actuated  by  the  same  spirit  which  has  converted  our 
farmers  and  backwoodsmen  into  the  veterans  who  are 
now  sweeping  irresistibly  through  Maryland  and 
Southern  Pennsylvania  under  the  leadership  of  our 
great  General  Lee.  Engineers  and  firemen  can  be  got 
here,  and  men  enough  to  work  the  ships  and  perhaps 
one  gun  on  each.  They  would  thus  be  able  to  overcome 
any  wooden  ship,  or  fleet  of  them.  I  respectfully  pro 
pose,  then,  that  the  ships,  when  ready  for  sea,  should 


410  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

be  ordered  to  proceed  as  quickly  as  possible  to  Wilming 
ton,  North  Carolina.  One  could  fall  in  with  the  land  at 
New  Inlet,  and  the  other  at  the  main  "  ship  bar  "  at  the 
mouth  of  Cape  Fear  river.  , 

'  By  steaming  quietly  in  at  early  daylight,  they  might 
entirely  destroy  the  blockading  vessels — not  one  should 
be  left  to  steal  away  and  make  known  the  fact  that 
the  ironclads  were  on  the  coast.  Crews  might  be  ready 
at  Smithville  or  Fort  Caswell,  to  be  put  on  board  the 
ships  as  soon  as  they  had  destroyed  or  dispersed  the 
blockaders,  and  in  a  very  few  hours  afterwards  the  two 
vessels  would  be  ready  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  in  any 
direction,  north  or  south.  I  am  earnest  and  anxious 
on  the  subject  of  crews,  because  the  ships  are  too 
formidable  and  too  valuable  to  be  trusted  in  the  hands  of 
a  mere  set  of  adventurers,  who,  actuated  by  no  feeling 
of  patriotism,  and  controlled  only  by  force,  might  fail  at 
a  critical  moment,  either  from  indifference  or  disaffection, 
thus  disconcerting  the  best  devised  plans,  or  perhaps 
even  occasioning  fatal  disaster.  When  the  departure  of 
the  ironclads  from  Europe  can  be  definitely  determined, 
say  within  two  weeks,  a  special  messenger  can  be  sent 
to  report  specifically  to  you,  so  that  all  necessary  steps 
may  be  taken  and  arrangements  made  to  cany  out  the 
further  views  of  the  Department. 

'  In  view  of  the  intimate  knowledge  I  necessarily 
possess  of  the  construction  and  capabilities  of  the  iron 
clads  294  and  295,  I  feel  called  upon  to  throw  out 
a  few  suggestions  as  to  the  service  for  which  they  would 
be  most  available,  and  I  trust  you  will  not  think 
me  presumptuous  for  doing  so.  I  feel  confident  that 
they  will  be  as  good  sea-boats  and  as  easily  handled  as 
armoured  vessels  can  be,  but  as  you  will  perceive  from 
the  drawings  and  descriptions,  they  are  large  ships,  both 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  411 

in  length  and  breadth,  and  in  the  rapid  current  and  short 
turnings  of  the  Mississippi,  they  would  be  at  great 
disadvantage,  and  their  full  force  and  power  as  rams 
-could  not  be  made  use  of.  If  they  could  be  accompanied 
by  smaller  and  shorter  vessels  to  assist  them  in  turning, 
or  to  occupy  the  enemy's  ironclads  while  they  were  thus 
engaged,  the  difficulty  might  be  somewhat  removed, 
but  in  such  narrow  waters  they  would  be  very  much  in 
the  condition  of  a  boxer  with  one  arm  tied  behind  his 
back.  I  am  supposing  now  that  they  would  have  to 
fight  their  way  up  the  river  in  face  of  the  enemy's  fleet 
of  ironclads.  If  these  latter  can  be  held  above  Vicks- 
burg  or  Port  Hudson,  and  "  294  "  and  "  295  "  were 
simply  expected  to  force  their  way  past  the  forts  and 
steam  up  to  the  city,  that  object  could  easily  be  accom 
plished.  Of  course,  in  such  an  event,  there  would  be  a 
movement  of  troops  by  land,  and  also  of  the  Mobile 
flotilla,  through  Lake  Pontchartrain ;  otherwise,  on  the 
approach  of  the  ships  by  the  river,  the  garrison  of  New 
Orleans  would  burn  the  city,  retire  upon  the  lake,  and 
escape  by  means  of  their  transports  through  Ship 
Island  Pass. 

1  The  Atlantic  coast  offers  enticing  and  decisive  work 
in  more  than  one  direction.  Without  a  moment's  delay, 
after  getting  their  crews  on  board  off  Wilmington,  our 
vessels  might  sail  southward,  sweep  the  blockading 
fleet  from  the  sea-front  of  every  harbour  from  the  Capes 
of  Virginia  to  Sabine  Pass,  and  cruising  up  and  down 
the  coast,  could  prevent  anything  like  permanent  syste 
matic  interruption  of  our  foreign  trade  for  the  future. 
Again,  should  Washington  still  be  held  by  the  enemy, 
our  ironclads  could  ascend  the  Potomac,  and  after 
destroying  all  'transports  and  gun-boats  falling  within 
their  reach,  could  render  Washington  itself  untenable, 


412  THE  SECRET  SEEVICE  OF  THE 

and  could  thus  create  a  powerful  diversion  in  favour  of 
any  operations  General  Lee  might  have  on  foot.  Third, 
Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  ...  is  a  wealthy  city 
in  itself,  and  opposite  the  town  is  an  important  national 
dock  and  building-yard.  The  whole  lies  invitingly 
open  to  attack  and  destruction.  Suppose  our  two  iron 
clads  should  steam,  unannounced,  into  that  harbour  on 
some  fine  October  morning,  and  while  one  proceeded  to 
demolish  the  navy -yard  and  all  it  contained,  the  other 
should  send  a  flag  of  truce  to  the  mayor,  to  say  that  if 
$1,000,000  in  gold  or  $5,000,000  in  greenbacks  were 
not  sent  on  board  in  four  hours  the  city  would  be 
destroyed  after  the  manner  of  Jacksonville  and  Blufton.* 
Portsmouth  could  afford  to  pay  for  its  existence. 
Philadelphia  is  another  point  open  to  such  an  attack. 
The  river  is  navigable,  the  banks  comparatively  low,  so 
that  no  plunging  fire  could  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
ships,  and  once  in  front  of  the  city  they  could  dictate 
their  own  terms.  Such  operations  as  are  thus  hastily 
sketched  would  inflict  great  damage  upon  the  enemy? 
besides  creating  a  striking  effect  in  Europe,  and  the 
ships  would  thus  be  employed  in  a  manner  which  would 
bring  into  use  their  full  power,  so  that  no  strength 
would  be  wasted.  .  .  . 

'  I  am,  etc., 

6  (Signed)         JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 
1  Hon.  S.  E.  Mallory, 

'  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Eichmond.' 

To  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  I  wrote  : — 

'Liverpool,  July  20^,  1863. 

'  You  will  remember  that  Lieutenant  R.  R.  Carter 
was  ordered  to  report  to  me  for  duty  in  the  ironclad  you 

*  Two  Southern  towns  which  had  been  just  then  reported  to  have 
been  burned  by  the  United  States  forces. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  413 

originally  intended  me  to  command.  Although  you 
have  changed  the  sphere  of  my  duties,  I  continue  to 
employ  him  as  an  assistant  in  the  inspection  of  work 
actually  in  progress,  as  well  as  to  advise  with  on  all 
matters  of  importance.  I  propose  in  a  few  days  to  put 
him  in  communication  (through  the  purchasers  of  "  294" 
and  "  295  ")  with  Captain  Blakely,  to  arrange  for  the 
arming  of  those  ships,  as  it  is  important  that  I  should 
keep  entirely  out  of  sight  in  the  matter.  I  take  pleasure 
in  saying  that  Lieutenant  Carter  yields  me  the  most 
cheerful  and  intelligent  assistance,  and  I  esteem  myself 
fortunate  in  having  him  with  me  at  this  time.  .  .  . 

'  The  opportunity  to  send  this  has  unexpectedly 
occurred,  and  I  am  forced  to  be  brief  and  hurried, 
only  adding  that  matters  still  progress  favourably 
with  "  294  "  and  "  295."  .  .  .  Application  will  very 
shortly  be  made  for  permission  to  arm  them  in  Eng 
land,  and  the  French  owners  anticipate  no  difficulty. 
If,  however,  their  application  is  refused,  we  will  have  to 
transport  the  armament  to  a  Continental  port,  which  will 
involve  some  delay.  .  .  . 

i  As  I  can  only  shape  plans  to  suit  possible  changes 
of  circumstances,  it  is  quite  impossible  to  go  farther 
into  detail  on  this  subject.' 

Not  long  after  the  date  of  the  above  despatch  we  began 
to  feel  the  effects  of  Mr.  Adams'  representations  to  Earl 
Eussell,  especially  on  the  subject  of  the  ironclads.  Under 
date  '  Liverpool,  October  1st,  1863/1  reported  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  thus  : — 

'  The  newspapers,  which  seem  to  pass  very  regularly 
through  the  lines  of  the  armies,  will  doubtless  have  pre 
pared  you  for  disappointment  in  all  our  English  under 
takings.  Of  course,  I  shall  continue  to  act  as  if  certain 


414  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

of  success,  but  am  forced  to  acknowledge  that  I  have  but 
little  hope.  .  .  . 

{  The  articles  alluded  to  in  my  despatch  of  June  30th, 
1863,*  would  have  been  ready  for  departure  now  if  it 
had  not  been  for  interference,  such  as  you  can  readily 
imagine.  They  cannot,  however,  be  wholly  lost,  for 
reasons  you  will  understand  by  referring  to  the  letter 
alluded  to  above/ 

The  difficulty  and  delay  in  communicating  with  Rich- 
mond  was  always  a  cause  of  great  embarrassment  in 
arranging  for  co-operative  movements  and  in  exchang 
ing  views.  Opportunities  were  often  lost,  from  the 
miscarriage  of  despatches,  and  suggestions  which  were 
approved  in  purpose  were  only  known  when  it  was  too 
late  to  act  upon  them.  About  October  15th,  1863,  I 
received  a  despatch  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  ad 
vising  me  of  the  safe  arrival  of  Lieutenant  Whittle  with 
a  large  batch  of  despatches  from  me,  including  that  of 
July  9th,  1863,  on  the  subject  of  the  proper  service  for 
the  ironclads.  Lieutenant  Whittle  left  Paris  on  July 
10th,  and  reached  Richmond  on  August  20th.  The 
despatch  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  just  above  men 
tioned  was  dated  '  Richmond,  August  29th,  1863.'  He 
said  : 

'  I  have  very  carefully  examined  the  drawings  (of 
"  294  "  and  "  295"),  and  so  far  as  I  can  form  an  opinion 
of  structures  so  novel  in  all  their  details,  I  think  they 
will  be  very  efficient  ships  ;  and  that  they  will  probably 
excel  all  other  ironclads  of  which  I  have  any  knowledge 
in  sea-going  qualities.  .  .  .  My  regret  and  disappoint 
ment  at  their  delay  in  England  is  very  great,  but  I 
understand  the  difficulties  in  your  path,  and  cannot  well 
see  how  you  could  have  done  better  than  you  have. 
*  Nos.  294  and  295. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  415 

Their  presence  at  this  time  upon  our  coast  would  be  of 
incalculable  value,  relieving,  as  they  would  be  able  to 
do,  the  blockade  of  Charleston  and  Wilmington,  and 
nothing  must  be  suffered  to  interfere  with  their  com 
pletion  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment.  ...  It  is 
deemed  expedient  to  send  an  officer  of  rank  out  to  bring 
over  "  294  "  and  "  295,"  and  Captain  Barren  has  been 
selected.  To  him  I  have  communicated  your  views  as 
to  appropriate  employment  for  them,  and  I  will  thank 
you  to  confer  with  him  freely  about  them.  He  will 
receive  them  from  you,  as  did  Captain  Semmes  the 
Alabama,  for  I  deem  it  important  that  you  shall  carry 
out  the  plans  you  have  devised  for  placing  them  in  our 
possession.  .  .  .  The  arrangements  made  by  you  for 
the  completion  of  "294"  and  "295"  and  their  final 
transfer,  seem  the  very  best  that  could  have  been  effected, 
and  I  doubt  not  your  judgment  and  discretion  will  con 
duct  the  negotiation  to  a  successful  conclusion.  Your 
suggestions  as  to  the  enterprises  to  be  undertaken  by 
them  command  much  consideration,  and  Captain  Barron 
will  receive  upon  this  subject  especial  instructions.' 

In  respect  to  manning  the  vessels,  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  said :  '  The  method  suggested  by  you  would 
meet  the  case  if  Wilmington  should  at  the  time  be  in 
its  present  condition  with  reference  to  the  enemy.  .  .  . 
You  will  regard  this  plan,  however,  namely,  manning 
the  vessels  from  Wilmington  as  suggested  by  you,  as 
the  one  to  be  carried  out  unless  otherwise  changed/  A 
great  portion  of  the  above  despatch  was  devoted  to  the 
subject  of  supplying  funds,  which  was  always  weighing 
upon  the  minds  of  the  heads  of  Departments  at  Eich- 
mond. 

Captain  Barron  arrived  in  due  course,  and  there  came 
with  or  followed  him  a  sufficient  number  of  other  officers 


416  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

to  supply  the  staff  for  the  two  ironclads.  By  the  time  of 
his  arrival  it  was  already  manifest  that  our  expectations 
with  reference  to  those  vessels  could  not  be  realized, 
and  he  retired  to  Paris  and  there  waited,  hoping  against 
hope  that  some  fortunate  turn  of  events,  or  some  change 
of  policy  in  the  two  chief  Maritime  Powers,  would  enable 
him  to  get  afloat.  Captain  Samuel  Barron  was  well 
known  in  the  United  States  service  before  the  war  as  a 
gallant  dashing  officer,  and  he  had  some  fine  young 
officers  with  him.  Sometimes  a  sense  of  companionship 
in  misfortune  serves  as  a  consolation,  but  it  was  rather 
an  aggravation  than  a  relief  to  my  own  disappointment, 
to  contemplate  those  ardent  men  yearning  for  employ 
ment  and  chafing  at  their  compulsory  inactivity.  It 
was  a  hard  case  to  be  so  near  to  a  great  opportunity 
and  yet  to  miss  it.  The  final  annihilation  of  all  hope  of 
getting  our  ironclads  and  so  ending  the  blockade  and 
securing  supplies  to  the  famishing  armies  in  the  field, 
was  reported  in  the  following  despatches  to  the  Navy 
Department : — 

'Liverpool,  October  20th,  1863. 

'  SIR  — 

'  In  my  despatch  of  October  1st,  1863,  I  called 
your  attention  to  the  newspaper  accounts  of  the  seizure 
of  the  ironclads  "  294  "  and  "  295,"  which  had  doubt 
less  reached  Richmond,  but  feared  to  trust  particulars  to 
the  ordinary  mails.  Now,  by  the  hands  of  Lieutenant 
R.  R.  Carter,  I  will  report  in  detail  all  that  has  trans 
pired  in  reference  to  those  ships.  When  the  proceedings 
in  the  case  of  the  Alexandra  had  exposed  the  extent  and 
unscrupulous  character  of  the  system  of  espionage  the 
United  States  officials  had  established  in  this  country, 
and  had  developed  to  the  full  the  great  treason  of  Mr. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  417 

Clarence  R.  Yonge,  it  became  evident  that  no  ships 
partaking  of  the  character  of  war- vessels  would  be  safe 
from  seizure  unless  they  were  known  to  be  the  property 
of  some  foreign  Government  not  a  belligerent.  It  was 
of  pressing  importance  to  destroy  any  trace  of  Con 
federate  ownership  in  "  294  "  and  "  295  "  at  once,  and 
the  arrangements  with  Messrs.  Bravay,  of  Paris,  pre 
viously  discussed  as  a  probable  and  very  plausible  means 
of  security,  were  speedily  consummated  in  the  manner 
already  reported  to  you  in  my  despatch  of  June  30th, 
1863.  The  transfer  papers,  and  indeed  all  the  corre 
spondence  involved  in  the  negotiation,  were  so  carefully 
drawn  in  accordance  with  British  law,  that  the  solicitor 
employed  to  conduct  the  sale  remarked  on  its  completion, 
"  The  ships  are  now  irretrievably  the  property  of  Messrs. 
Bravay  and  Co.,  and  could  not  be  recovered  by  any 
process  they  might  think  proper  to  resist."  It  certainly 
seemed  that  the  British  Government,  when  informed  of 
the  ownership,  could  and  would  reply  to  the  further 
demands  of  the  United  States  Minister  that,  the  ships 
being  the  property  of  French  citizens,  their  completion 
and  final  departure,  at  least  to  a  French  port,  could  not 
be  forbidden.  Under  these  circumstances  I  was  naturally 
hopeful  of  success  in  getting  them  both  to  sea,  and  once 
more  in  our  own  possession ;  for  even  though  the  British 
Government  might  refuse  Messrs.  Bravay  permission  to 
arm  them  in  England,  it  was  .  difficult  to  see  how  that 
Government  could  be  compromised  as  towards  the  United 
States  by  permitting  a  French  subject  to  take  his  pro 
perty,  even  though  in  the  shape  of  ships,  to  his  own 
country. 

'  Under  any  circumstances,  it  would  have  been  prudent 
for  me  to  absent  myself  from  this  neighbourhood ;  but 
at  the  time  of  the  Bravay  operation  I  was  just  beginning 

VOL.  i.  27 


418  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

some  new  contracts  on  account  of  the  Navy  Department 
in  France,  and  thus  my  absence  from  England  involved 
neither  loss  of  time  nor  waste  of  opportunity.  During 
the  month  of  July  everything  seemed  to  progress 
favourably ;  the  ships  steadily  advanced  towards  com 
pletion,  and  there  did  not  appear  any  reason  to  doubt 
that  they  would  be  ready  to  take  the  sea  during  the 
month  of  October. 

'  In  August  it  became  evident  that  the  United  States 
officials  were  getting  uneasy,  a  fact  made  manifest 
by  increased  activity  and  boldness  on  the  part  of  their 
spies,  and  undisguised  efforts  to  tamper  with  the 
employes  of  the  Messrs.  Laird.  Towards  the  end  of 
that  month  these  causes  began  to  operate  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  seriously  interfere  with  and  retard  the 
progress  of  the  work.  At  the  same  time  the  Custom 
House  officials  began  to  make  visits  of  inspection  to  the 
ships,  and  to  press  inquiries  as  to  their  destination  and 
ownership,  indicating  that  the  Government  was  listening 
to  the  affidavits  and  persistent  protests  of  the  American 
Minister.  Finally,  the  Messrs.  Laird,  hoping  that 
if  the  Government  were  furnished  with  proof  that  the 
ships  did  not  belong  to  the  Confederate  States,  they 
would  be  relieved  from  further  annoyance  and  incon 
venience,  asked  and  obtained  the  permission  of  the 
Messrs.  Bravay  to  avow  their  ownership  of  the  vessels. 
The  result  of  this  was  a  call  upon  M.  A.  Bravay  at  his 
house  in  Paris,  by  Captain  Hore,  R.N.,  who,  on  the  part 
of  his  Government,  made  minute  inquiries  as  to  the 
intent  of  the  purchase  by  Messrs.  Bravay  of  such 
formidable  ships.*  Receiving  apparently  satisfactory 
answers  to  all  of  his  questions,  Captain  Hore  then 
made  a  direct  offer  to  purchase  them  for  the  British 
*  See  '  British  Appendix,'  vol.  ii.,  p.  372. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  419 

Admiralty,  which  proposition  M.  Bravay  declined  to 
entertain,  at  least  until  the  vessels  were  fully  completed 
according  to  their  designs,  and  had  been  delivered  to  him 
in  a  French  port.  This  ended  the  interview  with  Captain 
Bore,  and  the  circumstances  were  minutely  detailed  to, 
me  by  M.  A.  Bravay  on  the  day  of  their  occurrence.* 

i  In  the  meantime,  matters  continued  to  grow  worse 
at  Liverpool.  The  nature  of  some  of  the  affidavits  sent 
up  to  the  Foreign  Office  by  the  United  States  Consul 
leaked  out,  and  although  most  of  them  were  glaringly 
false,  still  they  seemed  to  be  whispered  into  willing  ears, 
and  had  such  effect  that  the  Lairds  were  directed  not  to 
attempt  a  trial  trip  with  either  ship  without  giving 
notice  to  the  Customs  officials,  and  were  finally  forbidden 
to  do  so  at  all,  except  with  a  guard  of  marines,  or  other 
force  from  one  of  her  Majesty's  ships,  on  board. 

'  During  most  of  this  time  I  was  in  France,  coming  to 
Liverpool  only  for  a  day  or  two  at  a  time  to  receive  and 
write  letters  by  the  Bermuda  mail,  yet  the  United 
States  Consul,  through  his  spies,  was  swearing  to  my 
constant  presence  here,  and  superintendence  of  the  ships. 
The  local  authorities  are  well  aware  that  this  latter 
statement  is  untrue.  It  has  also  been  discovered  that 
most,  if  not  all,  the  affidavits  upon  which  the  Govern 
ment  is  acting  have  been  furnished  by  Chapman,  Yonge 
and  others,  whose  utter  want  of  character  was  so  clearly 
proved  in  the  proceedings  against  the  Alexandra.  The 
course  pursued  by  the  Foreign  Office  can  only  be 
accounted  for  upon  the  supposition  that  the  head  of  that 
Department  is  a  partizan  of  the  North,  and  is  acting  for 
its  interest,  instead  of  simply  and  consistently  following 
the  strictly  neutral  course  he  professes  to  have  adopted. 

*  The  statement  of  M.  Bravay  is  confirmed  in  all  essential  points 
by  Captain  Hore's  letter,  '  British  Case,'  Appendix,  vol.  ii.,  p.  372. 

27—2 


420  THE  SECEET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

No  one  would  expect  this  Government  to  permit  the 
equipment  of  a  ship -of- war  for  one  belligerent,  any  more 
than  it  would  be  expected  to  permit  the  open  enlisting  of 
troops  for  the  other  belligerent.  Yet  interference  with 
either  of  these  should,  it  would  seem,  be  conducted 
according  to  the  law  of  the  land,  and  not  in  accordance 
with  the  whim  or  partiality  of  a  Minister  of  State. 

'  The  fact  that  men  are  constantly  enlisted  in  Ireland 
for  the  Federal  army,  and  have  been  shipped  by  hundreds 
from  this  port,  is  so  notorious  as  to  be  generally 
discussed,  yet  I  have  not  heard  up  to  this  date,  that  the 
rights  of  a  single  British  shipowner  have  been  violated, 
nor  his  ship  detained  for  a  single  hour  in  order  that  the 
destination  or  character  of  the  passengers  might  be 
inquired  into,  while  in  the  case  of  a  ship  building  in 
a  private  yard,  this  Government  furnishes  detectives 
to  watch  her  progress,  listens  to  and  acts  upon  the 
statements  of  perjurers  and  avowed  traitors,  and  finally 
interferes  and  prevents  her  completion  in  a  most 
unusual  and  illegal  manner,  as  I  am  informed,  for  fear 
that  she  may  at  some  future  time  fall  into  the  hands 
of  the  Confederate  States. 

£  The  inference  is  so  clear  that  I  shall  not  suggest  it, 
but  will  simply  particularize  by  repeating  that  the  two 
rams  building  by  Messrs.  Laird  have  been  virtually 
seized  by  orders  from  the  Foreign  Office,  and  are  now  in 
the  possession  of  the  Customs  officers  of  this  port,  assisted 
by  one  of  her  Majesty's  gunboats,  and  a  guard  of 
marines  from  her  Majesty's  ship  Majestic.  The  actual 
seizure  took  place  only  about  a  fortnight  ago  (October 
9th),  although  the  public  has  been  prepared  for  such  an 
event  by  intimations  in  the  so-called  Government  organs, 
and  discussions  upon  the  matter  in  all  the  newspapers 
of  the  kingdom. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  421 

' 1  have  inquired  into  the  causes  of  this  act,  and 
learn,  from  the  best  possible  sources,  as  follows: — It 
has  been  made  known  to  the  authorities  that  a  large 
number  of  Confederate  naval  officers  have  during  the 
past  three  months  arrived  in  England.  The  Florida 
came  off  the  Irish  coast  some  six  weeks  since,  and 
proceeding  to  Brest,  there  discharged  the  greater  portion 
of  her  crew,  who  were  sent  to  Liverpool.  These  circum 
stances  were  eagerly  seized  upon  by  the  United  States 
representatives  here,  and  they  have  so  worked  upon 
Lord  Russell  as  to  make  him  believe  that  the  presence 
of  those  officers  and  men  has  direct  reference  to  the 
destination  of  the  rams.  At  any  rate,  the  declaration  of 
the  United  States  Consular  spies  to  that  effect  has  been 
the  cause  of  their  seizure  at  this  time,  because  the  reason 
assigned  is  that  the  ships  may  be  captured  on  their  trial 
trips,  or  even  forcibly  carried  out  of  Liverpool,  without 
the  consent  of  the  Messrs.  Laird,  by  these  very  officers 
and  men. 

1  The  precautions  taken  to  prevent  such  an  attempt 
are,  under  the  circumstances,  ludicrous.  One  of  the 
rams  is  in  the  Great  Birkenhead  Float.  To  be  got  out 
she  must  pass  through  a  kind  of  lock  ;  a  large  caisson 
must  be  lifted,  which  can  only  be  done  at  a  certain  stage 
of  the  tide ;  and  finally,  a  gate  requiring  machinery  to 
move  it  must  be  opened  to  give  her  egress.  I  learn 
upon  inquiry  that  if  it  were  desired  to  remove  her  from 
the  dock,  the  keeper  would  require  five  hours'  notice. 
Yet  this  Government  have  thought  it  necessary  to  place 
a  gunboat  with  extra  marines  alongside  of  her,  the  fasts 
of  the  gunboat  being  actually  placed  over  those  of  the 
ram,  and  until  within  the  last  few  days  have  kept  a 
sixty -gun  frigate  at  anchor  opposite  the  dock -gate,  for 
fear  that  this  formidable  ship  might  jump  over  all  the 


422  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

obstructions  and  proceed  to  sea  in  charge  of  the  afore 
mentioned  officers  and  discharged  seamen,  without  bend 
ing  a  sail  or  lighting  a  fire. 

'  Now,  sir,  the  final  issue  of  this  affair  is  no  longer  a 
practical  question.  No  amount  of  discretion  or  manage 
ment  on  my  part  can  effect  the  release  of  the  ships. 
Mr.  Slidell  has  always  given  me  to  understand  that  the 
Emperor  of  the  French  was  aware  of  the  nature  of  the 
transaction  with  the  Messrs.  Bravay,  and  that  at  the 
proper  time  the  French  Government  would  come  forward 
in  support  of  the  claims  or  assumed  rights  of  its  subjects. 
I  have  already  intimated  to  Mr.  Slidell,  in  a  cautiously 
worded  letter,  what  has  happened  here,  and  asked  what 
steps  the  French  Government  will  take.  ...  It  is  my 
opinion  that  the  British  Government  will  not  let  the 
ships  be  removed  from  their  present  position  unless  the 
French  Government  comes  forward  and  relieves  it  from 
all  responsibility  or  presumed  obligation  to  the  United 
States,  by  requesting  that  the  ships  may  be  allowed 
to  leave  Liverpool  as  the  property  of  a  French  subject. 
Whether  the  Emperor  is  prepared  to  change  places  with 
her  Majesty's  Government  or  not  can  only  be  determined 
when  M.  Bravay  asks  the  protection  or  countenance  of 
his  own  Government ;  and  I  will  do  all  in  my  power  to 
press  a  decision  in  the  matter,  and  will  report  to  you  the 
result  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 

6 1  have  always  been  under  the  impression  that  it 
would  have  been  better  for  the  Messrs.  Bravay  to  have 
avowed  their  ownership  of  the  ships  at  the  time  of  the 
assumed  sale,  and  to  have  asked  permission  to  complete 
them.  Thus  would  our  minds  have  been  at  least  set  at 
ease.  If  the  answer  had  been  "  No,"  we  should  have 
saved  the  money  since  expended,  and  could  have  sold 
the  ships  in  reality,  as  they  were,  and  have  put  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  423 

proceeds  to  other  pressing  uses.  I  waived  those  views 
in  deference  to  those  of  Mr.  Mason  and  Mr.  Slidell,  wjio 
thought  that  I  should  not  interfere  with  or  dictate  too 
much  to  Messrs.  Bravay  in  the  management  of  details, 
and  who  thought  that  we  should  await  some  direct  act  of 
interference  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government  before 
calling  upon  the  French  owners  to  act.  My  hands  are 
now  tied  until  those  French  subjects  succeed  in  effecting 
the  release  of  the  ships,  which  can  only  be  done  through 
the  medium  of  their  own  Government.  Under  all  the 
circumstances,  you  will  perceive  how  impossible  it  is  for 
me  to  predict  the  future  of  these  ships.  I  can  only  say 
that  if  they  are  released  from  seizure,  no  time  will  be  lost 
in  getting  them  clear  of  such  a  casualty  again.  I  feel 
bound  to  say  that  the  presence  of  the  Florida  in  these 
waters,  and  the  discharge  of  her  crew,  have  very 
materially  added  to  our  complications  here  ;  but  I  need 
not  go  into  detail  upon  matters  which  have  already 
taken  place,  and  can  only  be  felt  in  their  effects  without 
the  possibility  of  prevention. 

'  I  have  conversed  freely  with  Lieutenant  Carter 
(bearer  of  this)  upon  all  our  affairs  in  Europe,  with  the 
view  of  his  mentioning  the  substance  to  you,  and  I 
respectfully  request  that  you  will  give  him  an  oppor 
tunity  to  explain  some  things  to  you  which  would 
unnecessarily  swell  the  dimensions  of  this  despatch,  and 
which  I  do  not  wish  to  put  formally  upon  paper. 
4 1  have  the  honour,  etc., 

'  ( Signed)         JAMES  D.  BULLOCH. 
*  Hon.  S.  E.  Mallory, 
*  Eichmond.' 

I  reported  in  the  above  despatch  that   the  'actual 
seizure '  of  the  rams  was  effected  about  one  fortnight 


424  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

before  the  date  upon  which  it  was  written,  namely, 
about  October  9th,  1863.  This  was  sufficiently  correct 
for  the  information  of  the  Navy  Department  at  that  time ; 
but  for  a  clear  and  complete  exposition  of  the  case  in  all 
its  bearings,  a  more  precise  statement  of  dates  is  necessary. 
It  appears  from  the  official  correspondence  that  Mr. 
Layard,  the  Under- Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
wrote  to  her  Majesty's  Minister  at  Washington  on  the 
5th  of  September  thus  : — c  We  have  given  orders  to-day 
to  the  Commissioner  of  Customs  at  Liverpool  to  prevent 
the  two  ironclads  leaving  the  Mersey.  .  .  .  Mr.  Adams 
is  not  yet  aware  that  orders  have  been  given  to  stop  the 
vessels.  You  may  inform  Mr.  Seward  confidentially  of 
the  fact/ 

In  pursuance  of  the  above  intimation,  the  Messrs. 
Laird  were  notified  on  the  9th  or  10th  of  September  that 
the  ships  would  not  be  permitted  to  sail  or  even  to  make 
a  trial  trip,  without  special  notice  and  permission  ;  but  the 
actual  or  formal  seizure  was  not  effected  until  October 
9th,  1863.  On  the  27th  of  October  a  body  of  marines 
was  put  in  charge  of  the  ships,  and  two  gunboats 
stationed  to  watch  them,  the  workmen  being  sent  on 
shore. 

The  facts,  then,  are  briefly  as  follows.  The  ships 
were  *  detained  '  September  9th,  and  '  seized  '  October 
9th,  after  which  they  were  closely  watched  and  guarded, 
and  the  work  of  completing  them  virtually  stopped,  to 
the  great  inconvenience  and  injury  of  the  Messrs.  Laird, 
who  were  simply  executing  an  ordinary  commercial  order. 
Finally,  after  much  correspondence  and  remonstrance, 
they  were  permitted  to  go  on  with  work,  but  always 
under  vexatious  inspection  and  restraint. 

Thfs  state  of  affairs  continued  for  four  months,  during 
which  long  period  no  steps  were  taken  to  test  the 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  425 

legality  of  the  seizure,  or  to  bring  any  of  the  parties 
alleged  to  have  been  implicated  in  the  equipment  of  the 
ships  to  an  account.  The  particulars  of  the  proceedings 
against  the  ships  were  reported  by  me  to  the  Confederate 
Navy  Department  in  the  following  despatch  : 

'Liverpool,  February  17 th,  1864. 

'  You  have  doubtless  learned  by  means  of  newspapers? 
which  seem  to  pass  very  regularly  through  the  lines  of 
the  opposing  armies  in  Virginia,  as  well  as  from  the 
published  correspondence  between  Mr.  Seward  and  the 
United  States  Minister  at  the  Court  of  St.  James,  that 
every  attempt  to  build  a  ship  for  the  service  of  the  Con 
federate  States  is  opposed  not  only  by  the  active  exer 
tions  of  the  American  Minister  and  his  numerous  sub 
ordinates,  the  Consuls  of  that  nation,  but  that  through 
Lord  Russell  the  entire  machinery  of  the  British 
Government  which  can  in  any  way  be  used  for  such  a 
purpose  has  been  set  in  motion  and  put  at  Mr.  Adams' 
disposal,  not  to  be  worked  in  accordance  with  English 
custom  and  English  law,  but  in  such  a  manner  as  may 
be  dictated  by  the  Cabinet  at  Washington. 

4  The  spies  of  the  United  States  are  numerous,  active, 
and  unscrupulous.  They  invade  the  privacy  of  families, 
tamper  with  the  confidential  clerks  of  merchants,  and 
have  succeeded  in  converting  a  portion  of  the  police  of 
this  country  into  secret  agents  of  the  United  States,  who 
have  practised  a  prying  watchfulness  over  the  move 
ments  and  business  of  individuals  intolerably  vexatious, 
which  has  excited  the  disgust  and  openly  expressed  in 
dignation  of  many  prominent  Englishmen,  and  the 
frequent  criticism  of  that  portion  of  the  British  press 
which  is  really  neutral.  These  practices,  though  wholly 
inconsistent  with  the  spirit  of  justice  and  the  funda- 


426  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

mental  principles  of  constitutional  government,  are  not 
only  permitted,  but  to  all  appearance  are  directly 
countenanced  and  encouraged  by  the  present  Ministry, 
and  the  rights  of  British  subjects  are  violated,  and  their 
pecuniary  interests  damaged,  by  the  seizure  of  property 
in  their  hands  upon  the  affidavits  of  persons  who  have 
already  perjured  themselves  before  her  Majesty's  Courts.* 
A  nation  is  undoubtedly  justified  in  the  enforcement  of 
its  neutrality  by  all  legal  processes,  but  where  the  cus 
tomary  forms  of  law  are  departed  from,  where  a  large 
latitude  is  permitted  to  one  belligerent  and  the  other  is 
watched  with  a  jealous  and  even  vindictive  scrutiny,  the 
obligations  of  neutrality  are  violated.  That  these  obliga 
tions  are  violated  in  the  action  of  Great  Britain  to  the 
Confederate  States  must  be  apparent  to  the  world  at 
large.  The  point  is  conceded  by  many  Englishmen,  at 
any  rate. 

'  The  conjoint  efforts  of  Lord  Russell  and  Mr.  Adams 
have  proved  irresistible,  and  it  is  now  settled  beyond  a 
doubt  that  no  vessel  constructed  with  a  view  to  offen 
sive  warfare  can  be  built  and  got  out  of  England  for  the 
service  of  the  Confederate  States.  The  arrangement  by 
which  I  hoped  to  get  the  two  ironclads,  "  294  "  and  "295  " 
beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  England,  depended,  as  you 
have  already  been  informed,  mainly,  if  not  exclusively, 
upon  the  intervention  of  the  Emperor  of  the  French. 
It  was  hoped,  and  there  was  good  reason  for  the  hope, 
that  such  intervention  would  come  to  our  aid  at  the 
proper  time. 

'  It    was    confidently    believed   that   if  the   British 

Government,   fearing  that   the  Messrs.    Bravay   would 

resell  the  rams  to  the  Confederate  States,  should  cause 

them  to  be  seized,  and  should  demand  of  those  gentle  - 

*  Vide  Yonge  and  Chapman  in  re  Alexandra. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  427 

men  any  guarantee  that  the  vessels  should  actually 
be  delivered  to  the  Pasha  of  Egypt,  the  Emperor  of  the 
French  would  express  to  her  Majesty's  Government  his 
knowledge  of  the  connection,  in  a  business  way,  of 
Messrs.  Bravay  with  the  Egyptian  Government,  and 
would  request  the  release  of  the  ships  as  the  property 
of  French  subjects.  In  this  expectation,  based  upon 
intimations  purporting  to  have  come  directly  from 
the  Emperor,  we  have  been  grievously  disappointed. 
It  has  been  intimated  to  Mr.  Slidell,  through  no  less 
a  personage  than  the  Duke  de  Morny,  that  the  Emperor 
cannot  make  such  a  request  at  this  time,  although 
his  desire  is  that  somehow  or  other  the  release  of  the 
rams  should  be  effected,  and  their  possession  by  the 
Confederate  States  be  again  secured. 

'  Thus  reduced  to  a  struggle  with  the  British  Govern 
ment,  who,  in  case  of  a  decision  favourable  to  us  in 
the  Court  of  Exchequer,  will  exhaust  us  by  continual 
delays  and  appeals  even  up  to  the  House  of  Lords,  it  has 
been  determined  to  make  a  bond  fide  sale  of  the  ships, 
if  possible,  and  I  have  given  Messrs.  Bravay  instructions 
to  that  effect,  in  a  letter,  a  copy  of  which  I  enclose, 
marked  A.  It  is  possible  that  the  Government  may  not 
allow  the  sale  of  the  ships,  and  we  may  be  forced  to 
defend  the  suit,  but  the  lawyers  are  so  confident  that  the 
title  of  the  Messrs.  Bravay  will  be  sustained,  that  I 
hope  with  some  degree  of  confidence  that  Lord  Kussell 
may  abandon  the  case  and  permit  Messrs.  Bravay  to 
sell  the  ships,  although  I  am  satisfied  he  w^ould  never 
suffer  them  to  leave  England,  except  as  the  property  of 
some  responsible  Government  other  than  that  of  the 
Confederate  States. 

c  Under  date  of  October  20th,  1863,  I  had  the  honour 
to  report  very  fully  to  you  on  the  subject  of  the  seizure 


428  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

of  the  rams,  and  I  will  now  briefly  trace  their  fortunes 
to  the  present  time. 

'  It  was  naturally  supposed  that  as  British  subjects  of 
position  and  wealth  were  interested  pecuniarily  in  the 
case,  and  as  it  was  one  of  great  public  interest,  the 
Government  would  take  steps  to  bring  it  at  the  earliest 
possible  time  before  the  Exchequer  Court.  My  solicitor 
was  of  opinion  that  it  would  be  brought  up  during  the 
January  term ;  and  I  patiently  awaited  the  turn  of  the 
year.  There  seems  to  be  something  peculiar  in  the 
construction  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer  and  in  the  mode 
of  procedure  therein.  The  defendants  in  a  suit  have  no 
power  to  hasten  proceedings,  but  must  await  the  action 
of  the  prosecution.  The  solicitors  for  the  Messrs.  Laird 
and  for  the  Messrs.  Bravay  were  at  first  of  the  opinion 
that  the  Government  was  only  desirous  of  affording  the 
United  States  Minister  a  hearing  in  support  of  his 
suspicions,  and  that  in  justice  to  their  clients  a  hearing 
would  be  granted  at  the  earliest  possible  time.  Weeks 
passed,  however,  and  no  '  information '  was  lodged  in 
the  Exchequer  Court,  nor  could  the  solicitors  for  the 
defendants  obtain  from  the  Government  any  assurance 
as  to  when  the  case  would  be  tried,  or  what  would  be 
the  precise  nature  of  the  indictment,  or  4  information/  as 
it  is  technically  called,  in  the  Court  of  Exchequer. 

'About  the  end  of  December  (1863)  I  took  legal 
advice  on  the  following  points  :  (1)  Is  there  any  way  of 
forcing  the  Government  to  take  action  ?  (2)  Can  any 
damages  be  recovered  from  the  Government  if  the 
verdict  is  favourable  to  the  defendants  ?  (3)  Will  the 
Government  permit  the  ships  to  be  sold  to  a  foreign 
Power  ?  On  the  two  first  points  counsel  gave  technical 
opinions  not  necessary  to  insert  here.  In  reference  to 
the  third,  the  opinion  was  '  The  Government  would 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  429 

not  probably  allow  the  ships  to  be  sold  to  a  foreign 
State,  but  might  be  willing  to  settle  the  whole  matter 
in  full  by  making  the  purchase  themselves,  provided 
Messrs.  Bravay  would  sign  a  quit  claim/  My  own 
solicitor,  who  from  his  professional  as  well  as  political 
associations  was  favourably  situated  for  coming  to  a 
correct  conclusion,  expressed  to  me  very  decidedly  his 
opinion  that  Lord  Russell  would  not  act  in  accordance 
with  law ;  that  he  was  in  feeling  a  thorough  partizan  of 
the  United  States,  and,  acting  in  that  spirit,  he  would 
create  all  the  delay  possible  in  bringing  the  case  to  trial, 
and  would  further  embarrass  the  defendants  by  succes 
sive  appeals  from  each  consecutive  verdict.  He  also  felt 
convinced  that  Lord  Russell  would  never  permit  the 
rams  to  leave  England,  unless  the  Emperor  of  the 
French  would  claim  them  as  French  property,  and  thus 
relieve  her  Majesty's  Government  of  all  responsibility  to 
the  United  States. 

4  My  own  observation  of  the  progress  of  the  case  had 
brought  me  to  like  conclusions,  and  on  the  27th  of 
January  I  went  to  France  to  bring  the  matter  to  a  close 
without  further  delay,  and  by  direct  appeal  to  the 
Emperor,  through  Messrs.  Bravay.  Although  in  the 
beginning  there  was  good  reason  to  hope  that  the 
Emperor  would  intervene  at  this  stage  of  our  proceed 
ings,  I  had  for  some  time  begun  to  doubt  it,  and  on  my 
arrival  in  Paris  the  doubt  was  confirmed.  The  Emperor 
caused  the  Messrs.  Bravay,  as  well  as  the  Hon.  John 
Slidell,  to  be  informed  that  he  could  not  make  the  request 
to  the  British  Government  to  release  the  rams.  There 
was  a  good  deal  said  about  the  personal  sympathy  of 
the  Emperor  for  the  South,  and  his  earnest  desire  that 
by  some  means  or  other  we  might  get  our  ships  out,  but 
he  could  not  help  us,  so  the  sympathy  and  the  hope 


430  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

were  sheer  mockery,  when  we  had  been  buoyed  up  with 
the  expectation  of  something  more. 

'  I  now  laid  the  whole  case  before  Hon.  John  Slidell, 
Hon.  James  M.  Mason,  and  Captain  Barron,  all  of  whom 
were  in  Paris.  .  .  .  They  expressed  the  unanimous 
opinion  that  there  was  no  hope  of  getting  the  ships  out, 
and  that  there  was  nothing  left  for  me  to  do  but  to 
recover,  if  possible,  the  money  expended.  I  lost  110 
time  in  settling  preliminaries  with  Messrs.  Bravay,  and 
to  put  the  transaction  in  a  formal  business  shape  handed 
them  the  enclosed  letter,  marked  ^4,  already  alluded  to 
above — an  act  which,  I  assure  you,  sir,  gave  me  greater 
pain  and  regret  than  I  ever  thought  it  possible  to  feel. 
The  British  Government  have  within  the  last  two  or 
three  weeks  filed  the  '  information/  which  includes  130 
counts.  The  case  is  set  for  trial,  I  believe,  in  April  or 
May.  Messrs.  Bravay  will  not  receive  an  answer  to 
their  application  to  sell  in  time  for  me  to  report  the 
result  by  Commander  Wm.  L.  Maury,  who  will  take 
this  despatch,  but  you  will  probably  see  the  result  in 
the  newspapers  before  I  shall  have  an  opportunity  of 
writing  again.' 

On  the  3rd  of  April,  1864,  I  received  a  short  cypher 
despatch  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  '  Rich 
mond,  February  24th,  1864,'  expressing  the  greatest 
reluctance  to  part  with  the  rams,  and  saying  that  nothing 
short  of  the  impending  loss  of  them  would  justify 
their  sale.  He  had  not  then  received  the  above  ex 
planatory  report  upon  the  whole  case,  and  I  replied, 
under  date  of  '  Liverpool,  April  14th ' : — 

'  You  may  rest  assured  that  nothing  has  been  done  in 
the  matter  alluded  to  by  you  except  from  necessity.  I 
have  freely  consulted  with  Mr.  Mason  and  Mr.  Slidell, 
and  their  opinions  were  identical  with  my  own.  Com- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  431 

mander  Wm.  L.  Maury  is,  I  trust,  ere  this  in  Kichmond, 
with  despatches  fully  explaining  the  causes  which  com 
pelled  the  course  adopted.  I  send  you  by  to-morrow's 
mail,  via  Halifax,  a  number  of  Parliamentary  papers 
relating  to  the  rams.  The  affidavit  of  Chapman,  with 
reference  to  a  pretended  conversation  with  me,  is  wholly 
untrue.  Not  one  single  sentence  which  he  has  sworn 
to  ever  passed  between  us.  As  this  man  perjured  him 
self  in  the  case  of  the  Alexandra,  his  testimony  would 
not  probably  be  received  if  the  case  of  the  rams  is  ever 
brought  to  trial ;  yet  it  is  upon  such  testimony  as  this 
that  Lord  Russell  orders  the  forcible  seizure  of  the 
ships.  The  letter  from  Commander  Maffitt  to  me,  which 
you  will  perceive  was  used  by  Mr.  Adams  to  induce  the 
seizure  of  the  rams,  did  not  reach  me  through  the  men 
of  the  Florida,  by  whom  it  was  sent.  When  those  men 
arrived  in  Liverpool  I  was  absent  on  the  Continent. 
They  got  into  the  hands  of  a  solicitor,  and  gave  him  the 
letter,  which  he  seems  to  have  sent  to  the  United  States 
Consul,  and  the  immediate  cause  of  the  seizure  of  the 
ships  was  due  to  this  circumstance.' 

On  the  2nd  of  May,  1864, 1  received  another  despatch 
from  the  Navy  Department  on  the  engrossing  subject  of 
the  rams.  It  was  dated  i  Richmond,  March  21st,  1864.' 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  was  still  ignorant  of  the 
critical  state  of  affairs,  not  having  received  my  despatches 
forwarded  by  Commander  Maury,  and  he  directed  me 
not  to  sell  the  rams  '  until  that  measure  shall  have  been 
submitted  to  the  President,  with  the  reasons  for  it.' 

I  got  an  opportunity  to  reply  on  the  13th  of  May,  as 
follows : — 

<I  should  never  think  of  departing  from  your  in 
structions  nor  the  implied  wishes  of  the  President, 
except  in  a  case  wherein  such  a  course  alone  would  pre- 


432  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

vent  positive  disaster,  the  danger  of  which  you  could 
not  have  foreseen,  nor  even  then  without  the  advice  and 
support  of  rny  natural  and  proper  counsellors,  the  Com 
missioners  of  the'Confederate  States.  I  may  say,  how 
ever,  that  in  this  particular  instance  I  am  no  longer  a 
free  agent,  but  am  in  the  condition  of  a  disabled  ship 
taken  possession  of  by  a  current  she  has  no  power  to 
stem.  The  rams  are  in  the  possession  of  the  law  officers 
of  the  British  Crown,  and  they  are  acting  under  the 
instructions  of  a  Minister  who  has  on  every  occasion 
shown  in  practice  personal  animosity  to  the  Southern 
cause,  and  who  seems  regardless  of  the  forms  of  law  in 
his  efforts  to  prevent  our  getting  any  material  aid  from 
Great  Britain.  Hoping  to  regain  possession  of  these 
much-needed  ships,  or,  failing  in  this  hope,  at  least 
desiring  to  recover  the  large  sum  of  money  expended 
upon  them,  I  have  placed  the  case  in  the  hands  of  able 
solicitors,  who  are  acting  in  accord  with  eminent  counsel. 

1  Now,  sir,  unless  it  is  desired  to  establish  a  great 
grievance  against  the  British  Government,  and  it  is 
thought  that  the  money  already  expended  upon  the  ships 
may  be  advantageously  sacrificed  to  gain  that  end,  I 
respectfully  submit  that  my  duty  is  to  manage  the  case 
in  a  practical  business  way,  and  to  be  governed  by  the 
advice  of  the  counsel  employed.  The  only  chance  of 
gaining  the  pending  suit  rests  upon  the  ability  of  Messrs. 
Bravay  to  prove  their  contract  with  the  Pasha  of  Egypt, 
and  upon  the  consistency  of  their  own  testimony.  If  the 
case  goes  to  trial  and  the  Bravays  fail  in  the  above 
points,  the  verdict  will  undoubtedly  be  in  favour  of  the 
Crown,  and  our  ships  and  money  will  both  be  lost. 

'  This  is  the  opinion  of  counsel,  and  I  am  advised  to 
let  Messrs.  Bravay  sell  the  vessels  to  the  British  Govern 
ment  if  they  do  not  feel  quite  prepared  to  go  into  court 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  433 

with  a  clear  case.  On  the  very  day  of  the  receipt  of 
your  despatch  of  March  21st,  I  notified  Messrs.  Bravay 
to  suspend  all  pending  negotiations  for  the  sale  of  the 
rams.  The  elder  M.  Bravay  is  now  in  Egypt.  If  on 
his  return  he  expresses  confidence  in  himself  and  in  his 
case,  we  will  stand  to  the  issue  of  the  trial.  If,  on  the  con 
trary,  he  professes  doubt,  or  unwillingness  to  submit  to  a 
personal  examination,  it  is  Mr.  Slidell's  opinion  that  I 
should  permit  the  actual  sale  of  the  ships,  he  being 
satisfied,  as  well  as  myself,  that  such  would  be  the 
decision  of  the  President,  and  of  yourself  also,  if  you 
were  aware  of  the  actual  state  of  affairs.  The  solicitors- 
and  counsel  employed  are  of  opinion  that  if  the  first 
verdict  is  for  the  defendants  the  Crown  will  appeal  to  the 
Exchequer  Chamber,  and  from  thence  to  the  House  of 
Lords,  and  that  the  case  will  not  reach  this  latter  Court 
of  Appeal  during  this  entire  year. 

'  I  trust  you  have  not  thought  that  I  have  been  need 
lessly  fearful  of  the  result,  and  have  yielded  too  readily 
to  the  advice  of  my  solicitors.  .  .  I  held  out  as  long  as 
was  justifiable,  and  clung  to  hope  as  long  as  there  was  a  ray 
of  it.  No  one  could  have  had  stronger  inducements  to 
get  the  rams  to  sea  than  I  had.  Suppressing  all  allusion 
to  patriotic  impulses,  and  setting  aside  the  loyal  duty 
and  allegiance  I  owe  to  the  country,  there  are  personal 
reasons  which  could  not  fail  to  have  spurred  me  to  great 
exertions.  Although  I  was  not  to  have  had  the  honour 
of  commanding  either  of  the  ironclads,  I  felt  satisfied 
that  their  qualities  and  performances  would  redound  to 
my  professional  credit,  and  if  they  fail  to  do  service  for 
the  country  in  this  great  war  for  its  independence,  I 
frankly  confess  that  with  a  feeling  of  deep  regret  for  the 
public  loss  will  be  mingled  one  of  purely  selfish  personal 
disappointment. ' 

VOL.  i.  28 


434  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

On  the  30th  of  May,  1864, 1  again  received  a  despatch 
from  the  Navy  Department,  written  this  time  with  a  full 
knowledge  of  the  state  of  affairs  affecting  the  rams.  The 
above  mentioned  despatch  was  dated  '  Richmond,  April 
7th,  1864,'  and  began  thus  : — 

'  Commander  Maury  reached  Richmond  on  the  3rd  inst., 
and  delivered  your  several  despatches.  The  hopes  in 
which  I  have  long  and  confidently  indulged  of  certain 
important  results  to  our  country  from  your  efforts 
abroad,  and  which  hopes  were  shared  by  thousands 
around  me,  are  prostrated  by  the  intelligence  he  brings. 
One  reflection  alone  can  alleviate  the  bitterness  of  this 
disappointment,  and  this  is  the  reflection  that  it  results 
not  from  any  cause  within  our  control,  and  that  your 
whole  course,  as  the  immediate  and  principal  agent  in  the 
enterprise,  has  been  marked  by  equal  energy,  sagacity, 
and  tact.  Knowing  from  my  own  what  must  be  your 
depression  under  this  great  national  misfortune,  I  deem 
it  proper  to  say  this  in  reference  to  your  action/ 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  confirmed  the  decision  to 
sell  the  rams,  and  the  remainder  of  the  despatch  was  de 
voted  to  other  matters  of  business.  During  the  whole 
of  the  time,  from  the  first  '  detention '  of  the  rams,  on 
September  9th,  1863,  until  the  '  information '  was  filed 
in  the  Exchequer,  namely,  February  8th,  1864,  a  period 
of  five  months,  not  a  single  step  was  taken  by  her 
Majesty's  Government  to  justify  the  seizure,  or  to  show 
cause  for  the  detention.  It  now  appears,  from  the  official 
correspondence  published  in  the  'Appendix  to  the 
British  Case,'*  that  those  five  months  were  diligently 
occupied  in  looking  up  evidence  and  in  digesting  the 
numerous  affidavits  of  the  United  States  Consul  at 
Liverpool. 

*  '  Alabama  Claims,  British  Case,'  vol.  ii. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  435 

That  gentleman  manifested  his  usual  fecundity  of 
resource  in  supplying  c  statements.'  Those  in  this  case 
were  of  the  stereotyped  form,  the  persons  swearing  to 
them  being  generally  of  the  well-known  type  of  '  affidavit 
monger.'  They  l  believed  this/  and  had  '  heard  that,' 
but  were  always  wide  of  the  mark  when  they  came 
to  deal  with  specific  facts. 

After  the  formal  seizure  on  the  9th  of  October,  the 
ships  were  kept  literally  in  a  state  of  siege — Captain 
Ingiefield,  of  her  Majesty's  ship  Majestic,  was  the  officer 
charged  with  their  special  custody.  The  Government 
had  been  persuaded  by  Mr.  Adams  that  the  dis 
charged  crew  of  the  Florida  had  been  sent  to  Liverpool 
for  the  purpose  of  forcibly  seizing  the  rams  and  taking 
them  to  sea,  and  if  there  had  been  a  hostile  fleet  off  the 
harbour,  Captain  Ingiefield  could  not  have  been  more 
perplexed  and  anxious,  more  nervously  active  and 
watchful  in  his  precautions  and  preparations  to  discover 
and  defeat  a  cutting-out  expedition,  than  he  appears  to 
have  been  with  respect  to  the  alleged  hostile  seamen 
from  the  Florida,  who  were  probably  smoking  their 
pipes  at  the  '  Sailors'  Home,'  or  were  already  dispersed 
in  other  ships,  in  happy  or  careless  unconsciousness  of 
the  agitation  they  were  creating. 

On  the  6th  of  October,  1863,  Captain  Ingiefield 
wrote,  in  reply  to  '  confidential  instructions  '  from  the 
Admiralty  :  '  I  conceive  the  possibility  that  an  attempt 
might  be  made  to  carry  the  vessel  in  question  out  of 
British  waters  by  force.'  .  .  .  '  The  Custom-house 
authorities  having  placed  their  means  entirely  at  my 
disposal,  I  have  organized  a  system  of  espionage  which 
cannot  fail  to  give  me  the  earliest  possible  information 
of  any  movement  on  the  part  of  the  ironclad  vessel  in 

28—2 


436  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

question/*  On  the  8th  of  October  he  received  orders 
by  telegraph  '  to  give  every  assistance  to  officers  of  the 
Customs  in  effecting  and  maintaining  the  seizure  of  both 
iron  ships/  etc.  ;  and  on  the  9th  he  wrote  in  reply  :"(" 
' ....  In  obedience  to  the  above,  I  consider  it  most 
expedient  that  the  Liverpool^  should  be  moved  down 
the  river  to  a  berth  immediately  abreast  of  the  entrance 
to  the  Great  Float,  so  that  she  may  perfectly  command 
the  basin,  and  be  nearer  her  guard-boat.  The  gunboat 
will  remain  within  the  entrance  to  the  Great  Float,  and 
during  the  night  an  armed  pinnace  will  row  guard/ 
On  the  llth  of  October  he  reports  further  :  '  The  gun 
boat  will  take  up  a  position  beside  the  ironclad  vessel, 
and  during  the  daytime  the  marines  will  remain  on 
board  of  her.  After  the  workmen  have  left,  a  sentry  will 
be  placed  on  the  forecastle,  and  another  on  the  poop  of  the 
ram  ;  Messrs.  Laird's  shipkeepers  remaining  in  charge  of 
stores.  ...  I  shall  then  direct  a  lieutenant  of  marines 
to  remain  on  board  the  iron  ship  during  the  night,  only 
withdrawing  his  party  when  the  workpeople  return  in 
the  morning/§  On  the  25th  of  October  he  wrote  again  : 
'  If  an  effort  is  made  to  carry  off  the  rams,  I  think  it  will 
either  be  at  night,  or  in  such  thick  weather  as  we  con 
stantly  experience  at  this  time  of  year.  Unless  the 
gunboat  arrives  to-day,  I  must  employ  the  ferry-boat 
to-morrow  morning  ;  for  though  the  El  Mounassir  is  not 
masted,  nor  are  her  turrets  on  board,  she  is,  nevertheless, 
an  available  ironcased  ram,  which  would  be  of  con 
siderable  service  (even  in  her  present  condition)  for 
breaking  a  blockade.'||  .  .  .  '  The  arrival  of  the  Heron 
and  Britomart,  which  I  am  looking  for  anxiously,  will 

*  'Appendix  to  British  Case,'  p.  384.  t  Ibid.  p.  393. 

J  The  Liverpool  was  a  large  screw  frigate  of  sixty  guns. 
§  <  Appendix  to  British  Case,'  p.  400.  |j  Ibid.  p.  418. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  437 

obviate  the  necessity  of  seeking  the  assistance  of  the 
ferry-boat,  etc/ 

In  consequence  of  the  above  letter,  the  Secretary  to 
the  Admiralty  wrote  to  the  Under- Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs  on  October  26th  : — '  My  lords  are  quite  prepared, 
if  Earl  Kussell  thinks  it  desirable,  to  send  the  Prince 
Consort*  to  anchor  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mersey.'f 

There  are  more  documents  of  similar  purport  in  the 
official  correspondence,  but  the  above  quotations  will 
sufficiently  demonstrate  the  great  naval  force  that  was 
employed  in  guarding  these  mastless  and  turretless 
rams  from  being  carried  off,  the  items  being :  her 
Majesty's  ship  Majestic,  say  sixty  guns ;  her  Majesty's 
ship  Liverpool,  sixty  guns ;  three  gunboats — say  one 
pivot -gun  each — and  the  proffered  reinforcement  of  her 
Majesty's  armour-cased  ship  Prince  Consort. 

Captain  Inglefield  is  a  gallant  officer,  I  have  no  doubt 
on  that  point,  and  he  would  probably  make  skilful  and 
suitable  arrangements  to  repel  a  sea  attack  upon  the 
Mersey,  if  he  should  be  appointed  to  the  naval  command 
at  Liverpool  in  a  time  of  war;  but  I  cannot  help  thinking 
that,  as  he  sipped  his  wine  at  dinner  in  the  Majesties  cabin, 
after  writing  one  of  the  above  reports  to  the  Admiralty, 
there  must  have  floated  athwart  his  mind  a  suspicion 
that  there  was  a  comical  side  to  the  whole  transaction. 
I  cannot  bring  myself  to  believe  that  an  experienced 
naval  officer  would  give  credence  to  such  a  preposterous 
allegation  as  that  an  attempt  would  be  made  to  carry  off 
the  rams  by  force,  or  that  any  effort  would  be  made 
to  move  them  from  their  positions,  which  could  not 
have  been  prevented  by  the  remonstrance  of  a  single 

*  The  Prince  Consort  is  an  ironclad, 
t  '  Appendix  to  British  Case,'  p.  417. 


438  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Custom  House  officer,  with  a  pen  behind  his  ear  and  a 
memorandum-book  in  his  hand. 

The  Confederate  Government  was  impelled  by  every 
motive  of  policy,  if  not  of  principle,  to  conciliate  foreign 
Powene,  and  especially  Great  Britain,  and  it  is  incon 
ceivable  that  any  Minister  of  State,  nay,  I  may  say 
that  any  reasoning  being,  could  have  supposed  that  the 
President  of  the  Confederate  States  would  have  coun 
tenanced,  or  that  any  responsible  agent  of  that  Govern 
ment  would  have  made,  such  an  attempt. 

It  was  said,  I  believe,  that  as  the  Alabama  was  taken 
out  of  the  Mersey  without  permission,  the  same  thing 
might  be  done  with  the  ironclads,  but  the  cases  are  not 
comparable  with  each  other.  There  is  a  great  difference 
between  taking  up  your  hat  and  quietly  walking  out  of 
a  man's  house  without  asking  his  leave  when  he  has  not 
forbidden  your  departure,  and  the  act  of  knocking  him 
down  and  stepping  over  his  prostrate  body  to  get  out 
when  he  has  prohibited  your  going.  It  has  been  shown, 
and  I  think  it  will  be  admitted  by  all  fair-minded  people, 
that  the  taking  away  of  the  Alabama  infringed  no  law, 
and  it  has  never  been  alleged  that  she  w^as  restrained  in 
any  way,  or  that  a  single  false  statement  was  made  in 
reference  to  her  movements.  I  mean  that  her  Majesty's 
Government  have  never  alleged  it.  But  in  the  case 
of  the  rams,  they  w^ere  restrained  by  the  orders  of 
the  duly  authorized  civil  authorities  from  making  even 
a  trial-trip  without  especial  permission,  and  the  Messrs. 
Laird  would  not  have  connived  at  their  being  removed 
from  their  works ;  and  no  one  acting  on  behalf  of  the 
Confederate  Government  would  have  dreamed  of  attempt 
ing  a  forcible  removal.  Besides,  as  a  mere  practical 
question,  the  condition  of  the  vessels  was  such  that  they 
could  not  have  been  carried  off  without  so  much  open 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  439 

preparation,  and  so  much  assistance  from  local  people, 
that  there  could  have  been  no  disguise  and  no  coup 'de- 
main.  The  '  scare '  originated  at  the  United  States 
Consulate.  The  arrival  of  the  Florida's  men  was 
seized  upon  as  a  fortuitous  circumstance.  Mr.  Adams 
appears  to  have  convinced  Earl  Russell  of  c  the  desperate 
character  of  the  chief  persons  engaged  in  the  insurrection 
in  the  United  States/  of  whom  he  says,  in  one  of  the 
letters  to  his  lordship : — c  I  shall  be  little  surprised  at 
learning  of  their  resort  to  any  expedient,  however 
audacious  or  dishonest,  which  may  have  for  its  object 
the  possession  of  these  formidable  ships.'* 

It  is  well  known  among  business  men  that  a  ship 
remains  exclusively  in  the  custody  of  the  builder,  and  is 
in  fact  his  property,  until  the  last  instalment  of  her 
price  is  paid  and  the  builder's  certificate  is  handed  over 
to  the  contractor  or  purchaser.  The  latter  has,  of 
course,  a  contingent  interest  in  her,  equivalent  to  the 
portion  of  the  stipulated  price  he  has  paid,  but  he 
cannot  take  possession  or  remove  her  until  she  is  com 
pleted  and  paid  for.  If  there  is  delay  in  the  completion 
beyond  the  time  specified  for  delivery,  or  injury  to  the 
ship  in  course  of  building,  the  loss  falls  upon  the 
builder,  and  not  upon  the  purchaser. 

The  inconvenience  and  injury  to  the  Messrs.  Laird  by 
the  seizure  of  the  rams,  and  the  lashing  of  gun-boats 
alongside,  and  the  mounting  of  guards  on  board,  must 
have  been  serious.  They  protested,  and  pointed  out  the 
improbability — in  fact,  the  impossibility — of  any  party 
of  men  being  found  who  would  attempt  to  take  the 
ships  away  from  them  by  force.  On  the  17th  of  Octo 
ber,  1863,  they  wrote  to  the  Under- Secretary  of  the 

*  Published  in  Liverpool  Daily  Mercury,  with  other  official  corre 
spondence,  March  10th,  1864. 


440  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

Treasury : — '  Both  vessels  are  incomplete,  and  unfit  for 
sea-going.  The  second  vessel  has  not  even  got  her 
masts  or  funnel  in,  and  both  are  in  the  sole  charge 
of  our  own  people.  We  believe,  further,  that  if  any 
such  project  as  the  forcible  abduction  of  these  vessels 
had  ever  been  thought  of,  it  could  not  successfully  have 
been  carried  out  in  the  port  of  Liverpool.' 

At  one  time  it  was  proposed  to  stop  the  work  upon 
the  ships  entirely,  but  this  would  have  compelled  Messrs. 
Laird  to  discharge  a  large  number  of  men,  which 
Captain  Inglefield  thought  would  increase  the  ill-feeling 
already  exhibited  by  the  operatives  in  Messrs.  Laird's 
yard  towards  the  naval  officers  and  men  employed  in 
maintaining  the  seizure,  and  the  builders  were  permitted 
to  go  on  with  their  work,  although  under  such  restric 
tions  and  i  espionage '  the  progress  was  necessarily  slow 
and  unsatisfactory. 

Meanwhile,  the  Government  was  diligently  employed 
looking  up  evidence.  They  even  went  to  the  expense 
of  sending  a  commission  to  Egypt  to  examine  the 
Viceroy  and  his  Grand  Yizier  as  to  their  business  rela 
tions  with  Messrs.  Bravay.  Finally,  after  coquetting 
for  some  time  about  the  purchase  of  the  ships,  they 
sent  down  experts  from  the  Admiralty,  who  carefully 
examined  and  valued  them,  and  then,  with  the  law- suit 
in  one  hand  and  the  valuation  in  the  other,  they  made 
a  direct  offer  to  Messrs.  Bravay,  which  was  accepted, 
and  the  preliminary  terms  upon  which  the  two  rams 
should  pass  into  the  Royal  Navy  were  settled  on  about 
the  20th  of  May,  1864. 

Formal  notice  of  suit  for  the  forfeiture  of  the  rams 
had  been  given  on  the  8th  of  February,  and  in  the  '  in 
formation/  both  the  Messrs.  Laird  and  Messrs.  Bravay 
were  made  parties  to  the  suit.  It  is  ordinarily  supposed, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  441 

when  a  defendant  in  a  case  of  this  kind  abandons  his 
defence  and  accepts  the  terms  offered  by  the  Government, 
that  he  admits  the  weakness  of  his  position,  and  the 
legality  of  the  proceedings  which  have  been  taken  against 
him.  But  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  case  by  the 
Crown  it  was  thought  advisable  to  prevent  any  such 
conclusion  with  reference  to  Messrs.  Laird  and  Messrs. 
Bravay.  On  the  day  after  the  formal  notice  of  with 
drawal  of  the  suit,  namely,  May  27th,  1864,  the 
Attorney-General,  with  Sir  Hugh  Cairns,  appeared  in 
the  Court  of  Exchequer  at  Westminster,  and  the  former 
said : — 

'  The  Crown  had  asserted  that  there  was  a  valid 
seizure  for  a  valid  cause  of  forfeiture.  The  claimants 
had  to  the  last  asserted  that  there  was  110  such  valid 
cause  of  forfeiture,  but  the  matter  had  been  by  arrange 
ment  withdrawn  from  the  cognizance  of  the  court,  so 
that  no  determination  of  it  would  be  necessary,  and 
that  had  been  done  upon  the  footing  that  the  Crown 
had  agreed  to  pay  to  the  claimants  the  value  which  the 
Crown  themselves  had  placed  upon  the  property,  and 
that,  too,  entirely  without  prejudice  to  the  position  of 
the  Crown  or  the  claimants  with  regard  to  the  question 
that  would  have  required  to  be  tried  if  the  arrangement 
had  not  been  made.  The  mode  of  doing  it  and  giving 
effect  to  that  arrangement  had  not  been  finally  arrived 
at ;  but  no  mode  would  be  adopted  that  would  in  any 
degree  authorize  me  to  say  that  there  was  any  admission 
by  the  claimants  that  it  was  a  valid  forfeiture/ 

The  Messrs.  Bravay  made  no  concession  which  could 
be  taken  as  a  surrender  of  their  right  as  French  sub 
jects  to  buy  or  to  have  built  for  them  a  vessel  of  any 
description  in  England.  They  did  only  what  other 
private  parties  have  often  done,  namely,  consent  to 


442  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

an  arrangement  rather  than  to  continue  an  expensive 
and  tedious  litigation  with  the  State,  and  it  is  hardly 
probable  that  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown  would  have 
advised  a  settlement  which  resulted  in  a  pecuniary 
profit  to  the  claimants,  if  they  really  thought  that 
Messrs.  Bravay  had  infringed  the  terms  of  the  Foreign 
Enlistment  Act.  It  is  fair  and  reasonable  to  assume 
that,  having  in  remembrance  the  judgment  of  the  Court 
of  Exchequer  in  the  '  Alexandra  Case/  and  also  that  of 
the  Vice- Admiralty  Court  of  Nassau  in  respect  to  the 
Ore  to,  they  had  no  hopes  of  obtaining  a  favourable 
verdict,  and  no  expectation  of  proving  that  there  had 
been  i  a  valid  seizure  for  a  valid  cause  of  forfeiture/ 

I  am  bound  to  say  that  as  soon  as  it  was  decided  to 
get  out  of  the  difficulty  by  buying  the  ships,  the 
Admiralty  conducted  the  operation  in  a  perfectly  fair 
and  straightforward  way.  The  ships  were  valued  with 
scrupulous  regard  to  their  intrinsic  worth,  and  with  due 
reference  to  the  state  of  the  shipbuilding  trade  at  the 
time,  and  as  a  mere  commercial  transaction  the  sale  was 
satisfactory,  the  aggregate  amount  agreed  to  be  paid  by 
the  Government  being  about  £30,000  in  excess  of  the 
original  contract  price  of  the  two  ships,  which  proves 
that  they  were  good  vessels  of  their  kind,  and  that  the 
work  upon  them  had  been  faithfully  executed.  The 
whole  of  the  purchase  money  did  not  of  course  revert  to 
the  Confederate  Treasury,  but  only  a  part  proportioned 
to  the  amount  that  had  been  paid  on  account;  and 
although  the  circumstances  which  brought  this  pecu 
niary  reinforcement  to  the  funds  of  the  Navy  Depart 
ment  were  most  distressing,  yet  the  relief  came  at  a 
time  when  much  work  would  have  been  necessarily 
abandoned,  and  some  important  contracts  cancelled,  if 
it  had  not  been  obtained.  In  the  month  of  September, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  443 

1863,  I  had  reported  that  the  prospective  wants  of  the 
Department  were  £705,300  in  excess  of  the  visible 
supply.  Mr.  Secretary  Mallory  had  made  every  pos 
sible  effort  to  meet  the  deficiency,  but  it  had  not  been 
made  good,  the  demands  always  increasing  in  a  larger 
ratio  than  the  means  for  meeting  them.  These  matters 
of  finance  have,  however,  been  dealt  with  and  explained 
in  another  chapter. 

The  gratitude  of  the  United  States  to  Earl  Russell  for 
the  seizure  of  the  rams  was  even  greater  than  the  gratifi 
cation  Mr.  Seward  expressed  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
Alexandra.  As  soon  as  the  purpose  of  her  Majesty's 
Government  was  known  in  Washington,  Mr.  Adams  was 
instructed  to  thank  Lord  Russell,  and  to  say  that  the 
President  was  gratified  in  being  able  to  regard  his  con 
duct  in  the  light  of  a  sincere  desire,  on  just  principles,  to 
maintain  friendly  relations  with  the  United  States. 
Mr.  Adams  concluded  his  letter  of  thanks  in  these 
words  : — '  I  am  therefore  instructed  to  inform  your  lord 
ship  that  the  Government  will  hereafter  hold  itself  ob 
liged,  with  even  more  care  than  heretofore,  to  endeavour  so 
to  conduct  its  intercourse  with  Great  Britain  as  that  the 
war  in  which  it  is  now  unhappily  involved  may,  when 
ever  it  may  terminate,  leave  to  neither  nation  any  per 
manent  cause  of  discontent.  '* 

The  Government  of  Great  Britain  zealously  fulfilled 
its  share  in  accomplishing  the  purpose  which  Mr.  Adams 
so  ardently  hoped  would  follow  the  seizure  of  the  rams. 
Earl  Russell  applied  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  so 
stringently  with  reference  to  the  Confederate  States,  that 
it  was  very  difficult  to  forward  the  most  essential  sup 
plies,  and  while  the  drain  of  battle,  and  the  lack  of  neces 
sary  comforts  were  thinning  the  ranks  and  wasting  the 
*  Appendix  to  '  British  Case,'  vol.  ii.  p.  400. 


444  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

strength  of  the  armies  in  the  field,  and  the  difficulty  of 
placing  funds  in  Europe  was  daily  increasing,  the 
cheapest  and  most  favourable  market,  that  of  England, 
was  well  nigh  closed  to  the  Confederacy,  while  the 
United  States  were  permitted  to  buy  and  ship  what  they 
liked,  without  hindrance,  and  at  the  ordinary  current 
prices. 

I  do  not  wish  to  overstate  the  case,  but  I  say  without 
hesitation,  and  without  fear  of  contradiction,  that  the 
practice  of  stopping  ordinary  merchant  steamers  and 
detaining  them  for  examination  and  inquiry,  unless  they 
were  loading  for  a  Northern  port,  drove  the  Confederate 
agents  to  such  shifts  in  order  to  get  their  purchases  out 
of  England,  that  the  cost  of  every  rifle  and  every  ounce 
of  powder  was  greatly  increased,  irrespective  of  the  high 
blockade  rates  for  freight.  A  notable  and  distressing 
feature  of  this  unequal  treatment  of  the  two  belligerents 
was  that  the  restrictive  watchfulness  practised  over  the 
weaker  side  became  more  cold  and  rigid  as  the  disparity 
of  strength  became  more  and  more  manifest. 

But  while  Earl  Eussell  thus  did  all  in  his  power  to 
conciliate  the  United  States,  and  to  conduct  his  inter 
course  with  them  so  that  the  termination  of  the  war 
should  '  leave  to  neither  nation  any  permanent  cause  of 
discontent,'  the  Government  at  Washington  did  not  act 
in  the  spirit  of  Mr.  Adams's  promise.  No  sooner  was  the 
war  over  than  Mr.  Seward  began  to  collect  complaints 
against  Great  Britain.  He  originated  what  are  known 
as  the  l Alabama  Claims.'  He  began  and  continued  for 
several  years  an  active,  harassing,  and  sometimes  angry 
correspondence  with  the  British  Foreign  Office,  and 
finally  his  successor  haled  her  Majesty's  Government 
before  an  International  Court,  with  a  result  which  all  the 
world  knows. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  445 

Anyone  who  cares  to  read  c  The  Case  of  the  United 
States '  in  the  Geneva  Arbitration,  will  be  struck  with 
the  harsh  epithets  and  disparaging  insinuations  which 
are  cast  upon  the  Ministry  which  governed  England 
during  the  war,  and  indeed  upon  British  officials 
generally,  and  will  think  that  the  assurance  given  by 
Mr.  Adams  was  forgotten  as  soon  as  the  occasion  which 
inspired  it  had  served  its  purpose. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  did  not  ex 
aggerate  the  importance  of  preventing  the  departure  of 
the  rams  from  Liverpool,  and  the  passionate  appeals,  and 
strong  asseverations  of  Mr.  Adams  are  not  surprising.  He 
knew  the  formidable  character  of  the  ships,  and  foresaw 
the  havoc  they  would  work  if  they  ever  got  into  the 
hands  of  a  competent  Confederate  officer.  The  defensive 
powers  of  the  rams  were  quite  up  to  the  standard  of  the 
years  1861-63.  They  were  cased  over  the  vital  parts 
with  4^ -inch  armour  upon  twelve  inches  of  teak  backing, 
and  an  inner  skin  of  ^-inch  iron  plates.  Each  had  two 
revolving  turrets  with  5^-inch  armour  over  twelve 
inches  of  teak.  In  each  turret  there  would  have  been 
two  guns  of  the  best  possible  manufacture,  mounted 
parallel  to  each  other,  and  five  feet  from  centre  to  centre. 
Calibre  of  gun,  9-inch  rifled  ;  weight  of  projectile,  about 
220  pounds  ;  weight  of  gun,  about  twelve  tons.  If  one 
of  the  rams  had  gone  into  smooth  water,  and  had 
suffered  a  '  Monitor '  to  make  deliberate  practice  at  her 
with  15 -inch  shot  at  short  range,  as  in  the  engagement 
between  the  Weehawken  and  the  Atlanta  in  Warsaw 
Sound,  no  doubt  in  time  her  plates  would  have  been 
loosened  and  the  backing  splintered  ;  but  their  power 
and  speed  was  such  that  hi  open  water,  with  room  to 
manoeuvre,  I  think  they  would  have  had  no  difficulty  in 
running  down  any  '  Monitor '  then  afloat,  and  I  con- 


446  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

fidently  believe  that  they  would  have  broken  up  the 
blockade  completely,  and  then  perhaps  they  would  have 
paid  New  York  or  Boston  an  unpleasant  visit. 

I  have  now  given  a  full  and  accurate  account  of  the 
formidable  vessels  '  294  '  and  '295,'  from  the  first  dis 
cussion  of  their  plans  to  the  time  when  they  became  part 
of  the  naval  force  of  Great  Britain.  Those  persons  who 
permit  their  judgment  to  be  swayed  by  political  bias, 
who  were  unfriendly  to  the  South  during  the  war,  and 
who  have  pledged  themselves  to  the  opinion  that  the 
Confederate  Government  should  not  have  been  allowed 
to  get  ships  in  England  under  any  circumstances,  may 
say  that  the  foregoing  confession  of  the  ultimate  owner 
ship  and  purpose  of  the  rams  fully  justified  their  seizure. 
But  I  think  that  those,  on  the  other  hand,  who  only 
wish  to  come  to  a  right  judgment  after  a  dispassionate 
examination  of  the  facts,  will  be  brought  to  the  con 
clusion  that  there  was  no  valid  reason  for  the  inter 
ference  of  her  Majesty's  Government,  and  that  the 
proceedings  against  the  vessels  prescribed  by  Earl 
Russell,  and  so  rigidly  enforced  by  the  Customs  authori 
ties  and  by  the  naval  commander  at  Liverpool,  were  not 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  international  duty 
laid  down  for  its  practice  by  the  Government  itself,  and 
that  they  went  far  beyond  the  purpose  of  the  prohibitory 
clauses,  and  were  in  excess  of  the  powers  granted  in  the 
preventive  clauses  of  the  Neutrality  Laws  of  Great 
Britain,  as  expounded  by  the  Solicitor- General  in 
Parliament,  and  defined  by  the  judgment  of  the  Court 
of  Exchequer  in  the  Alexandra  case. 

In  forming  an  opinion  with  reference  to  Earl  Russell's 
proceedings  against  the  rams,  it  is  clearly  essential  to 
consider,  not  what  is  known  now,  but  what  were  the 
actual  circumstances  and  the  precise  position  of  affairs 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  447 

at  the  time  of  the  seizure ;  and  it  is  equally  important  to 
bear  in  mind  the  statements  made  by  leading  members 
of  the  Government  in  the  House  of  Commons  in  ex 
planation  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  and  defining 
what  each  belligerent  might  do  towards  supplying  its 
wants  without  infringing  the  statute.  Without  quoting 
.again  in  full  the  principles  of  action  laid  down  by  the 
Government,  I  may  for  the  present  purpose  merely 
remind  the  reader  that  the  Prime  Minister,  Lord 
Palmerston,  said  that  there  was  no  difference  in  principle 
between  supplying  a  belligerent  with  rifles  or  with  ships 
that  are  to  operate  in  war,  and  that  on  the  mere  ground 
of  international  law  it  was  quite  admissible  to  supply 
either  of  two  belligerents  not  only  with  arms  and 
cannon,  but  also  with  ships  destined  for  warlike 
purposes  ;  that  the  Solicitor- General  said  it  was  a  great 
mistake  to  suppose  that  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  was 
meant  to  prohibit  all  commercial  dealings  in  ships-of-war 
with  belligerent  countries,  and  that  even  the  Alabama, 
though  a  ship-of-war,  might  have  formed  a  legitimate 
.  article  of  merchandise,  even  if  meant  for  the  Confederate 
.States ;  and  that  Earl  Russell  himself,  in  a  letter  to  Mr. 
Adams,  said  that  her  Majesty's  Government  '  cannot 
interfere  with  commercial  dealings  between  Britsih  sub 
jects  and  the  so -sty  led  Confederate  States,  whether  the 
object  of  those  dealings  be  money  or  contraband  goods, 
«or  even  ships  adapted  for  warlike  purposes.' 

The  letter  from  Earl  Russell  containing  the  above 

statement  was  read  in  Court  by  Sir  Hugh  Cairns,  the 

leading  counsel  for  the  defendants  in  the  trial  of  the  Alex- 

.  andra,  and  was  commented  upon  by  him  as  the  opinion 

of  a  Minister  of  the  Crown,  and  it  probably  had  a  good 

deal  of  weight,  not  in  determining  the  '  direction  '  of  the 

Lord  Chief  Baron,  but  in  affecting  the  minds  of  the  jury. 


448  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

When  the  Messrs.  Laird  engaged  as  a  purely  com 
mercial  transaction  to  build  the  rams,  the  views  of  the 
Government  were  not  fully  and  specifically  known,  and 
neither  those  gentlemen  nor  the  Confederate  agent  had 
any  other  guide  to  the  scope  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment 
Act  than  the  opinions  of  their  legal  advisers.  But  the 
statements  above  referred  to  were  made  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  and  the  letter  of  Earl  Russell  was  written, 
several  months  before  the  seizure  of  the  rams.  They 
were  not  merely  the  opinions  of  three  eminent  men 
upon  an  abstract  question  of  international  or  municipal 
law,  but  they  were  the  declarations  of  two  responsible 
Ministers  of  the  Crown,  and  of  a  chief  law  officer  of  the 
Government,  in  reference  to  a  specific  Act  of  Parliament, 
and  must  have  been  intended  to  lay  down  the  principle 
upon  which  the  act  would  be  administered  in  the 
practice  of  their  neutrality.  When  those  statements  of 
Ministers  and  of  the  Solicitor- General  were  followed  by 
a  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer  which  fully 
confirmed  their  view  of  the  municipal  law,  it  can  hardly 
be  doubted  that  the  Confederate  Government  was 
justified  in  thinking  that  their  agents  might  supply 
all  their  wants  in  the  ordinary  commercial  way,  and  that 
they  might  buy  in  the  British  markets  and  from  British 
subjects,  not  only  '  contraband  goods/  but  i  even  ships 
adapted  for  warlike  purposes/  provided  there  was  no 
intention  that  in  the  port  of  Liverpool  or  in  any  other 
port  (of  the  British  dominions)  the  vessels  should  be,  in 
the  language  of  the  Act  of  Parliament,  ;  either  equipped, 
furnished,  fitted  out,  or  armed/  which  the  Lord  Chief 
Baron  in  his  summing  up  declared  all  meant  the  same 
thing,  and  referred  exclusively  to  the  warlike  arma 
ment. 

It  has  been  alleged  that  while   any  ordinary  ships, 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  449 

even  though  well  suited  in  structure  and  general 
arrangements  for  warlike  purposes,  might  be  legitimate 
objects  of  sale  by  British  subjects  to  a  belligerent,  yet 
armour-cased  vessels  were  fitted  for  hostile  operations, 
and  could  attack  and  destroy  an  enemy  immediately 
after  leaving  port,  without  being  armed  at  all  in  the 
sense  of  being  provided  with  guns,  and  therefore  the 
privilege  which  might  be  permitted  to  trade  in  the 
former,  would  not  be  permissible  with  reference  to  the 
latter  class.  In  reply  to  this  I  will  call  attention  to  the 
fact  that  the  official  statements  previously  quoted  were 
made  by  Ministers,  and  the  judgment  of  the  court 
was  rendered,  when  not  only  other  armoured  vessels  had 
been  built,  and  were  building,  but  when  the  particular 
vessels  in  question,  namely,  those  bought  by  Messrs. 
Bravay,  were  well-advanced  in  their  construction,  and 
that  neither  in  the  Ministerial  statements  nor  in  the 
judgment  of  the  court  was  there  any  limitation  to 
the  broad  and  inclusive  declaration,  that  '  even  ships 
adapted  for  warlike  purposes'  were  on  a  parity  with 
gunpowder  and  saltpetre  as  articles  of  commercial 
traffic. 

But  there  is  something  more  than  mere  negative 
testimony  to  offer  on  this  point.  On  the  5th  of  Sep 
tember,  1863,  Mr.  Adams  wrote  a  very  strong  letter  to 
Earl  Russell,  which  certainly  contained  an  ill-concealed 
threat  of  serious  consequences  if  the  rams  were  per 
mitted  to  leave  England.*  Earl  Russell  sent  a  brief 
memorandum  to  Mr.  Adams  on  the  8th  of  September : — 
'  Lord  Russell  presents  his  compliments  to  Mr.  Adams, 
and  has  the  honour  to  inform  him  that  instructions  have 
been  issued  which  will  prevent  the  departure  of  the  two 

*  '  British  Case,'  Appendix,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  352,  353. 

VOL.  i.  29 


450  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

ironclad  vessels  from  Liverpool/*  Now  it  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  the  letter  of  Mr.  Adams,  of  Septem 
ber  5th,  referred  exclusively  and  specifically  to  the  two 
rams,  i  294 '  and  '  295,'  and  Lord  Russell's  memorandum 
of  the  8th  had  reference  to  them  also.  On  the  llth  of 
September,  three  days  after,  Earl  Russell  replied  in  full 
to  Mr.  Adams's  letter  of  the  5th.  There  was  no  ques 
tion  now  of  a  duplicate  Alabama,  or  of  any  ordinary 
ship  merely  capable  of  being  subsequently  adapted  to 
warlike  purposes.  Earl  Russell  was  replying  to  a  re 
monstrance  against  the  departure  of  the  two  iron-cased 
rams  alleged  to  be  building  for  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment,  and  he  wrote  thus : — 

4  With  regard  to  the  general  duties  of  a  neutral  ac 
cording  to  international  law,  the  true  doctrine  has  been 
laid  down  repeatedly  by  Presidents  and  judges  of  emi 
nence  of  the  United  States,  and  that  doctrine  is,  that  a 
neutral  may  sell  to  either  or  both  of  two  belligerent 
parties  any  implements  or  munitions  of  war  which  such 
belligerent  may  wish  to  purchase  from  the  subjects  of 
the  neutral,  and  it  is  difficult  to  find  a  reason  why  a  ship 
that  is  to  be  used  for  warlike  purposes  is  more  an  instru 
ment  or  implement  of  war  than  cannon,  muskets,  swords, 
bayonets,  gunpowder,  and  projectiles  to  be  fired  from 
cannon  and  muskets.  A  ship  or  a  musket  may  be  sold  to 
one  belligerent  or  the  other,  and  only  ceases  to  be  neutral 
when  the  ship  is  owned,  manned,  and  employed  in  war, 
and  the  musket  is  held  by  a  soldier  and  used  for  the  pur 
pose  of  killing  his  enemy.  In  fact,  the  ship  can  never  be 
expected  'to  decide  a  war  or  a  campaign,  whereas  the  other 
things  above  mentioned  may,  by  equipping  a  large  army, 
enable  the  belligerent  which  acquires  them  to  obtain  decisive 

*  'British  Case,'  Appendix,  vol.  ii.,  p.  355. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  451 

advantages  in  war.1*  Earl  Russell,  in  continuation, 
points  out  very  forcibly  that  if  the  Confederates  had  been 
able  to  obtain  some  vessels  and  '  a  limited  supply  of 
arms  from  the  United  Kingdom,'  the  Federal  Govern 
ment  had  obtained  a  far  greater  supply  of  warlike  stores  ; 
and  then  he  adds  that  her  Majesty's  Government  had 
reasons  to  believe,  although  they  could  not  prove,  that 
agents  of  the  Federal  Government  had  been  employed  to 
engage  emigrants  to  go  to  the  United  States  for  the 
purpose  of  entering  into  the  military  service  of  the 
Federal  Government. 

The  linking  together  of  a  ship  and  so  great  a  variety 
of  contraband  goods,  as  being  equally  articles  of  legiti 
mate  trade  between  neutrals  and  either  of  two  belli 
gerents,  and  the  illustration  of  the  inefficiency  of  a  ship 
in  comparison  with  arms  to  decide  a  campaign,  which 
Earl  Russell  so  forcibly  employs  in  the  above  letter,  are 
quite  in  harmony  with  the  declarations  previously  made 
by  himself,  by  Lord  Palmers  ton,  by  the  Solicitor - 
General,  and  with  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Ex 
chequer,  on  the  right  of  a  British  subject  to  build  and 
sell,  and  a  belligerent  to  buy,  an  unarmed  ship  in 
England. 

I  think  anyone  reading  the  paragraphs  of  the  letter  I 
have  quoted  above,  knowing  that  they  were  parts  of  a 
long  argumentative  reply  to  a  demand  for  the  seizure 
of  the  rams,  would  naturally  expect  that  they  were 
intended  to  lead  up  to  and  to  justify  a  refusal  ;  but  in 
the  last  paragraph  of  the  letter  Earl  Russell  confirms  the 
promise  contained  in  his  memorandum  of  September  8th, 
and  says  that  the  vessels  will  be  detained  *  until  satis 
factory  evidence  can  be  given  as  to  their  destination.' 

For  several  months  previous  to  the  seizure  of  the  rams 

*  See  'British  Case,'  Appendix,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  358—360. 

29—2 


452  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

the  Foreign  Office  had  been  inundated  with  affidavits  by 
Mr.  Dudley,  the  Liverpool  Consul.  The  law  officers  of 
the  Crown  had  looked  with  distrust  upon  these  Consular 
statements.  They  recognised  probably  the  stereotyped 
form  with  which  they  had  become  unpleasantly  familiar 
in  the  Alexandra  case.  They  saw  the  names  of  Clarence 
R.  Yonge  and  George  Temple  Chapman  attached  to  some 
of  them,  and  doubtless  shrank  from  again  bringing  two 
such  witnesses  before  a  jury.  At  any  rate,  they  reported 
several  times  that  the  e  depositions  were  insufficient,' 
that  there  was  'no  evidence  capable  of  being  presented  to 
a  court  of  justice,'  etc. 

The  last  time  the  law  officers  were  consulted  before 
the  seizure  of  the  vessels  appears  to  have  been  on  the 
19th-20th  of  August.  The  opinion  is  signed  by  Sir 
Eoundell  Palmer,  who  was  then  the  Solicit  or- General, 
now  Lord  Selborne  and  the  Lord  Chancellor  of  England. 
He  alludes  to  the  fresh  affidavits  that  had  been  forwarded 
by  Mr.  Dudley,  and  concludes  with  the  following  final 
opinion  : — '  There  is  in  fact  no  additional  evidence,  and 
we  therefore  continue  to  think  that  the  interference  of 
the  Government,  by  seizure  of  these  vessels  or  otherwise, 
would  not  be  warranted  by  any  of  the  depositions  which 
have  been  brought  to  our  notice/* 

I  suppose  it  will  be  admitted  that  every  Government 
has  the  right  to  determine  the  standard  of  its  own 
neutrality,  subject  only  to  the  requirements  of  interna 
tional  law.  I  mean,  that  if  the  municipal  law  does  not 
confer  the  power  necessary  to  comply  with  neutral  duties 
as  prescribed  by  international  law,  the  statutes  should  be 
amended  ;  but  if  the  municipal  law  is  stronger  than  the 
law  of  nations  requires,  the  neutral  is  not  bound  to  enforce 
it  with  full  rigour. 

*  See  *  British  Case,'  Appendix,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  337,  338. 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  453 

It  is  well  known  that  the  United  States  complained 
bitterly  because  her  Majesty's  Government,  so  they 
alleged,  were  precipitate  in  acknowledging  the  Con 
federate  States  as  belligerents.  The  reply  was  in  effect 
that  the  United  States  had  themselves  both  created  and 
acknowledged  the  state  of  war,  and  that  the  British 
Government  had  only  recognised  a  condition  of  affairs 
which  already  existed.  The  South  could  have  urged  a 
valid  plea  to  belligerent  rights,  and  the  claim  could 
hardly  have  been  denied,  but  the  chief  Powers  took  the 
initiative,  and  acknowledged  the  existence  of  a  de  facto 
Government  at  Richmond,  as  soon  as  the  President  of 
the  United  States  proclaimed  a  blockade  of  the  Southern 
ports.  This  recognition  did  not,  however,  carry  with 
it  a  diplomatic  equality  with  foreign  States,  and  the 
Confederate  Government  could  not  therefore  com 
municate  its  views  nor  urge  remonstrances  in  a  direct 
official  manner. 

Great  Britain  laid  down  at  a  very  early  date  the 
rules  of  neutrality  by  which  she  would  be  guided. 
It  was  manifest  from  the  very  beginning  that  those 
rules,  even  if  administered  with  scrupulous  impartiality, 
would  give  the  United  States  an  advantage,  because 
of  their  open  ports  and  their  command  of  the  sea.  But 
the  Confederate  Government,  perceiving  the  improba 
bility  of  getting  a  modification  of  the  rules,  refrained 
from  wrangling  over  them,  and  was  content  to  use  the 
opportunities  of  supplying  the  wants  of  the  country 
to  the  best  possible  advantage.  One  of  the  chief 
requirements  of  the  south  was  ships,  not  only  for  the 
purpose  of  cruising  against  the  enemy,  but  to  run  the 
blockade. 

If  there  had  been  anything  in  the  municipal  law  of 
Great  Britain  which  prohibited  the  purchase  of  an 


454  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

unarmed  ship  for  any  subsequent  purpose  whatever, 
or  if  the  responsible  Ministers  of  the  Crown  had  stated 
specifically  that  there  was  a  difference  in  principle 
between  trading  with  a  belligerent  in  arms  and  in  ships, 
and  that  they  would  permit  the  one  and  forbid  the 
other,  the  justice  of  the  distinction  would  have  been 
doubted,  and  the  policy  questioned,  but  both  belligerents 
would  at  least  have  known  what  to  expect.  The  odds 
against  the  Confederacy,  great  enough  in  all  conscience  at 
best,  would  have  been  somewhat  increased,  but  the 
Southern  people  would  have  fought  their  battle  with 
none  the  less  spirit,  even  though  with  less  chance 
of  success.  But  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  (as  it 
stood  in  1861-65)  did  not  forbid  a  British  subject  to 
build  or  sell  a  ship  of  any  kind  to  any  mortal  man  who 
could  pay  for  her.  This  has  been  settled  by  the  decision 
of  a  court  of  law,  which  has  never  been  reversed,  and 
there  is  not  in  the  original  definition  of  their  neutral 
policy,  nor  in  the  subsequent  statements  of  Ministers, 
any  notice  or  hint  that  it  was  their  purpose  to  draw  the 
line  at  ships,  and  to  set  a  bail  upon  that  branch  of  trade 
alone.  On  the  contrary,  whether  we  examine  the 
speeches  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Solicitor- General 
in  Parliament,  or  the  despatches  of  the  Foreign  Secretary, 
we  find  one  uniform  maxim,  one  fundamental  rule  of 
action,  namely,  that  there  is  no  difference  in  principle 
between  selling  a  belligerent  rifles  and  gunpowder  or 
ships,  and  that  her  Majesty's  Government  cannot 
interfere  with  or  forbid  either. 

The  feeling  of  the  Government  on  the  above  subject 
was  never  more  plainly  expressed  than  in  Earl  EusselFs 
letter  of  September  llth,  1863,  to  Mr.  Adams,  in  which 
his  lordship  not  only  reiterates  the  general  proposition 
that  muskets  and  ships  may  be  dealt  in  alike,  but  with 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  455 

striking  particularity  he  proceeds  to  specify  a  condition 
of  affairs  in  which  rifles  and  cannon,  swords,  bayonets 
and  gunpowder,  may  be  more  useful  to  one  belligerent 
than  a  ship  to  the  other,  and  says  that  neither  a  ship  nor 
a  musket  ceases  to  be  neutral  until  it  is  in  the  possession 
of  a  belligerent  and  is  about  to  be  used  by  him  against 
his  enemy,  and  yet  in  that  very  letter  he  announces  the 
purpose  to  seize  the  alleged  Confederate  vessels. 

It  appears  from  the  printed  documents  that  the  vessels 
were  seized  by  the  order  of  her  Majesty's  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  on  his  own  authority  as  a 
Minister  of  the  Crown.  There  was  at  that  time  '  no 
evidence  capable  of  being  presented  to  a  court  of  justice  ;' 
the  seizure  was  therefore  an  act  of  the  State,  an  exercise 
of  prerogative,  and  not  a  process  of  law.  Earl  Eussell 
stated  that  the  object  of  the  seizure  was  to  detain  the 
ships  until  the  Government  could  obtain  satisfactory 
evidence  of  their  destination.  To  get  the  evidence  the 
Government  took  a  great  deal  of  trouble,  and  must  have 
incurred  no  little  expense.  A  special  Commission  was 
sent  to  Egypt  to  inquire  whether  the  Viceroy,  Ismail 
Pasha,  had  really  ordered  Messrs.  Bravay  to  build  two 
armour-cased  vessels  for  him  in  Europe ;  and  I  may 
state  at  once  that  the  Viceroy  said  he  had  not.  This 
was  all  the  evidence  the  Government  ever  did  get,  and 
no  legal  proceedings  wrere  ever  taken  against  either  the 
Messrs.  Bravay  or  Messrs.  Laird,  except  the  filing  of  the 
'  information/  But  was  her  Majesty's  Government  under 
any  obligation  to  go  to  all  this  trouble  and  expense  to 
inquire  into  the  business  relations  of  a  French  mercantile 
house  and  a  foreign  Government  ?  Was  it  not  perfectly 
legal  for  Messrs.  Bravay,  being  French  subjects,  and 
their  country  at  peace  with  both  belligerents  and  with 
Great  Britain,  to  contract  for  any  ships  they  liked  in 


456  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

England  ?  and  did  it  matter  at  all,  as  a  question  of  law, 
what  they  intended  to  do  with  them  after  taking  them 
away  from  Liverpool  ?  Is  it  to  be  understood  that  the 
precedent  is  now  established  that  whenever  Great 
Britain  is  a  neutral  in  all  future  wars,  the  Government 
will  undertake  to  compel  every  shipbuilder  in  the 
kingdom  to  report  who  he  is  working  for,  and  will  then 
require  the  person,  even  though  a  neutral  foreigner,  to 
prove  what  he  is  going  to  do  with  the  ship  ?  If  this  is  so, 
the  Consuls  of  the  belligerents  will  give  her  Majesty's 
Foreign  Office  more  work  than  any  ordinary  staff  can 
accomplish. 

When  the  arrangements  were  made  to  sell  the  two 
rams  to  Messrs.  Bravay,  there  was  no  necessity  for 
manufacturing  any  plea  of  a  pretended  contract  with  the 
Yiceroy  of  Egypt.  It  was  well  known  both  in  Paris 
and  in  Alexandria,  and  it  was  known  to  the  French 
Government,  that  the  firm  had  been  for  years  in  business 
relations  with  the  Egyptian  Government,  and  that  they 
had  executed  large  contracts  for  the  Viceroy  in  France. 
The  letters  from  M.  Franqois  Bravay  respecting  the  com 
missions  he  had  undertaken  on  account  of  the  Yiceroy, 
and  the  reply  of  the  Paris  house,  quoted  in  a  previous 
part  of  this  chapter,  were  written  months  before  any 
arrangement  in  respect  to  the  rarns  at  Liverpool  was 
contemplated,  and  therefore  could  not  have  been  pre 
pared  as  a  cover  for  that  transaction.  Indeed,  at  the 
date  of  those  letters  neither  Mr.  Slidell  nor  I  knew  any 
thing  whatever  of  Messrs.  Bravay,  and  had  never  met 
any  member  of  the  firm.  It  is  well  known  in  Europe 
that  his  Highness  Ismail  Pasha,  and  his  predecessor, 
Said  Pasha,  had  very  large  and  peculiar  dealings  with 
private  persons  in  England  and  France,  and  that  they 
both  made  efforts  to  add  to  their  military  and  naval 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  457 

strength  secretly,  wishing*  for  political  reasons  to  avoid 
the  interference  or  inquisitive  supervision  of  the  Sublime 
Porte. 

When  the  Messrs.  Laird  were  requested  to  sell  the 
ships,  they  were  open,  of  course,  to  all  practicable  offers, 
and  they  looked  about  for  a  purchaser,  just  as  any  other 
business  men  would  have  done  under  the  same  circum 
stances.  They  knew  that  the  sale  of  the  ships  would 
involve  the  release  of  one  contractor,  with  whose 
financial  position  they  were  satisfied,  and  the  sub 
stitution  of  another,  as  to  whose  commercial  credit  they 
must  be  assured.  Any  ship-builder  in  England  would 
have  treated  the  matter  in  this  way,  and  no  other.  When 
the  Messrs.  Bravay  came  forward  to  buy  the  ships,  it  is 
not  probable  that  Messrs.  Laird  inquired  particularly  into 
the  precise  nature  of  their  dealings  with  the  Viceroy. 
It  did  not  concern  them  to  know  whether  the  '  order ' 
from  the  Egyptian  Government  was  a  specific  contract 
in  writing  or  not ;  I  do  not  even  know  whether  they 
asked  anything  about  it.  As  prudent  business  men, 
they  inquired  into  the  financial  position  of  the  Messrs. 
Bravay,  and,  being  satisfied  with  the  security  they  could 
give  for  the  payment  of  the  two  ships,  they  reported 
the  offer  and  effected  the  sale.  The  whole  trans 
action  was  carried  out  in  a  perfectly  legal  way,  and  the 
ships  became  the  absolute  property  of  the  Messrs. 
Bravay.  No  process  of  law  could  have  destroyed  their 
title.  Of  this  we  were  assured  by  eminent  counsel. 
They  made  all  subsequent  payments,  and  when  Her 
Majesty's  Government  called  upon  Messrs.  Laird  to  say 
for  whom  they  were  building  the  ships,  they  replied  Tor 
Messrs.  A.  Bravay  and  Co.,  No.  6,  Rue  de  Londres, 
Paris.' 

The   Viceroy   had  refrained  from  making  a  specific 


458  THE  SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE 

contract  in  writing  for  any  ships  *  for  political  reasons/ 
When  brought  to  the  ordeal  of  a  formal  diplomatic 
inquiry,  he  repudiated  the  transaction  for  the  same 
reasons ;  but  even  though  he  thus  denied  the  validity  of 
the  alleged  commission  to  M.  Bravay,  how  could  that 
destroy  the  right  of  the  Paris  firm  to  the  property  which 
they  held  by  a  clear,  indisputable  title  in  England  ?  If 
a  neutral  has  the  right  to  sell  a  rifle  or  a  ship  to  a 
belligerent,  and  her  Majesty's  Ministers  and  the  Court 
of  Exchequer  have  both  declared  that  he  has,  why  may 
not  a  neutral  buy  from  another  neutral  a  rifle  or  a  ship 
and  sell  either  or  both  of  them  afterwards  to  a  belligerent 
for  a  profit  ? 

I  think  anyone  who  examines  this  case  fairly  upon 
the  facts  will  be  driven  to  acknowledge,  even  if  he  does 
not  willingly  admit,  that  in  seizing  the  two  rams  at 
Birkenhead,  and  in  bringing  about  a  forced  sale  to  the 
British  Admiralty,  Earl  Russell  departed  from  the  rules 
of  neutrality  laid  down  by  her  Majesty's  Government, 
from  the  principles  often  affirmed  by  himself,  and  from 
the  judgment  of  a  competent  court,  and  that  he  applied 
the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  not  merely  to  prevent  the 
danger  of  hostile  collision,  or  an  infringement  of  law 
within  the  kingdom,  which  the  Lord  Chief  Baron 
said  was  its  intent,  but  so  as  to  afford  protection  to 
a  belligerent,  which  he  distinctly  said  was  not  the 
intent. 

I  have  not  pretended  to.  discuss  this  question  with 
reference  to  international  law  as  commonly  understood, 
and  I  do  not  bring  it  forward  as  a  matter  of  complaint 
on  behalf  of  the  late  Confederate  States.  Arguments 
upon  dead  issues  cannot  change  results  or  moderate  past 
disappointments.  My  whole  and  only  purpose  in  this 
narrative  is  to  demonstrate  that  the  Confederate  Govern- 


CONFEDERATE  STATES  IN  EUROPE.  459 

ment,  in  the  effort  to  supply  its  wants  in  England 
during  the  Civil  War,  acted  with  due  circumspection, 
and  endeavoured  to  conform  to  the  laws  of  the  realm 
and  to  the  principles  of  neutrality  as  they  were  ex 
pounded  by  the  highest  constituted  authorities  in  the 
kingdom. 

My  acquaintance  with  the  Messrs.  Bravay  began  and 
ended  with  the  transaction  described  in  this  chapter. 
I  have  never  seen  a  member  of  the  firm  since.     Mr. 
Adams,  in  one  of  his  strongly  worded  letters  on  the 
subject,  speaks  of  M.  Bravay  as  '  a  French  commercial 
adventurer,  proved  to  have  been  capable  of  prevarica 
tion,  if  not  of  absolute  falsehood.'     As  a  matter  of  fact, 
M.  Bravay  was  not  placed  in  a  position  requiring  him 
to   prevaricate,    and   was    certainly   not   tested   to   the 
extreme  point  insinuated  by  Mr.  Adams.     He  exhibited 
proof  of  his  large  dealings  with  the  Viceroy,  and  showed 
the  correspondence  with  reference  to  the  building  of  two 
ships,  merely  as  evidence  that  he  could  undertake  a  large 
transaction.     I  think  no  one  who  was  conversant  with 
the  circumstances   would   have   doubted  that   he  was 
telling  the  truth  in  the  statement  then  made,  and  I  have 
never  heard  of  his  making  any  other.     The  firm  per 
formed  their  agreement  with  Mr.  Slidell  and  me  with 
perfect  good  faith  as  regards  all  monetary  transactions, 
and   unhesitatingly   waived   the  stipulated  commission 
when  the  enterprise  failed.     The  only  way  in  which  it 
could  possibly  be  said  that  they  misled  us  was  in  this 
respect,  that  they  were  very  sanguine  that  the  Viceroy 
would  not  deny  the  verbal  order  for  the  ships,  and  that 
even  if  he  did,  then,  as  French  subjects,  they  could  get 
the  vessels  out  of  England  and  take  them  to  a  French 
port.    In  these  respects  they  failed  both  in  their  expecta 
tions  and  in  their  promises ;  but  there  was  a  political 


460    SECRET  SERVICE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES. 

element  in  the  transaction  which  helped  to  give  them 
confidence  and  to  mislead  us ;  and  there  was  another 
disappointment  in  store  for  the  Confederate  Government 
emanating  from  the  same  political  source,  which  will  be 
fully  explained  in  another  chapter. 


END    OF   VOL.    I. 


BILLING   AND   SONS,    PRINTERS,    GUILDFORD   AND   LONDON. 


